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Abstract
The Dialogics of Satire: Foci and Faultlines in Orwell's Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four
This thesis uses Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, as well as
postmodernism, to open up faultlines in satire, and to explore and challenge
various perceptions and discourses surrounding and related to it. Both
dialogism and postmodernism are used to suggest fresh approaches to satire,
by repositioning it in relation to other discourses and reframing it as a
complex dynamic, rather than a closed and inflexible system. Chapter 1 of the
thesis opens with an historical survey of the beginnings and subsequent
development of satire. It also contains a general discussion of the nature of
satiric strategies and opens the door for the incorporation of postmodern
perspectives into the argument. Chapter 2 contrasts the issues of morality
and re-presentation in satire, arguing that satirists do not simply invite their
audience to condemn, but offer them an opportunity to discover alternative
worlds. The affinity between satire and postmodernism is emphasised by the
postmodern predilection for modes highly favoured by satire: allegory, parody
and fantasy. In Chapter 3 the issue of language and its referents is explored,
starting with Saussure's theory of how the signifier and the signified function.
It is argued that satire has never respected this fixed relationship, and that it
is in this respect similar to deconstruction. The last part of the chapter is
devoted to examining four key socio-political discourses - psychoanalysis,
ideology, propaganda and political myth - in relation to satire. These four
discourses are, like satire, intent on influencing the perceptions which people
have of the world. The intention in juxtaposing these discourses is to create a
dialogic process which will throw a fresh light on all of them, including satire
itself. The four socio-political discourses named above play an important part
in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, and are relevant to the subsequent
discussion of these novels. Chapter 4 consists of a detailed discussion of
Animal Farm, in which the various layers comprising the work are examined.
The satirical aspects of the novel are closely related to the fabular and fairy
tale elements which are an important part of its constitution. These elements
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or levels are juxtaposed with the historical details alluded to continuously in
Animal Farm and indicate its close concern with the world outside the novel.
Chapter 5 consists of a detailed exploration of Nineteen Eighty-Four, which is
illuminated by a process of dialogism between the modernist ideology from
which the novel springs and the postmodern perspective introduced into the
thesis, as well as the four socio-political discourses mentioned earlier. The
main postmodern theories used in this chapter are those of Foucault. The last
section of the thesis demonstrates how Orwell's personal experience drives
his satire, and relates this specifically to a discussion of utopia / dystopia in
satire.
Opsomming
Die Dialogiek van Satire: Fokuspunte en Breuke in Orwell se Animal
Farm en Nineteen Eighty-Four
Hierdie proefskrif maak gebruik van Mikhail Bakhtin se teorie van dialogisme,
sowel as die postmodernisme, om die breuke in satire bloot te le, en om die
verskillende persepsies en diskoerse wat verband hou met die satire te
ondersoek en te bevraagteken. Beide die dialogisme en die postmodernisme
word gebruik om nuwe perspektiewe op satire te open, deur dit te
herposisioneer in verhouding tot ander diskoerse en dit voor te stel in terme
van 'n komplekse dinamika eerder as 'n geslote en onbuigsame sisteem. Die
eerste hoofstuk van die proefskrif begin met 'n historiese oorsig van die
oorspronge en daaropvolgende ontwikkeling van satire. Dit omvat ook 'n
algemene bespreking van die aard van satiriese strateqiee en open die
moontlikheid om postmodernistiese perspektiewe in die argument te
integreer. Hoofstuk 2 kontrasteer die kwessies van moraliteit en representasie
in satire met mekaar; daar word geargumenteer dat satirici nie net hulle
gehore uitnooi om te veroordeel nie, maar hulle die geleentheid gee om
alternatiewe werelde te ontdek. Die verwantskap tussen satire en
postmodernisme word benadruk deur die postmodernisme se voorliefde vir
die modi waaraan die satire so dikwels voorkeur gee: allegorie, parodie en
fantasie. In hoofstuk 3 word die kwessie van taal en referensialiteit
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ondersoek, beginnende by Saussure se teorie oor die funksionering van die
betekenaar en die betekende. Daar word geargumenteer dat satire nog nooit
die vaste verhouding tussen betekenaar en betekende eerbiedig het nie, en
dat dit in hierdie opsig verwant is aan die dekonstruksie. Die laaste gedeelte
van die hoofstuk word gewy aan 'n ondersoek van vier sentrale sosio-politiese
diskoerse - psigoanalise, ideologie, propaganda en politieke mitologie - in
verhouding met satire. Hierdie vier diskoerse is, soos satire, daarop ingestel
om mense se persepsies/opvattings van die. wereld te verander. Die
doelstelling met die jukstaposisie van hierdie diskoerse is die skep van 'n
dialogiese proses wat al vier hierdie diskoerse, insluitende satire, in 'n nuwe
lig sal stel. Die genoemde sosio-politiese diskoerse speel 'n belangrike rol in
Animal Farm en Nineteen Eighty-Four, en is relevant vir die daaropvolgende
bespreking van die romans. Hoofstuk 4 bestaan uit 'n gedetailleerde
bespreking van Animal Farm, waarin daar ondersoek ingestel word na die
verskillende lae waaruit die roman bestaan. Die satiriese aspekte van die
roman word in noue verband gebring met die fabulere en die feeverhaal-
elemente wat so 'n belangrike deel uitmaak van die roman se samestelling.
Hierdie elemente of vlakke word gejukstaponeer met die historiese detail
waarna daar deurlopend in Animal Farm verwys word en wat die noue
bemoeienis met die wereld buite die roman aandui. Hoofstuk 5 bestaan uit 'n
intensiewe ondersoek van Nineteen Eighty-Four, wat belig word deur 'n
proses van dialogisme tussen die modernistiese ideologie waaruit die roman
spruit en die postmodernistiese perspektiewe wat in die proefskrif ingevoer
word. Die belangrikste postmodernistiese teoriee wat in hierdie hoofstuk
gebruik word, is die van Foucault. Die laaste afdeling van die proefskrif
demonstreer hoedat Orwell se persoonlike ervaring bepalend is vir sy satire
en bring dit spesifiek in verband met 'n bespreking van utopie/distopie in
satire.
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In fact, the spiritual climate surrounding the modernist artist
is ambivalent: it is above all exhilarating and exalting, because
of the momentum that mankind seemed to be gaining and
because of the endless prospects that seemed to open up, but
at the same time it is also frustrating, frightening and alienating,
because of the discrepancy which is more and more acutely
felt to exist between (spiritual) man and (technological) civilization.
Walter Gobbers ("Modernism, Modernity and the Avant-Garde: A
Bilingual Introduction," 9)
But a book is made to be used in ways not defined by its
writer. The more new, possible or unexpected uses there
are, the happier I shall be. All my books ... are, if you like, like
little tool-boxes. If people want to open them, to use this
sentence or that idea as a screwdriver or spanner to short-
circuit, discredit or smash systems of power, including
eventually those from which my books have emerged ... so
much the better!
Michel Foucault (Power, Truth, Strategy, 115)
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Introduction
This thesis uses Bahktin's theory of dialogism, in conjunction with
postmodernism, to open up faultlines in satire, and to explore and challenge
various discourses related to satire. Both dialogism and postmodernism are
used to suggest new views on satire, by repositioning it in relation to other
discourses and reframing it as a complex dynamic, rather than a closed and
inflexible system. Satirists themselves emerge as ambiguous figures,
associated with liminality and the alienation of audiences from the familiar in
life. At times, the thesis subjects the reputation and art of Orwell to
deconstruction as well, in the spirit of Randolph Quirk's warning about "the
undue reverence in which [Orwell] is held as a serious thinker on social and
linguistic matters." 1
The thesis makes implicit and explicit use of Bakhtin's notions of
heteroglossia and dialogism, and embraces his views on language. Like
Bakhtin, it also stresses the importance of flexibility in the way the world is
envisaged, since this reflects the principles and practice of both satire and
postmodernism (which is associated with satire in this thesis). Bakhtin has a
high regard for the role of traditional"parodic-travestying forms," satire among
them, since such forms are sites of heteroglossia, which creates dialogism.
He attributes particularly dynamic dialogic powers to these forms from their
inception:
They liberated the object from the power of language in
which it had become entangled as if in a net; they destroyed
the homogenizing power of the direct word, destroyed the
thick walls that had imprisoned consciousness within its own
discourse .... Language is transformed from the absolute
dogma it had been within the narrow framework of a sealed-off
and impermeable monoglossia into a working hypothesis for
1 Randolph Quirk, "Natural Language and Orwellian Intervention," The English Language
Today, ed. Sidney Greenbaum (Oxford: Pergamon, 1985) 48.
1
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comprehending and expressing reality. 2
For Bakhtin, maverick forms such as satire and parody are part of what he
calls "the carnivalesque" - powerful creators of heteroglossia, having a
catalytic force which involves formerly embedded discourses (monoglossia) in
a process of creative dialogue. The effect of both heteroglossia and satire is
to create shifts in language, dissolve rigid categories and boundaries, and
establish alternative worlds, which interact in a dialogic way with the
audience's own internal worlds. This thesis exploits the dialogism created by
satire and postmodernism, as well as that created between them, but also
sets out to create a pattern of dialogism involving certain other discourses
such as propaganda, psychiatry, ideology and political myth - the intention
being to engage them with satire in a process of mutual exploration. Bakhtin
himself acknowledges the power of heteroglot forms in relation to various
socio-political discourses, citing the role of such forms in the death of the
"unitary and totalizing" Greek national myth, 3 and bemoaning the "[monoglot]
propagandizing impulse [which] sometimes leads to a narrowing-down of
heteroglot social consciousness [and] a radical concretization of dialogization
(almost always undertaken in the service of a polemic)." 4 Orwell, in Animal
Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, subjects such socio-political discourse to the
heteroglot power of satire, so that, in Bakhtin's words, these "socio-ideological
belief systems ... are unmasked and destroyed as something false,
hypocritical, greedy, limited, narrowly rationalistic, inadequate to reality." 5
The chapters on Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four discuss these novels
by means of a technique of dialogism, in this case constructing heteroglot
forms by juxtaposing the text of the novels with other "voices," such as
historical parallels, aspects of Orwell's biography, psychological viewpoints,
postmodern theory and socio-political discourses. Throughout the thesis,
there is a continuous attempt to open up new views on satire, by exploring,
2 M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays by M.M. Bakhtin, trans Caryl Emerson
and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: U of Texas P, 1981) 60,61.
3 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 65
4 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 283.
5 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 311-12.
2
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reframing and redefining it, by means of the dynamics of postmodernism and
the dialogical method. This includes a continuous process of dialogism
between satire and the society within which it operates, and even between
satirists and the texts they create. As Bogel (one of the few critics on satire
who take a fully provisional stance) says, "Reading satire is not so much
about finding a position we can plug ourselves into as about exploring the
complexity of what it means to take a position." 6 Griffin, too, sees satire as an
exploratory form which aims "to question, to challenge orthodoxy, to induce
reflection, to awaken awareness, to enable us to see contradictions, and to
discover human limits." 7
This thesis views the satirist always as a socially-concerned but highly
marginal figure, who exploits that marginality in order to gain distance from
society and comment on it, while relatively unfettered by a fixed place in it.
Bakhtin speaks in similar terms of such figures as the rogue, the clown and
the fool - the bearers and mediators of parodic-travestying heteroglot forms
who have access to particular privileges:
[They have] the right to be 'other' in this world, the right
not to make common cause with any single one of the
existing categories that life makes available; none of these
categories quite suits them, they see the underside and
the falseness of every situation. 8
The satirist is often a clown or a "fool" (or both) - and is (from society's point
of view) always suspected of being a rogue. The suspicion that satirists live
under derives from their being the ideological and emotional equivalent of
homeless vagabonds, who are always seen as a threat to the peace and
contentment of an established society. As argued later in this thesis, the
6 Frederic V. Bagel, "The Difference Satire Makes: Reading Swift's Poems," Theorizing Satire
Essays in Literary Criticism, eds. Brian A. Connery and Kirk Combe ( New York St. Martin's
Press, 1995) 52.
7 Dustin Griffin, "Satire as an Exploratory Form," Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 265 (1989): 1246.
B Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 159.
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desire to be "other" and to evade categories is a basic quality of the satirist. 9
These are surely some of the qualities that have led a critic such as Rai to say
that with writing "so subtly ingratiating as Orwell's, criticism must become an
act of violence, delicate or brutal as the need arises, but determined anyway
to seize that which the work itself is reluctant to yield .... " 10 Satire, in its
approach to other texts or to socio-political issues, is anything but
domesticated, particularly the polemical kind of satire which Orwell produced.
This thesis views satire itself as a primarily interrogative form which habitually
generates dialogue with society, opening up to question the apparently solid
and certain texture of social and political life, in a way which is not
prescriptive, though also not entirely free of agendas. It is argued that
postmodernism and satire have certain similarities, in their tendency to initiate
sceptical and interrogatory processes, and postmodernism is thus seen here
as allied to satire. Yet postmodernism is also used to question certain aspects
of Orwell's ideology, since, particularly in the last chapters, one facet of the
methodology of the thesis is to expound Orwell's views, but set them side by
side with other views on the same issues, encouraging a greater degree of
the interrogatory and dialogic than Orwell seems to have anticipated. This
process consciously utilises the postmodern ethos, with its subversive stance
and insistence on the indeterminacy and pluralist nature of truth, to suggest
various views on issues such as history, language and power which challenge
Orwell's implicit modernist assumptions and conclusions. Points made in this
way encourage the dialogic mode, since postmodern terms are not finite: they
are themselves shifting and "problematized" (i.e. rendered problematic),
always open to challenge (though themselves always challenging), as
opposed to the modernist certainty which sees language, science, history and
truth as fixed, and views progress as a teleological process." Nowotny
9 See 102 below.
10 Alok Rai, Orwell and the Politics of Despair: A Critical Study of the Writings of George
Orwell (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988) 9.
11 According to Kate Soper in "Feminism, Humanism, Postmodernism," Feminisms, eds.
Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), "Postmodernist argument... has
issued a number of challenges: to the idea that we can continue to think, write and speak of
our culture as representing a continuous development and progress; to the idea that humanity
is proceeding towards a telos of 'emancipation' and 'self-realization' .... " (286)
4
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believes that "modern science ... was quickly transformed into a rational as
well as a utopian vehicle, charged to bring about a social world constructed in
its image." 12 Part of the difference between modernism and postmodernism
is that the latter usually espouses negotiable and interrogatory views,
whereas the former is more attracted to absolute definitions. This thesis also
uses both postmodernism and dialogism to highlight the disjunction between
the modernist ideology of Orwell and his more radical satiric practice. This is a
creative disjunction, though, since it emphasises that Orwell was not smug in
his modernism: he was a dissatisfied and fragmented figure who used satire
to objectify and confront aspects of his personal fragmentation - the latter a
particularly modernist issue.
Modernist literature, in general, saw the entire world as fragmented, but
concentrated on meticulously rendering this fragmented world and attempting
to give it some kind of coherence." The non-literary manifestation of
modernism was conservative (particularly in comparison to postmodernism),
with a great deal of faith in technoloqy." a lack of genuine political
democracy" and a belief (which postmodernists generally trace back to the
period of the Enlightenment) that social and scientific progress would
inevitably bring improvements to human life. 16 Postmodernism, with its more
radical approach, questions these utopian ideals, is suspicious of stasis and
encourages fragmentation - delights in it, even - embracing the fragments
12 Helga Nowotny, "Science and Utopia: On the Social Ordering of the Future," Nineteen
Eighty-Four: Science Between Utopia and Dystopia, eds. Everett Mendelsohn and Helga
Nowotny (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984) 7.
13 See, for example, Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London Routledge,
1989) 108.
14 Barry Smart, Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies (London: Routledge, 1992)
says that "What seems to distinguish the modern age is the strong conviction that a
progressive growth of scientific knowledge will uncover the natural order of things, making
possible the construction of technologies through which control might be exercised over the
course of the development of events." (62)
15 Both Stalinism and Nazism are systems associated with modernism David Daiches,
"Politics and the Literary Imagination," Liberations. New Essays on the Humanities and
Revolution, ed. Ihab Hassan (Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1971) speaks of
modernism's "reactionary political vision of an ideal order." (110)
16 JOrgen Habermas, "Modernity - An Incomplete Project," Postmodernism: A Reader, ed.
Thomas Docherty ( New York: HarvesterlWheatsheaf, 1993) speaks approvingly of the
"project of modernity formulated ... by the philosophers of the Enlightenment [who believed
that] the arts and science would promote ... moral progress, the justice of institutions and even
the happiness of human beings. The twentieth century has shattered this optimism" (103)
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without seeking fixed meaning In them, while allowing them to form a
continuously changing picture. Postmodernism is characterised by cultural
subversion - the revelation and questioning of (fixed) hegemonic discourses; 17
it is also concerned with ontology (ways of being in the world), as opposed to
modernism's primary concern with epistemology (ways of knowing the
world)." There are, of course, various versions of postmodernism and
normally, when this thesis refers to postmodernism, it has in mind the core of
elements which most postmodernisms have in common, despite their
differences. There are also various alternative views of modernism (for
example that of Bloom), which give a much more positive view of it. However,
it should be noted that this thesis does not claim to be exhaustive in such
matters, and that it defines modernism over and against postmodernism. It
takes its cue from satire itself, and focuses on being polemical and dialogic -
in the questioning and even aggressive way posited by Bakhtin. For him,
dialogism itself was an aggressive manifestation, since he saw heteroglossia
as not just a mixture of languages: it is a dialogue of languages, which
develops an energy of its own:
[In certain areas of heteroglossia,] the collision and
interaction of languages is especially powerful. ... In
this intense struggle, boundaries are drawn with new
sharpness and simultaneously erased with new ease; it is
sometimes impossible to establish where they have been
erased or where certain of the warring parties have already
crossed over into alien territory. 19
Orwell is the primary satirist dealt with in this thesis, though in the pages that
follow he is occasionally paired with Swift for purposes of discussion. Orwell
17 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, foreword
Fredric Jameson, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis U of
Minnesota P, 1979) defines postmodernism as "incredulity towards metanarratives." (xxiv)
18 According to Peter Brooker, ed., Modernism / Postmodernism (London: Longman, 1992),
the "shift from questions of epistemology (ways of knowing) to ontology (ways of being and
acting in the world) becomes then an expression of what some see as fundamental in the very
transition to postmodernism." (20-1)
19 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 418.
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and Swift have a demonstrable affinity, which can be seen in Orwell's essay
on Swift, in which he declares his debt to him, as well as the example of
Animal Farm, which clearly owes much of its inspiration to the fourth book of
Gulliver's Travels. In addition, both writers were journalists and polemicists,
deeply involved in political issues, and for both language was a matter of the
deepest importance. Both Swift and Orwell were (to use Orwell's phrase)
"Tory anarchists," that is they had a conservative and a radical side, equally
marked, and they shared a passionate commitment to reason and fair-
dealing. In fact, some critics regard a strong conservative streak as part of the
make-up of many satirists." Finally, Orwell lived ~ life of self-imposed
emotional exile (in the end it was literal exile) from his society, 21 which is akin
to the situation of Swift, who was in exile in Ireland for much of his life. This
kind of congruence is stressed by Koestler, who believes that "future
historians of literature will regard Orwell as a kind of missing link between
Kafka and Swift." 22
. The first three chapters of this thesis are devoted to the introduction and
discussion of the issues, approaches and terminology to be utilised in the last
two chapters, which deal with two novels by George Orwell: Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Postmodernism is one of the implicit forces that drive
this thesis, frequently providing approaches for interrogating discourses in a
questing and questioning spirit. Postmodern theories, like satire, create new
worlds for their audience and they both also make creative use of allegory
and parody. The differences between satire and postmodernism are equally
important, and the dialectic between them will provide creative energy as the
thesis progresses. Chapter 1 opens with a detailed historical perspective on
the beginnings and subsequent development of satire. It also contains a
general discussion of the nature of the satirist, as well as satiric strategies and
20 See, for example, Edward W. Rosenheim Jr., Swift ami the Satirist's Art (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1963) 185 and Robert C. Elliott, The Power of Satire: Magic, Ritual and Art
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996)266-74.
21 Raymond Williams, "George Orwell," Culture and Society 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia
UP, 1958) 289-91.
22 Arthur Koestler, "A Rebel's Progress: To George Orwell's Death," The Trail of the Dinosaur
and Other Essays (New York: Macmillan, 1947) 104.
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aims, and opens the door for the later incorporation of postmodern issues and
practice into the argument. The focus is on exploring satire rather than
attempting to define it in absolute terms, since satirical forms are marked by a
multifariousness that eludes absolute definition.
Chapter 2 takes the discussion much further, in detailing the interaction
between the satirist and society. It contrasts the issues of morality and re-
presentation in satire, arguing that satirists offer their audience an opportunity
to discover alternative worlds or versions of "reality," though satire also has a
certain didactic element to it. The affinity between satire and postmodernism
is again emphasised by pointing to the interrogative stance that the two share,
as well as the common ground created by the postmodern predilection for
modes highly favoured by satire: allegory, parody and fantasy.
In Chapter 3 the issue of language and its referents is explored, starting with
Saussure's theory of how the signifier and the signified function. It is argued
that satire has never respected this fixed relationship, and that it is in this
respect similar to deconstruction - an essential strategy of postmodernism.
The theories of the Russian formalists are examined, and it is shown how
what they preach is very much what satire practises, including especially the
element of aggression which is so apparent in so much satire. In fact,
aggression is present in deconstruction, even if it is there not as openly
menacing as it is in satire, manifesting itself instead as a mischievous
intention to manufacture creative confusion. The last part of this chapter is
devoted to examining four key socio-political discourses - psychoanalysis,
ideology, propaganda and political myth - in relation to satire. The term
"socio-political" here is not intended to suggest that satire is, by contrast, free
from a concern with either society in general or politics in particular, but rather
that satire is primarily a literary discourse - which the others are not. Satire's
being set in this thesis among such non-literary discourses as
psychoanalysis, ideology, propaganda and political myth signals a refusal to
separate, in practice, discourses which are literary from those which are not.
Psychoanalysis is named as a socio-political discourse on the grounds that it
8
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has been used for political purposes ("insanity" has long been used as
grounds for the incarceration of certain kinds of marginalised people, most
notably, but by no means only, by the former Soviet Union), as well as the
postmodern argument that it is not innocent of either social or political
agendas. 23 These four discourses are, like satire, intimately concerned with
language, as well as intent on working with the perceptions of the world which
people have and, perhaps, changing them. The intention in juxtaposing all
these discourses is to create a dialogic process which will allow the
deconstructive energy typically generated by dialogism to cast a fresh light on
them all, not least on satire itself. The four socio-political discourses named
above play an important part in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, and
will be relevant to the subsequent discussion of these novels.
Chapter 4 consists of a detailed exploration of Animal Farm, in which the
various layers comprising the work are examined. The satirical aspects of the
novel are closely related to the fabular and fairy tale elements which are an
important part of its constitution. These elements or levels are juxtaposed with
the historical details which are alluded to continuously in Animal Farm and
indicate its close concern with the world outside the novel. The juxtaposition
of various levels in a text, resulting in a dialogue between them, is central to
any allegory. The allegorical nature of Animal Farm provides a framework for
the contrasting levels of both meaning and emotion with which Orwell is
working. For example, the amusing in Animal Farm is, in fact, never very far
from the horrifying, though the reader is also made aware of the banality
which exists side-by-side with the many appalling examples of evil in the
novel. The degree of dialogism achieved here is high.
Chapter 5 consists of a detailed exploration of Nineteen Eighty-Four, which is
strongly illuminated by the process of dialogism between the modernist
ideology from which the novel springs and the postmodernist outlook
introduced into the thesis, as well as the four socio-political discourses
discussed earlier .. Chief among the postmodern theories used in this chapter
23 See 72-3 below.
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are those of Foucault. The issues of power and language are examined from
a psychological, a philosophical and a political point of view. The issue of
connivance is examined in relation to whether the people of Oceania have
passively accepted the oppression represented by Big Brother, or whether
they are making a willed effort to conform to the system of Ingsoc, wholly or
partly out of fear. This chapter ends by emphasising how the personal views
of the satirist pervade his / her satire, and relates this specifically to a
discussion of utopia / dystopia in Orwell's satire. As Orwell said of W.B.
Yeats, "a writer's personal beliefs are not excrescences to be laughed away,
but something that will leave their mark even on the smallest detail of his
work." 24
While it cannot be denied that much of literature has points of reference in the
world outside the text, this thesis treats satire as primarily a literary (though
sometimes a performed) discourse which is grounded in that world in a
particularly marked and unique way. This is because satire is almost always a
comment on contemporary people and events, and this diminishes the usual
distance between the text and the concrete, historical world to which it refers.
This point is strengthened by the close connection between satire and utopia,
which habitually forms one of the unspoken bases of satire and which shares
satire's particular connection with an historical world:
Utopian and anti-utopian works are, by convention in practice
(textually and discursively), centrifugal; their focus, the locus of
their argument, is outside the text. They function with the
readers' own society as the figure implied in the text and as their
integrating feature; that is, their coherence is not internal, but a
function of their constant dialectical movement between the
figure (the dystopian society) constructed in the text and the
figure of the writer's and contemporary reader's own society
24 Orwell, George, "W.B. Yeats," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London:
Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 276.
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implied in the text. 25
It is for this reason that in Chapters 4 and 5 history becomes an issue, since
the two satirical novels being discussed have a factual basis. The
contemporary nature of satire, together with its involvement in the well-being
of society, gives it an interest which is broadly political, in that it is concerned
with the functioning of the polis - hence Rosenheim's suggestion that satire
breaks down the boundaries between literary criticism and historical
scholarship. 26 In addition, there is the importance of Orwell's personal history,
elements of which figure in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
Specifically, Orwell's avowed antagonism to Stalinist communism, precipitated
by his experiences in the Spanish Civil War, is a crucial aspect of Animal
Farm. As for Nineteen Eighty-Four, the discussion of this novel focuses
towards the end of Chapter 5 on the significance of Orwell's religious views,
as well as some other key autobiographical elements. The conscious and
unconscious use of personal material - often exaggerated or even fabricated -
can be found in the work of satirists as different as Woody Allen, Mark Banks,
Jonathan Swift and Robert Kirby. The inclusion of all these various elements
in this thesis highlights the elusiveness (and allusiveness) of satire - its refusal
to become a genre, with definable elements and limits. Because satire is so
diverse and can include, inter alia, both written and performed forms as well
as works of art, reference is often made in this thesis to the audience, rather
than the readers, of satire.
Satire has an idiosyncratic quality which gives it a liminal and marginal status,
associated with a radical disrespect for both legitimate and (especially)
illegitimate forms of power. In fact, satire revels in what Bakhtin calls the
carnivalesque - informal forms which threaten stable structures by means of
dialogism and mock duly constituted authority. This is a marked tendency of
postmodernism and is one indication of how the postmodern outlook is part of
the fabric of this thesis - an outlook which rejects modernist notions of
25 Anne Cranny-Francis, "Nineteen Eighty-Four in 1984 in 1989: Raymond Williams and
George Orwell," Southern Review 22.2 (1989): 155.
26 Rosenheim, 32-33.
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epistemology, as well as the utopian myths of science, technology, progress
and information. Orwell attacked these, though this thesis proposes that his
reason was disappointment at their failure, rather than a rejection of these
ideals themselves. The Enlightenment I modernist view had more than its
share of utopian thinking, as suggested by Kumar when speaking of modern
anti-utopian writers: "They believed, often passionately, in equality, science
and reason. This is as plain in the early anti-utopian Wells as in Huxley and
Wells. Not the principles of progress themselves, but their use and practice,
was what dismayed and outraged them." 27 As mentioned earlier, there is a
significant disjunction between Orwell's ideological stance and his satirical
praxis, the former being often conservative, and the latter much more radical.
Satire is seen in this thesis as having a greater freedom and individuality than
overtly political discourses, but as paying for this freedom by having less real
power than those discourses. The discussion of propaganda, ideology and
political myth takes its cue from Orwell, as well as various theorists in these
fields, and presents these discourses as harmful but, in each case, it also
presents other important views of them as potentially beneficent or at least so
endemic to society that a modus vivendi rather than attack may be called for.
In the same way, while a strong case is built up for the value of satire, a
certain amount of scepticism is also expressed towards it, since the
postmodern bias of the thesis precludes it from proclaiming the complete
innocence of any discourse.
On the subject of ideology, this thesis has followed the practice of writers on
the subject such as Manning and Corbett, and used the term "ideologist" to
denote someone who is actively involved in the theory, manufacture and
dissemination of ideology, as opposed to the term "ideologue," which
suggests the less active role of one who espouses ideology in a conscious
way (one may live according to an ideology without being conscious of its
nature) but is not actively involved in its dissemination.
27 Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Oxford Blackwell, 1987) 110
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As regards "psychoanalysis," that is a term used in this thesis to refer to both
the discipline and the practice of the therapeutic method originated by Freud,
but important aspects of the discussion will eventually centre on the practice
of psychotherapy, which is a much wider term, embracing all the multifold
schools relating to the treatment of emotional or personality disorders which
have developed since the advent of Freud's methods, many of them having
moved far from their roots. The model of psychotherapy engaged with in
Chapter 3 is that espoused by the Dulwich Centre in Australia, where both
theory and treatment are highly influenced by postmodernist thought,
particularly that of Foucault.
Finally, when this thesis uses the term "discourse" it is assumed to have a
very broad application. Belsey defines a discourse as "a domain of language-
use, a particular way of talking (and writing and thinking)." 28 She also says
that for Foucault a "discourse (or discursive formation) is a domain of
language-use subject to rules of formation and transformation." 29 In using
the term "discourse" as it does, this thesis takes its chief cue from
deconstruction within which, as Culler says, "Context is just more text, just as
much in need of interpretation and in fact constituted by the same sort of
inimical forces that produce the possible ambiguities it is being called on to
resolve. The appeal to context only displaces into a larger arena the problems
at issue .... This leads to a second point about context... :while meaning is
context-bound, context is boundless." 30 In other words, there is nothing
outside the text, so that "discourse" may describe language as well as
practice in terms of that language, and Foucault can refer to "the formation of
a discursive practice and a body of ... knowledge that are expressed in
behaviour and strategies." 31 Edward Said, speaking of Derrida and Foucault,
says:
28 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Methuen, 1980) 5.
29 Belsey 160.
30 Jonathan Culler, Framing the Sign: Criticism and its Institutions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988)
147-8.
31 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London
Tavistock, 1972) 195.
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It helps to remember that cultural analyses like theirs began to
proliferate and to take a great deal of influence away from
traditional humanistic work because many people in the Sixties
recognized that traditional humanistic modes and techniques -
like the ethos of humanism itself - had really come to the end of
their road. 32
32 John Lukacs, Edward Said and Gerald Graff (participants), "The Legacy of Orwell: A
Discussion," Salmagundi 71-2 (1986): 124.
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Chapter 1 An Historical and Theoretical Overview
Satire has some of its most significant origins in magic, as well as formal
cursing, both of which have ritualistic elements requiring verbal fluency and
accuracy for effective results. The intention to do ill, in one way or another, is
also apparent - always in the case of cursing and often in the case of magic.
Those who had such power over words were seen in several early societies,
including ancient Finnish and Icelandic culture, as able to inflict real harm on
their victims. These qualities have left their mark on satire, a generally critical
stance expressed with unusual articulateness being one of the keynotes of
the satirical mode. The first satirist known by name was a Greek called
Archilocus (ih century B.C.) and he is remembered for the force and malice
of his condemnation of his promised bride and her father, both of whom
refused to honour her contract to marry Archilocus and both of whom are
supposed to have committed suicide as a result of this satirist's invective.' But
this is a primitive manifestation of satire, and Greek satire found its literary
form only at the hands of Menippus (3rd century B.C.) and Aristophanes (5th
century B.C.).
Satire also existed in a primitive form in ancient Arabia and ancient Ireland
where satirists were, in effect, sorcerers to be appeased or punished as what
Robinson terms "dangerous persons." 2 The malediction of Irish satirists is
reputed to have caused illness or even death to its victims. In ancient Arabia
(and almost certainly in some other societies) satirists rode out to war at the
head of the army to publicly satirise the enemy. A mark of the seriousness
with which Irish society viewed its satirists is the amount of legislation existing
in those times to regulate and contain the activities of this feared group of
people. The law distinguished no fewer than seven different kinds of satire
for the purposes of punishment, though a distinction was made between
lawful and unlawful satire. In general the laws discriminated against satirists:
1 john Burke Shipley, "Satire," Dictionary of World Literary Terms, 1970.
2 Fred Norris Robinson, "Satirists and Enchanters in Early Irish Literature," Satire: Modern
Essays in Criticism, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 4. All the
information about Irish satirists in this paragraph is taken from this source, unless otherwise
indicated.
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they forbade anyone to stand surety for a satirist, and the child of a woman
satirist was ineligible for the chieftainship. On the other hand, satirists
sometimes served the state by helping to collect taxes, and they were
accorded special privileges to speak in public. 3 But satirists were often
dangerous and troublesome in Ireland - and the reported activities of one
satirist, Airthirne the Importunate, show him to have been a brigand and an
extortioner." In the end Irish satirists were permitted to remain within that
society in considerably reduced numbers and only after they and the kings of
Ireland had entered into a pact.
This discussion of the beginnings of satire reflects some key elements that
have remained constant in the uneasy relationship between satirists and their
societies, particularly the lack of mutual trust. As has been shown, there was
some respect for satirists, but they were also feared. Since those times
attitudes to satirists have softened somewhat and, unless they live under an
authoritarian or totalitarian government, the law has certainly ceased to single
them out for such harsh treatment. Yet we are caught up in the same matrix
as the ancient Irish when it comes to satire. We too allow satire, but the
acceptability of satire is now governed not primarily by law but by more
indefinite things, such as the degree to which our collective unconscious fears
and taboos, masquerading as reason, will allow us to countenance the
attacking and ridiculing of authority figures and of deeply-rooted customs and
beliefs. Satirists have remained in an equivocal position vis-a-vis society,
while the degree of mistrust shown towards them has varied, often depending
on the stability or otherwise of the state and the degree of security of its
rulers. The relatively stable and tolerant nature of Augustan England may be
one reason why satire was well tolerated there (though not always approved
of by its rulers) - and why it is so poorly tolerated in modern authoritarian and
totalitarian states.
3 Robert C Elliott, "The Satirist and Society," Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed Ronald
Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 208.
4 Elliott, The Power of Satire 29.
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During the Roman period satire, like the epic, the elegy and other genres,
became formalised, though this did not result in its becoming an entirely tame
or predictable form, as the writing of Juvenal shows. According to Elliott,
Quintilian, the Roman teacher of rhetoric, uses the phrase "satura tota nostra
est," apparently "claiming satire as a wholly Roman phenomenon, although
he had read Aristophanes, and was familiar with a number of Greek forms
that we would call satiric. The point is that by satura (which meant originally
something like 'medley' and from which comes our satire) he intended to
specify that kind of poem 'invented' by Lucilius, written in hexameters on
certain appropriate themes, and dominated by a Lucilian-Horatian tone.
Satura referred, in short, to a poetic form, established and fixed by Roman
practice." 5 This definition, which chooses to ignore the Greek Menippean
tradition, perhaps for misguidedly patriotic reasons, is patently an attempt on
the part of a single society to fix its relations with satire once and for all - an
attempt which the very nature of satire is bound to defeat. Griffin's addition to
this discussion makes an important point: "In any case, [Quintilian's]
claim ... simplifies a complicated history by focusing on one element - here the
tradition and progressive refinement of formal verse satire from Lucilius
through Horace, Persius, and Juvenal - to the exclusion of ... what might be
called the unruly spirit of satyr." 6 Classen confirms the complexity of the
genre by showing that from Roman times until at least the Middle Ages the
term "satire" was regarded as too general to be used in an unqualified way
because there were so many varieties of satire. It was seen as necessary to
give the name of the author, thus indicating the particular style of satire under
discussion. 7
It may be that Quintilian, unable to deal with some of the wild qualities of
satire, chose to ignore them. It must, however, be conceded that the process
of formalisation may have led to a greater acceptance of satire by society. No
society tolerates unruly or unpredictable elements with ease, especially when
5 Robert C. Elliott, "The Definition of Satire: A Note on Method," Yearbook of Comparative and
General Literature No. 11 (Bloomington: Indiana, 1962) 19.
6 Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction (Lexington: U of Kentucky P, 1994) 9.
7 Carl Joachim Classen, "Satire - The Elusive Genre," Symbolae Osloenses 63 (1988):103,
109.
17
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
those elements are fairly sophisticated and have the potential to be highly
influential - though some societies have a greater tolerance of such
phenomena than others. As will be demonstrated in the course of this thesis,
the satirist is by definition a rogue element in society, to a greater or lesser
degree. For Roman society, the definition and formalisation of satire must
have been comforting, bringing an (apparent, at any rate) element of
predictability and order.
The degree to which satire finds acceptance is also dependent on the degree
to which satirists are willing to work within the basic norms of their society,
pointing out weaknesses but not questioning the very foundations of that
society. It seems that more radical satire would find itself addressing a
smaller group than, say, the gentlemanly musings of a Horace - a satirist who
enjoyed the kind of entente cordiale with Augustus Caesar which is very likely
to blunt the cutting edge of satire. Horace is a good example of the Roman
satirist who attempted to speak to what Braund terms "all right-thinking men"
- or "to those who can be persuaded into becoming for a time like-minded:"
[So,] in his poems he may surround himself with friends whose
opinions validate his own. This validation comes not just from
their numbers ... but from their position in Roman society. Society
is, on the one hand, the object of satire, but, on the other, a high-
ranking portion of it sets the standard of behaviour and guarantees
the satirist's moral outlook as sound. 8
While Roman satire often ensured itself an audience by adopting the norms
of its society - or, as Braund says, the norms of an important group within that
society - it is also true that the practice of different Roman satirists in this
respect varied widely. Juvenal, who lived in the time of Domitian, attacks so
many different groups in his satire that he can be said to be attacking the very
fabric of his society, rather than tamely relying on the unfailing support of a
group of like-minded people. In fact, so successful an irritant did Juvenal
8 Susan H, Braund, ed., Satire and Society in Ancient Rome (Exeter: U of Exeter P, 1989) 5.
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make of himself that he was sent into exile by Domitian. Thus, despite
Horace's example, there were Roman satirists who were individualists.
What this discussion suggests about Roman satire is that, even at times
when much of satire adopts the norms of the prevailing elite, there will still be
satirists who preserve the uneasy relationship with society which has marked
satire from its inception - and, significantly, it was Augustus who instituted
what was, in effect, the first libel law. There had been a general law in Rome
(the Lex leasae Majestatis) against those who insulted the Roman
government, its institutions or its people. Hitherto, according to Tacitus, this
law had been invoked only against insulting actions, but Augustus specifically
extended the law to cover literature as well, including defamatory lampoons
and satires. 9 To what degree this law made the entente between Augustus
and Horace purely a matter of professional survival for the poet is not clear.
McKnight says of Horace that he was "naturally servile and lived at court." 10
Dryden says that "Horace, as he was a courtier, complied with the interest of
his master, and avoiding the lashing of greater crimes, confined himself to the
ridiculing of petty vices, and common follies .... " 11Raphael, commenting on
this entente, remarks that "one cannot be a state pensioner and a true satirist,
for satire is, at the least, the expression of a temperamental dissidence rather
than of the indulgent complaisance which Horace did not bother to
disguise.,,12
It is not coincidental that the rapport between Augustus and Horace occurred
during a time of great peace and prosperity in Roman history. The tolerance
of governments, and of society in general, for satire increases during periods
of social stability - though it seems that Horace did not tax Augustus's
tolerance very heavily. The eighteenth century in England provides the other
great source of formal satire and this was indeed an England that was
9 Edward P. Nathan, "The Bench and the Pulpit: Conflicting Elements in the Augustan Apology
for Satire," ELH 52.2 (1985): 381-2.
10 Philip S. McKnight, "Sudden Glory: Some Preliminary Notes on the Assailant, the Victim and
the Collaborator in 'Type J' Satire," Colloquia Germanica 18.3 (1985): 193.
11 John Dryden, "Discourse on Satire," John Dryden: Selected Criticism, eds. James Kinsley
and George Parfitt (London: Oxford UP, 1970) 261.
12 Frederic Raphael, "What the Romans laughed at," The Listener 16 June 1977: 781.
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relatively stable. No doubt the political turmoil which marked seventeenth-
century England was still fresh enough in people's minds to make them
greatly value peace and order, the latter being prime values of the Augustan
age. It is thus not surprising that satire was an accepted feature of English
eighteenth-century life - and that much of it was formal.
The links between the Roman and the English Augustan ages were the result
of a conscious adoption of a classical frame of reference during the latter
period. This stance, embodying strong elements of the current literary and
social establishment, was adopted by satirists such as Pope, who used
classical verse forms as far as English would accommodate them. Mack
speaks of Pope and his fellow-satirists writing against the "Roman
background ... a kind of universal Augustan metaphor or 'myth' " embodying
the implied" standard of a mighty and civilized tradition in arts, morals and
government." 13 Brouwer describes Pope's tone as "the tone of Roman
civilization - more refined and truly Horatian, less downright and less
pompous than Dryden .... " 14 It was much more than the Roman tone which
eighteenth-century satire adopted: the neo-classical influence penetrated to
the warp and weft of the poetry of the time and influenced some of its verse
forms. The dominant form of satire during the Augustan age in England was
the closed (heroic) couplet, though this form originated in the Middle Ages as
a form used only for comedy. It was developed further by Elizabethan and
Jacobean poets such as Marlowe, Waller, Jonson and Donne, in an attempt
to convey in English the effects of the Latin elegiac distich (a couplet
consisting of a dactylic hexameter followed by a pentameter) of Ovid's
Amores and Martial's Epigrams. Part of the English Augustan project,
beginning with Dryden and culminating in the work of Pope was, according to
Piper, to refine the form and establish a particular tone for the heroic couplet,
based on the Horatian style: "sensible and quiet talk, easy without being
careless, terse without being crabbed" 15_ and then to combine rhetoric and
13 Maynard Mack, " 'Wit and Poetry and Pope': Some Observations on his Imagery," Pope and
his Contemporaries: Essays Presented to George Sherburn, eds. James L. Clifford and Louis
A Landa (London: Oxford UP, 1949) 34.
14 Rueben Brower, Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1959) 13.
15 W.B. Piper, The Heroic Couplet (Cleveland Case Western Reserve UP, 1969) 56.
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metre into that mutually supportive role which the neoclassical age called
"correctness." To Piper this "suggests the ease, the graceful associative
quality of polite talk .... Thus the closed couplet, with its close-grained system
of pauses, allows the poet to suggest a persistent responsiveness to his
society, a persistent readiness to change course in order to accommodate his
interlocutor's questions and doubts." 16
As can be seen, the watchword at this time was reasonableness, in both
thought and style. Yet, if it is accepted that the task of satirists is to establish
an adversarial relationship with their society and to question, rather than
accept, the dominant myths and ideologies of their time, the Augustan period
in England was one in which satire was in danger of sacrificing its integrity. It
is significant that it was the Horatian style that the Augustan heroic couplet
aimed at, and Raphael's point about this Roman satirist stands as a general
truth: a "temperamental dissidence" is the hallmark of satire, and satirists who
compound with their society or act as the bearer of its values to any great
degree may be seen as weakening their satirical thrust. As suggested earlier,
satirists occupy an equivocal position: 17 they are involved with their society,
yet they are also detached enough to be aware of and able to criticise its
shortcomings. However, the balance between these two contrasting stances
is not always easy to maintain, and what seems to have happened in both the
Roman and the English Augustan ages is that there were important satirists
who became heavily enmeshed in the norms of their society and thus struck a
highly conservative note. Adding weight to this tendency in England was the
fact that, as Nokes says, many eighteenth-century English satirists shared an
ideology usually described as "'Augustan humanism', of which the defining
characteristics were a veneration for the past allied to and predicated upon a
fundamental belief in the historical uniformity of common humanity." 18
16 Piper 141.
17 See 16 above.
18 David Nokes, Raillery and Rage: A Study of Eighteenth Century Satire (Brighton: The
Harvester Press, 1987) 77.
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The mainly conservative forms of eighteenth-century English satire were
reflected by its aim, which was to reform by a combination of ridicule and
persuasion, on the assumption that most people were reasonable. Nicolson
suggests that this was reinforced by the philosophical ethos of the time - the
Age of Reason - when, influenced by Newton, Locke, Voltaire and the
Encvclopedis tes, people turned from theology "to what they called 'natural
philosophy', namely the faith in individual reason rather than in divine
revelation ..... " 19 Eighteenth-century intellectuals stood for "good sense,
balance, moderation, order, taste, intellectual truthfulness and tolerance." 20
They also espoused humanitarian values, being against war and greatly in
favour of liberalism and egalitarianism. There was in addition in England a
stress on social awareness and responsibility, which was also one of the
underpinnings of satire in this period. An additional factor, mentioned by
Probyn, would have been that eighteenth-century writers in general were
under great pressure to use their texts as "vehicles for popular instruction.?"
and such overt didacticism tends to the absolute rather than the provisional. It
is significant that the Enlightenment in France undermined traditional ways of
thought sufficiently to usher in the Revolution, but the ideas of the ideologues
of the time were so radical that Napoleon soon suppressed them.22 In
England even the most biting satire of the Enlightenment has a containment
and underlying respect for norms which reflects the unlikelihood of revolution
there at that time. And, if Quintilian is seen as a spokesperson for his times,
the exclusion of the wilder aspects of satire from his definitions could be seen
as one sign among many that revolution was equally unlikely in Augustan
Rome. It seems clear that satire in England during the Enlightenment - and at
other times - could be relatively tame. Yet this thesis insists that one of the
creative functions of satire is not to resolve and reconcile issues, but rather to
create, multiply and exploit tensions within society. These qualities are, in
fact, often found in satire but many factors, including social and historical
circumstances, may attenuate them. In the case of the English
19 Harold Nicolson, The Age of Reason (1700-1789) (London: Panther, 1968) 20.
20 Nicolson 13-14.
21 Clive T. Probyn, English Fiction of the Eighteenth Century 1700-1789 (London: Longman,
1987) 22.
22 See 87 below
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Enlightenment, other aspects making for a less radical kind of satire could
have been the formality and, in the case of verse satire, relatively limited
structures of satire, which may, arguably, have blunted the thrust of satire.
This was the first and last time that English satire was so formalised - and,
significantly, never again has English satire been so in tune with the society in
which it has been produced. It has to be added though that, even at the
height of the Augustan age, there were English satirists whose voices often
had a distinctly informal, if not anarchic, ring - and of these Jonathan Swift is
a prime example (though even Pope could produce fairly scurrilous satire).
Rogers suggests that Swift's apparent espousal of orthodox views hides a
scepticism towards authority. "Anarchy is always round the corner," she
says;23 but something that is only around the corner is not something that
operates in a direct way. The following archly witty comment by Pope has a
great deal of truth to it, since it stresses both Swift's respectable position and
his satiric tendency to be subversive of the very morality a clergyman is
supposed to be safeguarding, with the implication that as much as Swift was
against the establishment, he was also part of it:
The person I mean is Dr. Swift, a dignified clergyman, but one
who by his own confession, has composed more libels than
sermons. If it be true, what I have heard often affirmed by innocent
people, "that too much wit is dangerous to salvation," this
unfortunate gentleman must certainly be damned to all eternity. 24
A maverick though he may have been (and his becoming something of an
Irish nationalist only demonstrates this quality), Swift also embraced the
common set of ideals that formed the basis of Augustan satire. Those ideals
were also those of society - and it is in this respect that satire has changed
since then. As sense and sensibility waged their struggle during the last part
23 Pat Rogers, "Swift and the Idea of Authority," The World of Jonathan Swift Essays for the
Tercentenary, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968) 33.
24 Maynard Mack, Alexander Pope: A Life (New York: Norton; New Haven Yale UP, 1985)
337.
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of the eighteenth century and Romantic ideals finally asserted themselves,
English society (and satire) lost its special sense of social cohesiveness (the
discussion in Chapter 3 on the role of myth as a binding force in society is
relevant here), and the individual consciousness grew in importance. Satire
was deprived of a strong ideological link with society, with a resulting
decrease in idealism. As a result of this process modern satire has often felt
freer to attack the very structures of society in a deeply radical way, though it
frequently retains at least some element of its conservative side, as can be
seen in a satirist such as Orwell.
Although eighteenth-century English satire was not without its detractors, with
the passing of that century its defenders seem to have become even fewer.
In Sense and Sensibility (published in 1811) Lady Middleton dislikes Elinor
and Marianne Dashwood and, "because they were fond of reading, she
fancied them satirical: perhaps without exactly knowing what it was to be
satirical; but that did not signify. It was censure in common use, and easily
given." 25 By mid-century, Thackeray was able to comment on satire as
follows:
We cannot afford to lose Satyr with his pipe and dances and
gambols. But we have washed, combed, clothed and taught
the rogue good manners: or rather let us say he has learned
them himself; for he is of nature soft and kindly, and he has put
aside his mad pranks and tipsy habits; and, frolicsome always,
has become gentle and harmless, smitten into shame by the pure
presence of our women and the sweet confiding smiles of our
children. 26
The suggestion here is that satire has lost its bite entirely. Yet, it is clear that
Thackeray is using a narrow definition of satire as, prior to this, he has been
25 Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility, ed. R.W. Chapman, 3'd ed. (London Oxford UP, 1933)
246.
26 Elliott, The Power of Satire 269-70.
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"deploring the savagery of the caricaturists Gilray and Rowlandson." 27 The
refusal to acknowledge caricature as a form of satire, together with the
attempt to limit satire in one area and encourage ferocity in another,
constitutes yet another strategy to control and contain satire. The lively
tradition of English caricature so firmly established in the eighteenth century
by Hogarth, Rowlandson and Dighton was continued in the nineteenth by the
"brilliant cruelty" of Gillray 28 and the unsparing mockery of Cruikshank.
Thackeray has chosen to chide the most potent manifestation of satire of his
time, while (rather unconvincingly) encouraging the least dangerous aspect
to become more assertive. Judging by Thackeray's views, society seems to
have been as uneasy and ambivalent about satire in the nineteenth century
as it was in ancient Ireland.
Trends and patterns in satire become increasingly difficult to chart as the
nature of satire becomes even more diverse during the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, and satirists have widely differing agendas and strategies .
.To illustrate the new range and diversity of satire, it might be mentioned that
at the beginning of this period Wilde and Shaw were writing satirical plays,
Campbell and Auden were writing satirical poems, and in 1922 T.S. Eliot
produced his masterpiece of satirical pastiche and allusion, The Waste Land.
Waugh produced satirical novels and, later this century, so did Orwell and
Huxley. Cummings wrote his brand of satirical poetry, and later still there
were the satirical novels of Lodge and Kingsley Amis. More currently, we
have Monty Python and Spitting Image, the British television show which uses
grotesque puppets of well-known figures in order to ridicule them - and the
vitriolic pen of Steadman, the cartoonist. All this certainly suggests that satire,
as a form, has become irrevocably fragmented, with no possibility now of
formal satire of any standing.
As a result of this fragmentation, working with satire presents certain
problems, and these are exacerbated by the fact that satire is a semi-covert
27 Elliott, The Power of Satire 269.
28 Richard Cork, "Gillray's Legacy: A New Spirit of Satire," The Listener 114.2919 (1985): 14.
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form, often with a hidden agenda. What presents even greater problems,
however, is providing a watertight and generally applicable definition of satire.
As Real says, "To this very day, satire has withstood all conceptual and
classificatory efforts claiming general validity.,,29 The elusiveness of satire as a
form springs from the fact that it is not a genre, in the conventional sense of
having a fixed structure and style; but satire is often a mode, in the sense of
having a prevailing manner in which it expresses itself, 30or, to use a much
wider term, satire is a discourse, as defined earlier. 31 Worcester's term
"protean" 32is a useful description of satire, considering that it is found in such
widely divergent forms as poetry, plays, jokes, novels and cartoons, inter alia.
Not only the style in which satire expresses itself in these forms, but also the
way in which satire manifests itself in the same form will differ, depending on
the stance of the satirist and when the satire was written. It is precisely
because of the restlessness of satire's nature and the elusiveness of the
satirist that this thesis aims to explore, rather than absolutely define, the
nature of satire.
This lack of clear definition is not an aspect only of the outward form of satire.
It is apparent at a much deeper level as well, where it appears as a refusal on
the part of satire to present a formal outline of its basic principles or intentions,
despite the fact that it is usually intent on some form of personal and social
change. In fact, the satirist is most at home in discourses which question
absolutes and which carry with them a deep scepticism towards fixed
positions. There is about satire a destabilising self-reflexiveness and a cultural
subversion which, despite the venerable lineage of satire, make it a very
contemporary phenomenon. Satire, among all the literary forms, has a
particular commitment to the revelation and questioning of hegemonic
29 Hermann Josef Real, "An Introduction to Satire," Teaching Satire: Oryden to Pope, ed.
Hermann Josef Real (Heidelberg: Real, 1992) 9.
30 For confirmation of the difficulty in defining satire see Leonard Feinberg, The Satirist: His
Temperament, Motivation, and Influence (Ames: Iowa State UP, 1963) 6-7, James
Sutherland, English Satire (London: Cambridge UP, 1962) 1-2 and Matthew Hodgart, Satire
~London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969) 8.
1 See 10,13-14 above.
32 David Worcester, The Art of Satire (1940; New York: Norton, 1969) 3.
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discourses, which suggests that it has a great deal in common with
postmodernism, and may be seen as one of the key discourses in the
postmodern world. More specifically, postmodernism has been described by
Brooker as having a "dominant tone of parody and pastiche ... , penned
between textualism and reference, licensed play and subversion. ,,33 In
certain types of satire, such as that of Swift and, in particular, Orwell, the
element of parody has become bitter and the quality of play transformed into a
dark kind of fantasy, though the subversively interrogative element is retained.
The affinities that exist between postmodernism and satire are inescapable,
though, because satire is a marginal form (a major contention of this thesis), it
is unusual for it to be so comfortable with an important element of the
Weltanschauung of its time. This represents a change from the traditional
relationship between satire and the societies within which it has operated. As
will be argued at length elsewhere, satire tends not to prosper for long in an
uncontroversial and unambiguous way in any society. This is so because of
the generally disturbing subversiveness of most satire and, perhaps, because
as mentioned earlier, satire is not really a genre at all. This would have been a
significant factor in times when genre was a matter of importance, since satire
(formal satire excepted) has usually resisted the rigorous classification to
which other literary forms are more amenable. In ancient Greece, for example,
no attempt was made to isolate the satiric from the comic elements in the
works of Aristophanes 34 and, certainly, in Aristotle's Poetics, there is no
mention of satire as a distinct form. The Romans had no unified theory of
satire (formal satire excepted, to some degree), and satiric theory then seems
to have been of interest mainly to satirists, each usually incorporating some
discussion of satire into his satirical work.35 Yet the typical lack of a warm and
close relationship between satirists and their society is not due simply to the
indifference or antagonism of society: many satirists do claim, implicitly or
33 Brooker 19.
34 Robert C. Elliott, "Satire," Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, eds. Alex
Preminger, Frank J. Warnke and O.B. Hardison, Jr., enlarged ed. (London: Macmillan,
1974) 739.
35 Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction 6-9.
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explicitly, a superiority which can be alienating and, as Zietsman notes,
Roman satirists were no exception to this:
Persius ... dissociates himself not only from the famous Greek
poets and from the early Roman poets like Ennius who
imitated Greek models .... but also from his contemporaries
who are inspired by the Muses and who are slavishly continuing
with this imitation of traditional epic and tragedy .... Horace
believes that the poet is set apart from the rest of mankind ... and
that he has authority ... to point to evils that need righting .... 36
Such aloofness is common among satirists and, logically enough, most
societies have not responded with unmitigated pleasure towards satire.
Sherbert speaks of "satire's traditionally low standing among the genres,,,37
and Elliott confirms that satire is "a form unremittingly aware of its low estate
in the hierarchy of genres. 38 Eighteenth-century critical writing makes it clear
that satire is not among the most important of literary torms.:" the discomfort
about satire which accompanied the fashion for it in that century being
evidenced by the need for frequent apologias for it in this, the greatest age of
English satire." Why the need for so much justification of satire if, in fact,
satire is considered a normal member of the literary family? That satire was
indeed a marginalised form is further suggested by the hostility it aroused at
the time, which is described by Elkin:
In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries satirists
were constantly being called to account. They could
expect every satire they published to arouse a storm
of protest: attacks on their characters, questionings
36 Johan Christoff Zietsman, "A Commentary on Persius: Satire 5: Themes and Structures,"
diss., U of Pretoria, 1987,31-2,37.
37 Gary Sherbert, Menippean Satire and the Poetics of Wit: Ideologies of Self-Consciousness
in Dunton, D'Uttey, and Sterne (New York: Peter Lang, 1996) xvii.
38 Elliott, "Satire" 738.
39 For a comment on the generally marginal position of satire in literary theory see George
Test, Satire: Spirit and Art (Tampa: U of Southern Florida P, 1991) 12.
40 Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction 24-25.
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of their motives, and aspersions on their literary capabilities. 41
Test, pointing to the generally unlovable nature and point of view of satire,
finds it logical that "satirists have been the most persecuted of artists -
exiled, silenced, sued, physically attacked." 42
In subsequent times, when genre had become less of an issue, satire
remained a suspect form, partly because of its frequently anarchic basis and
vituperative tone, and partly because the traditional prejudice against satire
still survived, though usually in an attenuated and only half-conscious form.
Elkin speaks of the matter as follows:
In the nineteenth century satire was not considered worthy
of theoretical consideration in its own right, but was treated
merely as a facet of comedy. Until recent years, indeed,
general, or theoretical, criticism of satire was incidental,
haphazard, defensive and partial. It was undertaken principally
by the satirists themselves in defence of their own professional
practice and of their reputations. 43
Falck's recent comments suggest that the prejudice against satire is still a
reality in this part of the twentieth century:
At their best, our actual'postmodernist' fictions are
overwhelmingly ironic in their mode, and the most literarily
valuable results of this widespread cultural condition of
inability to know what it is that we feel have been some
brilliant satires .... but we cannot keep the plumber on as
the cook. 44
41 P.K. Elkin, The Augustan Defence of Satire (London Oxford UP, 1973) 1.
42 Test 1.
43 P.K. Elkin, "Recent Changes in Satiric Theory," Kunstgriffe: Auskunfte zur Reichweite von
Literaturtheorie und Literaturkritik, Festschrift fur Herbert Mainusch, Herausgegeben von
Ulrich Horstmann und Wolfgang Zach (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1989) 51.
44 Colin Falck, Myth, Truth and Literature: Towards a True Postmodernism (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1989) 166.
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The fact that Falck's sweeping dismissal embraces both postmodernism and
satire is an acknowledgement of the affinities between the two, as suggested
earlier in this thesis. It also confirms that literary snobbery, centred around the
issue of genre, is by no means dead. By contrast, in postmodernist theory, the
notion of genre has lost most of its hold on art, and satire, with its innate
contradictions and penchant for parody and fantasy, has, perhaps for the first
time ever, found itself at one with the main literary theory and practice of its
time. (Kantra believes that much "modern literary theory ... has the appearance
of unintentional satire .... ") 45 This is the world in which satire finds itself today -
and for the satirist, it seems, it is both brave and new.
But, given that satire and postmodernism also show marked differences,
particularly when it to comes to the satire of Orwell, and considering the
mercurial qualities of both satire and postmodernism, their convergence is not
any guarantee of stability, especially as the satirist's natural place is on the
. fringes of society and satire itself is a form which thrives on the liminal, thus
giving both satire and satirist a rootless, shifting quality. As for satirists
themselves, this thesis will argue that they differ markedly from other artists in
many ways - so much so that (misguided) attempts have even been made to
isolate and define the satirist as a psychological type." In fact, there are
much more germane criteria that make satirists a special case among literary
writers, such as the strategies they employ, among which are their strongly
didactic thrust and the fact that they are as much concerned with influencing
views of "reality" as the psychotherapist, the ideologist, the propagandist and
the purveyor of political myths. Much of the distinction between the satirist
and these other figures hinges on their different strategies and their different
relationship with their societies. It is these relationships which constitute some
of the most serious concerns of this thesis.
45 Robert A. Kantra, "Practical'Wisdom and Satiric Humor in Philosophic Fictions," Mosaic
22.3 (1989): 89.
46 Feinberg, The Satirist 119-20.
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Barthes says that "a mode of writing is ... the relationship between creation
and society,,,47 but he goes further, to say that writing "unquestionably arises
from a confrontation of the writer with the society of his time." 48 This thesis
will deal at length with these aspects, maintaining that they are especially
germane to satire. Satirists address particular conditions in a particular
society, yet they are by no means totally at one with that society. Yet if they
are to be heeded (and it is of the utmost importance to satirists that they be
heard) they must have a fairly close relationship with their society and use at
least some elements of its discourse, or they will be disregarded. On the other
hand, they need to have a measure of detachment from the society that they
are satirising, both so that they can see more clearly and so that they will
have the dispassion, if not the ruthlessness, which their job usually entails.
Dryden speaks admiringly of the "fineness of a [satirical] stroke that separates
the head from the body, and leaves it standing in its place." 49Satirists need
skill and space to swing the axe, but they also need some measure of
consent - at least initially - from their audience, since satirists work within a
context at least of tolerance, if not always agreement. The fact that this
context often contains more mistrust than tolerance is well illustrated by a
cartoon in The Listener depicting an old-style prison cell, bare and dingy, with
unplastered brick walls and the usual single barred window high above the
floor. One of the occupants of the cell, who is writing something, is saying to
his companion, "The difference between COMEDY and SATIRE? Oh, about
a five-year prison sentence .... " 50 There is - and there always has been - an
uncomfortable relationship between the satirist and society.
Satirists can be seen as marginal people, grudgingly accepting the need for
some link with their society while at the same time habitually adopting an
adversarial stance towards it. This does not imply that satirists are simply
malcontents, nor does it imply that their stance as marginal people is either
safe or comfortable. Bogdanor has said of the twentieth-century novel that "it
47 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Anette Lavers and Colin Smith (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1967) 20.
48 Barthes 22.
49
Dryden 263.
50 R. Lowry, cartoon, The Listener 30 June 1983: 15.
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has been dominated by the outsider and his sense of the artificiality of settled
social forms. When the foundations of one's house are being undermined, the
inhabitants are usually the last to know what is happening. Only someone
who has felt within himself the fragility of all social arrangements will be in a
good position to interpret it to others.t''" This formulation is extremely
appropriate if applied to satirists. They, after all, have always been more or
less outsiders and have always fought against the smugness and placidity
that settled social forms bring with them. They are usually among the first to
become aware of the rottenness of a society's foundations and to try to
convey this to the inhabitants. As will be demonstrated in later chapters,
George Orwell's novels Animal Farm and, especially, Nineteen Eighty-Four,
are good examples of such satire, since they probe the illnesses of the body
politic most endemic to the age, take the temperature of the times, urge
humankind to examine its own nature and warn of tendencies which could
become endemic if not checked. This is the more serious side of satire,
lacking in laughter and heavy with prophetic foreboding. Every satirist, to a
greater or lesser degree, feels "within himself the fragility of all social
arrangements," because such an awareness is an inevitable part of being a
marginal person. By choosing marginality the satirist retains that awareness
of the precarious and provisional nature of life which others who embrace the
dominant discourses of society soon lose. For them ideology and political
myth take care of their existential anxieties, while for the satirist there are no
simple solutions and (as will be shown) ideology is anathema.
In their willingness to take risks and their position on the fringes of society,
satirists have a great deal in common with the prophet, in the biblical sense.
Both are dissatisfied with the status quo and, as a result, both will remain
marginal people, their position in relation to their society weakened by their
equal lack of formal authority. As a result they will not always be listened to
(satirists, as well as prophets, are often without honour in their own country),
but the fact that they can have informal influence is thoroughly disquieting to
society, which does not easily endure the presence of "rogue authority" in its
51 Vernon Bogdanor, "In or Out?," The Listener 115.2956 (1986): 28.
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midst. Thus the power of both satirist and prophet is weakened: they are not
part of any formal power structure and the existing political structures are
wary of them and will not make any great effort to welcome them. Another
important aspect which the satirist and the prophet have in common is that
both habitually see things from a dark perspective, though satirists do use
strategies such as humour and irony to ease the pain of the "truths" they
utter. Roelofs sees Orwell as a prophet in the biblical tradition:
In this tradition, a prophet is not a seer, fortuneteller (sic),
or clairvoyant. He is, first, a messenger - and Orwell was
a bearer of tidings. The prophet is, second, an extraordinary
person who confronts us in some specially dramatic way -
and Orwell with his horror story [Nineteen Eighty-Four] does
just that. Third, what a prophet confronts us with is the choice
that illuminates our moment, our existential predicament. ...
Orwell presses upon his readers a choice: which way will we
go, the way of love and equality and peace, or the way of
power and hierarchy and war? 52
The common notion of a prophet these days is based on the model of a stern-
faced, denunciatory Jeremiah rather than a gentle Micah, no doubt because
the former has a much more striking message and a more obvious power.
That anger is part of the role of both prophet and satirist is suggested by the
following remarks of Orwell's, quoted by Ingle: "This age makes me so sick
that I sometimes am almost impelled to stop at a corner and start calling
down curses from Heaven like Jeremiah or Ezra or something." 53 Prophets
like Jeremiah have never bothered with things such as humour and irony and,
unlike fortune tellers (their debased modern equivalent), they speak what they
see as the unvarnished "truth," not feeling called upon to offer either comfort
or hope to their audience. Although prophets speak with divine authority, they
are often not accepted, nor is their message always taken seriously
52 H. Mark Roelofs, "George Orwell's Obscured Utopia," Religion and Literature 19.2 (1987):
29-30
53 Stephen Ingle, George Orwell: A Political Life (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993) viii.
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(mythology offers a classic case in Cassandra), a fate often faced also by
satirists. The prophet has as venerable a lineage as the satirist, though
prophets have, for a long time, been out of fashion. The contemporary bearer
of the prophetic legacy is the satirist, who is as necessary to an ungrateful
society as the prophet ever was. For both, the society of their time is in decay
or in imminent danger of being so: that is all they see, that is their point of
view. Yet behind the warnings of the prophet lies a vision of an ideal state of
affairs and, until fairly recently satirists, too, often spoke with an implicit sense
of the perfectibility of the world around them. This duality in satirists - their
gloomy view of their surroundings working together with their strong covert
utopian idealism - is perhaps the dialectic from which springs their satirical
energy. Hazlitt says that "Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps, for
he is the only animal that is struck with the difference between what things
are, and what they ought to be. ,,54 People are also the only creatures that are
satirical - and it may be that they are satirical for the same reason as,
according to Hazlitt, they laugh and cry.
Given the didactic strand in satire, as well as the implicitly utopian (or anti-
utopian) view that usually underpins it, the kind of response made by people
to what is an imperfect world is a crucial issue for satire. The point frequently
made by writers on satire is that this form of writing is connected to the world
outside the text in a particularly direct way. As Pfaff and Gibbs put it, "in
satire, the author mostly hopes that readers will recover the absurdity of the
created text, which hopefully will prompt the readers to consider issues
beyond the text." 55 This is another way of saying that satire is primarily a
political mode, in that it is very aware of and concerned with the situation in
the polis, in the broadest sense. As mentioned above, most satire has until
recently been underpinned by some utopian ideal - some implied hope that
the world can indeed become a better place, and that satire has a role to play
in this process. However, the early part of this century saw the publication of
54 William Hazlitt, "On Wit and Humour," Selected Essays of William Heztitt: 1778 - 1830, ed
Geoffrey Keynes (London: Nonesuch P, 1930) 410.
55 Kerry L. Pfaff and Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., "Authorial Intention in Understanding Satirical
Texts," Poetics 25.1 (1997): 46.
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major satirical dystopian novels such as Wells's When the Sleeper Wakes
(1899), Zamyatin's We (1920), Huxley's Brave New World (1932), and
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). Now there were satirical texts which, if
they were idealistic, showed this only as a form of cynicism or disappointed
idealism, as well as a deep concern for the way things were. So deep was
Orwell's concern that his two dystopian novels are almost devoid of humour.
The development of dystopian fiction was related to then current philosophies
and events, particularly the threatened creation or advent of totalitarian
regimes and the tendency to increase control of populations. An example is
the case of late nineteenth-century socialism, which was the utopian ideal of
the nineteenth century, but which by the 1930s and 1940s had grown to
become Stalinist communism and hence a ready target for dystopian fiction.
Kumar sees early twentieth-century dystopian writing as designed expressly
to combat socialism and the forms that evolved from it which became, as
Kumar says, "the fullest and most sophisticated expression of the modern
worship of science, technology and organisation." 56 These aspects attained a
mythical status in the modern age, becoming a particular target of the satire
then current. They were a central tenet of Nazi philosophy, and the threat
posed by these forces was regarded as highly dangerous by satirists such as
Huxley and Orwell. There can be no doubt that fascism, too, worshipped
science and technology, associating them with power rather than the creation
of a better world. Herf's formulation sums up the issues: "For Hitler, the
decisive element remained the ideology of the will to power. If life and politics
were essentially a struggle in which the strongest won, then in politics among
nations the technologically weak would deserve to be defeated." 57
It is in these areas - the evils of ideology, as well as the abuse of power and
technology, coupled with an increasingly impersonal form of government -
that the enemy lies for Orwell, and these are his main targets in Animal Farm
and, particularly in Nineteen Eighty-Four. It is for these that he reserves his
56 Kumar 49.
57 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the
Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984) 194.
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most urgent and biting satire. It is surely no coincidence that there are today
several postmodernisms which are concerned with the same issues, among
them those of Baudrillard, Foucault and Jencks. It seems that the battle rages
on and, as this thesis proceeds, it will continue to make common cause with
postmodernism as a force which has inherited from satire the mission, albeit
in a transformed shape, to encourage pluralism, question absolutes and
undermine the forces of dehumanisation wherever it finds them.
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Chapter 2 Anatomizing Satire
Historically, satirists have often presented themselves as concerned with
morality. Their self-appointed function, and that often allotted them by critics,
(Dryden says that "Satire is of the nature of moral philosophy; as being
instructive ... " 1) has been to pin-point the failings of humankind and
endeavour to correct them by rebuking or mocking people into becoming
more sensible or more honest. This view limits both satirist and satire, running
the risk of painting the satirist as merely a moralist or a kind of preacher.
Such a holier-than-thou attitude is not, however, entirely convincing, nor is it
conducive to the relational way in which this thesis presents the whole
process of satire.
A shift from the realm of morality to one of relationship would stress the
engagement of satirists with their society and their times and, as a
consequence of this level of engagement (together with the equally important
aspect of detachment mentioned earlier), the satirist could then be seen as
one who is pre-eminently concerned with the way things are (as opposed to
the way they are seen to be), rather than someone who is intent on behaving
like some kind of moral policeman. This rather modernist view of satire is only
a starting-point - and this thesis does not propose that there is only one way
of seeing the world. However, it is not simply that, as Knight says, "the satirist
is the man who shouts 'Shadows' in a crowded cave." 2 Satirists are, from this
point of view, a kind of enlightened truth-teller - people who are committed to
seeing things in a very clear way, as far as that is possible - but (and this is
where morality alone becomes irrelevant) they also, by means of various
strategies, are intent on freeing others from conformity, while not condemning
them to another form of ontological bondage. Thus the satirist as seen here
represents an amalgam of qualities: the ability to see life with unusual clarity,
and the awareness that there is more than one way of re-presenting the
world, but also a sense (greater or lesser) that people should not be forced
1 Dryden 250.
2 Charles A. Knight, "Satire, Speech, and Genre," Comparative Literature 44.1 (1992): 28.
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into a mould. Satirists do not simply invite their audience to condemn the
satirical target, but offer them an opportunity to discover alternative worlds.
The satirist's urge to mediate fresh insights has to be tempered by a respect
for people's individuality and, although satire has a didactic urge which varies
in strength among satirists and can be overpoweringly strong in some, this is
still very different from a simple desire to humiliate people and show them up
as foolish and venal, not to mention plain wicked.
Of course the issue of morality will never be entirely absent from most kinds
of satire, and it is not the intention of this thesis to deny its presence, but to
shift the critical focus into a different area. This thesis will claim a privileged
status for the satirist's way of re-presenting the world, arguing that it provides
more impetus for change than the norm because of satire's particular
strategies, as well as its marginal stance. However, alongside these notions
there co-exist many others which cut across the image of the satirist set out
here, and these will be discussed in due course. It needs to be added that a
privileged view is not to be seen either as infallible or as the only possible
view. Satirists may indeed be concerned with authenticity, but the trickster
element is very strong in them, so that their re-presentation of the world is
often heavily flavoured with exaggeration, whimsy, fantasy and other kinds of
distortion.
This thesis will argue that both Orwell and Swift exemplify the qualities of
satire set out above. The deep involvement of both men in overtly political
writing as well as satire emphasises their dual stance: they were both
passionate political polemicists, as well as very serious satirists. That all
satirists are concerned with conditions in the polis (even if they do not write
for specifically political ends) has already been argued: the overt part played
in politics by Orwell and Swift serves to highlight this general statement. Satire
takes the world as presented through the dominant narrative of any particular
society and deliberately distorts that narrative - and this raises questions
about the nature of the strategy pursued by satire.
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Bruner discusses the way different views of the world are constructed,
drawing on the work of the philosopher Nelson Goodman, who speaks of
complementary or competing versions of "truth," which lead to the existence
of "different worlds." Goodman also maintains that each of these various
worlds is not independent of any other "linguistic versions of worlds," and that
one affects the other.' Bruner concludes that Goodman "has made clearer a
concept of mind to be specified not in terms of properties but rather as an
instrument for producing worlds." 4 This thesis holds that satire is adept at
producing what Bruner calls "multiple perspectives or stances and at
entertaining the results as, so to speak, alternative possible worlds." 5 Satire
understands this way of thinking and works within a similar kind of dynamic
framework. Satirists offer a version of what might pass for "reality," though it
clearly is not so since they have distorted it in some obvious ways. Yet they
imply that this version has some important relationship with the world, both as
it is and as it might be - and they invite us to grapple with these different
worlds and emerge with a new perspective on the reality which we, in turn,
have created for ourselves to live in from day to day. Satire is happiest in this
kind of liminal space, and its tendency to use provisional strategies such as
fantasy, irony and exaggeration facilitates its fabrication of these alternative
worlds. Swift's Lilliput and Orwell's Oceania are good examples of satirists'
penchant for producing worlds and then encouraging their audience to
engage in the challenging project of occupying these worlds for a while.
Feinberg maintains that "instead of emphasizing what is real, satire
emphasizes what seems to be real but is not." 6 This is offered by Feinberg as
a comment on the nature of satire, but it can equally be seen as a statement
(an incomplete statement) of the tactics used by the satirist to undermine
readers' views of "reality" and offer them the opportunity to engage with
another view of the world. Feinberg's statement seems fair enough, but it is
misleading precisely because of its incompleteness. Satirists do indeed take
3 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1986) 98-
100.
4 Bruner 104.
5 Bruner 109.
6 Leonard Feinberg, Introduction to Satire (Ames: Iowa State UP, 1968) 3.
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liberties with "reality" - they often exaggerate and distort facts or present us
with a fictional account which is patently "unreal" or lacking in naturalism - but
they do so with the intention of indicating that there are other versions of the
world available.
In Gulliver's Travels, for example, Swift offers us a tale that is compounded of
irony, burlesque, the grotesque - and a great deal that (as Kristeva says of
postmodernist literature) "writes itself with the more or less conscious
intention of expanding the signifiable and thus human realm .... " 7 Swift has
deliberately confronted us with much that we will be unable to accept as
"real," no matter how hard we try. In doing this he has deprived us, as far as
he can, of clear links between his fictional world and the world which we see
as reality. He has done this not merely in a spirit of anarchy (though satire is
by no means lacking in anarchy), but so that we, frustrated with the attempt to
relate Gulliver's Travels to what we see and think about our immediate
surroundings, will capitulate and begin to be aware that reality is not as much
a "given" as we have always believed it to be. In this state of betwixt-and-
between, readers are more malleable than usual, and Swift would also be
hoping to strike home with a didactic point wanting us, as we search for
meaning within the text, to take to heart the lessons about human fallibility,
folly and pride that underlie this strange text. It is clear from the foregoing
discussion that the satirical enterprise is rather an uncertain one, largely
because of the refusal or inability of satire to dragoon its audience into
obedience and its need for their co-operation - aspects which will be
discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. Kernan's view of satire is that it "is
not a force that produces social and political consequences, but an elaborate
civilized means for letting off steam." though that seems rather
oversimplified. Swift himself did seem to have reservations about the efficacy
of his work, saying in the preface to A Tale of a Tub that satirists "might very
well spare their Reproof and Correction: For there is not, through all Nature,
another so callous and insensible a Member as the World's Posteriors,
7 Julia Kristeva, "Postmodernism?", Modernism / Postmodernism, ed. Peter Brooker (London
Longman, 1992) 199.
B Dustin Griffin, "Venting Spleen," Essays in Criticism 40.2 (1990): 130.
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whether you apply to it the Toe or the Birch." 9 This has the ring of bitter
conviction, though a necessary scepticism demands that nothing satirists say
should be taken completely at face value, not least when they are talking
about satire.
Orwell, too, in Animal Farm, presents us with a world which is far from ours,
on one level at least. This is an allegorical world, in which animals represent
certain types or even particular human beings but, beneath the fantastic
surface of this tale about thinking donkeys and talking pigs lies the nightmare
world of a totalitarian state in which people are made into things and ideology
comes before human considerations. In many cases the satirist has to make
use of obliquity in order to draw the reader into the text, and allegory is only
one of the strategies that satirists use for this purpose. Swift, in Gulliver's
Travels, is addressing a multitude of human faults, both political and personal,
but he does so very much as a satirist, rather than, say, a preacher or even
the writer of a medieval "complaint." He provides entertainment for the reader
in order to sugar the pill of rebuke, and he does this by framing his book as a
series of travel stories which are filled with humour and fantasy. Orwell, too,
could not afford to be too direct: an important section of the people he was
targeting by writing Animal Farm was the British Left, whose eyes he wished
to open to the mythical nature of Soviet dogma. 10 It has been said that Orwell
was "the conscience of the British Left." 11 He tried to get under the guard of
his readers, at least initially, by presenting them with a world cast in the frame
of a fairy-tale (as the subtitle to Animal Farm announces). Of course, the
satirical aspects become obvious very soon - but one of the strongest
resources of satire is the power of the story on the mind, and good stories
grip one and draw one in, even against one's will. To return to the earlier
discussion of Feinberg's remarks: Orwell is indeed not emphasising "reality,"
but he is presenting us with an alternative world in an effective way, engaging
9 Jonathan Swift, A Tale of a Tub and Other Satires, ed. and introd. Kathleen Williams
~London: Dent, 1975) 29.
o George Orwell, Author's Preface to the Ukrainian Edition of Animal Farm, CEJL, eds. Sonia
Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 405.
11 Robert L. Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo, eds., "Extending the Orwellian Moment:
An Introduction," The Orwellian Moment: Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World
(Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989) 4.
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us by means of the story, but simultaneously immersing us in this bizarre
version of totalitarianism - which he has constructed in typical satirical fashion
by taking some recognisable facts and people and creating around them an
exaggerated (and appalling) political system.
Feinberg makes some general points about the reasons for the satirist's
distortion of "reality." He says that satirists aim their writing at an audience
that is often either indifferent or hostile to satire. A related point is that every
society has institutions which have a vested interest in maintaining their
facade of respectability and efficiency, even if venial faults are admitted. Such
institutions embody what Bakhtin would call "authoritative discourse" - which
is the privileged language which "approaches us from without; it is distanced,
taboo, and permits no play within its framing context." 12 Feinberg concludes
that there is a "formidable opposition" of "teachers, officials, and writers who
insist that unpleasant truths ... do not exist" that forces the satirist to
exaggerate - to be "unfair." 13
Even though this view of satire presents it as a counterbalance to existing
forms of mental tyranny, it also grants a licence to satirists which may
constitute a grave danger to society, for how can one be certain that satirists
will not abuse such powers? Satirists need licence, since that is one of their
rightful privileges, yet there may be a case for individuals to be protected from
such licence when it becomes excessive - though there will never be universal
agreement on what exactly constitutes excess in such matters. It has already
been shown how satirists distort the world of experience or appearances for
their own ends and there is nothing to compel satirists to be responsible when
doing this; in other words, there is nothing to prevent satirists from fabricating
facts about people and events. Two contemporary satirical publications - the
British magazine Private Eye and its South African equivalent, nose Week -
embody different views of the role of satire. Private Eye regularly receives
letters from people or organisations named in its columns alleging distortions,
12 Mikhail Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 424.
13 Feinberg, Introduction to Satire 13-14.
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wrongful and malicious insinuations or blatant untruths on the part of the
magazine. It also receives a steady stream of letters from lawyers, claiming
that their clients have been insulted and libelled, and threatening legal action
unless redress is made. All these are printed by Private Eye, each under an
arch or whimsical caption, in a spirit of gleeful mockery and devil-may-care
nose-thumbing. Some complaints do, in fact, come to court: in 1977 libel
suits cost Private Eye £85,000 "and readers' donations of £40,000 were
essential to keep the paper going," while in 1981 the cost of such suits
amounted to £100,000 .... The annual libel provision had to be doubled." 14
Occasionally an apology will appear in the magazine and the following
examples illustrate the type of statements to which some of Private Eye's
victims have objected. In March 1980 the magazine's apology to a
complainant began as follows: "In our issue of 18 February 1980 we
published a scurrilous and, indeed, vicious, piece about Rev. Canon David
Burgess. ,,15 Another retraction apologises "to Ms Booth for any 'distasteful
personal reference' to her in our issue of 28 Jan last which she claims was
both distressing and insulting. We withdraw unconditionally.?" Finally, after
legal proceedings for libel against Private Eye by Sir James Goldsmith, the
magazine, in a full-page advertisement in the London Evening Standard, "now
recognises that any suggestion in the issue of December 12, 1975, that Sir
James [Goldsmith] had taken part in a criminal conspiracy was particularly
serious and wishes to make it known publicly once and for all that there was
not a shred of truth in it." 17 This, rather than signifying any remorse, is
evidence of the persistence and deviousness of satire. Such an apology, by
offering an opportunity for the repetition of the original insults while denying
them, simply serves to broadcast the allegations even more widely, in this
case in another publication whose readership would be different from that of
Private Eye.
14 Patrick Marnham, The Private Eye Story. The First 21 Years (London: Andre Deutsch,
1982) 111.
1S Marnham 219.
16 Editorial statement. Private Eye 25 March 1983: 11.
17 Apology. The Evening Standard 10 May 1977: 4.
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It is useful to compare this with the case of the satirical South African
magazine nose Week, which also concerns itself with social and political
issues and which has a long record of publishing little-known information
about public figures, often to their discomfiture. Recently nose Week was
sued by a Dr Robert Hall for defamation, but a supreme court judge found in
favour of nose Week. Its editor, Martin Weltz, commented as follows:
When a small, cash-strapped publication like noseWEEK wins
against a bold and brazen millionaire, that's cause for celebration.
A man, who noseWEEK ... found occasion to merely report and
comment on - with some humour, I might add - has now been
damned by court order as a preposterous liar who not only created
a fake status for himself in politics and society but, as a tax dodger
and currency fraudster, stole from the public purse.
Judge Conradie has ... found that, by actively promoting himself as
a high-profile, highly principled man; by publicly supporting political
campaigns and by claiming a quasi-political role as 'unofficial
ambassador' for South Africa ... Dr Hall had 'thrown away the shield
of privacy to the same extent as a public figure and politician'. 18
These two legal battles involving two different satirical magazines raise
various issues about satire. A case against satire might be argued from the
Private Eye matter and a case for satire from the noseWeek affair. In fact, it is
not that simple, for the two magazines represent two sides of the same coin.
If satire is to function properly it has to be given enough freedom to do so.
The judgement in the Hall case gives satire considerable licence when it
comes to public figures and, indeed, this thesis argues that it is primarily
people of influence and power who have their heads above the parapet, as
18 Martin Weltz, "Dr Hall gets his nose rubbed in press victory," The Independent on Sunday
28/29 September 1996: "Sunday Insight" 3.
44
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
far as satire is concerned - and that is the way it should be. There will be
cases of satirists behaving outrageously, but these (it is argued) will have to
be endured by the victim or redressed by the courts. The implication of this is
that those who are not tough-minded or rich enough to take legal action will
suffer, though even if one wins one remains satirised, as the case of Sir
James Goldsmith demonstrates. The degree of acquiescence to this rather
harsh situation by any society will depend on how much value that society
places on the somewhat equivocal - but arguably very valuable - services of
satire.
Private Eye is an extreme case, and this thesis will not argue that satirists are
habitually as careless with facts as Private Eye sometimes seems to be.
Nevertheless, as argued earlier, satirists do distort "reality," for their own
purposes. One crude but effective way of distorting "reality" is by over-
simplifying it. This can be useful, provided it is seen as only part of the
dynamic of satire. When satire over-simplifies issues by abstracting them
from their context, it enables them to be viewed in isolation. This may help to
focus the audience's attention on such issues, particularly if the issues are of
the kind that an audience would gladly skim over if allowed to do so. But,
ideally, the audience is part of such a process and, after such issues have
been viewed in isolation, the audience is enabled to view them again, this
time in the midst of the other factors which operate in conjunction with them.
This helps prevent satire from becoming as prescriptive as some of the other
discourses discussed in Chapter 3. In other words, to adapt Goffman's
terminology, the satirist "reframes" the issues in several ways, as part of the
satirical process, and such reframing gives both distance and perspective to
issues. 19
This does not always happen, which is one among many reasons why the
satirist should not be seen as a legislator, even in a subtle sense, despite the
19 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Analysis of Experience (Cambridge,
Mass. Harvard UP, 1974) 1Off.
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fact that satire sometimes tries, implicitly, to assume such a role. An example
of this is the wistful statement by the satirical cabaret artist, Tom Lehrer, that
"If, after hearing my songs, just one person is inspired to say something nasty
to a friend, or strike a loved one, it will all have been worth the while [sic].,,2o
This is very amusing and it could be argued that it is entirely tongue-in-cheek,
but there is a sense in which it anarchistically attempts to challenge basic
relationships within society, simply for the sake of doing so. Such satire is an
essential part of the spectrum of satiric art to which society is exposed, but it
could also be seen as evidence that satirists should not be allowed to have
the last word. They are not fully-fledged secular prophets, nor are they the
only would-be truth-tellers operating in a social context. They are important
figures but, in a healthy society, satire will be only one of the factors acting to
influence people, within a system of mutual checks and balances. That such
a well-balanced system of power relations is only a utopian ideal in any
society is one of the important general points made by the dystopian scenario
set out in Nineteen Eighty-Four.
There is a tension between the function of satire as a mediator for changed
perceptions, on the one hand, and the more egocentric and morally
prescriptive stance of many satirists on the other, though such a stance is not
always overt. A publication such as Private Eye has chosen to adopt a heavily
moral stance (not always credibly), particularly towards the behaviour of
politicians and powerful industrialists and businessmen, and this is one of the
qualities which have gained it a great deal of attention. However, it is arguable
that Private Eye, by doing this, has gained so much respect that it has
sacrificed that aspect of satire which can open its readers' eyes to the
possibility of new worlds without influencing them in a directive manner. At its
best, satire has always been a healthy alternative voice to the established
moral voices of the time, but the satirist does not flourish if given too much
attention and respect. In fact more than a minimal amount of acceptance of
satirists may impair their marginal status - and if, as sometimes happens, they
20 Ethel Robinson, "Setting sharp satire to a snappy beat," Weekend Argus 13 May 1989:
Weekender Supplement: 4.
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are embraced by society (possibly as a ploy to render them harmless), that is
to be seen as the kiss of death for satire. We should view satirists as satirists,
not purely as media-people, teachers or psychotherapists - though satirists
may indeed adopt aspects of all these roles at times. Swift and Orwell need to
be viewed with a certain amount of scepticism and not weighed down with
any high degree of social responsibility. If the true mission of satirists is not
recognised, they may come to appear as rather cranky (if intelligent)
moralisers or philosophers who present us with valid but limited ways of
engaging with life. We give satirists a more creative kind of acceptability if we
retain for ourselves the right to exercise on their ideas the very freedom to
judge, choose and criticise which they claim for themselves. Such a process
is not simple because of the evasive quality of satire, which makes it no easy
task to decide exactly what satirists are doing or why they are doing it.
What satirists are doing will depend a lot on what they see as their task and
on what ethical or moral base (if any) underpins their text. However, satirists
are generally unwilling to be pinned down, so whatever they themselves say
about their craft or beliefs (on the rare occasions when they reveal the latter)
must be viewed with a great deal of scepticism, since such statements may
be intended more to sow confusion than to bring any enlightenment.
Rosenheim says that "The obliquity or invention which we call satiric fiction is
certainly not hospitable to the development of firmly stated principles." 21 As
suggested earlier, a study of satire can focus on its mediatory aspects or on
its moralistic qualities (this excludes, for the moment, satire which is written
entirely for malicious reasons). But whether we see satirists as ontological
movers and shakers or as figures with a certain amount of moral authority, to
what degree is it desirable to put ourselves into their hands? It is true that the
satirist seems to have a deeply-felt commitment to society but, given the
evasive temperament of the satirist, the nature of that commitment cannot
easily be measured. In fact satire does not lend itself to easy conclusions, but
one way of gaining some degree of clarity on these issues (resolution is not
21 Rosenheim 188.
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something one can hope for) may be by examining the way satire IS seen
today, operating within a contemporary environment.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis contemporary satire is described as fraqmented."
though this conclusion is intended to be factual rather than pessimistic.
Bearing in mind the way that satire (especially contemporary satire) and
postmodernism are portrayed as partners in this thesis, and given the
toughness and interrogative quality of both forms, fragmentation is likely to be
only the beginning of a journey to a different kind of configuration - and, in the
true provisional style which contemporary satire has found in postmodernism,
any degree of wholeness reached would again become vulnerable to a
process of deconstruction and reconstruction.
Hutcheon asserts that in our time satire has lost its direction and, reflecting
the lack of fixed social values in the world in which it finds itself, has collapsed
into anarchy and rudderless nastiness:
Satire tends to defend norms; it ridicules in order to bring
deviation into line - or it used to. 'Black humor,' today's
most common form of satire, seems to many to be a
defensive humor of shock, a humor of lost norms, of
disorientation, of lost confidence. 23
This, despite being the opinion of a postmodern theorist, is a traditional (and
common) view of satire. It regards satire as incorrigibly conservative and
irretrievably tied to a fixed set of norms. It sees the demise of moral
certainties as marking the end of any meaningful satiric statement. This thesis
is certainly more optimistic and, as indicated above, sees this part of the
twentieth century as marking the renewal of satire in reworked forms,
demonstrating the flexibility and ability to survive that satire has always had.
In fact, it is very much a phoenix rather than the dead duck portrayed above.
22 See 25 above.
23 Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody- The Teaching of Twentieth-Century Art Forms (New
York: Methuen, 1985) 79.
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What can be said about contemporary times is that far fewer texts which can
be called purely satirical are currently being produced. Postmodernism has
vigorously interrogated every textual form, including satire, and has made the
boundaries of genre highly permeable within texts and between texts.
Jameson puts it as follows:
It would now seem that, far from becoming extinct, the older
genres, released like viruses from their traditional ecosystem,
have now spread out and colonized reality itself, which we divide
up and file away according to typological schemes which are no
longer those of subject matter but for which the alternative
topic of style seems somehow inadequate. 24
Satire has always shown flexibility as a genre and an amenability to
incorporation into a wide range of other genres and forms, and this
phenomenon has accelerated during this part of the twentieth century. The
influence of postmodemism, sharing as it does many of satire's qualities, has
helped it to shake off many aspects of genre Which it might have retained
from the past. Now, freed from its shackles, though with its questioning and
questing spirit preserved, satire is rather close in temper to its ally
postmodernism which, being a particularly energetic manifestation of our
Zeitgeist, has given satire a renewed relevance and credibility.
Satire and postmodernism share an adversarial stance towards the world as it
is depicted by "official" discourse, and both tend to react by foregrounding
those discourses which "official" culture wishes to ignore or denigrate by
marginalising them. Bakhtin has written about the importance of "carnival
practices," which have always played a key role in breaking down the fixed
positions of "high" and "low" aspects of society by subjecting them to the
force of playfulness (with which both postmodernism and satire are often
24 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke
UP, 1991) 371.
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associated)." At least one postmodern theorist, McHale, sees Menippean
satire, "which initially developed in direct contact with popular carnival. ..as the
dialectical response to the consolidation of 'official' monological literary
genres .... 'Carnivalized' genres such as Menippean satire are in this sense
official literature's ... parodic double. Postmodernist fiction is the heir of
Menippean satire and its most recent historical avatar." 26 This reflects the
postmodern tendency to mistrust absolute boundaries since, if satire in
general is a highly protean mode, Menippean satire is particularly so, with its
"motley nature and the variety of its exemplars." 27 Though the extended
debates sometimes contained in Menippean satire can have the boisterous
setting of a banquet or party, Frye regards this as a "species or rather sub-
species of the form ... " 28 In fact, there is also a "purely moral type" of
Menippean satire which "is a serious vision of society as a single intellectual
pattern, in other words a Utopia," 29 and for Frye a text such as Burton's
Anatomy of Melancholy is among the greatest Menippean satires in English.
This is Menippean satire as defined by Sherbert as "a kind of intellectual
prose satire." He also says that Menippean satire examines utopian ideas
critically, aware that such social programmes easily lead to "a tyranny similar
to Socrates' Republic and Orwell's 1984." 30 According to Bakhtin, the
Menippean satirist challenges orthodox philosophical ideas, with satire here
undermining accepted discourses. 31 The views of both Frye and Bakhtin, as
well as the notions of utopia and dystopia generally, are relevant to the later
chapters of this thesis, where Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four are
discussed in detail.
Postmodernism and satire also have common concerns in the areas of
parody, allegory and the fantastic (all non-linear strategies), though they often
differ widely in their definition and use of these forms. McHale sees parody as
25 M.M. Bakhtin, introduction, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (1965;
Bloomington Indiana UP, 1984) 20-1.
26 McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (New York: Methuen, 1987) 164, 172.
27 Griffin, Satire.' A Critical Reintroduction 32.
28 Frye 311.
29 Frye 310.
30 Sherbert, 1, 13.
31 Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction 32.
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something healthily antiseptic that any text can employ as "a form of self-
reflection and self-critique, a genre's way of thinking critically about itself." 32
But Baudrillard suggests that we now have unintentional parody." which
seems to regard parody as lacking in animus and perhaps rather decadent,
while Jameson refuses to allow that parody can be valid in a postmodern
setting, maintaining that pastiche - a "neutral practice of ... mimicry, without
parody's ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter" - has
taken the place of parody. He argues that the effect of parody is "to cast
ridicule on ... [particular] stylistic mannerisms and their ... eccentricity with
respect to the way people normally speak or write." Literary parody thus
assumes that there is a linguistic norm against which the deficiencies of other
kinds of discourse will be evident. And what is happening now, according to
Jameson, is that belief in the existence of "normal language, or speech" is
waning. There is an immense process of "fragmentation and privatization of
modern literature," with different groups and professions each speaking their
own variety of discourse, each of which has come to be seen as valid and
acceptable. In such a case there is no linguistic norm for parody to use. 34
While Jameson sees parody as limited to literary texts (a rather un-
postmodern stance), satire, ever unwilling to be confined (and not ever an
exclusively literary form), practises other kinds of parody as well, in which
social and individual norms, philosophies and practices are grist to its mill -
this kind of parody approaching burlesque. For example, in both Animal Farm
and Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell parodies the actions and philosophy of
dictatorships, as well as the concept of utopia (and he may well be parodying
the utopian novels of the past, too). In Animal Farm he also parodies the fairy-
tale, though there is little attempt to ridicule it. The fact that the humour in
these novels is indeed black does not preclude parody. There is a certain
amount of dark - even grisly - humour in a Punch and Judy show, in which
everyday life is parodied.
32 McHale 145.
33 Margaret A. Rose, The Postmodern and the Post-Industrial (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1991) 70. .
34 Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," Modernism / Postmodernism,
ed. Peter Brooker (London: Longman, 1992) 166.
51
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The truth is that, despite jameson's contention, reports of parody's death are
greatly exaggerated. His rather utopian (he would say dystopian) reasoning
presumes that postmodernism has caused every group of people to accept
with equanimity individual languages and private discourses which differ from
their own. In reality, human weakness will ensure that parody survives, since
there will always be people who are willing to laugh at the "otherness" of
discourses different from their own, because of certain social, cultural or
political values such discourses carry or simply because one's neighbour, if at
all different, is usually a handy target. It is ironic that satire in general (of
which parody can be an invaluable ingredient) thus relies for its existence on
the fallen nature of the human race, while at the same time often claiming to
want to remedy that fallen ness by reforming people.
Hutcheon firmly claims parody as an important aspect of postmodernism,
choosing to foreground an aspect of parody which is not new, but which has
become the most practised in postmodernist art of all kinds:
The function of parody was often to be the malicious,
denigrating vehicle of satire, a role it continues to play
to this day in some forms of parody .... [But] the kind
of parody upon which I wish to focus is an integrated
structural modelling process of revising, replaying, inverting,
and 'trans-contextualizing' previous works of art. Perhaps
the archetypal manifestation of this process is what is now
called Postmodern architecture. 35
What Hutcheon is doing is both acknowledging the traditional close co-
operation between satire and parody, and then going on to say that parody,
when it abandons satire for something like irony, can achieve very different
objectives on its own: "It can be a serious criticism, not necessarily of the
parodied text; it can be a playful, genial mockery of codifiable forms. Its range
35 Hutcheon, Parody 11.
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of intent is from respectful admiration to biting ridicule." 36 Parody is thus
potentially either challenging and radical, or a more conservative force which
recontextualises and reinforces norms by imitating and juxtaposing them. To
some degree, it can be both at the same time.
Finally, Hutcheon distinguishes between the targets of parody and satire:
parody's target is "intramural," while satire's is "extramural." 37 In other words,
(literary) parody finds its targets in the world of already existing texts and its
frame of reference is limited by the texts it chooses to parody, so that it is, in
one sense, a parasitic form. Satire, on the other hand, is a form which is
closely in touch with the "world" outside the text, since it sets out to address
specific historical and cultural (or even personal) issues and works them into
the text for examination and comment. This is an aspect which will become
crucial in later chapters which demonstrate the impact that political ideologies
and historical events have in both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
A second element in which both postmodernism and satire have a stake is
allegory, though postmodern forms of it are often looser. It is of the essence
of this form that it operates on at least two levels, which readers either hold in
their minds simultaneously or between which they move. Both Animal Farm
and Nineteen Eighty-Four can be seen as allegories, the first an animal
allegory and the latter an allegory which sets the present against another
world which is a projection into the future. Leyburn sees the movement
between the levels of an allegory as more of a moment of recognition within a
kind of "time-lag" - the "brief interval in which the reader makes the
adjustment between the apparent meaning and the real one .... " 38 The
postmodern notion of allegory is more dynamic though, stressing continuous
movement rather than a single transition from one level to another. This
makes available a greater flexibility in the use of allegory, giving writers the
freedom to use more varied approaches when employing this literary form.
36 Hutcheon, Parody 15-16.
37 Hutcheon, Parody 54.
38 Ellen Douglass Leyburn, Satiric Allegory. Mirror of Man (Westport: Greenwood P, 1978) 10
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McHale, who maintains that postmodernist writing has revived allegory, shows
how the nature of allegory springs directly from its roots in metaphor:
Postmodernist writing seeks to foreground the ontological
duality of metaphor, its participation in two frames of reference
with different ontological statuses .... AII metaphor hesitates
between a literal function (in a secondary frame of reference)
and a metaphorical function (in a 'real' frame of reference).
Postmodernist texts often prolong this hesitation as a means of
foregrounding ontological structure. 39
This approximates to Leyburn's "brief interval of adjustment." However, in
postmodernist allegory the writer consciously manipulates this interval in order
to prevent the easy, straightforward access to meaning and lack of anxiety
offered by the structuralist model of signifier and signified (there will be more
detailed discussion of this issue in the next chapter). The mechanism of
allegory then, is simply that of metaphor writ large. Allegory occurs when the
metaphorical trope is inflated to what McHale calls the "limits of the text."
The result is a text-long trope which preserves the
two-level ontological structure of metaphor (literal frame of reference,
metaphorical frame of reference), but in which ... the two-level
structure ... [is] disseminated throughout the text. 40
An example of this might be the way Orwell in his parodic novel Animal Farm
directs readers simultaneously to both Britain and the Soviet Union
throughout, not allowing them to settle at either level for any length of time.
But, according to McHale's arguments, Orwell's use of allegory here would be
seen as conventional rather than postmodern because Orwell does not
prolong the natural hesitation between levels which is found in all types of
allegory.
39 McHale 134.
40 McHale 140.
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Some postmodernist writers do use conventional allegory, but others, as
McHale shows, offer texts which seem to contain allegorical meaning, while
the allegory remains elusive and unresolved:
[N]othing is actually an allegory; the trope seems to lack a
specific literal level or frame of reference .... Every expression
belongs simultaneously to several frames of reference, none
of them identifiable as the basic world of the text, relative to
which other frames are metaphorical; instead, there is a
perpetual jostling and jockeying for position among a plurality
of simultaneously present. ..worlds. 41
This strongly resembles Nelson Goodman's notion of complementary or
competing versions of "truth," leading to the existence of "different worlds." 42
The dynamic and playful quality of McHale's view of allegory is typical of
postmodernism, offering as it does an open-ended ness of both process and
viewpoint:
[I]f there are several distinguishable allegorical meanings,
then the literal level circulates among them, so to speak,
never coming to rest. In short, indeterminate allegory
is a means of inducing an ontological oscillation, the
same hesitation or 'slow flicker' that characterizes
other types of tropological world. 43
What is clear from the above discussion is that both previous and postmodern
views of allegory see two distinct levels involved in the process of allegory,
with a hesitation or pause occurring as the reader comes to terms with the
message of the trope. But the traditional view regards the process as
something that is predictable and happens once and for all, while for
41 McHale 141.
42 See 39 above.
43 McHale 142.
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postmodernism the process of the two levels coming together occurs
continuously, with different elements combining, breaking up and then re-
combining with other elements to make yet other patterns of meaning. The
allegorical elements in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four are not
postmodern in nature, but postmodernist allegorical practice serves to
interrogate them and gauge their effectiveness - and show them, by contrast,
to be representative of their own time. In general Orwell's use of allegory is,
by postmodernist standards, closed and unstimulating, yet these qualities sits
well with the oppressed state of society that Orwell is portraying.
The final topic to be dealt with in this chapter is fantasy which, in the broad
sense, is an important ingredient of satire. McHale makes the point that
"Postmodernist fiction has close affinities with the genre of the fantastic" 44
since the postmodern in literature is characterised by what Kristeva calls "its
fantasies or language-defying style." 45 This discussion is not concerned with
the fantasy romances of writers such as C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien,
which avoid the difficulties of confrontation that more radical fantasies face up
to. Their worlds are closed, avoiding the creative risks which come when a
fantasy writer acknowledges and confronts a world outside that of the text.
There is thus - to draw on the earlier discussion of parody - no "ontological
flicker" in their texts. The opposite kind of fantasy, which is flexible and
creative, is described by Jackson as follows:
[M]any fantasies from the late eighteenth century onwards attempt
to undermine dominant philosophical and epistemological orders.
They subvert and interrogate nominal unities of time, space and
character, as well as questioning the possibility, or honesty, of
fictional representation of these unities. Like the grotesque, with
which it overlaps, the fantastic can be seen as an art of estrange-
ment, resisting closure, opening structures which categorize
experience in the name of a 'human reality'. 46
44 McHale 74.
45 Kristeva 202.
46 Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion (London: Methuen, 1981) 175.
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There can be no doubt that satire often shares this subversive - aggressive,
even - stance with both fantasy and postmodernism. But the element of
fantasy is also present in satire in a more complex way, involving the
fabrication by satirists of a false or fantasy world which they then induce their
audience to inhabit, for the duration of the satire - a strategy which can plainly
be seen in both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. This involves a kind
of game of which the audience is completely conscious and to which it
willingly submits, agreeing to suspend its disbelief and, for a fixed period,
accept the world of the satire as at least a conceivable one. This is a
procedure which raises all kinds of questions about the integrity of the satirist
and the nature of what is seen as "reality," as well as the relationship between
language and cultural constructs and beliefs. These are some of the issues
which constitute the core of the next chapter, in which various cultural
discourses, some of them very powerful, will also be examined, in relation to
satire. In particular, there will be an engagement with the poststructuralist
debate surrounding language and meaning, with satire being viewed in this
context.
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Chapter 3 Satire and the Contemporary World: Ways of Seeing and
Being
This thesis has discussed the issue of re-presentation in relation to the satirist
- and has referred to the way satirists offer their audiences alternative
viewpoints by metaphorically inserting a crowbar into their fixed view of the
world, thus causing a shift to a more provisional stance. These worlds are not
necessarily offered as new ontological homes for the audience to occupy as
much as new places to stand which may alter the way it sees its own world.
These alternative worlds are constructed by the manipulation of language,
and the audience accepts their fictional quality, while at the same time giving
itself to the experience offered by satire. This chapter aims to deepen this
discussion, using the theoretical framework set up by Saussure, and then
tracing its development via the contributions of the deconstructionists. Many
of the theoretical views of the latter also form part of the personality of satire:
the urge to be playful and dismantle structures, with the intention to
"defamiliarise" the known world, as Russian formalism has it. Finally, satire
will be put into a dialogic relationship with some important socio-political
discourses which function alongside it to influence the way people view their
world: psychoanalysis, ideology, political myth and propaganda. These are
discourses which have come into their own during this century, and which
have a particularly close bearing on the two Orwell novels which serve as key
texts in this thesis.
The structuralist view is that language takes the form of deep, largely
unconscious structures and, since language is embedded in society, the latter
is also structured in an identical way. The structure of language is self-
contained and, therefore, so is the way in which members of that language
group view society or the reality around them, since reality is apprehended by
means of language. Thus, from the structuralist point of view, one can say
that all members of the same society or language group view reality in the
same way.
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Satirists, working through and with words, manipulate them and the reader, at
the same time managing to disrupt the particular view of reality that that
society has. Disruption at such a deep level implies an intimate knowledge of
the way that society functions and a thorough awareness of its beliefs and
taboos, expressed and (especially) unexpressed. The satirist, then, works
from within society: satire is an "inside job." This suggests that it cannot be
written by an outsider - or that an outsider must become an "honorary insider"
in order to write satire. Yet, at the same time, the satirist is essentially an
outsider or "fringe" person. The point discussed earlier needs constantly to be
borne in mind: satirists must know the society they are satirising but,
simultaneously, they must be able to stand outside it, in order to see it clearly
enough to attack it (and to launch such an attack in a spirit of glee rather than
guilt). This kind of equivocal stance gives the satirist greater freedom and
manoeuvrability - and attacks from one who has an intimate knowledge of a
society, but whose status is to some degree that of an outsider, are
particularly disturbing. That satire wishes to disturb (to say the least) is
obvious, whether it is simply ruffling the smooth surface of accepted patterns
of behaviour by creating laughter at their expense or causing society to react
with pain and indignation by planting a barb in one of its most sensitive parts.
It has already been noted that satirists are usually feared and mistrusted.
They are feared for the power of ridicule that they wield, and also because
many people, aware that they too secretly practise the vice that is being
attacked, feel threatened by the satire. But satirists are at their most
threatening when they disrupt the average person's view of reality to a
marked degree. The reason why satire so often evokes anger in particular is
that disruption of one's view of reality is intensely disturbing - and this leads to
anger, as well as various defensive ploys on the part of society. These could
include censorship and / or imprisonment, or even cruder moves to detract
from the credibility of the satirist. For example, Swift was referred to by certain
critics in both the eighteenth and nineteenth century as mad; 1 while the Soviet
1 Donald M. Berwick, The Reputation of Jonathan Swift 1781-1882 (New York: Haskell House,
1941) 4,7,121.
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authorities detained dissidents (among whom there were certainly satirists) in
mental institutions as "insane." Zimbardo relates how, twenty-five years after
Nineteen Eighty-Four was published, a Soviet dissident, Viktor Feinberg,
forcibly committed to a mental hospital, was told, "Your release depends on
your behavior ... .Your illness consists of dissenting opinions. As soon as you
renounce them and adopt a correct point of view, we will let you go." 2 The
ultimate form of rejection, perhaps, is to call people mad because one is
frightened of what they think or say - and this is what happens to Winston in
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Finally, society can combat satire by stressing ways of
looking at life that are inimical to satire (e.g. sentimentality, blind patriotism) or
it can absorb the satirical viewpoint into itself by embracing it, thus robbing
satire of its "outsider" status (e.g. Dr. Piet Koornhof agreeing to appear as
himself in one of Pieter-Dirk Uys's early satirical films). The Australian satirist,
Max Gillies, says that "to be embraced by his satiric target is an occupational
hazard for the satirist." 3 Schechter says that Lyndon B. johnson "knew how
to dry up the pens of satirists: ask them for autographed cartoons [of
johnson]." 4 Schechter also notes how Robert Walpole applauded verses
against himself in The Beggar's Opera - and even led the cries for an encore.
Satirists are acutely aware of the way language structures reality, and they
are expert at exposing the tenuous quality of apparently fixed meaning. In the
structuralist model set up by Saussure he stresses that language is a
convention, a "social bond," existing outside the individual and "only by virtue
of a sort of contract signed by its members." 5 This social contract, whereby
each word in a language refers to a particular element of reality, ensures that
each member of that society visualises the same version of reality whenever
any word is spoken or read. Saussure is very aware that language is far more
2 Philip G. Zimbardo, "Mind Control: Political Fiction and Psychological Reality," On Nineteen
Eighty-Four, ed. Peter Stansky (New York: Freeman, 1983) 209.
3 Max Gillies, "Satire," interview with Helen Thomson, Meanjin 45.2 (1986): 220.
4 Joel Schechter, "The Theater of Satire, or Politicians and the Arts," Before his Eyes: Essays
in Honor of Stanley Kauffmann, ed. Bert Cardullo (Lanham: University Press of America,
1986) 123.
5 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, eds. Charles
Bally and Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger (1915; New York: McGraw-Hili, 1966) 14.
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than simply a "name-giving system" 6 since it gives meaning to the world
around us, and that is crucial to our sense of ontological certainty. Saussure
notes how, in the case of "primitive" people, "each nation believes in the
superiority of its idiom and is quick to regard the man who uses a different
language as incapable of speaking." 7 As noted earlier, this is one of the ways
of thinking which satire exploits - and it certainly does not apply only to
"primitive" people." In other words, Saussure is saying that one's language
defines one's world and, for each individual, his or her language is the world.
As Wittgenstein has it, "The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that
the limits of [my] /anguage ... mean the limits of my worlc.'" Thus when
satirists disrupt a society's view of its world they are also violating this
structuralist social contract linking society's view of the world to its language.
The way in which Saussure sets out his theory throws some light on how
satirists, by working with language, are able to affect not simply the
perceptions but also the unconscious structures of their audience and (if the
satirical effects are efficacious) those of their society as well. Saussure sees
each word of a language (linguistic "sign") as consisting of "a concept and a
sound-image," which he refers to as the "signified" and the "signifier"
respectively. "The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but
the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our
sense." We can, after all, talk to ourselves without movement of lips or
tongue. "The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity ... .The two
elements [of signifier and signified] are intimately united, and each recalls the
other. Whether we try to find the meaning of the Latin word 'arbor' or the word
that Latin uses to designate the concept 'tree', it is clear that only the
associations sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality,
and we disregard whatever others might be imagined." 10 Saussure goes on
to insist on the arbitrariness of the bond between signifier and signified, the
6 Saussure, 16.
7 Saussure 191.
8 See 51-2 above.
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness
~1921; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961) 115.
o Saussure 66 - 7.
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connection between them being based on convention or collective behaviour
within the society.
This thesis will argue that the satirist (among others) does not feel bound to
honour this arbitrary bond between language and reality - though the
language worlds set up by satire are hardly less arbitrary. However, in an age
where doubt is endemic, this is no drawback: in fact, some decades ago
literary texts were acknowledged to have lacunae or "spots of
indeterminacy':" which the reader's involvement is required to make whole,
such a process indicating that texts are not available, initially at least, in a
neatly finished-off form. This spirit of provisionality is related to the issue of
liminality, which will figure in later discussion - both strongly marked qualities
of post-structuralist theories of language. It is to some of these theories -
those representing deconstruction and postmodernism - that we shall soon
turn, as these are ideas which are extremely useful in discussing the
strategies of the satirist and the psychotherapist, as well as the propagandist,
the ideologist and the political myth-maker. The latter three, interested as
they all are in altering the way other people view reality, are foremost among
those who have, so to speak, exploited the weakness of Saussure's model,
for their own ends.
Saussure was very much of his time. There is a strong affinity between
Saussure, Durkheim (the father of modern sociology) and Freud (the father of
modern psychology), in that all three offer what Culler calls a "structural rather
than a causal explanation" 12 for the way the world works. For these men,
society is not the result of individual behaviour; rather, "behaviour is made
possible by collective systems which individuals have assimilated .... " 13
though they are not conscious of these systems. Culler concludes as follows:
11 Roman Ingarden: The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology,
Logic, and Theory of Literature, trans. and introd. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston: North-
western UP, 1973) 246-54.
12 Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure, Penguin Modern Masters Ser. (Harmondsworth
Penguin, 1976) 77.
13 Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure 75.
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By internalizing origins, removing them from temporal history
[as Saussure, Durkheim and Freud, all did] one creates a new
space of explanation which has come to be called the unconscious.
It is not so much that the unconscious replaces the historical
series; rather it becomes the space where any antecedents
which have an explanatory function are located. Structural
explanation relates actions to a system of norms - the rules of a
language, the collective representations of a society, the
mechanisms of a psychical economy - the concept of the
unconscious is a way of explaining how these systems have
explanatory force. It is a way of explaining how they can be
simultaneously unknown yet effectively present."
Both the satirist and the psychotherapist are concerned, in their very different
ways, with aspects of the unconscious, and their avowed aim is creative
change. Psychotherapists use their awareness of unconscious structures to
help people understand themselves better, while satirists use it to provoke
and / or cajole people into an altered view of the world which will, satirists
hope, lead to altered beliefs and behaviour (though this is something also
aimed at by many psychotherapists).
What satirists do is to disrupt society's view of the world by distorting or
upsetting the linguistic (and therefore cultural) codes which form part of the
internal structure of that society. What they do, in Saussure's terminology
(though not at all on his terms), is to shift or disturb the settled and smoothly
functioning relationship between the signifier and the signified, inducing a
pause and / or a change in the linkage between words and the ideas or things
to which they refer. This results in uneasiness and uncertainty in the
audience, making it easier for the satirist either to provoke them by redefining
the relationship on his or her own terms or use some other strategy which will
make the audience aware of the arbitrariness and vulnerability of such a
relationship and force them to re-examine it themselves. These two
14 Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure 80,
63
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
passages, from the beginning and the middle respectively of Swift's A Modest
Proposal, can be used to illustrate the point:
I think it is agreed by all Parties, that this prodigious Number
of Children in the Arms, or on the Backs, or at the Heels of their
Mothers ... is in the present deplorable State of the Kingdom, a
very great additional Grievance; and therefore, whoever could
find out a fair, cheap, and easy Method of making these Children
sound and useful Members of the Commonwealth, would
deserve so well of the Publick, as to have his Statue set up for
a preserver of the Nation. 15
In this passage Swift casts his net particularly wide and only the most cynical
or sour of his audience would not find themselves giving a large measure of
assent to what is being said here by the satiric persona. The average reader
is drawn into what seems to be a highly rational and praiseworthy statement
of concern marked, apparently, by a sympathy which must gain the
audience's respect and attention.
The second passage, however, has very different implications and results:
I have been assured by a very knowing American of my
acquaintance that a young healthy Child, well nursed, is,
at a Year old, a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome
Food; whether Stewed, Roasted, Baked, or Boiled; and I
make no doubt, that it will equally serve in a Fricasie or
Ragoust.16
On encountering this second passage readers are suddenly put under
enormous pressure to revise their assessment of the satiric persona - and
that is entirely because of certain signifiers in the first passage which have, in
15 Swift, Tale 255.
16 Swift, Tale 257.
64
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the light of the second passage, been completely wrenched from their
sockets, so to speak. There is an unexpected though miniscule hesitation as
the readers realise that there has been a shift, and then they have to adjust to
the fact that these signifiers now point to a series of completely different
signifieds. The signifiers "fair," "preserver," "deplorable," "sound" and "useful,"
which in the earlier passage signified an attitude of caring and concern, have
here in retrospect been made to signify a callous and distantiated stance
which regards the poor as no more than a public nuisance. Similarly, the
many signifiers in the second passage which normally have as their signifieds
various pleasant aspects relating to cooking and eating, point instead to a
proposal of cannibalism as a means of reducing the numbers of indigent
people, replacing the reader's pleasure with horror. It is not merely that
certain signifiers now have different signifieds, but that these shifts have
collectively created a new and markedly uncomfortable world with which the
reader must now cope. By no mental or verbal juggling are readers able to re-
establish the status quo: they must either accept Swift's new world at face
value (and most readers would find this very difficult) or they must accept the
challenge this new world offers to explore the assumptions and conditions
prevailing in their own everyday world. The readers have been winkled out of
their snug ontological corner and may well feel angry and betrayed, as though
some unfair trick had been played on them, and they would be right. But it is
the kind of trick that might just lead the reader to grapple, for a while, with the
problem of language and meaning, and examine some of the moral bases of
society, both in Swift's time and in the present.
Yet anger is by no means the only reaction evoked by satire and, often, the
satirist's audience will be torn between anger and laughter, as well as several
other emotions. On the other hand, in some cases, as with the dystopian
novels of Orwell, laughter will be absent, though the effect of the satire on the
audience may be devastating. Examples of this in Nineteen Eighty-Four are
the name of the secret police torture centre ("The Ministry of Love"), and,
even less subtly, various slogans used by the state, such as "War is Peace"
and "Freedom is Slavery." It is certainly fair to say that the satirist's brand of
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linguistic disruption has some marked effect on the readers: it catches them
somewhere, often either on the raw or on the funny-bone, or both. There is,
though, a marked difference between an audience's reaction to a satirist and
its reaction to a humorist. The difference arises mainly from the divergent
intentions of the humorist and the satirist, as well as their differing perceptions
of their respective arts. Humour admits, by implication, its social and political
impotence, but satire, partly by its stance and partly by its choice of target,
behaves (whether justified or not) as though it has a greater effect on its
audience than simply to amuse them. Humour is one of the weapons or
strategies of satirists, but it is not their end, and the satirist is both more
hostile and more in earnest than the humorist. Satirists wish to involve their
audience in a dialogic process and they try to bring various attitudes and
preconceptions of their auditors to consciousness, in this case in order to
broaden awareness, but also to criticise them and exercise the satirist's
didactic function upon them. Above all, satirists try to force the audience to
react - to rob the audience of their ability to be neutral when confronted by
satire. In the face of satire, members of an audience (short of walking out of
the auditorium or closing the book) must either undergo an inner struggle to
defend their accustomed position or give in to satire's pressure for more
openness.
Satirists are emerging from the pages of this thesis as aggressive people and
that is not inaccurate, though such aggression is committed with a particular
aim in mind: to make people examine both the hidden assumptions and the
everyday events of their society and, perhaps, become aware of the faultlines
in that society. Russian formalism has evolved some theories about art in
general which have relevance to satire and aggression in particular. These
theories, according to Jameson, are "based on the opposition between
habituation and perception, between mechanical and thoughtless
performance and a sudden awareness of the very textures of the world and
language [which art can bring about]." 17Viktor Shklovsky, one of the founders
17 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and
Russian Formalism (Princeton: Prince UP, 1972) 50.
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of Russian formalism, defined art as "a defamiliarization, a making
strange ... of objects, a renewal of perception .... Art is in this context a way of
restoring conscious experience, of breaking through deadening and
mechanical habits of conduct. ..and allowing us to be reborn to the world in its
existential freshness and horror." 18 The concept of defamiliarization is
particularly relevant to satire since - whether one looks at A Modest Proposal
or Animal Farm - an important part of satiric strategy is to disrupt the
unthinking world of the average person, precisely in order to "make strange"
this world. Also significant is Shklovsky's point about "restoring conscious
experience," which is very much the kind of process desired by satire, in
some ways akin to the psychotherapist's aim of reintegrating repressed
memory into the fabric of consciousness.
Russian formalism, as described by Hawkes, proposes very ungentle ways of
furthering the defamiliarizing or alienating purpose of art "to shock us out of
the anaesthetic grip our language maintains on our perceptions." Hawkes, still
speaking of the formalist standpoint, reminds us of Saussure's view "that
native speakers tend to assume a necessary 'fitness', an unquestionable
'identity' between signifier and signified, between the 'sound image' made by
the word 'tree', and the concept of an actual tree. This assumption is the basis
of language's anaesthetic function." 19 Roman Jakobson, a formalist himself,
argues that the poet's task "requires him to refuse to permit that anaesthetic
to operate." According to him, "The function of poetry is to point out that the
sign is not identical with its referent." The "poet's attitude to language ... 'wakes
up' the reader, and makes him see the structure of his language, and so that
of his 'world', anew." 20 Foulkes, commenting on Maynard Solomon's notion
that" 'art is itself a strategy of demystification, a withdrawal. .. into a different
order of reality ' ," says, "A demystifying art ... is by its nature a subversive
and questioning art. It challenges habits and modes of perception, and
produces new ways of seeing and interpreting processes and relationships.
To do this successfully, it must be unpredictable, surprising, even
18 Jameson, Prison-House 50 -1.
19 Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (London: Methuen, 1978) 70.
20 Hawkes 70.
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shocking .... " 21 Finally, in a formulation which is of crucial importance to this
discussion of satire, Jakobson sees poetry as "a deliberate 'deformation' of
ordinary language: it is 'organized violence committed on ordinary speech,.,,22
As can be seen, Russian formalism encourages an attacking stance on the
part of art in general, and poetry in particular - and it envisages such an attack
as being conducted in precisely the way this thesis has proposed that satire
functions: by undermining the link between the signifier and the signified, and
in this way pulling the carpet out from underneath language itself. As a plan of
action for art in general this may, in practice, often be somewhat far-fetched
and liable to remain a theoretical concept - but it could function very
comfortably as a manifesto for the practice of satire, since it is satire that most
obviously has the requisite qualities to put such a plan into action. This thesis
claims a special standing for satire, since it is satire that is consistently
aggressive in a particularly ferocious and concentrated way, largely because it
is not motivated by aesthetic considerations, but by the satirical animus.
Satire functions unimpeded by any serious considerations of genre,
conventional plot, style or desire to entertain its audience (except as part of its
strategy of war), so that it can concentrate its energies on attacking the
factitious, the corrupt and the ridiculous. If, as Jakobson says, poetry in
general is "organized violence committed on ordinary speech," then satirists
are the Genghis Khans of literary art, in their deliberate and conscious
attitude of Schadenfreude towards both language and commonly-held views.
The attacking nature of satire has already been discussed in relation to
ancient Irish satirists. 23Randolph says that the Celtic satirist often "meant to
destroy his victim, flesh, bone, nerve, and sinew," as well as the victim's
possessions and relations. What was intended was "word-death."
Alternatively, the intention was often "to mutilate the victim's face so
shamefully that, if he were a man, he could hold no high tribal office; and if it
were a woman, she should be repulsive to those who might love her .... Few
21 A.P. Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda (London: Methuen, 1983) 56.
22 Hawkes 71.
23 See 15 above.
68
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
[early Irish] satires ... preserved to us fail to include the idea of physical
mutilation or destruction, an idea which the early Irish terms for satire and
satirists persistently stress." 24 Even when this ceased to be literally the case,
the idea of causing some kind of harm to one's victim remained an integral
part of satire. Renaissance theory on satire almost invariably involved words
such as scourge, whip, surgeon's scalpel, cauterizing iron, flay, cut, purge,
culprit, victim, whipper and executioner. 25 William Rankin, in 1598, wrote, "I
am a Satyre ... savage is my sport." 26 Randolph asserts that satire lost its
savagery towards the end of the seventeenth century, when there was more
concentration on "Reason ...Will, the workings of his mind, and [people's]
place in and in relation to society .... " Satire then became more philosophical
and psychological in the eyes of both critics and practitioners." But this thesis
regards Randolph's view as over-simplified, true only on the surface - and the
real inner nature of satire remains one of redness in tooth and claw, despite
the polished veneer of most Augustan satire. In any case, Swift speaks of
satirists kicking or beating the world's posteriors 28 - and if one turns to
modern satire, Nigel Dempster, a writer for Private Eye, is on record as saying
that people who "put themselves in the public eye must be aware that they
may be chastised." 29 More recently, Real has suggested that satire's aims
can be seen as those of "'demolition experts', of geniuses for 'intellectual
slum-clearance' .... ,,30
As it is clear that satire sets out, with some degree of force, to attack the
foundations of structuralism, one can safely say that it belongs among the
"demolition experts" and that its allegiance lies with those who are the
"intellectual slum-clearers" of our time. In fact, as suggested earlier in this
thesis, satire has strong familial associations with post-structuralism,
24 Mary Claire Randolph, "The Medieval Concept in English Renaissance Satiric Theory,"
Satire: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1971) 137- 8.
25 Randolph 135.
26 O.J. Campbell, "The Elizabethan Satyr-Satirist and his Satire," Satire: Modern Essays in -
Criticism, ed. Ronald Paulson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 89.
27 Randolph 135.
28 See 40-1 above.
29 Richard Ingrams (ed. Private Eye), interview, Tonight, SSC 1, London, 27 October 1976.
30 Real 9.
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specifically postmodernism, with its significant component of deconstruction.
Norris puts it as follows: "Deconstruction is avowedly 'post-structuralist' in its
refusal to accept the idea of structure as in any sense given or objectively
'there' in a text. Above all, it questions the assumption ... that structures of
meaning correspond to some deep-laid mental 'set' or pattern of mind which
determines the limits of intelligibility." 31
It has been shown how satire operates in terms of Saussure's signifier and
signified, shifting or disturbing the link between these two, giving the audience
pause (in both senses) and inducing a change in the linkage between words
and the objects or ideas to which they refer. What deconstruction does is
similar, though more radical than this. It also challenges the fixed nature of
the sign but, after it has disturbed the link between the signifier and the
signified, it suspends the usual process of communication of meaning and
sets in motion what Norris calls "the disconcerting 'free play' of signs" 32 - the
"giddying motion of pure differance,,,33 which may have no end. The genesis
of this latter term is attributed to Derrida, the father of deconstruction, who
has taken the Saussurean notion that it is the binary "difference" between
terms that allows them to exist and coined the term "differance," which
subsumes the French meanings of both differing and deferring - two aspects
which, for Derrida, are what always mark the sign and make for the inherent
quality of delay in the full communication of meaning. In other words, there
was already a gap (or delay) between the signifier and the signified, ready to
be deconstructed. What Derrida does is to drive a large wedge into this gap,
and make it into an ontological abyss. In fact, he has exploited the
possibilities offered by Saussure's notion of the sign by deconstructing it,
uncovering the faultline between signifier and signified which was not
expressed by Saussure but always existed. In short, as Atkins puts it,
"[d]econstructionists wish to avoid the interpretive mastery of closure that
imports into texts and the world meaning as transcendent truth or
31 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (London: Methuen, 1982) 3.
32 Norris 59.
33 Norris 60.
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significance, outside the play of difference." 34 Satire is not willing to go quite
as far as deconstruction in rejecting closure entirely, yet it does have a
reluctance to accept easy and ready closure of the sign, since this would
suggest a conservative and inflexible view of the world. In addition, both satire
and deconstruction are concerned with the matter of "play," in both senses of
the word: they both import a quality of flexibility into the fixity of the
structuralist paradigm, and they also insist that, within the pause or deferred
state of the link between the signifier and the signified, there should be an
opportunity for play, in the most childlike sense of the word. They are
temperamentally opposed to the po-faced rigidity of epistemology (indeed,
they assume that we cannot "know," in that self-satisfied way) and wish to
encourage a provisional and ontological approach towards language and
meaning, in which there is room for the childlike quality mentioned above.
It is a major contention of this thesis that satire is not, in essence,
prescriptive, but dialogic. Among the foremost discourses which share this
dialogic quality is psychoanalysis. In chapter 5 there will be further
examination of this issue in the light of the relationship between O'Brien and
Winston (in Nineteen Eighty-Four), which is on one level a parody of the
traditional relationship between psychoanalyst and patient. The arguments
about the use and abuse of psychoanalysis and psychiatry are very wide-
ranging, encompassing a whole spectrum ranging from the determined
professionalism of the majority of contemporary practitioners 35 to the wilful
betrayal of their calling by some psychologists in the former Soviet Union (for
example) who countenanced the transformation of mental hospitals into
places of torture for political dissidents:
What Lenin was prescribing, and what he began to put into effect,
was ... a process of purification .... The place for those classed as
undesirables was in concentration camps or, for political
34 Douglas G. Atkins, Reading Deconstruction, Deconstructive Reading (Lexington: UP of
Kentucky, 1983) 29.
35 See, for example, Nikolas Rose, "Psychiatry as a Political Science: Advanced Liberalism
and the Administration of Risk" History of the Human Sciences 9:2 (1996): 2-23.
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opponents, in lunatic asylums. Such camps and asylums
were already operating by 1918 [a year after the revolution]. 36
It is not the intention of this thesis to cover all the arguments on this issue.
However, the dialogic relationship established above between satire and the
psychological approach is intended to explore whether either discourse offers
a real degree of free thought and action to those it addresses. In the case of
psychology, this can only be so if this discourse is engaged in a constant
process of re-evaluation and self-examination, and of dialogism within itself,
of which the writings of David Epston and Michael White, under the influence
of postmodern thinking, show interesting signs:
If we accept [as Foucault has it] that power and knowledge
are inseparable ... and if we accept that we are simultaneously
undergoing the effects of power and exercising power over
others, then we will be unable to take a benign view of our
own practices .... We would work to identify the context of ideas
in which our practices are situated .... This would enable us to
more readily identify the effects, dangers, and limitations of
these ideas and of our own practices .... And instead of believing
that therapy has nothing to do with social control, we would
assume that this was always a strong possibility .... [We] would
also accept that we are inevitably engaged in a political activity.
This is not a political activity that involves the proposal of an
ideology, but one that challenges the techniques that subjugate
persons to a dominant ideology. 37
This quotation embodies many issues which are central to this thesis. It
strikes the keynote for the rest of this chapter, which will discuss and compare
the nature and role of various socio-political discourses which are relevant to
36 Dominique Colas, "Civil Society: From Utopia to Management, from Marxism to Anti-
Marxism," The South Atlantic Quarterly 94.4 (1995): 1021.
37 Michael White and David Epston, Literate Means to Therapeutic Ends (Adelaide: Dulwich
Centre Publications, 1989) 32-3.
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an examination of Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. The final
sentences of the quotation suggest that no social discourse can consider
itself to be apolitical, the implication being that psychology, even when it
challenges dominant ideologies, cannot entirely avoid having an ideology
itself. This is an expression of the postmodernist view which holds that all
discourses have an ideology (including postmodernism itself), and that mere
hostility towards dominant discourses does not, in itself, free any discourse
from the grip of ideology. The passage as a whole points to important links
between power, knowledge and language, which will be explored in Chapters
4 and 5. White and Epston's stand is clearly very honest, open and
courageous, yet its very honesty may lead us to ask whether the good
intentions of individuals are enough, if social, professional and political
structures do not reinforce laudable desires to be free of ideology, and to
encourage heteroglossia instead.
Like satire, psychotherapy offers structures which encourage change in
people, though perhaps not unlimited freedom. Yet there are undoubtedly
elements of power involved in the relationship between psychotherapist and
patient, and the dynamic of therapy makes equality and mutuality difficult.
Some therapists, like White and Epston, are opting out of the traditional
power patterns of therapy and replacing them with frameworks in which
patients also have power, specifically to ask questions and assess the
process, rather than delivering themselves entirely into the therapist's hands.
These therapists will demythologise the process by inviting patients to bring
other people to sessions, where their presence and verbal witness may be
helpful to the patient by forming links between the world of psychotherapy and
the more familiar world "out there," thus sharpening the dialogic quality of the
therapeutic process.
The collaborative nature of this process is paralleled by the essentially
dialogic nature of satire. In a satirical text or show the level of participation of
the audience is so intense that it can be called collusion, since it involves the
acceptance of some recognisably unnatural and fabricated features. Kreuz
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and Roberts discuss this aspect in terms of pretence and irony: the ironist
(who is often also a satirist) "pretends to be ignorant and injudicious, but the
listener ... correctly interprets the ironist's [or satirist's] utterance and, together,
the ironist and the listener constitute an 'inner circle' that is aware of the
pretense of the utterance." 38 There is also collusion involved in the
acceptance of the satirist's fantastical world as (temporarily) accurate and
"real," in the acceptance of the artistic, linguistic and moral authority of the
satirist and in the singling out and ridiculing of certain characters or ways of
thought. Goffman speaks of the willing suspension of disbelief which ordinary
theatregoers tacitly agree to make:
We willingly sought out the circumstances in which we
could be temporarily deceived or at least kept in the dark,
in brief, transformed into collaborators in unreality. And we
actively collaborate in sustaining this playful unknowingness ....
It might be said that a stage production was some sort of
voluntarily supported benign tabricatlon"
However, a satirical show goes further than this. Goffman says that the
"spatial boundaries of the stage [in an ordinary play] sharply and arbitrarily cut
off the depicted world from what lies beyond the stage line," 40 but this is the
diametrical opposite of the satirist's aim, which is to put the audience in touch
with the world beyond the stage line, paradoxically by drawing them into a
world which is itself not realistically credible. Satirists consistently violate the
theatrical frame by indulging in dialogism with individual members of the
audience, as well as revealing various aspects of their own selves (as
opposed to their satiric personae). In this the satirist behaves in the same way
as those psychotherapists who are willing to step outside the therapeutic
frame in the interests of the freedom of the patient. A further step - the
38 Roger J. Kreuz and Richard M. Roberts, "On Satire and Parody: The Importance of Being
Ironic," Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 8.2 (1993): 100.
39 Goffman 136, 138.
40 Goffman 139.
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enabling of the patient to become more independent and more in control of
what is happening - is commented on here by White and Epston:
This, along with invitations for persons to engage in activities
that generate an awareness of a process in which they are
simultaneously a performer and an audience to their own
performance ... provides for a context of reflexivity. This context
brings forth new choices for persons regarding the authoring
of themselves, others, and their relationships. 41
This encouragement of reflexivity is shared by both satire and psychotherapy,
but not so by the other socio-political discourses to be dealt with in this
chapter. Nevertheless, one needs to heed Linda Hutcheon's caveat that
"being made to feel that we are actively participating in the generation of
meaning is no guarantee of freedom; manipulators who make us feel In
control are no less present for all their careful concealment." 42 Thus, without
being too cynical, we need to be circumspect about accepting the bona fides
of even the most convincing psychotherapist - and we definitely need to be on
our guard when evaluating as slippery a customer as the satirist.
Certainly, when it comes to continually examining .one's motives and practices
in order to avoid potential dangers and limitations, the chances are that
psychotherapy will be more dutiful and rigorous than satire. After all,
psychology has governing bodies, rigorous training, professional ethics and
official accreditation to at least make it more likely that it will strive to be
responsible. Satirists, on the other hand, are answerable to no one except,
perhaps, themselves. They may proceed in a very blind and unexamined way,
if they choose. They are, in any case, expert at coming at topics and people
from eccentric and unexpected directions, and are very adept at covering their
tracks. They are masters of the double bind and enjoy keeping their audience
guessing for a lot of the time. They make a practice of speaking and behaving
41 White and Epston 24.
42 Hutcheon 92.
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In an opaque way, unless they wish to do otherwise for strategic purposes.
They are accustomed to using - or sometimes abusing - whatever ideas or
systems of thought come to hand, for all is grist to their mill. Their approach is
usually compounded of a strange mixture of facts, exaggeration, bias,
malevolence, impishness and I or general animus. For satirists to examine
themselves and their ideas as suggested above in the case of the therapist
might well lead to the collapse of the slender structure upon which satire is
built. In fact, it is likely that one of the props of that structure is a certain ability
in satirists to fool themselves as well - a certain tendency to become so
wrapped up in their particular combination of play and power that they are, to
some degree, sucked into the satiric world they create for their audience. This
is a step further than the collusion discussed earlier, since here the
manipulators are unable to step back from their own machinations, and are
caught in the same web as their audience. It is true that satirists maintain their
fringe status by having one foot outside the society they are addressing, but
even that may riot preserve their balance. In any case, such an attempt to
maintain a distance from their targets is made in order to facilitate the
proceedings of satirists, rather than to encourage critical examination of
themselves and their practices. As Karl Kraus, a Viennese satirist of the fin de
siecle, put it, "I don't like to meddle in my private affairs." 43 The satiric
impulse does not find self-examination highly attractive and, even if only by
default rather than intent, the distance under discussion comes very close to
being a means of control, a concept which would normally be associated with
a prime target of the satirist: the abuse of power. Thus, it seems, like blue
cheese which is given its flavour by microbes which we would normally
eschew, satire, in order to have its full potency, needs a degree of just that
kind of contamination which is its enemy. It is possible that part of the
cultivated ambiguity of the satirists' stance may also lie in a subtly equivocal
attitude to their audiences. The divide between psychotherapy and satire in
matters of responsibility and accountability is made clear if one asks oneself
whether a serious and responsible person would ever be any kind of success
43 Adam Philips, "How to be Viennese." Rev. of Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist, by Edward
Timms and Half- Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths: Selected Aphorisms of Karl Kraus, ed.
and trans. Harry Zohn. London Review of Books 9.5 (1987): 17.
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as a satirist, whose stock-in-trade is usually precisely of the opposite kind.
"Rational and benevolent reform is satire's social alibi, but is often maintained
on only the shakiest ground. Posing as the upstanding custodian of social and
cultural correction, satire often stumbles .... " 44
This contrast is also apparent when it comes to the exercise of power, where
it seems that satire may have more in common with postmodernism than
psychoanalysis, as the two former discourses are not able to have as great a
degree of influence on their audience as psychoanalysis. In practice,
psychoanalysts and psychotherapists are able to penetrate much more
deeply into the psyches of their patients than either postmodernism or satire
could ever achieve in relation to their target audiences. The limitations of
satire in the South African context are spelled out by Ian Glenn, who says that
" [Pieter-Dirk] Uys seems to lay down his art as helpless before extremism or
as unable to deal with political crisis as manifested in black-on-black
violence." 45 However, given the violent reaction that satire sometimes
arouses, one should perhaps credit it with more influence than
postmodernism and place it firmly between postmodernism and
psychoanalysis, particularly in view of what it does share with the latter.
Despite satire's lack of formal social or political influence, this thesis is
insistent that satire has a different kind of power which can, given the right
conditions, have a significant influence on society. Perhaps one could
conclude (tentatively) that satire embodies a great deal of the playfulness and
deconstructive nature of postmodernism (as well as its ontological
ruthlessness), while also sharing some of the serious and open intention to
change people that psychoanalysis has.
As it concerns psychotherapy (admittedly of the avant garde kind chosen for
discussion here), this process of change is set out by Epston and White in
terms of van Gennep's work on the "rite of passage," which he sees as
44 Erin Mackie, "The Culture Market, the Marriage Market, and the Exchange of Language:
Swift and the Progress of Desire," Theorizing Satire: Essays in Literary Criticism, eds Brian A
Connery and Kirk Combe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 173.
4S Ian Glenn, "South African Satire Now," New Contrast 77 (1992) 83.
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occurring in three stages: separation, transition and incorporation, 46 though
Epston and White (among others) refer to the middle phase as the "liminal
phase" 47 - an amendment of which the importance will become clear. The
idea is that psychotherapy operates very much along these lines, with the first
step being separation, in which people are detached from their familiar roles,
ideas, preconceptions and stock notions. People are encouraged by the
psychotherapist to "distinguish themselves from their problems by engaging in
[new and liberating] externalizing discourses in relation to these
problems .... This dislodges persons from certain familiar and taken-for-
granted notions about problems and from the dominant externalizing
discourses that guide their lives. This initiates the experience of liminality,"
the second stage of the process." In this unfamiliar space of the liminal many
of these thoughtlessly sustained ways of living are suspended. Liminality "is
'betwixt and between' known worlds, and is characterized by experiences of
disorganization and confusion, by a spirit of exploration, and by a heightened
sense of possibility." 49 One might add that the liminal space is an area with
potential for movement and change of many kinds - and that laughter and
play are both important agents of liminality, Bakhtinian issues which will be
relevant when satiric liminality is discussed. When Russian formalism speaks
of people and worlds being "made strange" it is, in fact, describing one of the
effects of liminality. Finally, there is the third stage, incorporation, in which
people are enabled to re-enter their familiar world, but at a different point and
in a different way. Their world may still be the familiar one, but in this final
stage people see both themselves and the world with new eyes, and (if the
psychotherapy is effective) are more open to engagement with change.
The process of satire can be seen as following the same pattern. Satirists first
proceed to dislodge people from their fossilised ways of thought and
behaviour, which they accomplish by various means. Satire is a freeing
46 Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, trans Monika B. Vizedom and Gabrielle L.
Caffee, introd. Solon T. Kimball (London: Routledge, 1960) 10-11.
47 David Epston and Michael White, Experience, Contradiction, Narrative & Imagination:
Selected Papers of David Epston and Michael White, 1989 - 1991 (Adelaide: Dulwich Centre
Publications, 1992) 15.
48 Epston and White 13.
49 Epston and White 15.
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externalising discourse par excellence, in that it separates people from their
familiar world as well as their habitual ways of thinking and reacting. It urges
them to take a step back from their everyday world, so that they may view it
more clearly. The gap created by this separation is a liminal space (the word
itself is derived from the Latin for "threshold") which is characterised by
provisionality and - as both psychotherapists and satirists know - once people
are persuaded or enticed into a liminal or threshold space there is the
potential for much movement, since provisionality generates its own dynamic.
As mentioned earlier, the laughter and the invitation to play which is the
hallmark of much satire, are themselves productive of liminality, and thus
further the process. As will become clear from the later discussion of Orwell's
novels, fairy tales and nightmares are also elements which encourage
liminality. In addition, looking back at the earlier discussion, one could say
that what postmodernism and deconstruction do to the sign is to induce an
element of liminality into it, either by suspending the link between the signifier
and the signified or by creating a situation in which the reader's attention
oscillates between the signifiers of different worlds. In all these cases, the
creative potential of liminality is exploited to the full and the power of the
threshold is demonstrated. Turner also delivers a warning: "Liminality is both
more creative and more destructive than the structural norm.,,50 The
implication here is that liminality's lack of containment makes it potentially
dangerous as well as offering challenges and opportunities. This is
recognised by the existence of structures and rites which help people to pass
safely through transitional experiences, whether they be tribal initiation,
religious conversion or the process of psychotherapy. In these cases there is
a tacit recognition that it is irresponsible and even potentially disastrous to set
people off on liminal quests without ensuring that there are sufficient
constraints to prevent those on the journey from losing their way entirely, and
thus being unable to return to the everyday world when they need to. It is
obvious that these are concerns which should exercise the mind of
psychotherapists, but when it comes to satire there are no such constraints
50 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York:
Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982) 47.
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because satire is in a rather different position. What the satirist does is, on the
face of it at any rate, not as serious and, certainly, satirists do not have the
depth of influence that psychotherapists, potentially, have over their patients:
the relationship between satirists and their audience is not as intimate as that
between psychotherapists and their patients, and it is always much easier and
less complicated for the satirist's audience to sever their relationship.
Given the three stages of van Gennep's framework, the satirist's aims and
methods are both similar to and different from those of psychotherapy.
Satirists precipitate and mediate shifts in people's views, initially using
laughter, irony, malice and fantasy to jolt them out of their old ways and draw
them into the liminal world created by satire. It should be noted, in passing,
that the popularity of horror films and the still widespread admiration for
Nineteen Eighty-Four indicates that terror can be as powerful as anything else
when it comes to drawing an audience into an alternative world. If the
audience, in response to the satirist's combination of blandishments and
goading, identify with his or her liminal world, they emerge as different people,
occupying a slightly different ontological place as a result of the satirist's
manoeuvrings. This process may be repeated many times in the course of a
satirical show or other text, since the satirist may offer access to a succession
of liminal worlds, return the audience to their original world, and then repeat
the process several times, the effect of these repeated little shocks or shifts
being to change the audience's relationship with their original world. They
may well emerge with a different standpoint, though how long such a
standpoint lasts and how deep it goes are debatable. It may well be argued
that the pull of a long-established view of reality is a very powerful one, but
the question which both satire and psychoanalysis ask is whether many
people really do engage, in the full sense of the word, with the concrete world
around them. Satirists and psychoanalysts would both like to see people
being less evasive when they relate to their surroundings and more honest in
their dealings with both themselves and others.
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It also needs to be recognised that satiric alternative worlds have their own
powerful attractions, particularly if, while audiences are under their spell,
satirists manage to infect them with something of their own fringe status. The
effect of satire can be particularly marked during and after a live performance,
as it is a shared communal experience during which people strengthen and
legitimate one another's new stance - though, in some cases, previously
existing ways of seeing the world will also be confirmed. Certainly there
seems to be an experience of bonding among the audience, both during and
after the performance, almost as though all have been through some process
of initiation at the hands of the satirist who, in this sense, may have
something of the shaman about him or her. This notion becomes even more
attractive when it is recalled that van Gennep's notion of the rite of passage
is, essentially, the framework within which this discussion is proceeding, and
that initiation always involves an element of danger to the initiate. It takes a
certain kind of courage to read a deeply satirical book or go to a satirical
show, particularly given the propensity of satirists in live performance to
pounce unexpectedly on members of their audience. People who want a quiet
life, with no growth or change, do not willingly place themselves in contact
with satire. However, it is conceivable that some members of such an
audience may, in reaction to the satirist, suddenly find themselves in the
position, posited by McKnight, of people who don't "really want to know what
is going on [and] would prefer to maintain illusions, including those
perpetrated by the current political and social status quo .... " 51
It is reasonable to suppose that most people desiring psychotherapy are also
taking the risk of change and unpredictable growth, whatever school of
psychology their psychotherapist espouses, though this thesis does make the
very broad distinction between the traditional modes of psychotherapeutical
praxis and the contemporary mode of psychotherapy chosen, because it is
most similar to satire and makes use of postmodern thought. Freud, speaking
of the disadvantages of becoming a psychoanalyst, expresses the following
opinion:
51 McKnight 197.
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As things stand at present, such a choice of profession would
ruin any chance he might have of success at a University, and ...
he would find himself in a society which did not understand his
efforts, which regarded him with distrust and hostility, and
unleashed upon him all the evil spirits lurking within it. 52
This suggests that there are also ties between the satirist and traditional
psychoanalysis, specifically relating to the suspicion with which both have
been (and, in many ways, still are) viewed by society. The mention of the evil
spirits lurking within society evokes the shamanistic aspects of satirists, seen
most clearly in their identification with sorcery in ancient times, their
marginalised status and their being a kind of emotional witch-doctor. A
summation by Coon of the relevant characteristics of shamans reveals their
similarities to satirists immediately:
In the anthropological literature, shamans have often been
categorized as natural neurotics who would have been social
misfits in a society like our own - the craziest hunters of all.
Actually, they were exceptionally intelligent and well-disciplined
53men ....
Certainly satirists are also often misfits - and it is not difficult to make out a
case for many of them being neurotic. They are also generally both highly
intelligent, as well as "the craziest hunters of ali," pursuing the follies and the
malignancies of society with a blend of off-beat reasoning and deadly
seriousness. Who but one of the tribe of crazy hunters, the American satirist
Bill Hicks, could have transfixed his prey with such deadly accuracy by
referring to the human race as "viruses with shoes"? 54 This view of humanity
has some connection with Freud's "evil spirits" of society and, whether they
are defined as people's own unexpressed hates and fears that trap and
52 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey, eds.
James Strachey and Angela Richards, The Penguin Freud Library vol. 1 (London: Penguin,
1991) 40.
53 Carleton S. Coon, The Hunting People (Boston: Little Brown, 1971) 390.
54 Meridian, Narr. Brian Sibley, BBC World Service, London, 1 Mar. 1997.
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harass them or the outward manifestation of such destructive emotions in the
bestial behaviour of a Stalin or a Hitler, these "evil spirits of society" are
among the concerns and the banes of both psychoanalysis and satire.
However, psychoanalysis tends to be much more dispassionate than satire
about its work, as one can see by comparing the stance and tone of Hicks's
remark with that of the following by Freud:
The thesis that symptoms disappear when we have made their
unconscious predeterminants conscious has been confirmed by
all subsequent research, although we meet with the strangest and
most unexpected complications when we attempt to carry it through
in practice. Our therapy works by transforming what is unconscious
into what is conscious, and it works only in so far as it is in a
position to effect that transformation. 55
The processes of satire are not amenable to the kind of research Freud
mentions, nor do satirists have his calm certainty, which suggests a kind of
power or control in the hands of the psychoanalyst. There is no saving doubt
in Freud here, and it is this certainty that Epston and White's views and
practices are intended to counteract. Yet (fortunately) Freud is not always so
sure of himself and, in general, it is fair to say that psychoanalysis and satire
share a sense that much of what they do is not completely explicable. Both
discourses work with the unconscious, though satirists do so in a much more
covert way. Certainly, as will be shown, Orwell's satire in Animal Farm and,
especially, Nineteen Eighty-Four, is deeply concerned with both individual and
collective devils, whether they be psychic and invisible or only too visible
human beings wielding machines of torture, whether they manifest
themselves as individual "viruses with shoes" or as whole societies which
operate in a psychologically toxic environment.
However, psychology does not have the satirist's lack of commitment to
formal frameworks and inventive ways with language, qualities which bring to
55 Freud 321.
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mind not the solemn doctor of the soul, but the trickster - the marginalised
shaman-like figure about whom people feel both unease and fascination. ("I
and my public understand each other very well," [Karl Kraus] noted: "it does
not want to hear what I say, and I don't say what it wants to hear. ") 56 Kern
provides the origin of the term "trickster" which, originally, "was the name
given to a clownish figure of mercurial unpredictability and changeability, a
mythical hero of North American Indians .... " 57 Tricksters are shifty, roguish,
ambiguous and cunning - though they can also be Lords of Misrule who turn
the world upside down in acts of creative chaos from which can spring new
knowledge and awareness for others. In Greek mythology it is Hermes, the
messenger of the gods, who is regarded as the archetypal trickster figure -
and he is renowned for both his puckishly thieving nature and his capacity to
cause the liberating laughter which can threaten whole edifices of rule-bound
structures with destruction by ridicule." Kern says that "Tricksters are the
instigators of carnivalesque activities, whether ... jesters, clowns, devils, or
saintly prophets of the nature of Nietzsche's Zarathustra." 59 As we have
seen, Bakhtin values the carnivalesque highly for its destabilising effects."
Tricksters are also associated with the creation of liminal states, which they
induce in a similar way to the satirist, by means of the farcical, the ridiculous
and the fantastic. Literature abounds in trickster figures, among them
Tartuffe, Moll Flanders, Falstaff and Chaucer's Nicolas - though tricksters are
often also the scapegoats of society which, while being entertained by their
winning ways, may turn on them and exact revenge for their unconventionality
and association with the liminal.
This constitutes a severe limitation on tricksters, and suggests that if they do
have power it is never licence. In this tricksters partake more of the comic
than the satiric, since it is the comic that has an unwritten contract with
society not to exceed its levels of tolerance. The trickster is absolutely
dependent on the goodwill of society, while satirists reserve the right to
56 Philips 16.
57 Edith Kern, The Absolute Comic (New York: Columbia UP, 1980) 117.
58 Murray Stein, In Midlife. A Jungian Perspective (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1983) 3-5.
59 Kern 117.
60 See 1-2 above.
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antagonise society when they wish, and avoid coming to terms with those who
constitute their potential targets. This leaves satirists in a much more isolated
and vulnerable position, yet it is essential for the work of the satirist. To be a
loner is traditionally the fate of any artist, but the loneliness of the satirist is a
particularly impenetrable and intense one and, one could say, the success of
the satire depends on it. Company could be dangerous to satire, since
company could easily become society, intruding into the particular kind of
critical and creative space that the satirist needs and associating satire with a
group of people, rather than a single one. Satirical collaboration has never
been common, with perhaps the best known example of such collaboration
having occurred (significantly, in the eighteenth century) between the
members of the Scriblerus Club, which included Swift, Pope and Gay, though
even that was short-lived. In general, satirists are not egalitarian and their
loyalty - their approval even - is not easily given. One could call the satirist an
elitist or, to put a different slant on it, something of a hermit, at least by
temperament: if the examples of satirists such as Swift, Pope and Orwell, are
anything to go by, it is important to satirists that they at least see themselves
as isolated (and, perhaps, beleaguered in some sense) even though they
may, in fact, have a reasonably happy, if limited, social life, as seems to have
been the case with the three satirists mentioned. Certainly, for satirists to be
part of a cause or a member of a political party could blunt their edge and
dilute their venom. Adders and vipers are at their most irritable and dangerous
when confined, and satirists have to find ways of preserving and
concentrating their spleen. It could be argued that most artists need creative
space in order to be successful, but satirists also need to feel that they stand
alone in a world which is both foolish and threatening.
The degree of detachment from society that the satirist thrives on is very
different from the mass influence and contact which some more obviously
political discourses seek and foster. Discourses which emanate from
individuals rather than the state operate on a very different basis, since the
latter have the whole machinery of government to call upon. Such
considerations are important because they govern the amount of control that
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these respective discourses are able to exercise on their audiences. Satire
may be seen by some of its individual victims as offensive and by some of its
political targets as dangerous. Nevertheless, the potential harm inflicted by
satire is limited by its lack of a power base of any kind, since it operates from
the fringes of society and is unable to call on any kind of organisational help
to achieve its aims. "For the world of power in a kind such as satire, which is
often about things political, is remarkably lacking in efficacy .... " 61 Perhaps
satire, by its nature, does not require such help and, in any case, the lack of
access to power is surely the only sure safeguard against its abuse. The other
discourses to be considered in this chapter - ideology, propaganda and
political myth - do not have such safeguards in relation to power, since they
are often part of massive systems of control.
For satire, didacticism (a comparatively mild form of power) is one of its
greatest potential pitfalls: it may want to achieve certain aims too badly. There
is sometimes a sense in which, while encouraging their audience to explore
alternative worlds, satirists are not entirely disinterested as to the results of
their art. Satirists have their thumb on the scale to a certain extent, and they
do not always approach their task or communicate with their audience in an
entirely detached way. The way in which they interpose the lens of their work
between their audience and the world outside the text can be liberating, but
they may also wish subtly to direct the audience towards specific new insights
about the world.
Satire can also be distinguished from other literary discourses in that it is
grounded in the world in a unique way, since it is a mode that consistently
refers to historical and contemporary events and ideas in the world outside
itself for its foundations - even for its very right to exist and be taken seriously.
Hence satire's literary relevance is often reliant on the importance of its
contemporary social referents: if they are not sufficiently memorable then the
61 John Snyder, Prospects of Power: Tragedy, Satire, the Essay, and the Theory of Genre
(Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1991) 25.
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satirical work in question may be neglected by later generations. There is an
inherent need for satire to be grounded in contemporary issues, which also
have some universality, in order to be understood and effective in both its
own time and beyond it. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the satirist also needs a
degree of detachment from the concerns of the society being satirised. What
this amounts to is a restatement of the paradoxical situation of both satire and
satirist which has been insisted on from the beginning of this thesis.
This rather complex picture of how satirists are embedded in their society
raises important issues about the nature of satire, particularly its relationship
to the socio-political discourses against which it is to be measured, the first of
which is ideology. The concept of ideology has modulated over time, so that
modern views of it will differ widely from those held after the French
revolution, when the term first surfaced in a politically meaningful way. At that
time, it was the so-called "ideologues" who set the philosophical seal on the
revolution, though they were later discarded by Napoleon, who could not
tolerate the radicalism of their ideas 62_which does suggest something about
the vulnerability of ideology, despite the fact that it wears an air of great
assurance while it is accepted. This may explain the tendency in totalitarian
states to safeguard and promote ideology by means of propaganda, terror
and political myth. Contemporary social scientists tend to shy away from the
stigmatisation of ideology which has been - and still is - very common, and to
suggest that ideology can serve other, less questionable, purposes. Clifford
Geertz, for example, acknowledges that it is one of the tasks of the social
sciences "to criticize [ideologies], to force them to come to terms with (but not
necessarily surrender to) reality.,,63 This is a very even-handed approach,
which is painstaking in its attempts to avoid absolute judgements about
ideology, so much so that it implicitly accepts that a kind of armed neutrality
rather than a wholehearted commitment to "reality" is in order, even in a
discourse which wields so much power over people. Nevertheless, the notion
62 George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1967)
4-5.
63 Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," The Interpretation of Cultures.· Selected
Essays by Clifford Geertz (London: Hutchinson, 1975) 232.
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of ideology as a force to be regarded with suspicion remains strong and, as
will become clear, a stance such as that of Geertz would have been
unacceptable to Orwell as well, both as a satirist and as a democratic socialist
(his own description of his political stance)." Geertz's case for a relativistic
view of ideology is summed up as follows:
Whatever else ideologies may be - projections of unacknowledged
fears, disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group
solidarity - they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social
reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience.
Whether, in any particular case, the map is accurate or the conscience
creditable is a separate question to which one can hardly give the
same answer for Nazism and Zionism, for the nationalisms of
McCarthy and of Churchill, for the defenders of segregation and its
opponents. 65
Geertz here, by implication, acknowledges that ideology can be the bearer of
feelings and motives which have been either deliberately or unconsciously
evaded and repressed by whole groups or societies, though he makes no
comment on the poor mental hygiene which such habits represent. He also
suggests that ideology can be a kind of social glue, uniting people and
providing an ordered framework within which societies may be contained,
though what he does not ask is when the price of unity becomes too high and
containment becomes claustrophobia, nor does he consider a situation in
which unity may be attained at the cost of individual freedoms. His boldest
assertion is that ideologies can provide "maps of problematic social reality
and matrices for the creation of collective conscience." These assertions are
delivered from the viewpoint of one who describes and dissects social
phenomena, rather than judging them or even commenting on them. Geertz
speaks as a social scientist, but the satirist's stance is a very different one
64 George Orwell, "Why I Write," The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George
Orwell [hereafter referred to as CEJL], eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. I (London:
Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 5.
65 Geertz 220.
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and it is at this point that satire and social science definitively part company.
Satire's natural scepticism makes it unable to be as detached and accepting
as this and it would certainly never claim to be a science, though it is quite
capable of satirising (no doubt unfairly) the claims of sociologists to be
scientists.
The emotional charge carried by the term "ideology" will differ according to
people's political beliefs and even that is not a sure guide. Marxism, for
example, has a bad name among many writers on ideology, yet Marxist views
are not that predictable, as the case of Orwell shows. Traditional Marxists (of
whom Orwell certainly was not one) view the term "ideology" as a criticism to
be applied to systems of thought (not acceptable to Marxism) which favour
the interests of a particular group, while for many of their more modern
counterparts it is a more neutral term. Marx himself frequently referred to
ideology as "false consciousness":
By false consciousness Marx appears to have meant a set of
mistaken beliefs about matters important to them shared by a
whole group of persons or even a whole community. [False
consciousness] consists of a number of closely related illusions
common to all or nearly all persons whose situations or roles in
society are the same. 66
Both Marx and Engels adopted a privileged stance in this matter, since they
did not regard their own theory as ideology, even though it is a theory which
does favour the interests of a particular class - the proletariat. Their theory
was not, in their view, an ideology (and thus false consciousness) because of
the nature of the proletariat who, they believed, have an unconscious
understanding of the historical processes of history and act upon them with a
kind of instinctive sureness by revolting against oppressive political and social
structures. There is, for Marxism, a kind of inherent human and political virtue
66 John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Pall Mall P, 1970) 24.
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in the proletariat which elevates them above other classes in this respect (a
view which Winston clings to in Nineteen Eighty-Four). Such thinking
encourages the use of the term "ideology" as an easy way of negating any
political philosophy which differs from one's own. It turns what might be a
neutral term into one of abuse, except when an ideology of one's own (which
is then not identified as an ideology) is concerned. These views represent a
dangerous temptation for Marxists unjustifiably to occupy the moral and
political high ground and are also an example of the phenomenon of
"doublethink" which flourishes in the totalitarian state of Oceania depicted in
Nineteen Eighty-Four. The French intellectual Raymond Aron does not even
bother to refute directly the Marxist claim that it is not an ideology, but simply
speaks of the Soviet state as one in which ideology reigns supreme:
So much does the [Soviet] Communist regime call upon ideology ...
that it has often been called an ideocracy. It is always necessary
to contrast ideology and reality, a distinction which is often difficult
.to draw. But it is particularly relevant in the case of a regime which
is more directly based on ideology than any other .... To believe in
a false idea is sometimes enough to make it true. 67
However, Orwell wrote in the days of the worst excesses of Stalinist
communism and since then there have been some changes, as Plamenatz
indicates:
Marxists today do not speak of ideology always as though
it were a form of false consciousness. They even use such
expressions as 'the communist ideology' ... : expressions
which older Marxists avoid. Perhaps when they call even
Marxism an ideology they think of it as serving to hold a
party or class together and to guide their actions. When they
think of it primarily as explaining the course of social change,
67 Raymond Aron, Democracy and Ideology, trans.Valence lonescu (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1968) 162.
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they call it a theory .... This theory or ideology is, they think,
essentially true, though sometimes misapplied by those who
accept it. 68
So, in some important circumstances Marxists will refer to their beliefs as a
theory and, in all cases, they will maintain that this remains true, though
theory may go awry through misapplication. But what has remained constant
among Marxists (as well as many other groups) is the absolute, almost
religious, faith which ideology (which most groups do not call by that name)
habitually arouses in its adherents, stemming perhaps from the need that
people have for a framework of ideas that makes sense of the world for them
and, if possible, also offers them hope for the future. This thesis does not
dispute the common humanity of such a need, but it does recognise the
distinction between apparently benign systems of meaning (ideologies) which
provide comfort and unity to a society, and those which are labelled
ideologies because they are seen by one or other group as harmful. However,
as the foregoing discussion indicates, this distinction is not a clear-cut one,
depending heavily on the stance and intention of those who wield the ideology
and the perceptions of those who feel threatened by it.
Ideology, as discussed in this thesis, is political ideology as it manifests itself
in the modern world. The phenomenon of ideology is not new, but what is
new is the conscious and systematic application of ideology by sophisticated
means within modern societies with the express purpose of controlling large
groups of people, without sufficient concern for their political or human rights.
It is this, still generally unpopular, manifestation of ideology which was
Orwell's satirical target in both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four,
becoming embedded in the minds of millions as summed up by Geertz: "I
have a social philosophy; you have political opinions; he has an ideology." 69
Irrespective of the efforts of some social scientists to diminish its threatening
aspect in favour of a more detached view, the former is the manifestation of
68 Plamenatz 80.
69 Geertz 194.
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ideology with which Orwell is concerned - and it is on this view of ideology that
the thesis will focus, though not without drawing attention to the limitations of
such a view. It has been said that Orwell himself had certain personal
"ideological propositions, to which he was fiercely committed [and which
remained] unacknowledged." 70 Without attempting to lessen the accusation,
it may be said that this is a general truth about human nature; though in the
case of Orwell, such a charge must be weighed, in a spirit of dialogism,
against earlier assertions about the clarity of thought with which satirists are
endowed. However, what Orwell depicts in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-
Four, is not simply personal idiosyncrasy, but a manifestation of political
ideology which has caused, and continues to cause, grave physical and
mental harm to untold numbers of people.
It was mentioned earlier that satire seems to be less open-minded than
literature in general, since it has a certain didactic thrust which may not leave
its audience entirely free. Thus, on the face of it, satire has certain affinities
with ideology, but the differences between satire and ideology begin to
emerge when one puts them into a dialogic relationship. It then becomes
apparent that, in comparison to the ideologist, the satirist is a model of
reasonableness. If satirists sometimes combine their efforts to free their
audience with a slight nudge in the direction of a particular view of reality, they
do not try to imprison them in it unconditionally, which is the aim of the
ideologist. Both satire and ideology are very down to earth, in that both build
on the situation of society as they find it, yet they do it in very different ways.
Satirists, as has been shown earlier, have a range of strategies through which
they try to persuade people to change because their present behaviour is
foolish, inconsistent, anti-social or immoral - but, above ali, unthinking.
Ideologists, being concerned more with ends than means, are preoccupied
mainly with issues of power, even if they may also profess some concern
about the moral or emotional welfare of the body politic and, since ideology
does not spring out of thin air and is most powerful when it is based on the
70 Daphne Patai, The Orwell Mystique· A Study in Male Ideology (Amherst: U of
Massachusetts P, 1984) 266.
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familiar, ideologists will take as their raw material whatever strong beliefs,
likes and dislikes they find already extant in a society and elaborate on those
that will further their cause. Geertz's views on Nazi ideology illuminate the
above point:
Hitler was not distorting the German conscience when he
rendered his countrymen's demonic self-hatred in the
tropological figure of the magically corrupting Jew; he was
merely objectifying it - transforming a prevalent neurosis
into a powerful force. 71
The power of ideologists to do harm both to those whom they are targeting as
scapegoats and to those upon whom they are practising ideology is well
illustrated here. As so often, ideologists in this instance recognised the need
for the German people to have a collective scapegoat - a group of people
who could be saddled with all that the German people disliked about
themselves. In psychological terms, they needed to project their own
perceived inferiority onto relatively powerless outsiders, who could be made
to carry that burden for them and allow them to feel superior. This distrust of
Jews may already have been present in the collective unconscious of the
German people (as a fear of "the Other" may be present, unconsciously, in
most people), but it took a master of both ideology and propaganda - Joseph
Goebbels - to foster distrust into a burning hatred and use it as an instrument
of state policy, making it a cornerstone of the ideological fabric of the Third
Reich. Geertz's use of the term "magically" points to the hidden way in which
ideology often operates, working as it usually does through deep-seated
needs and drives of which the majority of the population is not consciously
aware. It is obvious that if one is not aware of one's deepest needs and drives
one is going to find it very difficult to defend oneself against being
manipulated and exploited through them. The issues of the "magical" aspect
of ideology, as well as the matter of political scapegoating, are well illustrated
71 Geertz 232.
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by the role of Snowball in Animal Farm and Goldstein In Nineteen Eighty-
Four.
As is becoming clear, ideology is much more in earnest than satire, partly
because satire's habitual stance is an ironic one, which can involve attitudes
such as diffidence, self-mockery and doubt, and its habitual mode is a
humorous one, even if the humour is often of a ferocious kind. The stance of
ideology is always an absolute one, without self-doubt or compromise, and it
does not deal in humour unless it is of a scarifying kind directed at the enemy.
Its aim is not merely to force the whole of its audience to believe in the
version of reality which it offers, but also to make them believe that every
other way of looking at life is worthless. Ideology seeks to polarise issues, and
to present those who are opposed to it as so irrational, natve or even evil that
compromise or co-existence with them is impossible. To this end, the
ideologist will provide signifiers which can be used to distance "unbelievers"
and to render them as alien - even inhuman - as possible. These signifiers
may, under other circumstances or in other communities, be neutral or carry
other connotations, but in this particular context they have become so loaded
because of their connection with the particular ideology that they carry an
enormous charge of repulsion which works exactly as the ancient taboos did -
by engendering a sense of rejection and hatred at a very primitive level which
modern people seldom experience in a conscious way. Hence, the word
"Jew," in other contexts merely a descriptive term, aroused deep communal
loathing and an unbearable sense of the "otherness" of the person in the
average German during the Nazi period; so it is not by chance that Orwell
named his scapegoat figure "Goldstein." Similarly, in former days in
Communist Russia, the term "capitalist" 72 was sufficient to evoke the same
reaction. There is a network of ideological beliefs and prejudices underlying
such reactions, but its nature and its mechanisms are seldom clear to many
people within any society.
72 JAC. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963) 119
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Gouldner highlights the ambitiousness and all-embracing tendencies of
ideology when he says:
[N]ow that the whole self has been reorganised in terms that
hinge on the ideology, the latter cannot be lightly opened up
for examination; it cannot be kept perpetually open to continual,
critical examination or challenge. Known with an inward
conviction, there seems to be nothing more, or at least nothing
more of comparable importance, for the ideologue to know. 73
The rigidity of outlook in ideology is matched by the narrowness and
exclusivity of the language in which it is formulated - a language which
consists of invented terms or those taken from everyday speech, but in either
case purged of any associations or reverberations beyond those that will
serve ideology in the most obvious and direct way. The whole structure of
Newspeak, the emasculated form of language devised by the rulers of
Oceania, demonstrates how ideology controls and disempowers people,
limiting their ability to think by curtailing the range of signification of their
language. According to Arendt, the ideologue believes we have "the right to
retreat into our own worlds of meaning, and demand[s] only that each of us
remain consistent within his own private terminology." 74 Satirists, by
implication, deny such a right: their appeal is to all people, their attempt is not
to establish philosophical and linguistic insularity and their kind of reality is a
social or communal manifestation, in the broadest sense of the term. Satirists
may indeed play games with language worlds, as has been demonstrated, but
their ironic and / or humorous stance warns the audience that all may not be
what it seems: the satirical world may, at times, approximate to the perceived
world of its audience and, at other times, it may try to pull the carpet out from
beneath it, but it is very clear that it does not try to pass itself off as anything
but a fantastic or fictitious world which has no kind of enduring quality. As has
been shown, satirists have unwritten contracts with their audiences, whereby
73 Gouldner 47.
74 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (London:
Faber,1961) 96.
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both parties know what is happening and the audience willingly give
themselves to the process. But ideologists have no such contract with their
communities though, like satire, they manipulate language worlds; but they
offer their audience no signals as to what they are doing, and their discourse
uses language to offer people a coherent system of meaning that is to be
taken entirely at face value.
According to Gouldner, "Ideology ... is ... the effort to 'normalize' relations
between ... power and goodness, making that which is good, powerful and that
which is powerful, good." 75 This raises many questions about the definition of
the good and the powerful, not to mention the thorny question of what is
meant by "normalize," and the later discussion of Nineteen Eighty-Four will
certainly throw further light on this particular formulation. For the moment,
suffice it to say that ideology is beginning to look like satire wearing jackboots
since, unlike satire, it has access to the full might of the state in terms of
guns, laws and printing presses to help it apply pressure to society so that its
ideals "may be realised.
This argument is germane to the matter of Swift and Orwell's functioning as
political writers as well as satirists. Both were extremely interested in politics
and much of their satire has a high political content. The fact that they both
produced serious political material and did not confine themselves to satire
may well suggest a longing for more substantial (i.e. overtly political) power,
rather than simply the ability only to point, however forcefully, to what may be
amiss and to direct laughter and scorn in its direction, while coaxing their
audience to experiment with new ways of seeing the world. Given different
circumstances, either or both of them might have become ideologists - and it
is impossible to deny that both of them, at various points in their careers,
produced what can only be called propaganda.
Satirists may have to take care lest they become too committed to one
particular party, and thus imprisoned in an ideology which turns them into little
75 Gouldner 85.
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more than political hacks. Todorov insists that, for the writer, "Recognizing the
political dimension of life does not mean allowing oneself to be enlisted by a
party in the service of some dogma." 76Orwell himself said, "In sentiment I am
definitely 'left', but I believe that a writer can only remain honest if he keeps
free of party labels.,,77 The only political party 78 that Orwell joined was the
Independent Party (in 1938), though within 18 months he was at loggerheads
with it.79 The result of this, in practice, is that "both Swift and Orwell have
been seen as traitors to their own parties [to which they were not fully
committed], advocates for the wrong side." 80 Some satirists have overtly
served the cause of specific political parties, though one does not have to be
a paid-up member of a party to do that. The eighteenth-century cartoonist,
Gillray, was undeniably a propagandist (though that did not stop him from
being a very effective satirist) because of his biting attacks on King George III
and his family - and, as Jowett and O'Donnell relate, "after Gillray's
conversion to conservatism as a result of his dismay at the French
Revolution, he launched a long series of political attacks ridiculing Napoleon
and the French, while glorifying John Bull and the common Englishman" 81
By remaining at least relatively free of cast-iron political loyalties the majority
of satirists sacrifice the chances of a certain kind of power, but they retain a
greater objectivity and the ability to operate in relative freedom from ideology.
Such a lack of overt commitment is useful to satirists, since it makes it more
difficult for their victims to pin them down in order to make a counter-attack on
them. Satire is very much a free spirit when compared with the dour
purposefulness of ideology, and it is clear that the two discourses are, in fact,
natural enemies.
76 Tzvetan Todorov, "Politics, Morality, and the Writer's Life: Notes on George Orwell,"
Stanford French Review 16.1 (1992): 139.
77 George Orwell, Autobiographical Note, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II
~London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 23-4.
8 John Rodden, 'The Politics of Literary Reputation: George Woodcock and the Anarchists'
Orwell," Queen's Quarterly 95.2 (1988): 334.
79 Michael Sheldon, Orwell: The Authorised Biography (London: Heinemann, 1991) 327-8.
80J.J. Peereboom, "Swift and Orwell: Utopia as Nightmare," Between Dream and Nature:
Essays on Utopia and Dystopia, ed. D. Baker-Smith and C.C. Barfoot (Amsterdam, Rodopi,
1987) 97.
81 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1986) 51.
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If ideology is set in a dialogic relation with postmodernism, on the other hand,
a very different result is obtained. Postmodernism acknowledges the
existence of ideology, but, as Hutcheon indicates, it regards ideology more as
a common condition of existence than a problem to be grappled with and
eradicated:
What postmodern theory and practice has taught is less that
'truth' is illusory than that it is institutional, for we always act and
use language in the context of politico-discursive conditions ....
Ideology both constructs and is constructed by the way we live
our role in the social totality ... and the way we represent that
process in art. Its fate, however, is to appear as natural, common
sense. Our consciousness of ourselves is usually, therefore,
uncriticized because it is familiar, obvious. 82
The provisional and uncommitted nature of postmodernism has worried some
commentators but here, as elsewhere, these qualities result in a fresh
approach to stock issues. Hutcheon's statement about truth circumvents
many of the traditional ways of discussing both "truth" and language by
focusing on what constitute both the roots and the framework of both "truth"
and language: the political institutions of society. In this way, postmodernism
takes the discussion away from the purely aesthetic or linguistic and into the
realm of the political. It is in the social and political realm that matters such as
"truth," language and ideology are both formed and used as the unexamined
basis for everyday life. Thus, calmly disentangling itself from the toils of liberal
humanist 83 and modernist belief, postmodernism sets out one of the
conditions of existence which it believes has to be accepted: our helplessness
82 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism. History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge,
1988) 178.
83 Modernism is generally associated with humanism. For example, see Daniel Stern, "The
Mysterious New Novel," Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities in Revolution, ed. Ihab
Hassan (Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1971) 26. For a discussion of Orwell's liberal
tendencies, see Rai: "Orwell is a liberal who endorses and owes allegiance to the socialist
critique of liberalism and capitalism; and his career is, in its particular form, a working through
of that contradiction."(1) Arthur Eckstein, in "1984 and George Orwell's Other View of
Capitalism" Modern Age 29.1 (1985), also explores the nature of Orwell's liberalism (18).
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in the face of forces which can perhaps be made conscious but can neither
be fitted into some neat and logical framework nor eradicated. The message
is that the force of ideology is a complex and all-pervasive thing, and if we
really want to eradicate it we may have to eradicate society first.
What seemed to escape Orwell was that one could not avoid having an
ideology simply by avoiding formal commitment to any official party or
organisation - and that to approach life (or literature) with one's hands
surgically clean of all ideology was not possible. For Orwell things were
much more clear-cut, and he tended to sound the alarm bells and man the
gun turrets when he saw an obvious example of ideology approaching. His
consistently liberal view of the political writer was that he or she should (and
could) address the issues of the day without embracing any political ideology -
a stance he continued to hold even when anxiety about what he saw as a
future "political and cultural apocalypse" 84 drove him to write such committed
political novels as Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. 85
But the advent of postmodern thought has, as Jameson says, brought about
"the eclipse of all the affect (depth, anxiety, terror, the emotions of the
monumental) that marked high modernism and its replacement with what
Coleridge would have called fancy and Schiller aesthetic play .... " 86
Specifically, postmodernism is less adversarial about the subject of ideology,
perhaps because postmodernist art and theory in general acknowledge that
postmodernism itself has ideological longings of a kind, as Hutcheon
indicates:
[Postmodern] writers have an ideological impulse: the desire
to challenge the institutional structures of bourgeois society
(usually seen as being reinforced by realism) by awakening
84 David M. Zehr, "George Orwell: The Novelist Displaced," Bucknell Review 27.1 (1982): 29.
85 Zehr, "George Orwell" 23, 30.
86 Fredric Jameson, foreword, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Know/edge, by Jean-
Francois Lyotard, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota
P, 1979) xviii.
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readers to the political implications of accepted literary practices. 87
Postmodernism has tried to reunite the political and the aesthetic, believing
that they have important things to say to each other. Instead of simply vilifying
and rejecting ideology, postmodernism has learned to live with it, examine it,
deconstruct it and incorporate it into the patchwork of creative and dynamic
contradictions that postmodernism represents. In fact, the very insistence by
postmodernism that process is more valuable than conclusions, as well as its
tendency to nurture contradictions rather than resolve them, is a denial of the
monolithic and controlling structures of ideology. Insisting as it does on its
provisionality and its refusal to countenance closure, postmodernism
contrives to dance as well as take issue with its antagonists, so that the term
"antagonist" loses its meaning. Using a form of ontological jujitsu instead of
encouraging a head-on encounter, postmodernist art, as Hutcheon says,
"asserts and then deliberately undermines such principles as value, order,
meaning, control, and identity ... that have been the basic premises of
bourgeois [liberal ideology]." 88
The difference between Orwell's views and those of postmodernism is partly a
matter of different experience and different historical times: the terrors of the
Nazi and Stalinist regimes (as well as the Soviet invasion of Hungary) have
ceased to be realities, in the intellectual sense, to a new generation, and the
ideologies which these regimes were able to impose so powerfully have lost
their hold both on their previously captive populations and the imaginations of
subsequent thinkers. However, Orwell's ideas about ideology were not always
predictable. On the one hand, he had the satirist's habit of exaggerating, and
for his tendency to depict such issues through the distorting lens of satire we
need look no further than his nightmarish and surreal depiction of totalitarian
rule in Nineteen Eighty-Four. However, when he was speaking as a political
commentator who was not attempting to be satirical, he could take a very
different line, a result no doubt of the fact that the attempt to be fair-minded in
87 Hutcheon, Poetics 141-2.
88 Hutcheon Poetics 13.
100
the classic English way underpinned his thought and writing, as well as his
life. His fairness is highlighted by some rough notes he made in the last year
of his life, when he wrote "Gross unfairness & misleading ness of much
criticism of both USA & USSR, because of failure to allow for the size of these
countries." 89 This piece of even-handedness comes from the pen of a long-
time vigorous crusader against the Soviet Union, at which both Animal Farm
and Nineteen Eighty-Four were, in large part, aimed.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that Orwell's personal views were not devoid
of ideology, since he never abandoned his allegiance to socialism though he
would, no doubt, have considered this to be a benign example of ideology, if
in fact he allowed it to be ideology at all. Perhaps a sign that Orwell was in his
own idiosyncratic way indeed not an ideologue is that he made no single and
obvious statement about his political beliefs, leading various people who knew
him to offer widely differing comments on the subject. Frederic Warburg, one
of Orwell's publishers, denies that Orwell "was ever a socialist, though he
would have described himself as a socialist" 90 and A.J. Ayer says that
Orwell's socialism "owed nothing to Marxist theory and much to the tradition
of English Nonconformity. He saw it primarily as an instrument of justice." 91
The writer Paul Potts refers to Orwell as "by temperament a Tory radical," 92
but Stephen Spender says that "Orwell really was a socialist who wanted
people ... to live socialist lives in a kind of socialist, anarchist society." 93 Orwell
himself says that there were publications of the right which "have tried to use
1984 as propaganda against the Labour Party, but I have published a sort of
dementi which I hope will be printed." 94 Symons sees Orwell as "handy for
radicals who view him as a renegade partly responsible for the failures and
defeats of the Left, and equally for right-wingers as a stick with which to beat
89 George Orwell, Extracts from a Manuscript Note-book, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 514.
90 Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick, eds., Orwell Remembered (London: Ariel. 1984) 194.
91 Coppard and Crick 211.
92 Coppard and Crick 254.
93 Coppard and Crick 266.
94 George Orwell, letter to Vernon Richards, 22 June 1949, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 504.
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left-wing parties and movements." 95 Orwell emerges from these comments
as having the classic qualities of the satirist implicit in this thesis: elusiveness
and independence of mind, together with a profound radicalism, a suspicion
of the status quo and a consequent desire for people to change. All this
suggests that Orwell was true to the stance he recommended to writers: of
avoiding commitment to a party political line 96 - a stance suggested by this
thesis as offering the most integrity and creativity for satirists. Ingle sees
Orwell's individualism as an inherent part of him, believing that "Orwell was
temperamentally unsuited to being a regular soldier in anybody's army; he
was an irregular fighting in his own way under his own command." 97
Commenting on Orwell's temperament, Bernard Crick says that he "was
expert in the art of rubbing his own eat's fur backwards and he enjoyed doing
just that." 98
Orwell himself does not discuss the concept of ideology in any detail, but it is
clear that he would have been at home with the notion that it is when ideology
becomes palpably toxic (a highly debatable and subjective issue, until
concentration camps or planned starvation begin to occur in a country) that it
needs to be fought. That is very different from the postmodern notion that
ideology is everywhere and innocence is dead - but this thesis proposes to
continue the dialogue already begun in earlier chapters between satire and
postmodernism. It is a dialogue which implicitly asserts the value of
provisionality, difference and contradiction as opposed to clear-cut moral and
political judgements, and thus promises also to become a dialogue between
postmodernism and modernism, insofar as Orwell was a modernist.
Specifically, the notion of ideology will again become a major issue when
Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four are discussed in detail.
95 Julian Symons, "Orwellspeak," rev. of The Politics of Literary Reputation: The Making and
Claiming of 'St George' Orwell, by John Rodden, London Review of Books 11.21 (1989) 20.
96 See 96-7 above.
97 Ingle, A Political Life 23.
98 Bernard Crick, introd., Nineteen Eighty-Four, by George Orwell (1949. Oxford: Oxford
UP, 1984) 4.
102
Closely related to the subject of ideology is that of propaganda, and what now
follows is a discussion of the nature of propaganda in dialogic relation to
satire (and, more specifically, Orwell's statements on propaganda). Jowett
and O'Donnell offer the following definition of propaganda, which may serve
here as a working definition:
Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt
to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct
behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired
intent of the propagandist .... Further, propaganda seeks
to contain information in a specific area, and responses
to propaganda are manipulated in an attempt to keep
them in the contained area. The recipient of the propaganda
message is discouraged from asking about anything outside
the contained area. 99
Propaga"nda is closely linked to ideology and, in fact, propaganda can be
seen as ideology in action, though when ideology is forceful enough, there
may be no distinction between it and propaganda. Orwell did not really
discuss ideology at any length, but he had a passionate interest in
propaganda, possibly because ideology smacks of theory, of which he was
always suspicious, whereas propaganda has an eminently practical quality to
it. There are some key statements about the relationship between
propaganda and writing in a piece Orwell wrote in 1946:
Once again, no book is genuinely free from political bias. The
opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a
political attitude .... Every line of serious work that I have written
since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against
totalitarianism and for democratic Socialism, as I understand
it. ...Anyone who cares to examine my work will see that even
99 Jowett and O'Donnell 16.
103
when it is downright propaganda it contains much that a
full-time politician would consider irrelevant. 100
The first statement about art and politics recognises the pervasive quality of
politics in human life, even if it does not call such an influence "ideology."
Orwell also suggests that his serious writing has been committed to a
particular political purpose - a stance which it would be difficult now not to call
propaganda. However, one also needs to examine Orwell's democratic
socialist ideals, which are similar to those of the Marxist critic Terry Eagleton,
who speaks contemptuously of "bourgeois criticism's smug assumption that
art is one thing and propaganda another." 101 Orwell's final statement implicitly
differentiates between political writing and propaganda and, significantly,
implies that even when writers produce "downright propaganda" they have not
necessarily become propagandists (in the wholly pejorative sense of the
word), since a politician would still consider much of what Orwell wrote as
"irrelevant." A few years earlier Orwell had written the following:
It is fashionable to say that in verse only the words count
and the "meaning" is irrelevant, but in fact every poem contains
a prose meaning, and when the poem is any good it is a
meaning which the poet urgently wishes to express. All art is
to some extent propaganda. 102
These views help to clarify Orwell's views about propaganda which, in relation
to art at any rate, seem to be very broad, since he seems to feel that any
deeply felt views, successfully conveyed so as to influence an audience,
constitute propaganda. As indicated earlier, Orwell had little respect for
theoretical considerations and here, as elsewhere, he is exercising his right
not to commit himself to a rigid statement of his views on propaganda. While
he has a right to such flexibility - he is not, after all, setting himself up as a
100 Orwell, "Why I Write" 4,5,6.
101 Terry Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism (London: Methuen, 1976) 57.
102 George Orwell, rev.of Burnt Norton, East Coker, The Dry Salvages, by T.S. Eliot, CEJL,
eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 239-40.
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political philosopher - his two best-known novels are much exercised with the
practice and the effects of propaganda, and his raw material for these novels
is drawn from historical events, relating his text to a world outside the literary
work in the distinctive way common to satire. Yet, as has been suggested in
earlier discussion, satirists are "truth-tellers" in only a limited sense and their
aim is to influence their audience towards some kind of shift in thought and
action. So what is Orwell's agenda in these two highly political novels of his,
and what kind of credence are we to give to their stand on the issue of
propaganda, even after we have made allowance for the fact that he is writing
satire? Are these novels themselves propagandistic and if so how are we to
assess them? In short, there is a need to evaluate both Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four in terms of whether they actually partake of precisely
the culture of propaganda of which Orwell is so critical in these novels. This
need is increased by the fact that from 1941 to 1943 Orwell worked for the
BBC producing, and sometimes taking part in, talks and programmes which
clearly fell within the broad category of propaganda, though they clearly did
not constitute what is known as "black" propaqanda."?' In a letter to
Woodcock Orwell hedges on this matter, first saying that "it is chiefly a
question of whether one considers it more important to down the Nazis first"
and then claiming that he has "kept our propaganda slightly less disgusting
than it might otherwise have been." 104However, when he left the BBC he
"spoke of feeling like an orange that has been trodden on by a very dirty
boot,,105and at a later point he refers to "all the bilge" he wrote for the BBC.106
Finally, to reiterate an earlier point, it is not unknown for a satirist to fill the role
of a party political hack, and write out-and-out propaganda for that particular
103 Jowett and O'Donnell (18) speak of white, grey and black propaganda, the latter entailing
successful falsification at many levels. The citizens of Oceania, for example, live in an
atmosphere of constant black propaganda.
104 George Orwell, letter to George Woodcock, 2 December 1942, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell
and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 268.
105 W.J. West, The Larger Evils: Nineteen Eightv-Four (Edinburgh: Canongate P, 1992) 65.
106 George Orwell, letter to Stafford Cottman, 25 April 1946, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, vol. IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 149.
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party: Jonathan Swift did this for the Tories, particularly between 1710 and
1711, as Michael Foot shows. 107
One view of propaganda is that, like the view of ideology discussed earlier, it
is - and always has been - all-pervasive, and thus inescapable. The corollary
to this view is that propaganda is a legitimate aspect of any society and that
its bad reputation is undeserved. Thomson says that "[in] reality, it is hard to
find any piece of communication which is devoid of propaganda content or
intention.,,108 This seems to confirm Orwell's above-quoted views about
propaganda, though Thomson's reasoning is rather different:
[It] is easy to become alarmist and to condemn all forms
of propaganda, without appreciating 'the myriad small rites'
which help societies to function .... There is a need to find
some guidelines for a balanced judgement on the use of
media and communication techniques for achieving acceptable
levels of social indoctrination in a democratic society .... [There]
may be some standard by which techniques of social control. ..
can be justified on the grounds of.. .eliminating war, reducing
population growth, encouraging hygiene .... 109
Thomson is not alone in his thinking about the nature of propaganda. In the
same way as some people suggest that there can be ideology which is both
acceptable and useful, so there is an argument that certain uses of
propaganda can serve society well. Doob airs the commonly-held view 110that
propaganda acquired its reputation for slyness and manipulation largely from
the large-scale abuse of it during World War I. He adds that "'propaganda' is
disliked in a democratic society because people feel naively that their
decisions should be made by themselves and not by someone else. The
107 Michael Foot, The Pen and the Sword: A Year in the Life of Jonathan Swift (London:
McGibbon and Kee, 1966) 140, 255, 291ft, 317, 356-9. Swift's later political writing, on the
Irish situation, was a separate matter.
108 Oliver Thomson, Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of
Propaganda Techniques (Edinburgh: Paul Harris, 1977) 4.
109 Thomson 6.
110 See, for example, Brown 11.
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feeling is naive because decisions result from past experiences, many of
which are usually culturally determined .... " 111
Despite these assertions Thomson, Doob and others do also point out that
propaganda has extensive and alarming possibilities for abuse. In fact, those
writers who begin by arguing for a more balanced view of propaganda almost
always go on to devote much more attention to its questionable side. While
accepting that propaganda can sometimes be socially useful, this thesis deals
mainly with the widely held view that this discourse is a force for evil rather
than good and, certainly, Orwell showed in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-
Four that modern propaganda can lead to untold harm. Doob, rather
controversially, suggests that contemporary American society is more
saturated with propaganda than Nazi Germany ever was, and adverts to the
multifarious sources of propaganda in North America - "political parties, trade
unions, churches, business houses, newspaper owners ... societies, clubs,
professional associations." His main point is that propaganda is really
harmful only in a totalitarian society, where there is only one source of
propaganda (the state) and citizens are robbed of the right of choice. 112 It
does seem crucial to know how oppressive (or not) the structures of a state
are and how effectively propaganda is propagated and applied.
Several commentators agree that propaganda is not anything new, but what
is new is the twentieth-century use of technology to establish propaganda as
a permanent feature of political life which manipulates the thoughts, choices
and actions of large numbers of people in a premeditated and co-ordinated
way. So, propaganda is, among other things, a device for narrowing people's
worlds rather than expanding them - and the propagandist has a range of
strategies by which to accomplish this: the ideology animating the
propaganda will nearly always contain and limit thought and the language
used to express the propaganda can itself also serve this function
(Newspeak, the language spoken in Nineteen Eighty-Four, is a good
111 Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York Holt, 1948) 242.
112 Doob 121-22.
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example), while various social measures, always embracing a culture of
conformity and possibly including terror, will reinforce this narrowness. As with
ideology, propaganda also has its own vocabulary, which is often used to
deify what is approved of and demonise what is not, as Qualter indicates in
the case of Soviet propaganda:
In its actual operation Russian propaganda has been
characterized by a distinctive use of language described,
with fair accuracy, as 'semantic warfare' .... Soviet propaganda
policy does not allow for subtle shades of friendship. The
world is divided into two mutually exclusive camps where
those who are not unquestionably loyal are mortal enemies.
Neutrals and 'deviationists' are left in a difficult position. 113
Propaganda shares with ideology its pervasive and devious qualities, since all
these strategies reach very deep into society but are imposed on people,
without their conscious knowledge and co-operation.
Adolf Hitler's views on propaganda display a contemptuous view of human
nature as weak, irrational and completely malleable:
The receptive ability of the masses is very limited, their
understanding small; on the other hand, they have a great
power of forgetting. This being so, all effective propaganda
must be confined to a few points, which must be brought
out in the form of slogans .... An immense majority of the
people are so feminine [sic] in nature and point of view,
that their thoughts and actions are governed more by
feeling and sentiment than by reasoned consideration .... 114
113 Terence H. Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare (1962; Pretoria: Unisa P,
1965) 107.
114 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, The Paternoster Library (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1933) 81-2,
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Hitler's attitudes and methods of making propaganda were faithfully aped by
Joseph Goebbels, the Reichsminister for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda. His title's frank mention of propaganda conveys well the
unabashed quality of Goebbels's deceptions, and the term "Popular
Enlightenment" is worthy in its cynicism of the Party in Nineteen Eighty-Four
which calls its propaganda arm "The Ministry of Truth." Goebbels, reporting
on a conversation he had with Hitler, says, "I emphasized that I insist upon
totalitarianism in carrying out the propaganda and news policies of the Reich.
He agreed with me absolutely .... 115 Lochner says that Goebbels was
interested in the sheer exercise of power, having "an almost psychopathic lust
for power," 116 and this is reflected in the painstaking nature of his
propaganda activities:
[T]he machinery that controlled Nazi propaganda activities
was carefully concealed from public view .... On one occasion,
Goebbels had a fit of blinding fury because an illustrated
magazine had published a picture of a man putting on a record
of a triumphal bell chime after a special announcement. ... 117
Propaganda does, in fact, have a strong covert streak, and this is related to
the need for flexibility, since an open and fixed programme of thought and
action makes short-term changes more difficult to justify. Propaganda can
change its methods and its current of thought without missing a beat, as can
be seen from the Hitler-Stalin pact announced in 1939, which overnight
reversed the hitherto (officially) antagonistic relations between these two
countries, the announcement being accompanied by press releases
concerning the long-standing friendship between the countries - a
propaganda somersault which is parodied by Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-
Four.118
115 Joseph Paul Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, trans. and ed. Louis P. Lochner (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1948) 385.
116 Goebbels xxiv.
117 Goebbels 39.
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Since propaganda works on an emotional and irrational level, exploiting
unconscious needs, no organisation or government (with the exception of
Marxism) will admit to using it, though all do. Satire is more open in its
approach.!" as demonstrated earlier, it too is aware that the mind contains
unconscious structures, but satirists overtly try to break these down or at least
to stimulate (or irritate) their audience by attacking such structures. It is
propagandists who, as stealthily as possible, make use of such structures for
covert ends or attempt to replace them with structures which are by no means
always announced, but which will ensure the greatest support for whatever it
is the propagandist wishes to accomplish.
The best known type of propaganda is that commonly known as "agitation
propaganda," which, according to Foulkes, "is usually subversive and
oppositional. It may seek to overthrow a government or established order, but
may equally be used by governments, for example in times of war, when they
wish to break down" 120 what Ellul calls "the psychological barriers of habit,
belief, and judgment." 121Such is the kind of propaganda described by Lord
Beaverbrook, Minister of Information in Britain during World War I, as "the
munitions of the mind.,,122 This is propaganda which may be noisy and
obvious on the surface, though its precise intentions and long-term goals are
kept hidden.
A covert kind of propaganda, referred to by Ellul as "integration propaganda,"
is very similar to ideology, functioning essentially as a tranquilliser, arguing
away any contradictions or conflicts and reassuring people that everything is
under control. As Szanto says, integration propaganda tries to make its
audience "accept unquestioningly and uncomplainingly the social
conundrums of the present and not challenge the authority of those who
perpetuate the dominant and ongoing social institutions." 123 It is "so
119 See 73-5 above.
120 Foulkes 11.
121 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, trans. Konrad Kellen and
Jean Lerner, introd. Konrad Kellen (New York: Vintage, 1973) 72.
122 Philip Waller, "A Small Triumph," rev. of British Propaganda During the First World War
1914-18, by Michael Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, The Literary Review, June 1983: 1.
123 George H. Szanto, Theater and Propaganda (Austin: U of Texas P, 1978) 9
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pervasive, its effect is so permeating, that one becomes aware of its
existence only with great difficulty. Integration propaganda suggests
that. ..one should accept one's society and participate passively within
it. ... Integration propaganda's purpose is preventative: to avoid unplanned
change." 124
From the above it seems that there are certain limited similarities between
agitation propaganda and satire, in that both are subversive, in one sense or
another. However, as was seen earlier when ideology and satire were
presented in a dialogic relationship, satire lacks the element of totalitarianism
which underlies propaganda: satire is not motivated by a lust for power, nor
does it have the strong ambition to impose conformity which both agitation
and integration propaganda have. Again, propaganda shares, to some
degree, the indirect approach of the satirist (it is not fruitful to attack
unconscious structures directly, since most people are very protective of such
structures) but, in comparison to propaganda, satire is not very indirect and
the satirist's audience is not long unaware of what is being done to them. The
intentions - and often the very existence - of propaganda can remain hidden
for a very long time. This is particularly so in the case of integration
propaganda, which is intended to "avoid unplanned change." Satire, on the
contrary, is an invitational mode which challenges its audience to take risks
and explore alternative worlds - not an easy option, since the avoidance of
unplanned change, although it is very poor emotional hygiene and causes
personal and political stultification, is a more attractive prospect to most
people.
Propaganda's battle against unplanned change is related to its intention to fix
the recipient's view of reality, as well as bring about planned changes in the
actual circumstances of reality, using the recipient as its tool. The former
intention has much in common with ideology, which also tries to provide a
final way of interpreting society though, as has been indicated, propaganda
has more flexibility than ideology. The attempt to fix people's view of reality is
124 Szanto 24.
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very far-reaching, since it involves a kind of social engineering which can
have extremely sinister implications. Though propaganda may begin by
serving and promoting an ideology, in the end it may modify or even
supersede that ideology (as in the case of the Hitler-Stalin pact). 125 Ellul is
categorical on this point: "The same holds for ideology as for doctrine; when
propaganda uses it, it destroys it. ...AII that is believed, known, and accepted
is what propaganda has promulgated." 126 It seems that propaganda is too
cynical and pragmatic to allow itself to be yoked to any fixed ideology for long.
It soon takes on a life of its own, doing whatever it must in order to continue to
keep a particular government or group in power. The ideas, means and
doctrines used will be those that best serve this purpose, whether they be the
Communist notion of the inevitability of history or the seventeenth-century
belief that women have no souls, Rome's bread and circuses or Hitler's
Nuremburg rallies.
The cynicism with which propaganda sets to work can also be seen in the
way it uses information and, in particular, statistics, as Ellul makes clear:
[M]uch of the information disseminated nowadays - research
findings, facts, statistics, explanations, analyses - eliminate [sic]
personal judgement and the capacity to form one's own opinion ....
A surfeit of data, far from permitting people to make judgements
and form opinions, prevents them from doing so and actually
paralyzes them. They are caught in a web of facts and must
remain at the level of the facts they have been given .... Thus
the mechanisms of modern information induce a sort of
hypnosis in the individual, who cannot get out of the field that
has been laid out for him by the information. 127
The above-quoted passage is concerned with the abuse of information, which
is a key issue in this chapter, and in this thesis as a whole. Satirists are
125 See 109 above.
126 Ellul 202.
127 Ellul 87.
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concerned not with information but, rather with process, offering an audience
a space in which it can reassess its view of reality, as opposed to the
confining quality of discourses such as ideology and propaganda. Satire has
more detachment, in certain respects, than many other discourses, and it
certainly has a greater seriousness (which sounds ironic in view of its liberal
use of humour). This seriousness consists of a kind of integrity which is not
available to propagandists, since they are representatives of ideologies and /
or institutions and therefore lack the moral and teleological freedom which
satirists, as artists and outsiders, have. Satirists are deeply concerned with
the problems of both individual people and society, rather than the narrower
issues of power and manipulation which are the lifeblood of both the
ideologist and the propagandist. It is not simply, as Francis Bacon said, that
"knowledge itself is power." 128 It is that people naturally, even without the
interference of ideologists or propagandists, use the knowledge and
information that they are given to construct inner worlds for themselves in
which they will feel powerful and safe. But what propaganda and ideology do
is to encourage, interfere with, direct and control this process of construction,
not in an attempt to make people freer or more powerful, but with entirely
contrary intentions. The role of ideology is to inform propaganda and underpin
it in this process: ideology is what inspires the propagandist deliberately to set
about distorting the creative urges of people to construct a reality for
themselves, but it is satire which encourages people to question this reality -
to ask whether it has been created in a spontaneous way or at the instance of
more invasive discourses which seek to become dominant (or are already so).
A discourse which is related to both ideology and propaganda, but is arguably
more durable than both, is political myth. The terms "myth" and "ideology" are
occasionally used as approximate synonyms, but it is more accurate to say
that myths are often used to support ideology or, as Waardenburg has it, they
may even be assimilated into ideology. 129 Nevertheless, it is both possible
128 Francis Bacon, "Meditationes Sacrae: Of Heresies," The Works of Francis Bacon, eds.
James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, vol. VII (London: Longman,
1859)253
129 Jacques Waardenburg, "Symbolic Aspects of Myth," Myth. Symbol and Reality, ed. Alan M.
Olson (Notre Dame:U of Notre Dame P, 1980) 55.
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and useful to distinguish between political myth and ideology, since they do
not always operate in precisely the same way. Ideology offers a structure of
ideas on which people can base a view of themselves and the world around
them, but myth (whether political or otherwise) offers a structure of symbols
which people can mentally inhabit and in which they can find a solid network
of meaning. Ellul speaks of myth as follows:
Finally, myth has to be global. ... It furnishes both the explanation
and the synthesis, the future and the requirements. The totality
of myth is what counts, not this or that fugitive aspect which
might be discounted tomorrow without too much damage.
Again, it is global because there is no part of the individual
to which it is indifferent. Its control is complete .... Nothing
subsists outside its sphere. There is no point which could
serve as a fulcrum for criticism. It supplies the entire man
with a satisfying image. It is a design which permits ... no
decisive divergence ... among those who harbour the same
myth. 130
This view of myth is a bleak one. It sees myth as nothing more than a trap
which offers a coherent and certain view of the world and exacts in return a
complete loss of the power to discriminate or see clearly. As with ideology
and propaganda, some of the power of myth comes from its uncritical
acceptance by people as "normality" rather than as an imposed construct. If
propaganda is seen as the sheepdog which tirelessly drives the sheep in a
certain direction, then political myth can be seen as the corral (or laager) into
which the sheep are driven. However, political myth is something that many
people find very attractive - and the more threatening the socio-political
situation the greater the temptation to seek refuge in myth of one kind or
another. The myths surrounding the Nazi regime (e.g. the myth of the Aryan
race) are a good example of this.
130 Jacques Ellul. The New Demons (London: Mowbrays, 1975) 95-96.
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But Ellul's views on myth are directed solely at political myth. He is not
concerned with the kind of myth which is peopled by gods or has a specific
link with ritual, unless they are the gods and the ritual of the modern secular
state, which he abhors as psychologically and politically emasculating. Myth
has, of course, a much broader reach than that and need not be political, in
the strict sense of the word. This is indicated by Mark Schorer's definition:
Myths are the instruments by which we continually struggle
to make our experience intelligible to ourselves. A myth is a
large, controlling image that gives philosophical meaning to
the facts of ordinary life; that is, which has organizing value
f . 131or experience ....
The creative value of myth is here apparent, with myth being portrayed as a
tool for finding oneself, as well as giving reality a pattern which helps one to
negotiate the maze of life. The negative aspect of this is that it is a fixed
pattern and offers a single view of reality. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say
that myth has particular value for communities in ensuring that the past is not
forgotten and offering a path forward based on what that particular community
has already achieved. Myth gives coherence to current human experience,
often by reaching back into the past and interpreting present events in terms
of the actions of ancient gods, for example, or in terms of historical or (more
commonly) quasi-historical events, such events being themselves shaped and
pointed in order to make them more significant. Myth also helps to bind
communities together by means of the rituals which often accompany it, thus
providing a way for people to overcome their sense of separateness.
However, there is another view, represented by Sorel, which sees myths as
more active and less conservative:
Their function is not to stabilize, but to direct energies and
inspire action. They do this by embodying a dynamic vision
131 Mark Scharer, "The Necessity of Myth," Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Henry A Murray (New
York Braziller, 1960) 355.
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of the movement of life, the more potent because not rational. ... 132
Myth can also have an explanatory role, offering narratives which speak of the
origins and the current practices of the group or society concerned, though
such explanations are not offered in a rational or scientific mode. This is both
a strength and a weakness of myth, since irrational ways of communicating
may penetrate into areas of the human mind not accessible to logos (the
realm of cold, detached ratiocination), as opposed to mythos. On the other
hand, myth is often viewed suspiciously by an age in which linear ways of
thinking are still regarded as superior to non-linear, mainly because science is
associated with the former - not to mention the general view that often
equates the very word "myth" with falsehood.
Kolakowski sums up the arguments for and against myth, acknowledging its
value but delivering a warning as to how easily myth can be abused:
What we know for certain is that in maintaining any kind of
human fellowship we need a faith in ready-made and arbitrary
values, and that at the same time it is dangerous to believe
that these values are at any time fixed and completed, that
they can relieve one of situational interpretations and a
situational responsibility for them. A mythology can be socially
fruitful only when it is unceasingly subject to vigilance which
would frustrate its natural tendency to turn into a narcotic. 133
What this clear-sighted and humane, though hard-headed, statement
indicates is that people need stable communal values, but that such values
will become destructive if they are not accompanied by responsible attitudes
on the part of the community. At its best, myth is an organic part of society,
expressing ideals and desires which dwell in the collective unconscious of
132 Quoted by William Righter, Myth and Literature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975)
9.
133 Leszek Kolakowski, The Presence of Myth, trans. Adam Czerniawski (1972; Chicago U of
Chicago P, 1989) 105.
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that society, helping to direct it and to reconcile contradictions which might
otherwise cripple it.
Malinowski emphasizes that in primitive societies myth "expresses, enhances,
and codifies belief; it safeguards morality .... It is not an intellectual explanation
or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral
wisdom." 134 It is significant that this highly optimistic view of myth is limited to
so-called primitive society, since by far the worst abuses of myth have
occurred in so-called advanced civilizations, in the guise of what we would call
social or political myth. At its worst, myth is the conscious and cynical use of a
society's ideals and desires to keep a particular group or party in power, and
to legitimize its past, present and future actions. It is in this guise that myth
can be used to abuse whole societies by the "engineers of the soul" (a
description, intended to be laudatory, attributed to Stalin by Gorky). 135 As
Cassirer says, "The power of mythical thought. .. is perhaps the most
important and the most alarming feature ... of modern political thought." 136
It is this particular manifestation of myth, highlighted so starkly in Animal Farm
and especially in Nineteen Eighty-Four, which satirists seek to expose and
weaken. As has been shown, satire finds itself at odds with both ideology and
propaganda - but it is a particular enemy of political myth, perhaps because of
the latter's comprehensiveness and attractiveness. Political myth is unique in
that it encourages in people an abandonment of self, in conjunction with blind
belief and participation at the level of ritual and taboo otherwise associated
only with religion. Satire, on the other hand, is a force that works for freedom
of thought, encouraging clear and subtle views of the world, while stressing its
provisional quality. As will be seen in the final chapter, the world of a novel
such as Nineteen Eighty-Four is saturated in political myth, with clear
elements of ritual and taboo emerging in the daily "Two Minutes Hate"
sessions in which all citizens must participate and which draw on the most
primitive levels of belief and action.
134 Leonard Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid (New Haven Yale UP, 1985) 7.
135 Maxim Gorky, address, Writers' Congress, 26 Oct 1934.
136 Ernst Cassirer The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale UP, 1946) 3.
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Marina Warner makes the point that there are "hopeful myths which imagine
a different world, which hold out a promise of happiness - and
tran'sformation," 137 Myth in general can indeed have a transforming power,
and perhaps what is most alien to satire in purely political myths is that they
foster a dreary conformity, especially in the case of authoritarian or totalitarian
regimes, as Nineteen Eighty-Four so clearly shows. Satire, on the other hand,
is a radical force for unplanned change which tries to jolt people out of their
habitual ways of thinking, while exercising the minimum amount of control
and, in contrast to political myth, fostering the critical awareness of the
individuals it is addressing.
The standard Marxist approach to myth is the same as its view of ideology:
both are suspect because they represent forms of false consciousness.
Roland Barthes, for example, is scathing about myth. Defining myth "in a
bourgeois society," Barthes says that "myth is depoliticized speech. One must
naturally understand political in its deeper meaning, as describing the whole
of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the
world .... " 138 This is a very telling criticism of myth, since it accuses it of
debasing the very language ("depoliticized speech") that people use in order
to rob them of the right to participate in the political process. More than that,
because of the formulation Barthes uses to define the political, myth stands
accused of depriving people of the opportunity to shape the society in which
they live. As can be seen from the previous paragraph, the implicit view of
satire on the issue of political myth does not contradict that of Barthes,
particularly as his definition of the political reflects the kind of broad
involvement in politics practised by satirists. 139
137 Marina Warner, Managing Monsters: Six Myths of our Time, The 1994 Reith Lectures
(London: Vintage, 1994) 25.
38 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, selected and trans, Annette Lavers (London: Jonathan Cape,
1972) 143,
139 See 34, 38 above.
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Finally, a dialogic juxtaposition of myth and postmodernism suggests that, as
with its attitude to other discourses, postmodernism is very relaxed about
myth. Hutcheon states the case as follows:
Postmodernist discourses ... need the very myths and conventions
they contest and reduce ... ; they do not necessarily come to terms
with either order or disorder ... but question both in terms of each
other. The myths and conventions exist for a reason, and
postmodernism investigates that reason. The postmodern impulse
is not to seek any total vision. It merely questions. If it finds such
a vision, it questions how, in fact, it made it. 140
As' elsewhere in this thesis, the postmodern outlook provides a touchstone, a
counterpoint and an alternative stance against which to assess the
necessarily serious and committed stance of Orwell's novels. The stance of
postmodernism is one of open and interested intellectual curiosity which
refuses to adopt any ideology or fixed set of beliefs. It is, as so often, the
refusal of postmodernism to cement itself into a particular position that gives it
its attractiveness and liveliness. The fact that Orwell sometimes committed
himself to fixed positions does not lessen the value of his work, but it does
lead one to examine whether he, in his need to have defined beliefs, did not
to some degree fall into the trap of rigid ideology, propaganda and myth which
he sought so hard to fend off and render harmless - an issue which will be
taken up in later chapters. The lightness of touch that postmodernism has
towards socio-political discourses was just not possible in Orwell's time, but it
is important to juxtapose the different approaches, very much in the spirit of
postmodernism, and initiate a dialogic process between them. As can be
seen, postmodernism practises a remarkable kind of economy, finding a use
for what it questions rather than consigning it to perdition, as a more rigid
approach might do. This process of defining and redefining is part of the life-
blood of postmodernism, which remains in a creative and provisional stance,
always dynamic and never judgmental. In Jungian terms, it refuses to disown
140 Hutcheon, Poetics 48.
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its shadow - the implicit and unrealised but powerful and "unacceptable" side
which one is tempted to reject for fear that it will take control - but chooses
rather to make fertile use of it. Satire, not being as self-aware as
postmodernism, is not as ready to acknowledge that shadow side.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to ask a discourse like satire, which thrives on
estrangement and deviousness, to become more integrated in this way,
especially since satire has a large shadow side which is useful in its
unexpressed form. The success of satire may depend on the satirist being, to
a certain degree, dis-integrated. But the danger in these matters is that a
shadow side has such energy that if rejected it may surface unexpectedly and
claim its right to life 141 - as, arguably, the discourses demonised by Orwell
arise to haunt the very texts in which he attempts to exorcise them. In fact,
one way of seeing satire is to characterise it as entirely a shadow form:
"Satire is the stranger that lives in the basement" 142 - and this suggests that
satire represents something both uncomfortable and familiar: a stranger, yet
living in the heart (the "home") of society, in the basement which,
metaphorically speaking, is where the shadow side resides.
One of the topics to be discussed in Chapter 5 is precisely the dark or
shadow sides of Orwell which he fails to acknowledge. Is his case against
totalitarianism in Nineteen Eighty-Four so univocal (in Bakhtin's terms,
monoglot) that aspects of what he is condemning are incorporated, willy-nilly,
as the discourse of his shadow side - a return of the repressed carnivalesque
- in both his writing and his general stance? For example, there is his
linguistic rigidity discussed later in this thesis, 143 as well as the issue of
sadism. 144 Satirists may in fact sometimes be too rigid and narrow, and not
interrogative and unruly enough, particularly towards themselves. In this
thesis, such aspects are revealed when Orwell's modernist attempts to
141 C G. Jung, Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice, The Tavistock Lectures (1968;
London: Routledge, 1986) 21-25.
142 Test 6.
143 See 128-30 below.
144 See 237-8,273-4 below.
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systematise ways of seeing the world are brought into a dialogic relationship
with postmodernism, which emphasises play and differance.
In the last part of this chapter, three different but related ways of manipulating
the world have been explored, in dialogic relationship with satire: ideology,
propaganda and political myth. In their most unlovely manifestations, at any
rate, all share an absolute intolerance of any world-view other than the one
they propagate, and label any deviation from or questioning of their viewpoint
as a form of heresy. The Stalinist belief in a communist utopia, the Nazi idea
of the Aryan race and related Western notions of the infallibility of science
and progress are all myths, nurtured and fixed in people's minds by a
combination of ideology and propaganda. Central to these three discourses is
an obsessive concern with language, which is controlled and manipulated in a
conscious attempt to create a world in which a small group of people has a
great deal of power over many others. The intimate link between language
and power is one that Orwell is bent on exposing - and it will be one of the
main concerns of Chapters 4 and 5, which will consist of a discussion of
Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four respectively.
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Chapter 4 Animal Farm: Language, Terror, History and Utopia
Earlier chapters of this thesis have highlighted the aggressive nature of satire,
as well as its mischievous side, while ideology, propaganda and political myth
were also shown to have an aggressive side, giving them the ability to inflict
mischief of a much more serious kind. The negative views of ideology,
propaganda and political myth are part of the modernist view espoused by
Orwell, and they were juxtaposed with postmodern views to create a dialogic
process. The integrity of satire is not harmed by such dialogism, even though
the lightness of touch of postmodernism is sometimes in conflict with the
underlying basis of Orwell's satire. In these last chapters the dialogism is
sharpened as these theoretical considerations are for the first time brought to
bear on literary texts, and the faultlines between Orwell's modernist
ideological stand and his radical satiric praxis also become more apparent.
The solidarity between satire and postmodernism described earlier still
stands, though, primarily because both work with provisionality, even if
postmodernism is more open and shifting.
In Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell shows how ideology,
propaganda and political myth can strike at the root of public and personal
well-being. Such discourses may inflict wounds on the psyche of society that
are intended to destroy democratic structures, operating within the context of
power rather than the invitational and provisional mode which marks satire.
One of the most specific markers which separate satire from these other
discourses is its attitude to and use of language. Both Swift and Orwell wrote
essays on language which show their concern with it, and their longer works,
in which language is seen in action within a society, show their involvement
even more clearly. It is Sartre who, borrowing Brice-Parrain's phrase,
maintains that words are "loaded pistols," concluding that "If [a person]
speaks he fires. He may be silent, but since he has chosen to fire, he must do
it like a man, by aiming at targets, and not like a child, at random .... ,,1 The
implication here is that language is dangerous and its use demands
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?, trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950)
14.
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responsibility on the part of the mature speaker or writer. The aggression and
the frequently playful nature of satire might suggest that it is both dangerous
and immature but, as this thesis argues, the issue is more complex than that:
the "danger" satire presents is only to thoughtlessly entrenched habits of
thought and its playfulness is an invitation to openness and growth.
There can be no doubt that readers of works such as Nineteen Eighty-Four,
Gulliver's Travels or A Modest Proposal do frequently feel that they are
human targets for the satirist's marksmanship. But satirists aim with care,
their goals are defined and limited and (unless one speaks of ancient satirical
practice) 2 they intend to inflict only a certain amount of damage, which will
not result in death of the mind or spirit. Ideologists, propagandists and political
myth-makers, on the other hand, have very different attitudes towards
language and use it for ends which are essentially manipulative. They are
intent on wrenching language from its moorings (as opposed to invoking
ditterencei in both the collective and the individual psyche, with the intention
of changing and moulding thought (and therefore action) in a very specific
direction. The aim of the socio-political discourses discussed in this thesis is
to limit the Weltanschauung of whole groups or nations by means of
language, and to control that Weltanschauung for the foreseeable future. The
argument here is not that satire is entirely neutral in the matter of wishing to
influence public opinion, but satire is engendered by feelings such as
concern, anger and irritation, while ideology, propaganda and political myth
stem from a much colder desire to imprison the human spirit. Robert Graves
warns that "There's a cool web of language winds us in,,,3 suggesting that the
very structure of ordinary language has a deceptively comfortable quality
which can limit people's ability to experience and feel. This quality is exploited
by some very influential discourses, which use language in ways that confirm
and encourage the limitations of language, to increase the influence of these
discourses. By contrast, Russian formalists, psychoanalysts, satirists,
2 See 15 above.
3 Robert Graves, "The Cool Web," Robert Graves: Poems Selected by Himself
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) 43.
123
postmodernists and poststructuralists engage in a struggle to liberate
language, and to keep it flexible and open.
Swift and Orwell, being political polemicists as well as satirists, pointed out
the dangers posed to society by those who abuse and distort language. Both
of these writers were also very aware of how the fate of language is directly
linked to political developments within any society. Orwell's concern about
these matters is much more overt, but Swift's involvement in them IS
nevertheless unmistakable. Among his writings on the subject is his A
Proposal for Correcting, Improving and Ascertaining the English Tongue
[hereafter referred to as the Proposeti, in which, speaking to the Earl of
Oxford, he says, "And I take it to be your Lordship's duty, as prime Minister, to
give Order for inspecting our Language .... " 4 Swift makes a related point
about the connection between language and politics when he attributes the
corruption of Latin to the Roman government's tyranny, "which ruined the
Study of Eloquence; there being no further Use or Encouragement for popular
Orators." 5 He also complains that the Roman Senate and people had
become "slavish" in disposition, and thus "the Wit and Eloquence of the Age
were wholly turned into Panegyrick, the most barren of all subjects." 6 Finally,
the Roman language was adversely affected by "The great Corruption of
Manners, and Introduction of foreign Luxury, with foreign Terms to express
it. ,,7
Swift's arguments stress the close links between language, politics and the
moral health of society. A tyrannical government can harm the language of
the land because it curtails freedom of speech, thus setting an arbitrary limit
to the critical use of language. When a people becomes servile ("slavish")
there is not only a loss of political freedom, but also a loss to language: "Wit
and Eloquence" now reflect this servility by abandoning their integrity and
failing to nurture the cogent and trenchant use of language, lending
4 Swift, A Proposal 17.
5 Swift, A Proposal 8.
6 Swift, A Proposal 8.
7 Swift, A Proposal 8.
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themselves instead to fawning and flattery. The way in which language
shapes both thought and action is stressed by Swift's last point (about
"foreign Luxury"), which reflects how the nature of society can be adversely
affected not only by foreign decadent habits but also by the very terms which
are introduced to mediate that decadence. For Swift, the health of the body
politic and the existence of a lean and muscular system of language are
interdependent.
Swift maintains that the English Civil War ("the great Rebellion") initiated a
period in which the "corruptions" of English at least equalled its "refinements,"
and he continues in similar vein:
During the Usurpation [the Cromwellian period], such an
Infusion of Enthusiastick Jargon prevailed in every Writing,
as was not shaken off in many Years after. To this
succeeded that Licentiousness which entered with the
Restoration; and from infecting our Religion and Morals,
fell to corrupt our Language. 8
For Swift, as for Orwell, language was not a peripheral issue. He saw that
words have the power both to shape the inner worlds that people inhabit and
to determine the way events occur in the public domain. His passionate
engagement with the inter-linked issues of politics and language can also be
seen in the fourth book of Gulliver's Travels, where the nature of the
Houyhnhnms' language is decisive in defining and reflecting the quality of
their society: for example, the suffix "yahoo" is attached to signifiers in order
to give them negative connotations, thus helping to entrench the lower status
of the Yahoos, and there is no word for telling a lie in the Houyhnhnm
language - which encourages the Houyhnhmns' smugness and narrow view
of life.
8 Swift, A Proposal 10.
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Orwell's views on these issues are expressed with even more directness. In
the opening lines of his essay "Politics and the English Language" he states
that "the decline of a language must ultimately have political and economic
causes." 9 Orwell lists several ways in which language can be used to
mislead readers and prevent them from seeing situations clearly - a
"catalogue of swindles and perversions" he calls this. 10 He attacks such
debasements of language as "dying metaphors," "pretentious diction" and
"meaningless words," but it is clear that his objections are not simply to
linguistic pretentiousness and poor style. Orwell is concerned about the
propagation of a fuzzy, false and ultimately dangerous view of the world -
dangerous because it is an evasion of "reality" and therefore a very poor
basis upon which to act. Psychology and satire could easily make common
cause here: both are intent on questioning views of the world which are not
dynamic enough to aid individuals or groups along whatever road will allow
them to develop their full potential. The precise road is not laid down, since
each individual or group will have a unique path to find and follow, but the
road may be obstructed or obfuscated, either by internal psychic factors or by
discourses inimical to personal or political freedom. It is to the latter that
Orwell directs his hostility, here unmasking the ways in which propaganda
uses language to offer a view of the world which can blind people to the
horror of events in times of war and political oppression:
In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence
of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in
India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the
atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by
arguments which are too brutal for most political parties. Thus
political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-
begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are
bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the
9 George Orwell, "Politics and the English Language," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus,
vol. IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 127.
10 Orwell, "Politics and the English Language" 133.
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countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with
incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants
are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with
no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population
or rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years with-
out trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy
in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable
elements. 11
The use of language to inoculate people against a knowledge of actual
events is something particularly abhorrent to Orwell, since he was both a
satirist and a journalist. Specifically, he was the kind of journalist who went to
live among the poor before he wrote about them in The Road to Wigan Pier,
and based his account of the Spanish civil war in Homage to Catalonia on his
experience of having fought there. In his preface to the Ukrainian edition of
the novel, Orwell makes it clear that the satiric alternative world which Animal
Farm constitutes is based primarily on autobiographical foundations - Orwell's
experiences and his consequent desire to accomplish "the destruction of the
Soviet Union." 12 This use of personal experience seems to be common
among satirists, as Frye suggests: "Insofar as the satirist has a 'position' of
his own, it is the preference of practice to theory, experience to
rnetaphysics.r '" Orwell certainly put a premium on experience, and this made
his thinking heavily empirical - an approach which Joseph and Taylor regard
as helpful in avoiding "the covert influence of ideology." 14
Whether Orwell's particular brand of empiricism did in fact allow him to avoid
ideology is highly debatable, particularly when earlier arguments about the
near impossibility of avoiding ideology under any circumstances are borne in
mind. While Orwell admits to the pervasiveness of propaganda in art 15 he is
110rwell, "Politics and the English Language" 136.
120rwell, Author's Preface 405.
13 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism. Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957) 230
14John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor, "Ideology, Science and Language," Ideologies of
Language, eds. Joseph and Taylor (London: Routledge, 1990) 2.
15See 104 above.
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not similarly open on the subject of ideology. As the quotation from "Politics
and the English Language" shows, Orwell's views on language, although
presented as something commonsensically obvious, are far from detached.
Orwell's plain style here (and elsewhere) is that of the good journalist and
able polemicist, but such clarity also involves a certain sacrifice of nuance
and complexity: he mistrusted intellectuals 16 and what they stood for
(ironically, so did the Nazis), 17 and this sometimes led to a rigidity and lack of
breadth in his thought. Proudly asserting his Englishness, he says that "the
English are not intellectual. They have a horror of abstract thought, they feel
no need for any philosophy or systematic 'world-view.' " 18 His mistrust of
theoretical speculation - his empiricism - as well as his unwillingness to take
philosophical risks may have kept him from the worst excesses of ideological
thinking, but did not equip him to detect and counter ideological tendencies in
himself. Carl Freedman finds Nineteen Eighty-Four flawed because Winston
Smith makes his stand against the Party purely on the basis of common
sense (for example, 2+2 must make 4). Freedman regards Orwell's "long
attachment to empiricist common-sense reason [as] prevent[ing] him ... from
considering more complex ... more dialectical forms of reason." 19
Orwell's views on language, imbued as they are with liberal humanism, are
prescriptive rather than discursive, and purport to relate to certain fixed values
and truths. Quirk, speaking of "Politics and the English Language," suggests
that Orwell is neither adventurous nor unconventional here, and speaks of his
"sociolinguistic naivety." 20 These qualities are reminiscent of the attitudes
towards language of the authorities in both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-
Four, which are also prescriptive, only significantly more so, and Orwell's
16 George Orwell, letter to Victor Gollancz, 8 January 1940, CEJL, eds.Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, vol. I (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 409-10, letter to H.J. Willmett, 18 May
1944, CEJL, vol. III, 150, "Inside the Whale," CEJL, vol. I, 515 and "James Burnham and the
Managerial Revolution," CEJL, vol. IV, 179.
17 John Wesley Young, Totalitarian Language: OMell's Newspeak and its Nazi and
Communist Antecedents (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1991) 70-3.
1B George Orwell, "The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius," CEJL, eds.
Sona Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. II (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 58.
19 Carl Freedman, in "Antinomies of Nineteen Eighty-Four," Modern Fiction Studies 30.4
~1984): 614
a Randolph Quirk, "1984 and '1984', London Review of Books 6.3 (1984):10.
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attempt to assert certain fixed linguistic norms, while filled with genuine care
for humanity, is not ideologically innocent. Taylor warns against the dangers
of normative theories of language, concluding as follows: "If, in language, our
situation is one in which there is no escape from the mechanisms of power,
then it is better that we be aware of our situation.?" Orwell states that "The
great enemy of clear language is insincerity," but his conception of the
relationship between language and its referents is highly debatable. As
Flammia puts it, Orwell "makes the error of believing that thought predates
language and fails to see that people are enmeshed in their language
system." 22 Patai makes the point more fully:
Orwell ... assumes a predetermined meaning standing in
opposition to preexisting (sic) words. Totalitarianism, which
to Orwell is a deviation from a normal reality 'out there',
must therefore try to control language and ultimately thought,
to the point where 'clear' meanings in the outside world will
no longer be available. But [Orwell] ... does not see that his
thoughts, his language, made public, also help maintain a
certain reality in place. 23
George Trail attempts to defend "Politics and the English Language," but
seems to have been able to find only critical articles about it. He begins by
describing the various strictures of other writers on it, including Hugh Rank
who, in examining the essay, accuses Orwell of '''weak analogies, massive
overgeneralizations, a pleading for our sympathetic understanding ... and an
awkward paste-and-scissors listing of examples of bad writing.",24 The
unstinting praise given to this essay by some other writers suggests that
21 Talbot J. Taylor, "Which is to be Master?: The Institutionalizing of Authority in the Science of
Language," Ideologies of Language, eds. John E. Joseph and Talbot J. Taylor (London:
Routiedge,1990)25.
22 Madelyn Flammia, "Beyond Orwell: Clarity and the English Language," George Orwell, eds.
Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky (New York Greenwood P, 1987) 28.
23 Patai 267.
24 George Y. Trail, "Teaching Argument and the Rhetoric of Orwell's 'Politics and the English
Language' ," College English 57.5 (1995): 570-1.
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Orwell's widespread reputation for having a plain style may have mesmerised
some readers into glossing over his faults.
The application of current critical criteria to Orwell's work makes him emerge
as less aware and more complex than the idealised figure depicted by earlier
criticism. Gill, in a general theoretical statement which is applicable to both
Orwell's essays and his fictional writing, says that postmodern critical
approaches "tend to distrust exclusive moral or philosophical stances,
especially those feigning embattled and lonely disinterestedness and
objectivity." 25 This sounds harsh and cynical, particularly the word "feigning,"
but this thesis does not regard Orwell as a hypocrite, and accepts that his
particular "embattled and lonely disinterestedness" was genuinely felt, even
though it may not stand up to examination today. However, a degree of
scepticism, even hostility, is inevitable when what Ricoeur calls "the
hermeneutics of suspicion'r" are applied to earlier structures of thought and
belief. As Gill says, postmodern readings offer "alternative models of reading
by challenging their predecessors' cultural hegemony,,27 - a process which
calls into question not just previous ways of reading and writing, but the very
assumptions which made them possible. In the light of post-structuralist
thought it is difficult to accept Orwell's implicit belief that language is a simple
matter; but this belief needs to be seen in the context of the time, which was
one of desperation in which the fate of the world seemed to hang in the
balance. In such a world simplicity was a valuable asset - and Orwell's views
are an example of how history and culture condition the way language is used
and regarded. This thesis seeks to make a truce (even if not complete peace)
with Orwell's views, with the aim of showing that his novels still have value,
both in themselves and as a measure of how far ontology has come since his
time. In any case, postmodernism itself accepts that there are no final
positions and that the way language is viewed depends entirely on the
framework of the viewer.
25 James E. Gill, ed., Cutting Edges: Postmodem Critical Essays on Eighteenth-Century
Satire (Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1995) ix.
26 Richard Kearney, "Between Tradition and Utopia: The Hermeneutical Problem of Myth," On
Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1991) 66.
27 Gill x.
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Any discussion of Animal Farm (or Nineteen Eighty-Four) tends to return
repeatedly to the issue of language, despite the fact that, as Chilton says,
"There is no denying that Orwell knew no linguistic theory, or that his obiter
dicta on language are capricious and sometimes snobbish." Chilton does add,
however, "But so were and are the pronouncements of many language
commentators, and that alone cannot explain the persistent interest of what
he had to say." 28 That Orwell's views on linguistic obfuscation still have some
relevance is apparent from an examination of the way businessmen,
stockbrokers, academics and military officials, among others, use language
today. Troops can be described as "advisors," bombing as "air support,"
jammed telephone lines as "a slow-talk situation," a drop in share prices as a
"technical correction," and the jail in Madison, Wisconsin as a "total
incarceration facility." 29 Hannah Arendt, though writing in a different mode,
shares Orwell's concern about language in relation to public affairs:
Power is actualized [in a positive way] only where word and
deed have not parted company, where words are not empty
and are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities,
and deeds are not used to violate and destroy, but to establish
relations and create new realities. 30
Orwell shares Arendt's perception that power and language are intimately
connected - and his sense of how "word and deed have ... parted company"
seems to underlie most of his general statements about power. Orwell's
concern about totalitarianism is wider than Arendt's, sometimes addressing
the abuse of power in the world as a whole, as in these views written in 1944:
I believe, or fear, that taking the world as a whole these things
[totalitarianism, leader worship] are on the increase. Hitler, no
doubt, will soon disappear, but only at the expense of
26 Paul Chilton, rev. of The Language of 1984. Orwell's English and Ours, by W.F. Bolton, The
Modern Language Review 82 (1987): 723.
29 Dwight Bolinger, Language - The Loaded Weapon (London: Longman, 1980) 130-2.
30 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1958) 200.
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strengthening (a) Stalin, (b) the Anglo-American millionaires
and (c) all sorts of petty fuehrers of the type of De Gaulle. All
the national movements everywhere ... seem to take non-
democratic forms .... Everywhere the world movement seems
to be in the direction of centralised economies which can be
made to "work" in an economic sense but which are not
democratically organised and which tend to establish a caste
system. 31
This is the kind of pessimistic thinking that pervades Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four and seems to see the merging of capitalism, fascism
and Stalinist communism. But Orwell was not alone in having such a vision,
as Jameson's comments on Adorno, Horkheimer (contemporaries of Orwell)
and "late capitalism" suggest:
[Late capitalism is] found commonly in both Adorno and
Horkheimer, stressing two essential features: (1) a tendential
web of bureaucratic control (in its more nightmarish forms, a
Foucault-like grid ... ), and (2) the interpenetration of
government and big business ("state capitalism") such that
Nazism and the New Deal are related systems (and some
form of socialism, benign or Stalinist, also seems to be on the
agenda). 32
The point here (with the mention of Adorno and Horkheimer) is that a version
of the world view found particularly in Nineteen Eighty-Four was current, at
least in certain circles, during Orwell's lifetime. This is not to suggest that he
was part of such circles, but that he was both speaking for his time and
adopting the kind of prophetic role sometimes taken by satirists.
Jameson continues his account as follows:
31 Orwell, letter to H.J. Wilimett 148-50.
32 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, xviii.
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As widely used today, the term late capitalism has very different
overtones .... No one particularly notices the expansion of the state
sector and bureaucratization any longer; it seems a ... natural fact
of life .... [This] whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is
the internal and superstructural expression of American military
and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as
throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture,
death, and terror. 33
This thesis has argued that postmodernism and satire can often be seen as
making common cause, and this is yet another instance of it: Jameson, a
Marxist and postmodern theorist, in many respects confirms the vision Orwell
had of the future, indicating that centralised control and ruthlessly
undemocratic forms of government are the rule today. Where Jameson differs
from Orwell is in his reaction to these circumstances, since he believes that in
a time of postmodern culture "the luxury of old-fashioned ideological critique,
the indignant moral denunciation of the other, becomes unavailable." He
urges, instead, that "we make at least some effort to think of the cultural
evolution of capitalism dialectically, as catastrophe and progress together" 34
As elsewhere in this thesis, the stance of postmodernism differs from that of
Orwell in that it is more relaxed and exercises that peculiarly postmodern
tendency to come to terms with rather than demonise cultural phenomena
which do not directly reflect its own tendencies.
In Animal Farm and Nineteen-Four Orwell explores the key role played by
language in societies ruled by a combination of manipulation, control and
violence. Building on the historical facts of life in both Stalinist Russia and
Nazi Germany, he shows how state interference with language and the right
to free expression warp and pervert the network of private and public
relationships that constitute society. The subject of language and society is
33 Jameson, Postmodernism 5.
34 Jameson, Postmodernism 46,47.
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also the theme of an essay by George Steiner, who charts the process of
linguistic dislocation in Germany, starting from the period between 1870 and
the First World War, and relating it to more recent events:
[University], officialdom, army and court combined to drill
into the German language habits no less dangerous than
those they drilled into the German people: a terrible weakness
for slogans and pompous cliches (Lebensraum, "the yellow
peril," "the Nordic virtues"); an automatic reverence before
the long word or the loud voice; a fatal taste for saccharine
pathos (Gemutlichkeit) beneath which to conceal any amount
of rawness or deception .... A Hitler would have found reservoirs
of venom and moral illiteracy in any language. But by virtue
of recent history, they were nowhere else so ready and so near
the very surface of common speech. A language in which one
can write a "Horst Wessel Lied" is ready to give hell a native
tongue. (How should the word "spritzen" recover a sane meaning
after having signified to millions the "spurting" of Jewish blood
from knife points?) 35
Steiner's approach here, like that of Orwell, is also largely empirical, but his
use of a specific historical framework for his critique of the German language
demonstrates that such analysis has its place, pace the postmodern
penchant for theory which transcends history. This stands even if the use of
history does lend itself to selectivity - an issue which will be dealt with in more
detail later. Postmodern critical theory as a whole arguably lends itself to
selectivity too (though in a different sense), since it embodies various
approaches of which not all can be fully employed at anyone time.
Steiner's views on the German language are shared by Karl Kraus, the
Austrian satirist, who died in 1936. Kraus (who did not live to see the more
brutal Nazi atrocities) bitterly remarked that "he could forgive Hitler everything
35 George Steiner, Language and Silence (New York: Athaneum, 1967) 97,99.
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except what he had done to the German language." 36 Kraus, Swift, Orwell
and Steiner share a common concern with the vulnerability of language and
an awareness of how its strength and credibility can be damaged by its
political and cultural context. It is noteworthy, though, that Steiner published
his views on the German language long after the defeat of Hitler and that both
Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which Orwell exposes the linguistic
and moral bankruptcy in totalitarianism of both the Right and the Left, were
written in the spacious freedom of democratic Britain. It seems that distance
is needed to write tellingly of the effects of linguistic degeneration, since a
degree of clarity is most easily found outside the context of the language and
society concerned. This is so because no language is entirely free of
phenomena such as propaganda, ideology and political myth, which limit
people's ability to think and perceive with any kind of objectivity, rendering
them unable to look beyond the "prison-house of language,,37 (to use
Nietzsche's phrase) in which they find themselves. Since language is never a
perfectly "clean" means of mediating and interpreting experience, and is
always misleading, to some degree, there is no way of ever escaping the
prison-house entirely, only of ameliorating the conditions of one's
incarceration. The issue is one of degree, as well as intention, since the
darkest prison-houses are created when language is distorted in a radical and
intentional way.
Swift and Orwell were both engaged in a continuous struggle to preserve
language as a means of perception and direct communication. The fact that
they would never entirely reach their goal may not have occurred to them, but
if it did it is unlikely to have deterred them. They were concerned to resist the
blunting of language which, inter alia, could make it conceal or glamorize the
world, instead of opening it up for exploration. This can be seen in their
attacks against modish and meaningless words, and in the quality of their
own writing. Test speaks of the concern for language of another satirist, and
goes on to suggest that the "satiric dictionaries of Ambrose Bierce, Gustav
36 Bernard Crick, introd., Nineteen Eighty-Four, by George Orwell (1949; Oxford: Oxford UP,
1984) 75.
37 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language, title-page.
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Flaubert, Voltaire, Kingsley Amis, and William Safire are further indications
that many satirists are extra-sensitive to the misuse, corruption, and violations
of their language." 38 This thesis maintains that the motives of satirists are not
always apparent and would like to suggest that their concern about language
is not only a concern for the general good but also a desire to safeguard
jealously one of satire's primary tools for the manufacture of alternative
worlds.
However, Wordsworth, by no means a satirist, also feels the need for
vigilance when using language, since he sees its effects as highly variable:
Language, if it do not uphold, and feed, and leave in quiet,
like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe, is a
counterspirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work, to
subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve. 39
Ironically, the kind of language disparaged by Wordsworth is the kind of
language valued by both satire and postmodernism. They find language that
"is a counterspirit" creative and interesting, precisely because it does not
"leave in quiet," but rather tends to "subvert ... and to dissolve" things that are
no longer alive and useful. Satire stresses the existence of stupidity,
hypocrisy and evil, offering resistance when language is used to sanitise
these aspects of existence. The strategy of satire is to be on the alert for the
unpleasant realities in life and to rub people's noses in them. Franz Kafka,
whose dark satire shows certain affinities with that of Orwell, wrote a letter
containing the following passage:
If the book we are reading does not wake us, as with a fist
hammering on our skull, why then do we read it? So that it
shall make us happy? Good God, we would also be happy
if we had no books, and such books as make us happy we
38 Test 145-46.
39 William Wordsworth, "Upon Epitaphs (III)," Prose Works of William Wordsworth, ed. William
Knight, vol. II (London: Macmillan, 1896).
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could, if need be, write ourselves. But what we must have
are those books which come upon us like ill-fortune, and
distress us deeply, like the death of one we love better than
ourselves, like suicide. A book must be an ice-axe to break
the frozen sea inside us. 40
Satirists wield particularly large and sharp ice-axes and, as has been argued
in different terms elsewhere in this thesis, they are also the writers who most
consciously and directly try to break the frozen sea inside us. Orwell does this
in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four by drawing us into the alternative
world of totalitarianism and making us experience the helplessness of
ordinary citizens in such a system.
In Animal Farm Orwell invites us into the alternative world of a farm which has
been taken over by animals after the ejection of the human who originally
owned it. This satiric world bristles with parody, directed at various targets:
totalitarian forms of government, the notion of utopia, the credibility of the
masses - and the fairy tale form itself which Orwell has chosen to carry his
narrative. In depicting this world he has drawn on the events of the Russian
Revolution and its aftermath, coloured perhaps by his own experience of
disillusionment with revolution in Spain, as set out in his Homage to
Catalonia, of which Mairet says that "It shows us the heart of innocence that
lies in revolution; also the miasma of lying that, far more than cruelty, takes
the heart out of it." 41 The pre-revolutionary rhetoric on the farm has promised
the animals a paradisaical future, but this dream of perfection is undermined
by the new rulers of the farm - the pigs - who turn out to be as oppressive and
self-serving as the human being had been, if not more so. The reader, too, is
drawn into the heady post-revolutionary liminal world in which all things seem
possible, only to experience the systematic and inexorable destruction of all
that utopian promise offers. "The Gospel according to Marx ... teaches the true
believer that Utopia will inevitably dawn: the mechanics of History guarantee
40 Quoted by Steiner 67.
41 David Pryce-Jones, "Orwell's Reputation," The World of George Orwell, ed. Miriam Gross
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 144.
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it." 42 Satire's implicit involvement with the notion of utopia is nowhere as clear
as when utopias turn sour and become dystopias instead. Orwell offers us
some kind of utopian hope when, with deceptive lightness and heavy irony,
he subtitles his novel "A Fairy Story," but it turns out instead to be a heart-
rending account of what Trotsky called his book on the Russian Revolution:
"The Revolution Betrayed." 43
In Animal Farm the satirist is hard at work on our frozen hearts with his ice-
axe, depicting through the animals his view of the devastating innocence of
the masses who participated in the Russian Revolution, as well as the cynical
and duplicitous nature of their leaders. It is crucial that we preserve a sense
that this is only one alternative world into which we are being invited - a
version of the truth - so that we keep our critical faculties about us as we
respond to it, even as we give ourselves to the experience of the novel. There
is no single version of the truth - and certainly not of history. Orwell, like other
writers, has his own agenda, but that does not negate the value of what he
says. It simply demands that the reader interrogate the text in various ways,
and also be aware of the ideology espoused by Orwell: in other words, the
reader has to be aware of the nature of dialogism that is initiated by satirical
texts. Such issues are not made simpler by the elusiveness of most satirists
when it comes to declaring their beliefs, or committing themselves to specific
parties or ideologies - and Orwell was no exception to this. It is thus not
surprising that T.S. Eliot said of Animal Farm that "it was clear whom Orwell
was attacking ... [but] not so clear from which side" Eliot believed that "it was
necessary to have a constituency - and Orwell had none." 44 Satire does
often contain a didactic element which may involve a specific constituency,
but the broad mechanics of satire function to free its audience by presenting
them with alternative worlds in which truth is shown as unstructured and not
unitary, very much in postmodern vein.
42 Young 159.
43 Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed. What is the Soviet Union and Where is it Going?,
trans. Max Eastman, s" ed. (New York: Pathfinder P, 1972)
44 Ingle, A Political Life 64.
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The notion that there is no simple version of the truth is encouraged by the
allegorical nature of Animal Farm, which functions as a non-linear and rather
elusive form of discourse. Leyburn comments on the success of Orwell's use
of allegory as follows:
It is because the imaginative scheme of the animal allegory
is sustained that the revelation of the ease with which well-
meaning citizens can be duped into serving the masters of
a totalitarian state achieves its power. Orwell's keeping the
point of view consistently that of the helpless animals and
letting us make only the discoveries that they make forces
us to interpret for ourselves not just the misfortunes of
the renamed Manor Farm, but also those of our own world.
We are compelled to participate imaginatively. Animal Farm
is successful social satire because it is successful allegory. 45
Here Leyburn speaks of the mechanism of allegory as one initially of restraint,
confining readers to a single level until the unfolding events of the tale give
them access to the other levels. But this thesis offers a more dynamic
interpretation of the process, suggesting that allegory allows readers to move
constantly back and forth between the level of animals and that of human
beings, the levels of Britain and Soviet Russia, the levels of capitalism and
Marxism, the levels of conscious and unconscious behaviour and the levels of
the text and the concrete world, among others. This means that readers are
not simply moving back and forth between two levels, but rather that there are
several different levels between which readers move, some readers dwelling
longer on particular levels than others, some aware of more levels than
others. The primary movement of readers between the level of the animals
and that of human beings is set up by the structure of the allegory,
encouraging the "discoveries" mentioned by Leyburn, but that structure
serves to set off the other movements between other levels mentioned above.
The result is an unpredictable and unstable process of dialogism within the
45 Leyburn 69-70.
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text between the various levels which serves the purposes of satire well, since
in practice it encourages liminality, keeps the reader off balance, and may
offer different alternative worlds to particular readers at different times, or
even a different array of alternative worlds to particular readers each time
they re-read the novel. Although it must be acknowledged that conventional
allegory has its limitations, ideally this array of alternative worlds would have a
dialogic force, preventing readers from settling into a single comfortable view
of Animal Farm, and encouraging them to continue thinking about the issues
it raises. In fact, it is far more likely that such a result would be accomplished
by the postmodern form of allegory, which induces a more radical and
continuous oscillation of meaning, one that comes from the freeing of the
signifier from the signified - or, better still, from the existence of various
alternating and competing signifieds which themselves form a pattern in the
complete absence of a signifier. This would give rise to a highly provisional
quality, involving many different issues simultaneously, which the mere
movement and variety of conventional allegory cannot match. 46
The following excerpt from Animal Farm contains many such issues, and
occurs at a point in the novel where the realities of life in a totalitarian
environment are starting to penetrate the idealistic haze in which the animals
have been living. In this chapter the phrase "the animals" generally refers to
the mass of animals on the farm, as opposed to the pigs and their dogs. The
Rebellion against the oppressor, man, has taken place, but, for some reason,
the animals are worse off than before:
Meanwhile life was hard. The winter was as cold as the last one
had been, and food was even shorter. Once again all rations were
reduced, except those of the pigs and dogs. A too rigid equality
in rations, Squealer explained, would have been contrary to the
principles of Animalism. In any case he had no difficulty in proving
to the other animals that they were not in reality short of food,
whatever the appearances might be. For the time being, certainly,
46 See 53-6 above for a full discussion of this.
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it had been found necessary to make a readjustment of rations ...
but in comparison with the days of Jones, the improvement was
enormous. Reading out the figures in a shrill, rapid voice, he
proved to them in detail that they had more oats, more hay,
more turnips than they had had in Jones's day, that they
worked shorter hours, that their drinking water was of better
quality, that they lived longer, that a larger proportion of their
young ones survived infancy, and that they ... suffered less
from fleas. The animals believed every word of it. Truth to tell,
Jones and all he stood for had almost faded out of their
memories. They knew that life nowadays was harsh and bare,
they were often hungry and often cold, and that they were
usually working when they were not asleep. But doubtless it
had been worse in the old days. They were glad to believe so.
Besides, in those days they had been slaves and now they
were free, and that made all the difference, as Squealer did not
fail to point out. 47
An integral part of freedom consists of access to public information presented
in a meaningful way, and Squealer's rapid and cursory reading out of figures
apparently proving how well the animals are living is a satirical gibe at the
abuse of information by propagandists. The figures quoted are, in general,
unverifiable and represent an evasiveness masquerading as transparent
government. Much of the "information" presented by Squealer here refers to
the past, which is a blank to the animals, (except perhaps to Benjamin, the
donkey) and Squealer's rapid delivery of it is a further safeguard against the
animals absorbing the information or asking any awkward questions about it.
The whole passage is an attack by Orwell on Soviet communism, which he
calls "Animalism," perhaps implying that it is distinctly beastly, rather than
human or humane - and, throughout Animal Farm, the reader is made to
ponder on the difference (if any) between human beings and animals, by the
47 George Orwell, Animal Farm' A Fairy Story (1945; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951) 95-6.
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force of the allegorical movement between these two levels. If, as has been
argued, the satirist creates alternative worlds for his readers, so does
Squealer in this passage, by persuading the animals to disregard the hard
evidence of their senses and accept his interpretation of both their experience
and the events they have lived through. The difference between the satirist's
alternative worlds and those of the ideologue or propagandist is that, in the
latter cases the alternative world is intended to block off entirely the
audience's own sense of the world (monoglossia) - while the satirist
introduces a heteroglot flavour, intent on initiating a process of dialogism
between the various worlds. Squealer refers to their hunger pangs as
"appearances" and has "no difficulty in proving" that the shortage of food
does not, "in reality," exist. In terms of Orwell's satire, Squealer represents the
propagandist who deliberately forces the signification of words - for example
"appearances" and "reality" - into a specific mould, in the cause of a particular
political ideology. The tone of sweet reasonableness which is part of the
integration propagandist's 48 stock-in-trade can be heard in the sentence
beginning "For the time being, certainly, it has been found necessary .... " As
for the victims of ideology and the other discourses related to it, throughout
this novel Orwell seems to both satirise and pity them. Here the narrator tells
us that the animals are "glad to believe" Squealer, leaving the reader to
speculate that the animals need and want to believe him because they have
so much emotional capital invested in doing so: they have participated in the
Rebellion, given up their former view of the world, and accepted the ideology
of Animalism and the myth of the Rebellion as their guiding principles - and
they need these principles to be reliable. Orwell is commenting on human
behaviour here, suggesting that people cannot happily absorb too much
change: they need some kind of fixed framework and, he may be suggesting,
in order to secure this stability they will connive at their own enslavement by
giving away their right to have lives of their own. Bettelheim formulates what
he calls the appeal of tyranny as follows:
The more absolute the tyranny, the more debilitated the subject,
48 See 110-11 above.
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the more tempting to him to "regain" strength by becoming part
of the tyranny and thus enjoy its power. In accepting all this one
can attain, or retain, some inner integration through conformity.
But the price one must pay is to identify with the tyranny without
reservation; in brief, to give up autonomy. 49
The notion that many people are drawn to give up their freedom and want to
be told how to live their lives is confirmed by the views of Erich Fromm:
Another common illusion, perhaps the most dangerous of all,
was that men like Hitler had gained power over the vast
apparatus of the state through nothing but cunning and trickery,
that they and their satellites ruled merely by sheer force; that
the whole population was only the will-less object of betrayal
and terror .... We have been compelled to recognize that
millions in Germany were as eager to surrender their freedom
as their fathers were to fight for it; that other millions were
indifferent and did not believe the defence of freedom to be
worth fighting and dying for. 50
If Fromm's views on human behaviour are taken into account it is not possible
to have an unambiguous and sentimentalised response to the message of
Animal Farm. Another reason why one should be wary of seeing the animals
merely as victims is that such a view ignores the tendency of satire to present
audiences with distorted scenarios, not intended to be interpreted in a realist
spirit, and seldom encouraging interpretative closure: for example, groups of
people are never in fact as uniformly stupid as the animals in Orwell's novel
are depicted. Other possible interpretations of Animal Farm would insist that
people (or animals, here) are responsible for the way they live their lives,
even in the face of an oppressive regime. Some of these alternative views are
available mainly through deconstructive techniques, rather than the reactions
49 Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart (1960; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) 294.
50 Erich Fromm: Escape from Freedom ( New York: Holt, 1941) 4-5.
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of the ordinary reader - which might suggest that the didactic element in this
text is so strong that it tends to overpower the liminal force of satire. However,
as Bogel says, "If we are to find our way here, we must be able to lose it, and
that means allowing the satirist to fail and ourselves to be uncertain whether
the satirist has failed or not. Really uncertain." 51 The implication of this is that
audiences of satire may be prevented from taking comfortable and
oversimplified stances in relation to it, but rather compelled to remain in what
this thesis calls the liminal spaces offered by satire - spaces that offer satire's
audiences not comfort, but the opportunity to change and grow.
In Orwell's totalitarian worlds uncontrolled change is stifled, inter alia, by the
limitation of communication, both public and private. In Animal Farm the
majority of the animals is depicted as illiterate and the pigs are seen as using
language to disempower the other animals, while in Nineteen Eighty-Four a
new and deliberately impoverished language is imposed on the populace,
with the same intention. Texts of any kind are seen in both novels as an
arena of struggle, with the "Seven Commandments" being the prime example
in Animal Farm. The commandments, far from being irrevocably graven in
stone like their namesakes, are subjected to surreptitious changes by the
pigs, in their own favour. The final change, which comes towards the end of
the novel, sees the commandments reduced to one, which reads as follows:
ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL
BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE
EQUAL THAN OTHERS 52
The first line shows the original ideal, which is shaken by the "BUT" at the
beginning of the second, though the word "MORE" offers hope to at least
some animals, and may be seen as ameliorating matters somewhat.
However, the last line's revelation that such hopes lie in the destruction of a
cornerstone of Animalism belies the constant use of the term "comrade" by
51 Bogel 52.
52 Orwell, Animal Farm 114.
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the pigs (especially Squealer) when addressing the other animals, and
abolishes any real sense of comradeship on the farm. Orwell's satiric intent
here is apparently to show how tyrannical the pigs (representing the
communist Party elite) are, in that they manipulate the masses and exploit
their naivete. The point of the satire is that the dignity, independence and
freedom which the pigs held out to the other animals have been short-lived,
since the pigs have been unable to resist the seductiveness of power,
privilege and luxury. For Patai, "It is not power that corrupts the pigs; power
simply provides them with the means to realize their 'nature'i'''" By parodying
the effect of power on pigs, Orwell is pointing to the piggishness of human
beings, in the field of politics at any rate, providing some pungent satire.
However, postmodernism, with its different view of power and politics, might
well insist on opening up the issues more by focusing instead on the
provisionality of all texts, and asking what new ideology was being imposed in
place of the old. Orwell's modernist seriousness and certainty present
difficulties today, since at least some of his satiric effects depend on his
readers sharing his assumptions in an equally serious way. For example,
freedom is a suspect utopian ideal in postmodern thinking, but Orwell takes it
very seriously, believing it to be attainable, or at least worth struggling
towards. (That the issue of utopianism is a crucial one for satirists as well as
utopians will be demonstrated later in this chapter.) Brooker, speaking of the
postmodern writers Derrida and Hassan, says that both "share 'a profound
sense of ontological uncertainty' but ... confirm this radical uncertainty in an
attitude of play and reconciliation, outdating the modernist's struggle for
wholeness and autonomy." 54 The struggle for wholeness and autonomy has
little point in a post-structuralist world which thrives on fragmentation, though
this struggle is a key factor in both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four
and, taken on its own terms, gives point to these novels which they would not
otherwise have.
53 Patai 214.
54 Brooker 14.
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Much of the discussion so far has centred on language and its provisionality
or otherwise, depending on whether one takes a postmodernist or a
modernist view. Orwell's satirical stance towards (Marxist) propaganda and
ideology in Animal Farm repeatedly leads him to question the pigs' use of
language and to pillory these discourses as dishonest and misleading. One of
the ways he does this is through attacking the use of slogans, of which the
best known in the novel, the parodic "Four legs good, two legs bad," arises
because of the high illiteracy rate among the animals, which (on the face of it)
causes Snowball to reduce the Seven Commandments to this single,
unwritten maxim. The birds on the farm object to this formulation because
they, having two legs, are now classed as "bad," but Snowball "proved"
(Orwell's ironical word) to them that they were in error:
'A bird's wing, comrades, ' he said, 'is an organ of propulsion
and not of manipulation. It should therefore be regarded as a
leg. The distinguishing mark of Man is the hand, the instrument
with which he does all his mischief. ,55
In other words, when is a wing a leg? When an ideologue says so. To use the
lanquaqe of Marxist dialectics, the wing is "objectively" a leg. This use of the
word "objectively" is an example of how ideology can appropriate to itself
certain signifiers with positive connotations and apply them only to its
adherents or their point of view. Orwell's quarrel in this case seems to be that
the Marxist point of view is ideological, since it is offered as an objective point
of view (the only one) and all other points of view are, by implication, not
objective. Significantly, it is the sheep, traditionally representative of an
inability to think independently, who really take to this slogan, and they "bleat"
it "for hours on end, never growing tired of it." 56 The primacy of language in
any discussion of Animal Farm is confirmed by Elbarbary:
I suggest that the deliberate derangement of language, and
55 Orwell, Animal Farm 31.
56 Orwell, Animal Farm 31.
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linguistic exclusiveness which sustain the usurpation of power,
stand out as one of the novel's central thematic concerns. In a
sense, the revolution on the farm is a language-focused
enterprise, a product of specifically aggressive linguistic energy,
and language, which can effectively control reality, is at the root
of the tragic experience rather than merely mirroring it. 57
Speaking of life in Soviet satellite states, Fraser says that lithe perpetual
nagging of Communist propaganda slogans involves a soul-destroying
boredom which only the stoutest and most patient spirit can withstand.t''"
Slogans are recommended by Hitler in Mein Kampf, 59 and Ozhegov's
Dictionary of the Russian Language assumes that slogans are an essential
part of political education. 60 Orwell's suspicion of slogans can be seen from
the way he uses them in Animal Farm, as well as his account of the
telegraphese language Newspeak in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Since it draws on
the animals' experience of the oppressiveness of human beings, "Four legs
good two legs bad" is a highly effective slogan, and it operates not simply at
an intellectual level, but is also deeply felt (as with all propaganda). It forms
part of the agitation propaganda 61 against humans to which the animals are
habitually subjected. They have been encouraged to see all humans as evil
creatures who seek to dominate and exploit animals, and a deep fear of
humankind has been inculcated into them. They have come to see people's
habitual stance - on two legs - as an inherent part of their threatening nature,
and Squealer depicts the human hand in the same way. These features are
seen by the animals as unnatural or "other," signifying the absolute difference
between the animals and their implacable enemy.
Such is the ability of propaganda to manipulate, though, that it can swiftly
overcome the resistance generated even by such a taboo-like rejection of the
57 Samir Elbarbary, "Language as Theme in Animal Farm," International Fiction Review 19.1
~1992): 31.
8 Brown 125.
59 See 108 above.
60 Brown 21.
61 See 110 above.
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"other," undermining the animals' dislike of these key features of human
beings and even making them accept what before was anathema. This
happens when, one day, their leader Napoleon (who represents Stalin)
appears walking on his hind legs and clutching a whip in his trotter. The latter
is a particularly savage stroke on Orwell's part since, immediately after the
rebellion against farmer Jones (representing Tsar Nicholas II), the animals
destroy all his nose-rings, halters, blinkers, whips and the like as symbols of
oppression. Now the animals are stunned into silence ("It was as though the
world had been turned upside down") 62 and make no protest, though it is
clear that Napoleon has taken on the authority of Jones and intends to wield
power in the same way. The clearly pre-arranged response to this is a new
slogan chanted by the sheep, which confirms Napoleon in the role he has
taken on, and continues for five minutes, without intermission: "Four legs
good, two legs better. Four legs good, two legs better!" Like all effective
slogans, the new one becomes one of the secular prayers of the group,
incontrovertible because it has such force to bind people together and to
silence any alternative ideas. In this case, the new slogan has successfully
altered one of the founding myths of Animalism as expressed by the old
slogan, allowing the pigs to take on the worst qualities of the enemy without
opposition from the animals. Furthermore, what was previously seen as a
mark of irretrievable evil in humans is now seen as valuable and prestigious,
setting Napoleon up as superior to the animals.
Slogans, together with other political discourses, define the inner world which
the adherents of a specific ideology inhabit, in this case Animalism. But
implicit in Orwell's satire is the outline of another world, with different values
and assumptions, which is in a dialogic relationship with the world set out by
Animalism and its propagandists. In the allegory of Animal Farm, the implicit
dialogue is between the view that the prosperity of the state is all that counts
(with the pigs as the all-powerful directors of the state) and the alternative
view that it is, above all, personal values and individuality that count. The
former view is strengthened by ideology, political myth and propaganda
62 Orwell, Animal Farm 113.
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(including slogans), while the latter view does not get much of a direct
hearing, but functions as a powerfully implicit counterpoint to much that
happens in the novel. Support for the first view is shown after Boxer has killed
a stable-lad in the Battle of the Cowshed when Snowball produces the
following slogan: "The only good human being is a dead one." But Boxer's
immediate reply (which suggests the second view) is " 'I have no wish to take
life, not even human life'".and his eyes were full of tears." 63 Boxer at this
stage rejects the slogan but, as the novel progresses, he is drawn so far into
the world of the pigs that he loses his sense of the value and dignity even of
his own life and uniqueness so that, at the memorial banquet held in Boxer's
honour after his death, Napoleon can truthfully sum up Boxer's life by quoting
his "two favourite maxims, 'I will work harder' and 'Comrade Napoleon is
always right' - maxims, he said, which every animal would do well to adopt as
his own." 64 In Boxer Orwell is satirising the Stakhanovites of Stalinist Russia,
people modelling themselves on a miner called Stakhanov who raised
production by means of more efficient methods. However, another comment
of the time on the same issue brings a different reality into play: "But most
workers live[d] by the motto, 'As long as the bosses pretend they are paying
us a decent wage we will pretend that we are workinq". ,," 65 This latter rather
different light on what happened under Stalin serves as a reminder that
satirists do not simply manufacture their alternative worlds in a spirit of
realism; they may also have very specific agendas of their own which lead
them to distort and exaggerate issues. At any rate, the parodic version offered
us by Orwell in this novel shows one side of the picture by depicting Boxer as
noble, if naive, from the start and, as the novel progresses - especially as it
becomes clear that the pigs are cynically exploiting his blind loyalty to their
regime - it seems that Orwell is using Boxer to arouse our pity and anger.
Such feelings are also evident in the writing of the French writer, Gallais, who
a year after the French Revolution expressed his doubts about it:
63 Orwell, Animal Farm 39.
64 Orwell, Animal Farm 107.
65 The People's Chronology, Microsoft Bookshelf '95, CD-ROM (Redmond: Microsoft, 1995).
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Almost everywhere the popular masses, the instruments of
revolution, served the ambitions of demagogues, and were
poor, ignorant... and restless. It is not difficult to incite to a
revolution wretches who are always willing and ready to sell
themselves and to change masters. 66
But it is also necessary to look beyond both Gallais's points to the issue
raised earlier in this discussion - in effect, to adopt a dialogic stance - and
take into account that the advent of tyranny is not always unavoidable and its
victims often connive at its growth. 67 The mental prison of political myth can
be very attractive to people because it offers them escape from the
troublesome and contradictory world which they normally inhabit - and the
same could be said of propaganda and ideology. Particularly when times are
bad, the temptation to abdicate responsibility for one's own life can be strong
- and people may be willing to sacrifice a great deal of their freedom in order
to be relieved of important decisions.
The nineteenth-century historian Burckhardt prophesied that "dreadful
simplifiers" would take over the world. 68 In this century his prophecy has
been realised with a thoroughness which might have surprised even him, and
a plethora of totalitarian regimes has sprung up. Their intention is to exert
control over populations, with language as a prime means of persuading
people to accept a simplified view of the world. The more efficient of these
regimes have such a degree of control that they are able to decide for people
what "the truth" is. Raymond Carr, commenting on Orwell's differences with
his fellow members of the Left, says that ordinary Communist party members
saw truth itself as "class conditioned," and believed that conventional notions
of truth should be "superseded by historically correct proletarian truth." 69 It is
66 Pieter Desmet, Johan Rooryck and Pierre Swiggers, "What are Words Worth? Language
and Ideology in French Dictionaries of the Revolutionary Period," Ideologies of Language, eds.
john E. joseph and Talbot j Taylor (London: Routledge, 1990) 175.
67 See 142-3 above.
68 Henry Hatfield, "The Myth of Nazism," Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Henry A Murray (New
York: Braziller, 1960) 217.
69 Raymond Carr, "Orwell and the Spanish Civil War," The World of George Orwell, ed. Miriam
Gross (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 65.
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often easier to alter the past than the present, and the regimes of both Stalin
and Hitler made quite sophisticated attempts to alter people's perceptions of
both history and truth by changing them to suit the present regime's needs. In
Animal Farm the standard views of the Left on history and truth in Orwell's
time are put under pressure by the establishment of a dialogic process
between them and the liberal humanist values which the novel is implicitly
advocating.
An example of the manipulation of both history and "truth" in Animal Farm
occurs when Napoleon suddenly announces that Animal Farm would
thenceforth engage in trade with the neighbouring farms. The animals are
bemused and uneasy, because they recall that immediately after the
Rebellion against Jones resolutions were passed by them forbidding animals
to deal with human beings, to engage in trade or make use of money. But
Squealer "settles" the matter in his own way:
Afterwards Squealer made a round of the farm and set the
animals' minds at rest. He assured them that the resolution
against engaging in trade and using money had never been
passed, or even suggested. It was pure imagination, probably
traceable in the beginning to lies circulated by Snowball. A
few animals still felt faintly doubtful, but Squealer asked them
shrewdly, 'Are you certain that this is not something that you
have dreamed, comrades? Have you any record of such a
resolution? Is it written down anywhere?' And since it was
certainly true that nothing of the kind existed in writing, the
animals were satisfied that they had been mistaken. 70
The phrase "set the animals' minds at rest" is ironic here, since Squealer's
actual intention is to make the animals mistrust their recollection of events
and accept that of the authorities instead (as happens in Nineteen Eighty-
Four). Squealer invokes the name of a pig called Snowball (representing
70 Orwell, Animal Farm 57-8.
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Trotsky) who has been demonised by the other pigs. Just like Trotsky, who
opposed Stalin, left Russia and continued his opposition outside the country,
Snowball serves as a scapegoat for any occasion and, being absent and thus
unable to defend himself, he can be used to bolster the pigs' version of
history. The spurious defensive unity thus created against this invisible
external enemy takes the minds of the animals off the reality of conditions on
the farm. Squealer cynically exploits the animals' illiteracy, as well as the lack
of written records, brushing aside the common memory of the animals and
citing the lack of records as evidence that resolutions were not taken. He has
recreated a new view of past events and has thus successfully rewritten
history.
A similar revision of the past occurs when, after opposing Snowball's plans to
build a windmill, Napoleon suddenly drives him off the farm and then
announces that the windmill will be built after all:
That evening Squealer explained privately to the other
animals that Napoleon had never in reality been opposed
to the windmill. On the contrary, it was he who had
advocated it in the beginning .... The windmill was, in fact,
Napoleon's own creation .... He had seemed to oppose the
windmill, simply as a manoeuvre to get rid of Snowball, who
was a dangerous character .... This, said Squealer, was
something called tactics. He repeated a number of times,
'Tactics, comrades, tactics!' skipping round and whisking
his tail with a merry laugh. 71
Squealer embodies the cynicism and smugness traditionally attributed to
many propagandists, among them Hitler and Goebbels, 72 and seen here in
the self-congratulatory jig danced by Squealer at the end of the passage. The
word "privately" in the first sentence is calculated to mislead, suggesting that
71 Orwell, Animal Farm 52.
72 See 108-9 above.
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Squealer is taking the animals into his confidence by giving them privileged
information, when in fact he is giving them what is now called
"disinformation." It is apparent from the whole of Animal Farm that he is not
merely a common liar or manipulator, nor just a party stooge. In terms of the
discussion of propaganda in Chapter 3, Squealer is a propagandist by virtue
of his cynicism, his deviousness and his readiness to defend and rationalise
anything that the ruling group does, marking his intense commitment to the
pigs' cause, which consists of the intensification and perpetuation of their hold
on power. He seems conscienceless, always ready to undermine the certainty
of the animals in order to reshape history or simply to keep them unsettled so
as to make them more malleable.
The history presented to any society has always been a product of selection,
bias and manipulation, but the propagandist shapes history more consciously
than most historians. Arendt sees the Greek historian Herodotus as highly
idealistic, one who aimed "to save human deeds from the futility that comes
from oblivion .... " 73 But, she goes on to say, all history translates "action and
speech ... into that kind of fabrication which eventually becomes the written
word." 74 Orwell's attitude towards history is illustrated by his comments on
the history of the Spanish Civil War, which he fought in and thus knew at first
hand. He says, "I saw, in fact, history being written not in terms of what
happened but of what ought to have happened according to various 'party
lines'." 75 That he is by no means entirely naive on this issue is confirmed by
his going on to say:
I am willing to believe that history is for the most part
inaccurate and biased, but what is peculiar to our own age
is the abandonment of the idea that history could be
truthfully written. In the past people deliberately lied, or
they unconsciously coloured what they wrote, or they
73 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (London
Faber, 1961) 41.
74 Arendt, Between Past and Future 45.
75 George Orwell, "Looking Baek on the Spanish War," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, vol.ll (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 257.
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struggled after the truth, well knowing that they must make
many mistakes; but in each case they believed that "the
facts" existed and were more or less discoverable. 76
Orwell makes a stout effort to come to terms with the elusiveness of history,
though he can't bring himself to quite let go of the notion that truth may
always, in some way, be accessible. He believes that "as long as some parts
of the earth remain unconquered, the liberal tradition can be kept alive [and
truth will survive]" - and that "the truth goes on existing." 77 In another article
he does admit that "History is written by the winners .... In the last analysis our
only claim to victory is that if we win the war we shall tell less lies about it than
our adversaries." Yet, he goes on to say "There is some hope ... that the
liberal habit of mind, which thinks of truth as something to be discovered, and
not as something you can make up as you go along, will survive." 78 Orwell
expresses scepticism about the absolute quality of history, yet his liberalism
prevents him from acknowledging the provisionality of history without
reservation. In this he shows himself to be a modernist, rather than a
postmodern writer, since it is only a short step from this reserved position
about history to the notion that there is a single version of it, which one owns,
and another short step thence to exactly what Orwell deplored in Animal Farm
and Nineteen Eighty-Four the conscious manufacture and mystification of
history found in totalitarian states. As Tismaneanu says, "Communism, as
formulated by Marx and Lenin, had sacralized history, turning it into a myth in
the name of which all sacrifices were justified." 79 Orwell's view is that it is only
totalitarian states that "demand" the manipulation and falsification of history 80
- yet there is good reason to believe that such practices are much more
widespread and that history habitually diverges from simple fact. It is possible
that Orwell's views on history arose from his writing very much as a journalist,
76 Orwell, "Looking Back on the Spanish War" 258.
77 Orwell, "Looking Back on the Spanish War" 259.
78 George Orwell, "As I Please," 4 February 1944, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus,
vol. III (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 88
79 Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Resurrecting Utopia: The Search for Myth Under Post-Communism,"
Partisan Review 64 (1997): 387.
80 George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol.
IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 63-4.
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rather than a historian. Journalists have to believe that the truth is both
recoverable and transmissible, while historians (of today, at any rate) do not
have such certainties. Meyer suggests that "the practice that seems to horrify
[Orwell] the most, the control of the past by falsifying records and rewriting
history, is, of course, as old as historiography itself." 81
Speaking of history, the narrator in Samuel Butler's nineteenth-century satire,
Erewhon Revisited, remarks: "It has been said that though God cannot alter
the past, historians can; it is perhaps because they can be useful to Him in
this respect that He tolerates their existence." 82 It is this kind of scepticism
that is closer to contemporary views on history than Orwell's attempts to
shore up the already permeable boundaries of "truth" against uncertainty.
Samuel and Thompson express their scepticism as follows:
Historians themselves, however rationalistic in their method,
are by no means insulated from the appeal of myth, as can
be seen from symbolic categories we employ (like 'the nation',
or 'the common people'), the grand theories we subscribe to
and, not least, our own fetishistic faith in the facts .... Most
fundamentally of ali ... many of us weigh evidence with an
instinctive narvety which rests on our failure to recognize
rationalistic realism as the special myth of our own Western
culture .... Yet if we turn to almost any historical field, this
persistent blindness to myth robs us of much of our power to
understand and interpret the past. 83
Samuel and Thompson see myth as omnipresent and unavoidable, but
historians' blindness to myth's role is seen as a barrier to understanding the
past. Significantly, Samuel and Thompson urge a kind of dialogism: not the
eradication of myth, but its acceptance as a source of energy and flexibility of
81 Meyer, 127.
82 Samuel Butler, Erewhon and Erewhon Revisited (London: Dent, 1932) 293.
83 Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson, The Myths We Live By, eds. Samuel and Thompson
(London: Routledge, 1990) 4-5.
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approach, which will "open up a history which refuses to be safely boxed
away ...which instead pivots on the active relationship between past and
present, subjective and objective, poetic and political." 84 This kind of
openness to ontological uncertainties is a distinctive quality of
postmodernism, which has the courage to wait for patterns to emerge, as well
as the confidence not to regard such patterns as definitive, while keeping faith
in the value of continuous process - as Hutcheon's comments on history
demonstrate:
Among the consequences of the postmodern desire to
denaturalise history is a new self-consciousness about the
distinction between the brute events of the past and the
historical events we construct out of them. Facts are events to
which we have given meaning. 85
History as seen by Orwell is not "denaturalised": it has for him a purity and
clarity which give rise to a single, indisputable account of the past. Hence the
extent of his outrage when the version of history espoused by him is
tampered with, since he fails to see that the way history is commonly viewed
is coloured by a set of assumptions, an ideology, a political myth or some
other fixed way of interpreting events: "Facts are events to which we have
given meaning." In Animal Farm (and Nineteen Eighty-Four) Orwell's
assumption that he views history objectively is a place for him to stand while
he swings his satiric axe, and it gives energy to his angry polemic against
those who manipulate history. Postmodernism, however, regards history as
an artefact, as merely another text, with the unreliability and provisionality
common to all texts: from this perspective history cannot be seen as
synonymous with "truth."
In this regard, we are reminded by Jameson of the following:
84 Samuel and Thompson 5.
85 Linda Hutcheon, "Telling Stories: Fiction and History," Modernism I Postmodernism, ed.
Peter Brooker (London: Longman, 1992) 238.
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[There is] a lesson we are supposed to have learned by now,
namely, that even ... in the present context even the plainest
unreflective history - the sheerest, most 'mindless'
enumeration of facts of an annals or a chronicle - implies
a whole metaphysic and constitutes through its mere
enunciation a whole philosophy of history in its own right. 86
In Animal Farm Orwell is only too well aware of the theoretical baggage
implicit in the historical events he allegorises, but tends to dodge the full
consequences of his own commitment to socialism insofar as he reserves the
right to view it in an unorthodox way, in this case by denying that "the USSR
. was progressing towards anything that one could truly call Socialism.t''" This
kind of evasiveness with regard to the principles and beliefs held by the
satirist is endemic to satire, 88 but it does throw light on Orwell's particular
brand of socialism, especially given the uncertainty of his contemporaries (as
well as more recent commentators) as to his true political colours." In
addition, there is an innate conservatism in Orwell which conflicts with both
his socialist values and his satirical stance. Both socialism and satire stand
for movement and change, but both also have a powerful utopian foundation,
making Orwell doubly prone implicitly to explain events against the backdrop
of utopia. However, utopia is, by definition, a place or condition of stasis,
rather than dynamism, leading writers like Elliott to accuse utopian writers of
attempting "to freeze history." 90 Both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four
embody a howl of protest, not merely because people are unjust to others,
but because they have deviated so far from the utopian view of the world
which satirists in general, and Orwell in particular, covertly cherish. 91
86 Fredric Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986, vol. 1: Situations of Theory
~Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988) 154.
7 Orwell, Author's Preface 404.
88 See 47 above.
89 See 101-2 above.
90 Robert C Elliott, The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre (Chicago: Chicago UP,
1970) 10
91 See 175-7, 288-9 below.
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The totally pessimistic interpretation of Animal Farm adopted by this thesis is
not universally accepted, though. Letemendia, for example, believes that the
lack of self-confidence and political wisdom shown by the animals does not
necessarily indicate that the masses will always be enslaved. He sees the
novel, instead, as Orwell's challenge to socialism as a movement:
The crude proletarian spirit of the common animals necessarily
provides the essential ingredient for a revolution towards a free
and equal society, but it needs careful honing and polishing if it
is not to fall victim to its own inherent decency and modesty. 92
Letemendia's view is attractive, though the question is how to establish a
society which is prepared to actively nurture these qualities of decency and
modesty. Michael Peters regards a pessimistic view of Animal Farm as "anti-
Communist propaganda":
Whilst Orwell was happy to see [Animal Farm] used to attack
the Soviet myth, he did become increasingly worried about the
way it was being used by the Right as a means of demonstrating
that all revolutionary change was bound to fail. Picking out as
central the moment when the pigs keep the apples and milk for
themselves, he makes the point that if 'the other animals had had
the sense to put their foot down then it would have been all right'.
Major's dream could have been realised. 93.
Considering the inexorability of Animal Farm it is unconvincingly idealistic to
suggest that good sense alone can defeat tyranny. Revolutions often begin
precisely because under-educated and powerless masses of people are not
capable of intervening and asserting their rights.94 It almost smacks of self-
92 V.C. Letemendia, "Revolution on Animal Farm: Orwell's Neglected Commentary," Journal of
Modern Literature 18.1 (1992): 129.
93 Michael Peters, "'Animal Farm' Fifty Years On," Contemporary Review 267.1555 (1995):
91.
94 See 214-6 below for a discussion of Orwell's attitudes towards the masses in Nineteen
Eighty-Four
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deception, therefore, for Orwell to speak of the assertion of such rights before
a revolution, organised by those few who do know how to assert their rights,
has begun to empower the many who do not. Is this a case of "trust the tale,
not the teller"?
The first part of this chapter has charted the movement in Animal Farm from
utopia to dystopia in terms of how both ideology and language can be abused
to gain political power. However, part of the lesson of Animal Farm (and
Nineteen Eighty-Four) is that a totalitarian regime does not gain and keep
power over people's lives and thoughts by words alone, no matter how
cleverly it is done: the force of terror has to be added in order to complete and
maintain the supremacy of tyrannical rule.95 In both Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four it is the manipulativeness of propaganda, the blinkered
quality of ideology and the coerciveness of terror that together provide the
means for total control of a population. This requires a police force which has
the savagery necessary to reduce a society to submission and which is free
from the restraints of the law. In Animal Farm such a force emerges in the
form of the dogs, which have been nurtured since puppyhood in such
seclusion that, as we are told, the other animals forget about their existence'"
- as does the reader. Orwell stages a dramatic reappearance of the dogs at
the climax of the disagreement between Snowball and Napoleon over the
matter of the windmill. The re-emergence of the dogs marks the end of the
"fairy story" for the animals, but announces a fresh attempt on Orwell's part to
"make strange" (in the Russian formalist sense) the familiar:
But just at this moment Napoleon stood up and ... uttered
a high-pitched whimper. ...At this there was a terrible baying
sound outside, and nine enormous dogs wearing brass-studded
collars came bounding into the barn. They dashed straight
for Snowball, who only sprang from his place just in time to
escape their snapping jaws. In a moment he was out of the
95 Aron 185.
96 Orwell, Animal Farm 32.
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door and they were after him. Too amazed and frightened to
speak, all the animals crowded through the door to watch ....
Snowball ... was running as only a pig can run, but the dogs
were close on his heels .... Then he put on an extra spurt and,
with a few extra inches to spare, slipped through a hole in the
hedge and was seen no more .... Silent and terrified, the
animals crept back into the barn. In a moment the dogs
came bounding back .... Though not yet full-grown, they were
huge dogs, and as fierce-looking as wolves .... Napoleon, with
the dogs following him, now mounted on to the raised portion
of the floor .... He announced that from now on the Sunday
morning Meetings would come to an end .... In future all
questions relating to the working of the farm would be settled
by a special committee of pigs .... These would meet in private
... .The animals would still assemble on Sunday mornings to ...
receive their orders for the week; but there would be no more
debates. 97
This quotation is crucial to Orwell's purpose in Animal Farm since, from a
political point of view, it represents the climax of the novel. Here Napoleon
asserts his personal power over the farm and tightens the grip of the pigs
over the animals by means of the dogs, which symbolize the G.P.U., the
ruthless and feared secret police employed by Stalin. The passage opens
with Napoleon whistling to his dogs in an unmistakably human sound
denoting ownership and control over the animals. The scene as a whole
combines a monde renverse quality with an animal ferocity, depicting a pig
setting his dogs, which unquestioningly obey him, on to his political rival,
another pig. This alternative world is one in which Orwell deliberately blurs
the boundaries between human and animal behaviour - a device which
exceeds the bounds of mere allegory, compelling readers into a surrealist
framework which forces them to re-examine conventional ideas about both
human and animal behaviour. In political terms, Napoleon has betrayed the
97 Orwell, Animal Farm 47-9.
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most important principles of the Rebellion: that all animals should be free and
equal, and that all the ways of man should be eschewed. It is significant that
the dogs are wearing collars, which are the mark of man, the oppressor,
because their appearance constitutes a dramatic announcement of the fact
that henceforth there will be no semblance of democracy and justice on
Animal Farm. The dogs produced by Napoleon are "as fierce as wolves,"
which carries a particularly sinister quality of threat, since most of the citizens
of this society are, literally, sheep.
Having reduced the animals to a state of terror, Napoleon proceeds to
formally entrench himself as chief ruler of Animal Farm. He stands in the
same place where Major (representing Marx), the great idealist and preacher
of freedom, had once stood and thrilled the animals with his words, but
Napoleon has a very different message, and he has the dogs with him in case
of disagreement. Orwell is here satirising the blatant abuse of power, in
which, at a stroke, the animals are deprived of all their political rights by a
cynical leader. He clearly intended this to reflect the actual outcome of the
Russian Revolution, which is contrasted with the theories of Marx, here
summarised by Bendix:
In [Marx's] view, the workers will provide the political momentum
for the great historical change to come; they will cause a
revolutionary upheaval against the material and psychological
inhumanities to which they have been subjected, but they do not
possess the intellectual tools to direct that upheaval. This
direction will be provided by bourgeois ideologists who respond
to the dissolution of their own class, the miseries of the
proletariat, and the historical opportunities that arise .... 98
But Animal Farm portrays the proletariat as having been misled, abused and
98 Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," Ideology and Discontent,
ed. David E. Apter (Glencoe: The Free P, 1964) 309.
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freshly enslaved by the bourgeoisie who, if they ever had any idealism,
abandon it entirely after the Rebellion. Orwell declared that "Animal Farm was
the first book in which I tried, with full consciousness of what I was doing, to
fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole." 99 In his Preface to
the Ukranian edition of Animal Farm he says:
[It] was of the utmost importance to me that people in western
Europe should see the Soviet regime for what it really was ....
And so for the past ten years I have been convinced that the
destruction of the Soviet myth was essential if we wanted a
revival of the Socialist movement. 100
Orwell is here using the term "myth" in Ellul's pejorative sense rather than, for
example, Schorer's view which sees myth as something which gives meaning
to experience and helps people give it shape and form. 101 The Marxist view
offers itself as something akin to the latter, though it does not refer to itself as
a myth, but Orwell's aim in Animal Farm is to expose that view as myth in the
most destructive sense of the word. Speaking of the genesis of Animal Farm,
Zwerdling points to the growth of two disturbing aspects in that time, the
worship of power and the seductiveness of political myth:
These two forces were in fact connected, for the myths were
necessary to protect committed people from the knowledge
that the universal hunger for power threatened every political
system .... The myths of the perfect society, of the inevitability
of human improvement, and of the possibility of achieving
genuine equality were all necessary to hide the new facts of
tyranny ... and the rigidification of social privilege. 102
99 Orwell, "Why I Write" 7.
100 Orwell, Author's Preface 404-5.
101 See 115 above.
102 Alex Zwerdling, "Orwell and the Techniques of Didactic Fantasy," Twentieth Century
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Zwerdling suggests that all "these myths came together for [gullible]
Westerners in the myth of the Soviet Union - the ideal socialist
commonwealth" and that Orwell decided to provide a counter-myth by way of
Animal Farm. 103 Yet this counter-myth - this alternative world - which Orwell's
satire offers his audience cannot be seen as ideologically neutral, and Animal
Farm comes very close to being as much political myth as the myth of the
Soviet Union - an affinity between satire and its adversaries that has been
noted elsewhere in this thesis. 104 It needs to be stressed again that satire is
not always as innocent as it claims to be: no discourse could be so
consistently on the side of the angels.
As has been shown, Orwell's avowed intention in writing Animal Farm was
political, and this, combined with its shortness, gives it something of the
polemical nature of a pamphlet. The polemic mode is well suited to satire,
since both have a tendency to exaggerate and distort, and aim to make a
point rather than be fair to all sides. Orwell admired the simplicity and power
of the pamphlet form at its best, so it is not surprising that he decided to
produce a novel in something resembling that form. He liked and collected
pamphlets, bemoaning the poor quality of contemporary ones, and insisted
that pamphlets should, ideally, occupy a central place in the political life of the
time:
The reason why the badness of contemporary pamphlets is
somewhat surprising is that the pamphlet ought to be the
literary form of an age like our own. We live in a time when
political passions run high, channels of free expression are
dwindling, and organised lying exists on a scale never before
known. For plugging the holes in history the pamphlet is the
ideal form. 105
103 Zwerdling, "Didactic Fantasy" 91.
104 See 76, 122-3 above.
105 George Orwell, "Pamphlet Literature," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vel. II
(London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 284-5.
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It is clear from what Orwell says about his motivation for writing Animal Farm
that he was intent on plugging what he saw as a particularly large hole in
history. In fact, it appears that Animal Farm came very close to being
published as a fully-fledged pamphlet. It was difficult to find a publisher for
this novel, since in 1944 it was considered outrageous to attack Britain's
Soviet allies as Orwell does in Animal Farm. 106In a letter to Leonard Moore
an irate Orwell threatens to " ... publish it myself as a pamphlet at 2/-. I have
already half-arranged to do so & have got the necessary financial backing.,,107
It may well be that the pamphlet-like form of Animal Farm is also responsible
for the novel's occasional oversimplifications.
Rosenheim insists that "All satire is not only an attack; it is an attack upon
discernible, historically authentic particulars ... " 108and, certainly, the parallels
between conditions and events in Orwell's novel and those in Stalinist Russia
are precise down to the smallest detail. Meyers says that "the political
allegory of Animal Farm, whether specific or general, detailed or allusive, is
pervasive, thorough and accurate, and the brilliance of the book becomes
much clearer when the satiric allegory is compared to the political
actuality.,,109 For example, the characterisation of Napoleon as Stalin and
Snowball as Trotsky is extremely true to life, Napoleon being depicted as the
quiet, dogged and pathologically cruel and deceitful leader that Stalin was,
and Snowball possessing Trotsky's oratorical brilliance and intellectual flair,
as well as the assurance that led him to underestimate fatally Stalin's
shrewdness and gift for political manipulation. A great deal of Stalin's quality
comes across in the following words of his, quoted by Tucker and Cohen: "To
choose one's victim, to prepare one's plans minutely, to slake an implacable
vengeance, and then to go to bed ... there is nothing sweeter in the world." 110
106 T.R. Fyvel, George Orwell: A Personal Memoir (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982)
131-32.
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Orwell's bitter disappointment at the realities of communist oppression springs
partly from his naive belief that political ideals can be successfully translated
into practice without the adaptation and corruption of those ideals. Colas says
of Marxism that "The state in Marx's system was destined to disappear
eventually, after the real, proletarian revolution, which would give birth to the
dictatorship of the proletariat." 111 The satirical scenario in Animal Farm is
entirely the opposite, with the proletariat showing no signs of becoming
dictators but rather suffering great oppression. Orwell's satire is aimed, inter
alia, at Stalin's totalitarian stance; yet, as Colas indicates (and Animal Farm
confirms), the deviation from Marx's theories began directly after the
revolution staged in the name of those theories, and years before Stalin came
to power:
After the revolution of October 1917, the main mission of [the
Bolshevik Party] became the destruction of all the debris of the
former society, particularly the parasitic peasantry, the kulaks,
whom Lenin compared to insects, lice, and whom he planned
to eradicate. Mass terror, targeting selected groups of people,
would be one of the key aims and methods of such a totalitarian
regime. 112
Power did not come into the hands of the proletariat after the revolution, the
planned bloodshed described above was not of their doing and they did not
particularly benefit by it.
The most dramatic moments of oppression in Animal Farm occur during the
mass confessions and punishment of animals which are Orwell's satirical
version of Stalin's show trials, showing how connivance and sado-masochism
function as part of the apparatus of terror:
Four days later ... Napoleon ordered all the animals to assemble
111 Colas 1019.
112 Colas 1020 - 21.
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in the yard. When they were all gathered together, [he] emerged
... wearing both his medals (for he had recently awarded himself
'Animal Hero, First Class', and 'Animal Hero, Second Class'), with
his nine huge dogs ... uttering growls that sent shivers down all the
animals' spines. They all cowered silently .... Napoleon stood sternly
surveying his audience; then he uttered a high-pitched whimper.
Immediately the dogs bounded forward, seized four of the pigs by
the ear and dragged them, squealing with pain and terror, to
Napoleon's feet. ... [He]now called upon them to confess their
crimes. They were the same four pigs as had protested when
Napoleon abolished the Sunday Meetings .... [T]hey confessed that
they had been secretly in touch with Snowball. .. that they had
collaborated with him in destroying the windmill, and that they had
entered into an agreement. .. to hand over Animal Farm to Mr
Frederick .... When they had finished their confession, the dogs
promptly tore their throats out, and in a terrible voice Napoleon
demanded whether any other animal had anything to confess ....
The three hens who had been the ringleaders in the attempted
rebellion over the eggs now came forward and stated that
Snowball had appeared to them in a dream and incited them to
disobey Napoleon's orders. They, too, were slaughtered. Then
a goose came forward and confessed to having secreted six ears
of corn during the last years' harvest. Then a sheep confessed
to having urinated in the drinking pool. and two other sheep
confessed to having murdered an old ram ... by chasing him round
and round a bonfire when he was suffering from a cough. They
were all slain on the spot. And so the tale of confessions and
executions went on, until there was a pile of corpses lying
before Napoleon's feet and the air was heavy with the smell of
blood, which had been unknown there since the expulsion of Jones. 113
113 Orwell, Animal Farm 72-4.
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Napoleon now no longer calls meetings, but orders the animals to assemble.
His rather stagy appearance, wearing his self-awarded medals, suggests the
archetypal dictator, vain and revelling in power - a Stroessner or an Idi Amin,
as much as a Stalin. The interplay between Napoleon and the animals is
telling. The flood of confessions that is elicited from the animals shows no
sense of self-preservation, since this flood does not abate, even when it is
clear that rio-one is getting a fair trial, no distinction is being made between
trivial and serious offences and all executions are being summarily carried
out.
There is a sado-masochistic relationship between Napoleon and the animals,
with him showing a dramatic relish as he plays the vindictive and punitive role,
while the animals offer themselves up to death, goaded by their great sense
of guilt and gripped by their fatalistic sense that what is happening must be
right. The last sentence of the passage strongly suggests a scene in an
abattoir, and the mention of Jones reinforces this. No doubt Jones had killed
animals in order to eat or sell them, but even animals in an abattoir do not
always submit meekly to death, sometimes struggling and expressing terror
when they smell the blood and hear the cries of the other animals. Here,
though, the animals' sense of Napoleon's power, coupled with their low
sense of self-worth, results in confessions - some ridiculous - followed by a
meek acceptance of death. The force of satiric distortion presents us with a
surrealist world in which animals express guilt and pigs indulge in mass killing.
By twisting the formerly orderly strands of the allegory back and forth in this
way Orwell is tampering with the traditional links between the signifiers and
the signifieds of words in order to make people concentrate less on the
comfort of epistemology and more on the ontological significance of the
events he is describing. When Orwell makes pigs into butchers he strips away
the mask of civilisation adopted by human beings, shocking and shaming
people into an awareness of what their race is capable of, since even in the
pig, for which people usually have contempt anyway, such behaviour is
unnatural and horrific. When he shows the animals, which here represent
humans, going meekly to the slaughter, Orwell exposes our psychic
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vulnerability, demonstrating how fragile the supposed mastery of the human
race really is. Either way the satire is savage, showing how totalitarianism
robs individuals both of their self-respect and the ability to act with freedom
and dignity. This is satire in its function of performing "a kind of border work,"
here by repeatedly "invoking an antithesis between the social and the
anima!." 114
A parallel can be drawn between the way the animals relate to Napoleon and
the operation of various charismatic movements, both political and religious.
Lindholm says that "there is a deep human desire to escape from the limits of
the self' 115 and this would involve handing over one's freedom to a leader or
guru, as suggested earlier by Fromm. 116 Hitler, Charles Manson and the
Reverend Jim Jones are all examples of leaders who drew people to
themselves, inspiring uncritical love and obedience in their followers, as well
as calm acceptance of their death. Crowd psychologists speak of groups who
in the presence of such leaders become mesmerised so that, as Lindholm
says, they "give up all volition, even though paradoxically they believe
themselves to be acting spontaneously." 117 Such an experience reduces the
group to the emotional state of a child who is utterly dependent on a parent
figure. Freud is even more specific, suggesting that under these
circumstances "the leader is the embodiment of the ... 'dreaded primal
father' ... who is believed to be superhuman, full of sexual energy, and
endowed with absolute power." 118 In a similar strategy of asserting
dominance, Hitler's rhetoric was aimed at eroding his audience's sense of its
own individuality, something both Manson and Jones also aimed to do.
According to Lindholm, Manson's followers were made to " become nothing,
undergo a psychological and spiritual death that burned out any independent
personality," 119 and of the Reverend Jones, Lindholm says that the
114 Richard Nash, "Satyrs and Satire in Augustan England," Theorizing Seiire: Essays in
Literary Criticism, eds. Brian A Connery and Kirk Combe (New York St. Martin's Press,1995)
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charismatic tends to "create environments where he would be in complete
control, and where he could act out fantasies of omnipotence and violence as
the regulator of life and death.,,120Whether it is the Reverend Jones inducing
hundreds of people to drink juice containing cyanide or Napoleon prompting
scores of animals to go to their deaths by confessing to crimes which are
either largely fantasy or so minor as to be risible, the leader is a god-like
figure with hypnotic power over his followers,
The historical basis for the scenes of confession and execution in Animal
Farm is clearly the Moscow Trials of Stalin (part of what is known as the Great
Purge) which took place between 1936 and 1939. The allegory is particularly
telling here, the details being central to a full understanding of the novel.
Napoleon and Stalin have many characteristics in common, among them
being arrogance, coldness and paranoia. The way in which the Great Purge
was organized - indeed, the fact that it occurred at all - was directly due to
these personal qualities of Stalin, who masterminded the purges. It is
estimated that some nine million people were arrested during the Great
Purges, most of whom were either executed, imprisoned or sent to the labour
camps in Siberia. Stalin personally approved the arrest of thousands upon
thousands of people, and it was he who made all the decisions about the
arrest of high party leaders, sometimes without the knowledge of the State
Prosecutor. Fischer provides further details:
[This period saw] the death, without trial, of countless top-rank,
second-rank, third-rank and fourth-rank officials. Of the twenty-
seven ... outstanding Bolsheviks who drafted the 1936
Constitution, fifteen had been shot by 1938. Eleven ...
ambassadors were shot. ... Universities saw ... entire faculties
vanish. Many hundreds of foreign Communists who had found
asylum in Russia were executed. Hundreds of journalists,
novelists, poets, playwrights, theatre managers, actors,
sculptors, and painters were purged. Pages and pages could
120Undholm 141.
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be filled with the mere surnames of nationally famous
Communists who were killed .... With each prominent party
member went at least a score of his associates and friends.
Many cabinet members in the federal governments and in the
smaller regional republics were purged; their staffs, often
numbering hundreds, were purged with them. 121
In the army some 35,000 officers suffered the same fate, including four
hundred of the seven hundred generals and the entire high command.
In all this Stalin was the prime mover. The Moscow Trials were, according to
Tucker and Cohen, "basically one-man shows of which Stalin himself was
organizer, chief producer, and stage manager as well as an appreciative
spectator from a darkened room at the rear of the Hall of Columns, where the
trials were held." 122 A feature of the Trials was that the defendants all
confessed to whatever they had been charged with and, in reflecting this in
Animal Farm, Orwell is presenting an important aspect of Stalin's
psychological makeup: it was essential to him that those whom he decided
were guilty of conspiracy, sabotage or plotting to overthrow the regime should
publicly confirm their guilt. Deutscher says that Stalin pressed his enemies
and critics, real or imagined, to "commit moral suicide. He demanded that
they should recant ... [and] denounce their own mistakes." 123 Like many
dictators, it seems that Stalin needed to create the illusion that he was in the
right - hence his habit of clothing his paranoid suspicions in a series of legal
fictions in which the dice were loaded against the accused. No doubt such
show trials reinforced Stalin's wishful view of himself as both perfect and
omnipotent.
That Stalin continued to exercise power - and terror - to the end of his life is
clear from the so-called "Doctor's Plot," in response to which, Deutscher says,
Stalin appears to have intended "a new Witches' Sabbath, with mass
121 Louis Fischer, The Life and Death of Stalin (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953) 155.
122 Tucker and Cohen xiv-xv.
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accusations, mass confessions and mass executions.v''" This affair, of which
the full carrying through was averted only by Stalin's death in 1953, was
sparked off by a doctor who wrote to him alleging that doctors at the Kremlin
were not treating their patients properly. This was sufficient to persuade Stalin
that there was a plot against the regime and he promptly ordered the arrest of
a whole group of eminent medical specialists. He supervised the matter very
closely, and was explicit in his instructions as to how the magistrate was to
behave during the initial private examination required by law: "Beat them,
beat them, and then beat them again!" he said, as Deutscher tells us. 125
There is thus heavy irony in the myth current during the Moscow Trials that
Stalin was not responsible for the suffering of his countrymen, that he in fact
knew nothing about it and that his officials were perpetrating these deeds
without his knowledge.
Given the now widely accepted fact that the vast majority of Stalin's victims
were innocent, the question arises as to why they confessed to crimes they
had not in fact committed. Deutscher quotes a speech in which Nikita
Khruschev states that "Stalin employed mass terror .... Thousands upon
thousands of innocent and honest communists died as a result of monstrous
falsifications .... They were forced to bring false charges against both
themselves and others. These slanderous confessions were extorted from
them." 126
The trial sequence in Animal Farm graphically illustrates the way in which
people can be tortured and terrorized into confession. There four pigs confess
to the same trumped-up charges which key figures in the Moscow Trials had
faced: sabotage and conspiracy with Nazi Germany to overthrow the
government, depicted specifically in the Animal Farm trials as the wrecking of
the windmill (though in fact this was an act of nature), and seditious collusion
with Mr Frederick, who represents Hitler here. Historically, some of the
charges were more bizarre than this, including the deliberate infection of pigs
124 Deutscher, Great Purges 154.
125 Deutscher, Great Purges 160.
126 Deutscher, Great Purges 8.
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with the plague and the mixing of nails and glass into butter. Apart from the
defendants' confessions, the prosecution was able to produce no evidence to
substantiate the charges. For both Stalin and Napoleon such confessions
would have been a way of distracting attention from the deficiencies of their
regimes, and, given the superhuman image of Stalin, it is likely that some
defendants willingly colluded to save the reputation of the Soviet state and its
leaders. The details from some of the trials, supplied by Fischer, show that
Orwell did not misrepresent the ineptness of the regime he was parodying,
and indeed, it is of the essence of parodic attack that the malicious mimicry
occurring in the satiric world be based on recognisable figures or events in the
primary world:
There had been hundreds of train wrecks in Siberia. An
accused official confessed that he had staged them
deliberately. The peasants in collective farms complained
that they were underpaid. Former Commissar of Finance
Grinka confessed that he, on instructions from Prime Minister
Rykov, another defendant, purposely underpaid the peasants
in order to sow discontent. In White-Russia, the number of
livestock had been disastrously reduced. Defendants at one
Moscow trial confessed that it was done on orders from the
Polish Intelligence Service. Thirty thousand horses had died
of anaemia in White-Russia in 1936. "My work," accused
Sharangovich testified. 127
Such details are the basis for the wild and wonderful confessions in Animal
Farm, culminating in the confession of two sheep to having murdered an old
ram by "chasing him round and round a bonfire when he was suffering from a
cough." Meyers has traced the source of this to one of the Great Purge trials,
in which "Gorky's secretary Kryuchkov confessed, 'I arranged long walks for
127 Fischer, Stalin 38.
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Alexei Maximovich [Gorky], I was always arranging bonfires. The smoke of
the bonfire naturally affected Gorky's weak lungs." 128
Tamara Deutscher graphically encapsulates all the elements of the Moscow
Trials:
What made the Moscow spectacle so exceptionally hallucinatory
in its sadism and masochism was the depth of self-humiliation
into which ... [Stalin] hurled his broken adversaries, denying them
all possibility to defend their honour and their dignity .... The
drama rose to its bizarre climax with Vyshinsky, the Prosecutor
General, bellowing his fantastic indictment, and the defendants -
all heroic revolutionaries - making their blood-chilling "confessions"
and declaring themselves guilty of monstrous crimes they could
not have committed. 129
The word "hallucinatory" describes equally well the trial and execution scene
in Animal Farm, the horribly theatrical nature of the proceedings permeating
both accounts, which have the ring of some appalling nightmare which cannot
be halted, but has to be lived out to the end. It is clear from the accounts of
the time that it was into such a general world of waking nightmare that the
entire Russian people were plunged by Stalin's Great Purges, and it is no
exaggeration to say that the level of oppression after the Revolution at least
equalled that in Russia during the time of the Tsars. The notion that the wheel
of history tends to come full circle is one of Orwell's main points in Animal
Farm.
Underlying Animal Farm is Orwell's continuous awareness of and certainty
about historical events and their significance. Earlier in this thesis the
influence of myth on interpretations of history was discussed and the point
was made that the myths and ideologies used to interpret the past are often
128 David Wykes, A Preface to Orwell (New York: Longman, 1987) 129.
129 Deutscher 6-7.
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covert and unconscious. It is not the accuracy of Orwell's historical facts, but
his way of selecting facts and the philosophy according to which he
manipulates and interprets these facts, that are at issue. Jameson, speaking
about a novel by Balzac, suggests a different (postmodern, here) strategy of
dealing with history:
[The novel] inscribes the irrevocable brute facts of
empirical history ... [but] it does so in order the more surely to
'manage' those facts and to open up a space in which they
are no longer quite so irreparable, no longer quite so definitive. 130
Orwell had various axes to grind in his satiric presentation of history in Animal
Farm, among them being to refute the Marxist maxim concerning the
inevitability of history. Orwell tries to show that the history of a society does
not proceed in a sequential way from capitalism through revolution with the
aid of the bourgeoisie and then on to the triumph of the proletariat in a
classless society, as Marx believed. Orwell, on the contrary, sees history as
much less predictable and, because some people are gullible and others are
dishonest and power-hungry, the Marxist utopia will never become a reality.
He "proves" this by depicting the Russian leaders as entirely evil and self-
seeking, and the masses as natve victims of those leaders. His account of
this history omits any sense of lasting idealism on the part of the leaders and
any deep sense of gain and happiness on the part of the people. This is
perhaps a weakness directly attributable to the novel being a fable, since it is
a form that leaves little room for nuance. Nelson speaks of the creation of a
"mythos of totalitarianism" by writers such as Hannah Arendt and George
Orwell who, because they were confronting such appalling realities, "depicted
totalitarianism as the starkest and most absolute evil known to humanity: an
irrational threat to the very soul of every living person and to the merest
memory of every moment past." 131 Nelson believes that this "mystification of
130 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London
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power" achieves the opposite of its intention: it impedes the struggle against
totalitarian regimes because it clouds the issue. 132
Orwell seems to have no sense of what Jameson, quoting Lyotard, refers to
as "the desire called Marx," which Jameson sees as something that can
reconcile and give meaning to the separate dimensions of individual life on
the one hand, and history on the other:
The "desire called Marx," then, is not the will to reduce one of
these dimensions to the other ... but rather the effort to develop
organs of perception capable of enabling us fitfully to position
ourselves in that other temporality, that other story, over which
we also hope - but now as groups and collectives, rather than
as individuals - to assert some influence and control. 133
From this point of view, Marxism becomes a desire to re-story creatively the
relationship between history and individual destiny, so as to empower
individuals by repositioning them in relation to history. That Stalinist
communism does not fully fit this description is not in question, but what is in
question is how fully the doleful and hopeless narrative of Animal Farm deals
with Stalinist communism, even given that satire. is not intended to be taken
literally and that the fable form has built-in limitations which may prevent it
from conveying subtleties. This thesis argues that Orwell's unacknowledged
but disappointed longing for utopia, which he shares with satirists in general,
is in this case so bitter that it has lessened the universality of his novel and
made it more difficult for contemporary readers to engage fully with it. A
further difficulty is created by Orwell's implicit insistence that life can be fully
represented by facts which are easily apprehensible because they lie on the
surface. Trilling praises Orwell for this quality:
[Orwell] liberates us. He tells us that we can understand our
132 Nelson 27.
133 Jameson, Ideologies of Theory xxviii.
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political and social life merely by looking around us; he frees
us from the need for the inside dope. He implies that our job
is not to be intellectual, certainly not to be intellectual in this
fashion or that, but merely to be intelligent according to our
lights - he restores the old sense of the democracy of the mind,
releasing us from the belief that the mind can work only in a
technical, professional way .... He has the effect of making us
believe that we may become full members of the society of
thinking men. 134
Yet these arguments are based on naive liberal humanist conceptions of the
equality of man 135 and confirm Orwell's empiricism and mistrust of the
philosophical. They also identify with Orwell's implicit yearning for a utopian
state, though Trilling takes this even further ("restores the old sense of a
democracy of the mind") and, unlike Orwell, seems to believe that such a
utopia is within our grasp. In a postmodern age these ideas have far less
credibility than they had in Orwell's day. His disappointed utopianism and the
static quality of utopia 136 have already been alluded to, but for a writer of
dystopian novels like Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, the future holds
no hope and utopia is something not even partially attainable, to be found
only in the past. The conservative tendency to long for the past, paradoxically
co-existing with his desire for radical change, may be what Orwell recognised
in himself when in 1930 he spoke of himself as a "Tory anarchist." 137
Beneath the surface of most satire there lies a visron (often dim and
unacknowledged) of the Golden Age, the Garden of Eden or some such
utopian state - the paradisaical state from which people have been cast out,
the loss of which, on one level, satire bewails and to which it desires people
at least to begin to return. Perhaps the bitterness of satire such as Orwell's
134 Lionel Trilling, "George Orwell and the Politics of Truth," The Opposing Self Nine Essays in
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springs precisely from a recognition that this is not possible: one cannot "go
back home," since the gates of Eden are forever guarded by an angel with a
fiery sword. As indicated earlier, this issue is complicated by Orwell's
allegiance to socialism, which carries its own version of utopia.l "
In political circles, elaborate utopian ideals flourish within extreme ideologies,
as Tismaneanu indicates:
The total ideologies of Communism and Fascism held in
common a belief in the plasticity of human nature and in
the possibility of transforming it in accordance with some
utopian blueprint. Both Marxism and Fascism have inspired
unflinching loyalties, a fascination with the figure of the
perfect society and romantic immersions in collective
movements promising the advent of the millennium. 139
Many of the attitudes mentioned above are satirised in Animal Farm,
particularly the utopian aspect, combined with the unflinching loyalties, while
the mention of the millennium brings to mind the utterly unquestioning faith of
the animals in their leaders and the creed they espouse. It is his view of the
shattering of the Marxist utopian dream that Orwell so bitterly depicts in the
massacre scene of Animal Farm, and all the subsequent events in the novel
are filled with the deep sadness of disappointed ideals. This is exacerbated
by the animals' unwillingness to speak openly about their sense of loss, since
they still have so much invested in their beliefs that it is preferable to suffer in
silence rather than articulate their ontological emptiness. It is this sense of
emptiness and pain that is evident immediately after the killings, when the
animals move off in shock and disbelief, ending up on a knoll overlooking the
farm, huddled together around Clover, the mare - an embodiment of caring
and common sense:
138 See 157 above.
139 Tismaneanu 385.
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The knoll where they were lying gave them a wide prospect
across the countryside ... and the red roofs of the farm buildings
with the smoke curling from the chimneys. It was a clear spring
evening .... Never had the farm ... appeared to the animals so
desirable a place. As Clover looked down the hillside her eyes
filled with tears. If she could have spoken her thoughts, it would
have been to say that this was not what they had aimed at when
they had set themselves years ago to work for the overthrow of
the human race. These scenes of terror ... were not what they
had looked forward to .... [Her own picture of the future] had
been of a society of animals set free from hunger and the whip,
all equal, each working according to his capacity, the strong
protecting the weak .... There was no thought of rebellion and
disobedience in her mind .... Such were her thoughts, though she
lacked the words to express them. 140
From a distance, the farm presents a picture of order and prosperity, a
seemingly idyllic scene which contrasts with the bloody executions which
have just occurred. It also contrasts the pre-revolutionary ideals and
ideological rhetoric with the injustice and violence which have been
perpetrated on the animals in the name of the Rebellion. However, the farm
does not belong to the animals, but to a relatively small ruling clique, with the
rest of the animals reduced to servants. The "red roofs of the farm buildings"
seem charming, but these buildings house the pigs in thoroughly
unegalitarian splendour, while the lives of the animals are as hard as ever.
That this allegorical point reflects at least a part of post-revolutionary Soviet
reality is indicated by one of Trotsky's descriptions:
As for the members of collective farms, they live as formerly
in the old huts with their calves and cockroaches. On the other
hand, the Soviet dignitaries complain in the Press that not all
the houses newly constructed for them possess 'rooms for
140 Orwell, Animal Farm 75-6.
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house-workers' - that is, for domestic servants. 141
This chimes well with Orwell's picture of revolutionary inequality, though it has
to be borne in mind that both Orwell and Trotsky speak from within a
framework of ideology and that both have axes to grind. The picture
presented by Trotsky underlines Orwell's point about how people can be
oppressed while being told that they have .been liberated, and how
disempowering such a deception can be. Clover feels betrayed, but cannot
say so because she is inarticulate, and one of the ways in which the Rebellion
has betrayed her is in not helping her to clearer ways of seeing and thinking
about the world around her. Orwell's depiction of her as a warm, loving being,
a member of the working class with a great capacity for nurturing others,
reminds us that Marx "saw in the working class the hopes of humanity in the
face of a self-destructive capitalistic system" 142 and Winston, in Nineteen
Eighty-Four, sees the "proles" as the only hope for the future.
Yet, Orwell's attitudes towards the working class in both Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four are controversial, showing the passivity of the workers
as unavoidable, perhaps even desirable. Zehr comments on this as follows:
[In Orwell] we begin to witness a problematic retreat into a
virtually mythic idealization of the working class. Increasingly,
he looked to the past as a time of stability and permanence
utterly unlike the present, and while this period of growing
pessimism led to his fatalistic portrait of the revolutionary
and intellectual impotence of the working class in Animal
Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, he seems to have found
a kind of consolation in the slumbering innocence of the
animals and the proles. 143
141 Trotsky 116.
142 Steven Seidman, Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era (Cambridge,
Mass.: Blackwell, 1994) 186.
143 David Morgan Zehr, "Orwell and the Proles: Revolutionary or Middle-Class voyeur>."
Centennial Review, 27.1 (1983): 34
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The connection between satire and utopia is particularly clear here, though
the waters are considerably muddied by Orwell's struggle to cast off his
middle-class background 144 and his lingering nostalgia for the past which
constitutes a sentimental kind of utopianism. These views are puzzling, even
in an avowedly deviant socialist, since empowerment of the people, at least
through family solidarity and affection, is what Orwell solidly endorses, both in
his essays and, implicitly, in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
Trotsky, with his "revisionist" stance, saw socialism as having moved away
from such relational values, under the false pretence of having already
attained them:
Socialism, if it is worthy of the name, means human relations
without greed, friendship without envy and intrigue, love
without base calculation. The official doctrine declares these
ideal norms already realized - and with more insistence the
louder the reality protests against such declarations. 145
Trotsky's voice is of course a voice speaking from an opposition point of view,
which is both isolated and powerless - a stance which notoriously encourages
highly idealistic positions that are always difficult to translate into reality in the
everyday administration of power. Essentially, his objection is to the Soviet
state proclaiming a reality which the facts do not support, and it is an
analogous disjunction between what the pigs proclaim and what the animals
feel that lies at the root of Clover's sadness.
Clover is shown as desperately unhappy, yet she chooses to accept the
situation. We are told she "knew" that things were better now than under
Jones, but the reader is aware that what the animals "know" is merely what
they have been persuaded to believe by means of propaganda. "Whatever
144 Zehr, "Orwell and the Proles" 31.
145 Trotsky 155.
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happened she would remain faithful, work hard, carry out the orders given to
her, and accept the leadership of Napoleon." 146 There is a passivity and
resignation about these words which suggest that she is unable or unwilling to
act on her real feelings because she has been programmed to have other
feelings. Deutscher's account of Soviet society after the great Purge is directly
relevant to this:
During the remaining fifteen years of Stalin's rule no group
was left in Soviet society, not even in the prisons and camps,
that was capable of challenging him. No centre of
independent political thinking had been allowed to survive. A
tremendous gap had been torn in the nation's consciousness;
its collective memory was shattered; the continuity of its
revolutionary traditions was broken; and its capacity to form
and crystallize any nonconformist notions was destroyed. The
Soviet Union was finally left, not merely in its practical politics,
but even in its hidden mental processes, with no alternative to
Stalinism. 147
Just as the Soviet people were left with no alternative but Stalinism, so the
animals are left with no alternative but Animalism. However, Animalism is an
ideology embodying a set of myths about the world which are couched in the
language of freedom but in fact act as a stultifying force. Since this ideology
has a need for mythical external enemies (Snowball, Frederick and Jones)
who are never overcome and who help to unite the animals, they always feel
under threat, and the utopian ideal of peace and freedom continues to
recede.
One movement within the myths which comprise the animals' world does
occur when their former human "enemies" are suddenly presented to the
animals as allies, "rehabilitated" and devoid of their former stigma as
146 Orwell, Animal Farm 76.
147 Deutscher, Great Purges 121.
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oppressors, who meet for an evening of celebration with the pigs in the manor
house of the farm. If, as we have seen, Clover has some unspoken doubts as
to whether the animals really are living in freedom, there is no doubt
whatsoever in the minds of their former oppressors. When Mr. Pilkington rises
to propose a toast to the farm, he does so as follows:
Today he and his friends had visited Animal Farm and inspected
every inch of it with their own eyes, and what did they find? Not
only the most up-to-date methods, but a discipline and an
orderliness which should be an example to all farmers everywhere.
He believed that he was right in saying that the lower animals on
Animal Farm did more work and received less food than any
animals in the county. Indeed, he and his fellow-visitors today had
observed many features which they intended to introduce on their
own farms immediately. 148
It takes an oppressor to properly recognise the degree to which the "lower
animals," as he calls them, are now more cruelly oppressed by their own kind
than they were by Jones. The "discipline" and "orderliness" that he praises
are spoken of as oppression when administered by Jones, and his comments
about the animals' rations speak for themselves. So far has the utopian ideal
of freedom degenerated that, as the last sentence of the passage indicates,
the former oppressors have been able to take lessons in oppression from a
society in which, officially, liberty reigns everywhere. Animal Farm depicts
history as a kind of vicious circle, in which the masses will always be doomed
to slavery. It is thus puzzling that Orwell should, in 1946, so trenchantly attack
James Burnham, whose arguments Orwell sums up as follows: "So that
history consists of a series of swindles, in which the masses are first lured
into revolt by the promise of Utopia, and then, when they have done their job,
enslaved over again by new masters." 149 Orwell's intention here is parodic,
yet he is, in fact, describing precisely what seems to happen in Animal Farm
148 Orwell, Animal Farm 117.
149 George Orwell, "James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell
and Ian Angus, vol IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 177.
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(completed in 1944). A partial explanation of this inconsistency may be found
in Crick's outline of how Orwell, over the years, was both critical of and
fascinated by Burnham's views. 150
In Animal Farm Orwell has given new life to the phrase which Hannah Arendt
used to entitle her book: "the banality of evil,,,151 since he shows that the
abuse of power results not only in misery and lack of freedom, but also an
empty quality to life which is just as destructive to the human spirit. In this
view, life under a totalitarian regime has a repetitious and limiting nature,
which may easily infect the perpetrators of evil as well, rendering their own
lives trivial and preventing them from being creative in any real sense. It is
from this point of view that evil is truly banal.
Yet the satiric dynamic of Animal Farm is far from banal, if Freud's concept of
the unheimlich or uncanny is used to examine it, breaking the illusion that
history is fact, by making readers see the text as one in which the ordinary is
made to seem uncanny or estranged from everyday experience. This is
closely related to the notion that satire creates liminality in order to challenge
our certainty about our particular view of the world and move us into an
alternative one in order to foster change. 152Freud stresses that the word
unheimlich is the opposite of heimlich, which connotes intimacy and
friendliness, 153yet he notes that heimlich can also connote the hidden, the
magical and the secret, which makes it similar to unheimlich.154 Thus, Freud
concludes, "heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction
of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite." 155There is a
dynamic ambiguity here involving the familiar and the uncanny - a Janus-like
two-facedness which is never at rest - that is of the essence of satire. The
150 Bernard Crick, introd., Nineteen Eighty-Four, by George Orwell (1949; Oxford: Oxford UP,
1984) 57-8,84-92, 121-2.
151 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Faber,
1963)
152 See 80-1 above.
153 Sigmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny' ,"The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund
Freud, eds. and trans. James Strachey and Anna Freud, vel. XVII (London Hogarth P, 1955)
222.
154 Freud, "The 'Uncanny'" 223-4.
155 Freud, "The 'Uncanny' " 226.
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satirical thrust of Animal Farm can be seen as juxtaposing the familiar or
purportedly historical with the uncanny, to create a dialogic process which
interrogates the former and makes it strange (in the Russian formalist sense),
in effect jostling the signification of the familiar so that it appears very like its
opposite. The existence of the totalitarian world of Stalinism seems to be
confirmed by the historical details used as a backdrop to the novel, but the
satirical and fabular mode of Animal Farm serves to alienate, make strange
and question the existential reality of that historical world. Readers find
themselves in a Kafkaesque world in which the energy of the liminal 156
integrates the historical aspects within the creative processes of dystopian
satire, which makes the text seem larger than life, compelling our attention by
infusing a dramatic tension into the bare bones of what purports to be history,
and drawing us into a powerful experience. This dissolves our sense of our
own world in a way which, at this point in the discussion, has perhaps more in
common with the effect of a fairy tale than that of satire. Among the most
effective creators of liminality are new externalising discourses, 157 of which
satire and fairy tales are examples. Orwell can be seen here as exploiting, in
a non-ironic way, the fairy tale element (a concept which he uses scathingly in
his subtitle) which, by infusing the text with liminality, creates the potential for
movement and play illustrated above.
However, the "fairy tale" of Animal Farm ends "Not with a bang but a
whimper.,,158 It looks as though Orwell's satirical strategy in thus subtitling his
novel was to lull his readers into complacency, the better to shock them at a
later stage by the savagery of his parody. In fact, this is a tale of brutality and
cynicism, at the end of which the animals will live unhappily ever after. Fairy
tales may indeed contain frightening elements, but they are also about
change, often in the end change for the better. Here, instead of Sleeping
Beauty waking up or the frog changing into a handsome prince, we have pigs
which, while retaining their traditionally worst characteristics as pigs, steadily
156 See 78ft above.
157 See 78-9 above.
158 T.S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men," The Complete Poems and Plays of TS. Eliot (London: Faber,
1969) 86.
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take on many of the worst characteristics of people until, as the last sentence
of Animal Farm has it, "The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and
from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to
say which was which." 159 An alternative (though rather utopian) view to the
generally pessimistic reading of this ending is provided by Letemendia, who
says that "The final scene of the book ... reveals the disillusionment of the
working beasts with their porcine leaders, an essential step in the process of
creating a new revolution." 160 More convincingly, Letemendia, arguing from a
letter written by Orwell to Dwight Macdonald in 1946, says that Orwell "was
calling not for the end of revolutionary hopes, but for the beginning of a new
kind of personal responsibility on the part of revolutionaries." 161 Elbarbary
suggests that the animals' hopes of liberation (however slim) depend on their
being "raised up into language and provided with semantic space ... to engage
[the pigs] on their own ground with a counter discourse and gestures of their
own." 162
By depicting events in Animal Farm which parallel those in Stalinist Russia
Orwell has written a novel which is not simply an attack on totalitarianism:
Orwell's primary message in Animal Farm is that the Marxist utopian ideal (the
fairy tale of his subtitle) is both unworkable and pernicious, as it was applied
in Soviet Russia. Yet, as mentioned earlier, satire has its own (covert) utopian
ideals and didactic intent, and it is not surprising, considering Animal Farm
and Nineteen Eighty-Four, that Orwell's allegiance to socialism has been
questioned by some of his contemporaries. Kolakowski, a Polish supporter of
Lech Walesa, has some relevant ideas on the subject of utopias:
As long as utopia is simply a vision of a perfect world ... without
suffering ... struggle and conflict, such a vision is a harmless
literary exercise. A utopia becomes sinister once we persuade
ourselves that we have a kind of technique to bring about our
159 Orwell, Animal Farm 120.
160 Letemendia 129.
161 Letemendia 136-7.
162 Elbarbary 37.
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fantasies; that we acquire a technique of apocalypse, a device
by which we can implement our dreams .... Utopia implies an
ultimate qoal. ..and absolutely all methods are good if we
believe that they will bring about this goal. To the rulers of the
communist countries this utopian fantasy gives a very
convenient conceptual framework within which everything is
allowed .... Only in this sense does utopia become malignant,
because [then] utopia is a device in the service of tyranny. 163
Kolakowski distinguishes between literary and political utopias, though it is
surely possible for them to become indistinguishable when literature is used
in the service of politics. However, he is careful to label as harmful only those
political structures which are put into place with the unrealisable aim of
making a utopian ideal into a reality. For him, it seems, it is this Faustian
element of arrogance and presumption which renders utopia dangerous,
since the search for a chimera can never end and it has such power over
people's minds that they will disregard any principle of democracy or morality
in the name of such a goal.
Heller and Feher declare that "the postmodern political condition is
tremendously ill at ease with Utopianism." 164 Smart writes in favour of a new
restructured notion of utopia, stating that "Utopian thought has had a bad
press, particularly within the critical tradition of inquiry developed by Marx"
and that "elements of utopian thinking are consistently present in Marx's
work." 165 Jameson too, from a Marxist perspective, wishes for a new view of
utopia, since he complains that, in the recent past, the word "utopia" has
been "a code word that simply meant 'socialism' or any revolutionary attempt
to create a radically different society ... [and] identified almost exclusively with
Stalin and Soviet communism." 166 In fact, there is common ground between
163 Enrique Krauze, "An Interview with Leszek Kolakowski," Partisan Review 52 (1985): 211-
12.
164 Agnes Heller and Ferenc Feher, The Postmodern Political Condition (Cambridge: Polity P,
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the self-proclaimed democratic socialism of Orwell and the Marxism of
Jameson, since both writers preserve some connection with Marxist ideology
while being flexible and critical, though both end up with quite different and
individualistic political philosophies. In addition, both want to demythologise
the political systems current in their time, though Jameson's stance is a much
more sophisticated and knowing one.
Animal Farm is a satirical dystopian novel which, using aspects of history as
its raw material, dissects the claims of a utopian creed to show that utopia is
here nothing but a myth, in the most pejorative sense of the term. On its own
terms, the novel succeeds in showing that such a myth can lead to dishonesty
and, in turn, to habits of manipulation and an insatiable desire for power. Yet,
as Ricoeur shows, there are alternative ways of disempowering harmful
myths, which allow for the retention and nurturing of the positive side of myth.
Specifically, Ricoeur is concerned to retain the idealistic aspect of utopian
myth, since it provides a valuable way into the future: "Without the forward
look [of myth a society] is deprived of its dreams.,,167 However, he does also
recognise the danger that this kind of myth "can be perverted, usually by
monopolistic elites, into a mystificatory discourse which serves to uncritically
vindicate the established political powers."!" This thesis has already spoken
of Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of suspicion," which has a demystifying function 169
but, after that, according to Ricoeur, there is the need for a more positive
process:
Myth is an ideological function. But it is also more than that.
Once a hermeneutics of suspicion has unmasked the alienating
role of myth as an agency of ideological conformism, there
remains the task of a positive interpretation. Hermeneutics, as
Ricoeur insists, has a double duty: to 'suspect' and to 'listen'.
Having demythologized the ideologies of false consciousness it
labours to disclose the utopian symbols of liberating
167 Kearney 64.
168 Kearney 65.
169 See 130 above.
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consciousness. 170
This approach, like the earlier discussion of myth, 171 distinguishes between
the myth which offers a misleading view and that which instead liberates. It
deals summarily with ideology, but has a great deal of sensitivity about
preserving aspects of utopian myth which can serve as a form of ontological
map, giving pattern and life to the future. Although Orwell's views on ideology
and political myth are less subtle, in the end it is not necessary to judge him
harshly for his particular way of dealing with utopian myth by presenting it as
dystopia. Different times have different needs, and besides, Orwell was a
satirist, with all that implies of the assumed right to be curmudgeonly and
unreasonable, to remain on the fringes of society and never make terms with
the enemy. In Animal Farm Orwell is being true to a calling which, as the
opening pages of this thesis show, has a long and honourable lineage.
170 Kearney 67.
171 See 113-19 above.
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Chapter 5 Nineteen Eighty-Four: Apocalypse Later or The Future Shape
of Power
As has become clear from the previous chapter, Animal Farm has little of the
playfulness and light-hearted ness that mark much of satire. This applies even
more to Nineteen Eighty-Four, which is pervaded by a spirit of despair and
prophetic gloom. Yet these qualities are not foreign to satire, along with the
elements of parody, exaggeration, fantasy and dystopia to be found in both
novels. Humour is a common weapon of the satirist but it is not an essential
element of satire - and some satire may make its audience wince more often
than laugh, as can be seen in Kafka's writing, as well as texts such as Swift's
A Modest Proposal and Gulliver's Travels. These works, like Nineteen Eighty-
Four, can be seen as examples of the "purely moral type" of Menippean
satire.' which strikes a more serious note than other kinds of satire, and
makes the connection between satire and utopianism / dystopianism much
more overt. Bakhtin, in particular, associates utopian elements with
Menippean satire and, for him, this kind of satire uses fantasy "to put to the
test and to expose ideas and ideologues." 2 Palmeri distinguishes between
verse satire and narrative satire: the former he sees as conservative, the
latter (Menippean satire in particular) he finds "'dialogical' in [that] different
voices or points of view enter into unresolved dialogue." 3 He concludes that
"[a]lthough many critics associate satire with comedy, satire in narrative more
closely resembles tragedy in its unresolved ambivalence." 4 Finally, Snyder
speaks about satire in general, and Menippean satire in particular, describing
it as a highly unstable genre which, by its nature, shifts into other genres,
which he names as tragedy and the novel." These views of Menippean satire
clearly have relevance to a discussion of Nineteen Eighty-Four, as has Frye's
assertion that Menippean satire has "a special function of breaking up the
lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories,
pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all the other things that
1 See 49-50 above.
2 Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination 26.
3 Frank Palmeri, Satire in Narrative: Petronius, Swift, Gibbon, Melville, and Pynchon (Austin: U
of Texas P, 1990) 12.
4 Palmeri 4.
5 Snyder 96,101,121,139.
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, .
impede the free movement. .. of society." Howe sees Nineteen Eighty-Four
as "mostly Menippean satire and conventional novel. ... " 7 Since this thesis
speaks of Orwell's humanism, it is interesting that, according to Lerner, one of
the models of Menippean satire "was developed in humanist circles to criticize
social and moral conditions of society .... " 8 Finally, both the novels dealt with
in this thesis can be seen as examples of what Halasz calls modern or black
satire, which speaks for a human condition which is on the verge of disaster.
Such satire is "an escape from mental pain, a protective mask and an outlet
for desperation, and, in relation to the readers, the proper vehicle for shocking
modern civilization into the realization of its own frustration and chaos." 9
Nineteen Eighty-Four, completed in 1948, three years after Orwell wrote
Animal Farm, is his last novel and, in many ways, it is Animal Farm writ large
and more terrible. The fable form of Animal Farm provides some sort of
emotional buffer for the reader, since the process of allegory leads the reader
to human considerations through the alternative world of the animals, but in
Nineteen Eighty-Four we are made to feel with great directness that both the
victims and the perpetrators are human beings, and the alternative world
presented so relentlessly in this case leads the readers themselves to feel
under attack. While Orwell subtitled Animal Farm "A Fairy Tale," he insisted
that Nineteen Eighty-Four be subtitled "A Novel" 10_ which serves to highlight
his more serious literary intentions, especially as the text suggests a
nightmare rather than a fairy tale. His satiric and polemical intentions are also
more serious in Nineteen Eighty-Four, since Orwell's canvas here is the
world, and the abuse of power portrayed is more systematic and inexorable
than in Animal Farm.
6 Frye 233.
7 Irving Howe, "1984: Enigmas of Power," 1984 Revisited:Totalitarianism in our Century, ed.
Irving Howe (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 8.
8 Lia Schwartz Lerner, "Golden Age Satire: Transformations of Genre," MLN 105.2 (1990):
271.
9Ann Mary Halasz, "The Metamorphoses of Satire," Acta Litteraria Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae 29.1-2 (1987): 6.
10 JR. Hammond, A George Orwell Companion. A Guide to the Novels, Documentaries and
Essays (London: Macmillan, 1982) 181.
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As in Animal Farm, issues of ideology, propaganda and myth are highly
relevant to Nineteen Eighty-Four, functioning within the satirical structures of
the texts. In the former novel the animals are in the grip of a highly oppressive
and dictatorial regime; the latter novel gives us the same kind of society, but
with several excruciating turns of the screw which strengthen the ideological
underpinnings of the society. In Nineteen Eighty-Four the state of Oceania
has harnessed sophisticated sociological, psychological and technological
techniques in order to control the sex lives of people, to institute a continuous
system of surveillance of most of its citizens, both in public and in the heart of
the family, and finally to monitor and punish by means of the cruellest
humiliation, torture and ultimately death, any deviation, in thought, word or
deed from the norms prescribed by the state. These punishments involve not
just the deprivation of the victims' human dignity, but the invasion of their
minds by highly developed electronic equipment which permanently damages
certain areas of the brain, thus opening it up to a series of "learning"
experiences which "encourage" the victims, by means of electric shocks - a
grotesque parody of classic behaviourist methods of conditioning - to alter
their entire view of the world, irrevocably and to the satisfaction of the state.
As Winston Smith, the hero of the novel, is told by his chief inquisitor, O'Brien,
"We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves." 11
This is the fate of everyone who is brought to the Ministry of Love accused of
what is called "thoughtcrime" and, after that, at some point, all are killed. The
entire system is aimed at dehumanising people, suggested particularly by the
use of electric shocks, which are a version of the methods used by
behavioural psychologists in experiments with animals. The brutally satirical
implication here is that the state recognises no difference between human
beings and animals, and this follows directly from what animals themselves, in
a different context, observe at the end of Animal Farm: that it was impossible
to tell animal from human being. The name "Ministry of Love" when applied to
the headquarters and torture facility of the Thought Police, is reminiscent in its
grim perversity of Himmler's insistence that the main gates of Dachau bear
11 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel (1949; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954) 206
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the legend "Arbeit Macht Frei" (Work Liberates). 12 This thesis has already
commented on the tendency of satire to distort or even sever the link between
signifier and signified, 13 and the names of the various ministries in Nineteen
Eighty-Four are some of the numerous examples of this in the novel. In fact,
the whole system of Newspeak represents such a process of linguistic
engineering, which Orwell uses to highlight the dystopian nature of Oceania.
As Nisbet comments, the use of language as a means of obfuscation is a
factor common to many modern totalitarian states: "The changes which Lenin
and Trotsky, Mussolini, Hitler and Goebbels, Mao, and so many others have
rung on the words 'freedom', 'justice', 'democracy', and the like are of course
notorious." 14
Both novels deal with the abuse of power but, as the degree of abuse in
Nineteen Eighty-Four differs from that in Animal Farm, so do the motive and
philosophy in each case. Napoleon, in Animal Farm, is a cunning, bullying pig
(figuratively as well as literally) who uses power and terror largely in order to
receive adulation and live a very luxurious life, rather like one of the more
decadent Roman emperors. The rulers of Oceania are different, and very
intimidating in their political puritanism, having more in common with
Savonarola than Nero. As O'Brien confirms, they are not interested in the
fruits of power as much as the dynamics of having and keeping it: "The object
of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of
power is power." 15
Orwell depicts Oceania as an all-powerful totalitarian state, with a massively
centralised system which administers power from the top in a way that
ensures total control of all its citizens. For the backdrop to this novel Orwell
drew on life as he knew it in wartime Britain - the seediness of the buildings,
the shortages of basic consumer goods and the atmosphere of repression (as
he saw it) at the BBC where he worked. In addition to these autobiographical
12 Peter Padfield, Himm/er: ReichsfOhrer-SS (London: Macmillan, 1991) 134.
13 See 68 above.
14 Robert Nisbet, "1984 and the Conservative Imagination," 1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in
our Century, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 202.
15 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 212.
192
aspects, he was also extrapolating from the recent historical examples of Nazi
Germany and Stalinist Russia, and exercising the satirist's prophetic role,
viewing these states as a model for the future, but also practising the satirist's
art of exaggeration by presenting us with a parody of a totalitarian state. He
speaks of Nineteen Eighty-Four in the following terms:
I do not believe that the kind of society I describe necessarily
will arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that
the book is a satire) that something resembling it could arrive.
I believe also that totalitarian ideas have taken root in the
minds of intellectuals everywhere, and I have tried to draw
these ideas out to their logical consequences. The scene of
the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the
English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone
else and totalitarianism, if not fought against, could triumph
anywhere. 16
Rose's comment that "Orwell's intention was to avert rather than predict a
nightmare" 17 is not entirely accurate, since there is an element of prediction
in Orwell's statement above, though he does not insist that his prediction will
necessarily be realised. Nineteen Eighty-Four is prophetic insofar as Orwell
was convinced that without vigilance and action the world would become a
kind of totalitarian nightmare. Hodgart says that "Prophecy was a subject that
Orwell could not leave alone" 18 and Ehrenfeld regards him as one of the
prominent prophets of this century. 19 McCarthy regards Orwell as one of the
"two authentic, certifiable, prophets ... of and for this century .... " 20 But Bernard
16 George Orwell, letter to Francis A. Henson (extract), 16 June 1949, CEJL, eds. Sonia
Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 502.
17 Jonathan Rose, ed., The Revised Orwell (East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1991) 1.
18 Matthew Hodgart, "From Animal Farm to Nineteen Eighty-Four," The World of George
Orwell, ed. Miriam Gross (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 139.
19 David Ehrenfeld, "The Roots of Prophecy: Orwell and Nature," Hudson Review 38.2 (1985):
193.
20 Eugene J. McCarthy, "George Orwell: A Prophet Honored Just after His Time," The Future
of Nineteen Eighty-Four, ed. Ejner J. Jensen (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984) 137.
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Crick seems to prefer the term "warning" to the word "prophecy," when
describing what Orwell does in Nineteen Eighty-Four. 21
However, since totalitarianism was alive and well in Orwell's time, it is also
necessary to examine totalitarianism as a political manifestation and not only
as a product of Orwell's prophetic sensibility. Schapiro speaks of the "five
contours from which the map reader in the political wilderness will recognize
'the totalitarian regime': the Leader; the subjugation of the legal order; control
over private morality; continuous mobilization; and legitimacy based on mass
support." 22 These represent important aspects of totalitarianism which either
have been or will be addressed in this thesis, but they are only a framework,
albeit a useful one. Malinowski, less dispassionate and more penetrating, fills
out the picture with this description of totalitarianism:
The ... transformation of nationhood and all its resources into a
lethal 'technocratic' government instrument of violence. This
becomes a means justified by the end ... .Thus the end of
totalitarianism, in so far as it saps all the resources of culture
and destroys its structure, is diametrically opposed and
completely incompatible with the constitution of human
societies for the normal, peaceful business of producing,
maintaining, and transmitting wealth, solidarity, reason, and
conscience, all of which are the real indices of civilization. 23
This suggests how destructive totalitarianism is to society, and to the values
which Western democracy holds most dear. The destruction is felt in the
fabric of society as a whole but, as demonstrated in Nineteen Eighty-Four, it
is experienced most keenly by the ordinary individuals who constitute that
society. Orwell, no mere theorist when it came to politics, would not allow his
readers to lose sight of this obvious truth by taking refuge in generalizations
21 Bernard Crick, "Nineteen Eighty-Four. Satire or Prophecy?," Dutch Quarterly Review of
Anglo-American Letters 13.2 (1983): 90 - 92.
22 Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism (London: Pall Mall P, 1972) 20.
23 Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1948) 303.
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or other distancing devices. Zuckert's views on totalitarianism embrace many
of the concerns and discourses foregrounded by this thesis. He quotes
Kirkpatrick's dictum that "totalitarianism is utopianism come to power," and
stresses that totalitarian states claim "a monopoly, not only of political power,
but over the means of communication .... Propaganda of all sorts is required."
He concludes that "Totalitarian rule ... refuses to recognize limits, in principle
or practice, to its sway, accepting neither legalism as a boundary nor a
delimited sphere of legitimate application." 24
At the heart of Nineteen Eighty-Four lies a form of government which lacks
any regard for morality and has an attitude of complete contempt towards
those who are ruled. Perhaps the best known formulations of this particular
view were made by Machiavelli (whose thoughts, Orwell believed, had
influenced the contemporary "British intelligentsia" 25) :
So, a prince is forced to know how to act like a beast, he
must learn from the fox and the lion .... So it follows that a
prudent ruler cannot, and must not, honour his word when
it places him at a disadvantage .... If all men were good
this precept would not be good; but because men are
wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you,
you need not keep your word to them .... But one must
know how to colour one's actions and to be a great liar
and deceiver. Men are so simple, and so much creatures
of circumstance, that the deceiver will always find
someone ready to be deceived. 26
There is much cynicism, as well as political expediency, in this view.
Nevertheless, there is an attempt to justify the opinions expressed, or at least
24 Michael P. Zuckert, "Orwell's Hopes, Orwell's Fears: 1984 as a Theory of Totalitarianism,"
The Orwellian Moment.' Hindsight and Foresight in the Post-1984 World, eds. Robert L.
Savage, James Combs and Dan Nimmo (Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 1989) 48.
25 George Orwell, "The English People," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III
~London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 7-8. .
6 Niccol6 Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. and introd. George Bull (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1975) 99-100.
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a tacit acknowledgement that conventional morality is being flouted. The
Prince's advice on how to gain power and hold on to it clearly contains the
seeds of totalitarianism, despite the note of regret which tinges Machiavelli's
description of people as unreliable and easily manipulable. In fact, at least
one critic regards The Prince as a dystopian text and sees many conscious
and unconscious echoes of it in Nineteen Eighty-Four. 27
Machiavelli is describing a form of authoritarianism which differs from the
more modern aspects of despotism which totalitarianism represents.
Authoritarianism lacks some of the ability to gain total power over a people,
and its harshness and oppression do not extend to every single aspect of a
nation's life. As Perlmutter says,
When one speaks of 'totalitarianism', one means an
institutionalized authoritarian regime sustained by a combination
of organization and ideology. Institutionalized authoritarian
regimes have an ideological orientation; noninstitutionalized
authoritarian regimes are basically non ideological. 28
As has been demonstrated, the more generous, or even neutral, view of
ideology is one that Orwell ignores, in favour of the view that ideology is a
dangerous phenomenon. Apter speaks more positively when he says that
revolutionaries use ideology as "a way of stipulating the moral superiority of
new ideas." He adds that in modern times ideology is devoid of the "utopian
element" 29 which his first statement implies. It is clear that the two dystopias
of Orwell's with which this thesis is concerned associate ideology with the
opposite of "moral superiority" and see the presence of ideology as one of the
signs of the death of utopia.
27 Kumar 101.
28 Amos Perlmutter, Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis (New
Haven: Yale UP, 1981) 175.
29 David E. Apter, "Ideology and Discontent," Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter
(Glencoe: The Free P, 1964) 17.
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The slight ambivalence shown earlier towards the issue of human
manipulability by Machiavelli is not to be found in the views of a later political
philosopher, Hegel:
Hegel. .. rejected all 'humanitarian' ideals. He declared the
'universal love of mankind' to be nothing more than an 'insipid
invention' .... Hegel is not interested in the beauty of the state
but in its 'truth'. And, according to him this truth is not a moral
one; it is rather 'the truth which lies in power'. 'Men are as
foolish as to forget. .. in their enthusiasm for liberty of conscience
and political freedom, the truth which lies in power.' 30
Totalitarianism is a peculiarly modern manifestation (the word took root in the
English language between 1930 and 1940), 31 but the attitude of Hegel,
writing in the nineteenth century, contains the seeds of totalitarianism. It is of
the essence of totalitarianism to reject ideas because they are not obviously
utilitarian ("beauty," "humanitarian ideals," "universal love of mankind"), a
tendency which can be liberally illustrated from Nineteen Eighty-Four. It is
also typical of totalitarianism to reject the notion of morality ("this truth is not a
moral one"), preferring to assert its will either by brute force or by reference to
some principle or myth such as the law of Nature (in the case of Nazism) or
the law of History (in the case of Communism). In Oceania - with a typical
Orwellian turn of the screw - the principle which justifies all actions by the
state is simply that of power.
In his essay entitled "The Prevention of Literature" Orwell says the following
of totalitarianism:
Totalitarianism demands, in fact, the continuous alteration
of the past, and in the long run probably demands a disbelief
in the very existence of objective truth .... A society becomes
30 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale UP, 1946) 226,227.
31 Schapiro 14.
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totalitarian when its structures become flagrantly artificial: that
is, when its ruling class has lost its function but succeeds in
clinging to power by force or fraud. Such a society, no matter
how long it persists, can never afford to become either tolerant
or intellectually stable. It can never permit either the truthful
recording of facts, or the emotional sincerity, that literary
creation demands. 32
What emerges here is the rigidity of the rulers of a totalitarian state: such a
society is kept busy altering history lest its lies be discovered, it lacks a
democratically strong core in that its rulers lack legitimacy and it cannot
permit any emotional integrity in its citizens. In fact, such rulers are also
disadvantaged by their own system, since those who subject others to tyranny
become the prisoners of their own tyranny, because of the onerousness and
waste of energy involved in maintaining such a system. But there is little point
in pointing out that such rulers live in a cultural and moral hell if they are
themselves impervious to the barrenness of their situation and are unable to
escape the boundaries of their own ideology and myth. In a state such as
Oceania there can be no question of "disbelief in the very existence of
objective truth" because there can be no possibility of widespread scepticism
when objective truth is universally accepted as what the Party declares it to
be. As for the few who rebel, there is a strong likelihood that this is part of the
Party's plan: the machinery of terror has to be fed and it is possible that the
provision of victims is not left to chance. In the case of Oceania, the Party's
striving towards omnipotence is so blatant, that to speak of it "clinging to
power" seems an absurd understatement, as O'Brien's thoughts suggest:.
But in the future there will be no wives and no friends. Children
will be taken from their mothers at birth, as one takes eggs from
a chicken. The sex instinct will be eradicated. Procreation will
be an annual formality like the renewal of a ration card. We shall
32 George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol.
IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 63-4,67.
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abolish the orgasm. Our neurologists are at work upon it now.
There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There
will be no love except the love of Big Brother. There will be no
laughter, except the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy.
There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we are
omnipotent we shall have no more need of science. There will
be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There will be no
curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing
pleasures will be destroyed. 33
Much of the satirical force of this passage lies in its being both appalling and
absurd. O'Brien's confidence in the imminent abolition of both the orgasm
and laughter (the former surely a hit at the Catholic Church, of which more
later) seems risible until one remembers that Winston is in the hands of a
merciless fanatic who will, in the end, succeed in abolishing him as a person.
The predicted end of art, literature and science sounds ridiculous until one
recalls that successive totalitarian regimes have exercised very real control
over these areas, either completely removing certain aspects of art from the
public domain or robbing scientists of their intellectual freedom to such a
degree that they have become unworthy of that name. The idea of a world in
which there is so little trust and affection that friends do not exist may well be
ludicrous, but the Russian writer Isaac Babel said, "Today a man can only talk
freely with his wife - at night, with the blankets pulled over his head," though
this did not prevent him from being arrested and executed on trumped up
charges. 34
It may well be part of Orwell's purpose to both appal and amuse his readers
at the same time. This would be part of the satirist's calculatedly mercurial
quality, which aims to put us off our guard while confronting us with some
aspect of reality which has been made grotesque. In this novel readers are
introduced into an alternative world which is frighteningly surrealist. O'Brien's
33 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 215.
34 Robert Conquest, "Totaliterror," On Nineteen Eighty-Four, ed. Peter Stansky (New York
Freeman,1983) 184.
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statements about sex, art and science mark one of the climaxes of such
surrealism, in which Orwell may be trying to confuse us into clearer thought by
making us laugh and cry, so to speak, at the same time. This bears out what
has been said in earlier chapters about the wily and unpredictable methods
used by satirists to make their points.
The programme for change set out by O'Brien is, one suspects, partly a
satirical thrust on the part of Orwell at the political myth of progress which has
often been espoused by totalitarian states. Five-Year Plans for economic or
industrial advancement (often unfulfilled) were common in Stalinist Russia, as
were the false announcements of success in these areas which Orwell
parodies:
'Comrades!' cried an eager youthful voice. 'Attention, comrades!
We have glorious news for you. We have won the battle for
production! Returns now completed of the output of all classes
of consumption goods show that the standard of living has risen
by no less than 20 per cent over the past year. 35
The materially drab lives of the people of Oceania (members of the Inner
Party excepted) give the lie to this statement, yet it is generally accepted by
most people, Winston's secret scepticism marking him as an outsider.
Similarly, what seems to the reader an outrageous and impossible plan of the
kind put forward by O'Brien would have been acceptable to the Party faithful
because the foundation for any tyrannical system of government had been
firmly laid - what Arendt refers to as "the banishment of the citizens from the
public realm and the insistence that they mind their private business while
only 'the ruler should attend to public affairs'. " 36 In a totalitarian state people
are isolated from the mechanics of government, but they are also isolated
from one another, by mutual suspicion and fear. In addition, because it is in
the nature of totalitarianism to create a self-contained and closed world for
35 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 50.
36 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1958) 221.
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itself, the ordinary members are cut off from the criteria by which they might
normally judge the words and actions of their government. In other words,
they are imprisoned in a specific version of reality created by the state, a
reality which conditions their emotional and their intellectual lives. This is
precisely the kind of situation which tempts satirists to move in and construct
the alternative, liminal worlds which will shake the massive certainty of the
totalitarian vision. In Oceania _ Orwell's brutal parody of a totalitarian state _
he has created a target worthy of the satire he vents upon it.
In an argument reminiscent of Orwell's thinking, Arendt concludes that the
existence of totalitarianism hinges on the confusion of certain binary
opposites:
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi
or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the
distinction between fact and fiction ... and the distinction
between true and false ... no longer exist. 37
Like Shakespeare in Macbeth, Arendt associates the inability to make these
distinctions with the flowering of evil in a state. Thus the words of the witches
in Macbeth _ "fair is foul and foul is fair,,38- are a way of defining totalitarian
politics, since to be trapped in the inhuman world created by the Party and
see it as "true" and desirable opens the way for cruel and inhuman acts.
O'Brien can torture Winston as he does only because he inhabits the mental
world of the Party, in which Winston's suffering is tolerable _ even good _
because it is necessary for the reinforcement of that world. Similar artificially
fixed views of the world, tailored for power, paved the way for Stalin's acts of
murder against the kulaks and those of the Nazis against the inmates of
concentration camps. Thus fairness becomes polluted by foulness, and this
leads in turn to a world in which foulness flourishes unchecked.
37 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1950; New York: World Publishing
Company, 1958) 474.
38 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. GK Hunter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) 1.1.9.
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The basis for this kind of confusion lies in the ability of rulers to cut their
people off from alternative views of reality and - from the point of view of this
dystopian novel - the primary means of doing that is ideology. As we have
already seen, one way of defining ideology is as "the effort to 'normalize'
relations between ... power and goodness, making that which is good, powerful
and that which is powerful, good." 39 This is directly analogous to the witches'
words in that it implies not just the meeting of virtue and political power but
their becoming interchangeable or even identical. In any political dispensation
such a narve belief would endanger the integrity of the body politic; in a
totalitarian setting, where this belief is engineered into being by the rulers of
the state, the stage is set for limitless abuse of power. Orwell himself has
commented on "the impossibility of combining power with righteousness," 40
and that is one of the most striking points made by Nineteen Eighty-Four.
In the previous ten pages power - as a constituent of totalitarianism - has
been discussed from a modernist point of view, with no flexibility in the
definition and treatment of hegemonic discourses and hierarchies: Malinowski
speaks uncompromisingly of completely incompatible elements, Hegel
believes in a single view of "truth," O'Brien is seen as evil partly because he
gleefully predicts the demise of science and Arendt insists on the importance
of certain binary opposites, such as fact and fiction. In addition, Orwell speaks
of the existence of objective truth - a belief which Peter Goodall describes as
the "most important manifestation of Orwell's realism," 41 summed up in
Nineteen Eighty-Four by Winston's insistence that 2+2=4.
Postmodernism, on the other hand, has less faith in science and technology.
In addition, postmodernism insists on the indeterminacy and pluralist nature
of truth, thus undermining the notion of mere binary opposition and
advocating an all-embracing view which could include elements thought to be
incompatible from a modernist point of view. As Hutcheon says,
39 See 96 above.
40 George Orwell, "Arthur Koestler," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. III (London
Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 238.
41 Peter Goodall, " 'Was the So-Called Melon Actually a Pumpkin'?: Orwell and the Problems
of Realism," AUMLA 75 (1991): 12.
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postmodernism indulges in a "general questioning of any totalizing or
homogenizing system" and "interrogate[s] the modernist totalizing ideal of
progress through rationality .... " 42 Yet the issue for Orwell is not a
straightforward one: as demonstrated more than once in this thesis, he has a
modernist view of the world yet, at the same time he is a satirist and, by
means of parody, exaggeration and the grotesque, he is attacking certain
manifestations of modernism, because they have failed to live up to their
promise, thus causing utopia to degenerate into dystopia (its fragmented
form), in a way not unrelated to the postmodern mode. The strategy of the
satire here is to exaggerate the enclosed and unself-reflexive nature of
modernist discourses of power in order (to use postmodern terminology) to
expose their totalizing quality. The word "totalizing" here refers to a discourse
which, according to Hawthorn, "seeks to occupy all the available ground" and
denies any standing to the discourses which it opposes. 43
The word "totalizing" denotes, as Hutcheon says, unification "with an eye to
power and control" 44, and is generally used by postmodern theorists in a
pejorative way. Michel Foucault is the postmodernist who has written most
tellingly on the issue of power, yet Jameson is antagonistic to Foucault's
notions of power and speaks of "the rather antediluvian fantasy
representations [of totalizing structure] that accompanied the 'domination'
models from 1984 ... all the way to Foucault - narratives rather comical for the
new postmodern age .... " 45 This is a rather over-simplified view of Foucault,
whose postmodernism differs from that of Jameson, though his views of
Nineteen Eighty-Four would probably have chimed with Jameson's opinion of
it. Hutcheon stresses the postmodern tendency to accommodate rather than
abolish opposites. She makes the point that while postmodernism does seek
to challenge totalizing forces, it does not deny them:
But it does seek to assert difference, not homogeneous identity.
42 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism 12, 25.
43 Jenny Hawthorn, A Concise Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory, 2nd ed. (London:
Arnold, 1994) 217.
44 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism xi.
45 Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 272.
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Of course, the very concept of difference could be said to entail
a typically postmodern contradiction: 'difference', unlike
'otherness', has no exact opposite against which to define itself. 46
In pursuit of such "difference", and in contrast to Orwell and other modernists,
Foucault sees power as diffuse and localised, having a quality which makes it
more difficult to point a finger at a single overarching source of control:
But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather
of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches
into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts
itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning
processes and everyday rives."
Part of this definition is applicable to Nineteen Eighty-Four, since in that novel
the powers of the state certainly do reach "into the very grain of individuals"
and "touch their bodies," in a particularly invasive way in the case of
dissidents. But, as has been shown, Orwell seeS state power primarily as a
heavily centralised manifestation which imposes itself with crude directness
on the populace below, while Foucault, with his notion of capillary forms, is
intent on problematizing this conception of power, that is, making this issue a
debatable one and generating discourses around it. This, pace Jameson, is
entirely faithful to mainstream postmodern ways of thought, since it seeks to
break down monolithic ways of viewing the world. The following statement by
Foucault during an interview sets out his view:
Power in the substantive sense, 'Ie'pouvoir, does not exist. What
I mean is this: the idea that there is located at - or emanating from -
a given point something which is a 'power' seems to me to be
based on a misguided analysis .... In reality power means relations,
46 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism 20,6.
47 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977,
trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton:
Harvester, 1980) 39.
204
a more-or-less organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of
relations. 48
His interviewer (Grosrichard), playing the same game as Foucault, attempts
to deconstruct this view:
Then you think this representation of power as exercised from
above, and in a negative or repressive way, is an illusion? Isn't
it a necessary illusion, one engendered by itself? At all events,
the illusion is a very persistent one, and after all it's against just
this kind of power that people have struggled in the hope of being
able to change things .... One always needs to have someone
smaller than oneself. 49
Grosrichard's point is a shrewd one, setting up Foucault's theory against what
is perceived as reality by those oppressed by power. He challenges
Foucault's notion of power, but then implies that it does not matter if Foucault
is right and the general view of power is an illusion, even if it is induced by
power itself, since this illusion has always provided a focal point for resistance
to power. His final statement about smallness is penetrating and highly
relevant to Nineteen Eighty-Four, since it goes to the very heart of
oppression, whether it be the bully in the playground or the tyrant in his
bunker. It brings the practice of oppression down to a very human scale: in
big or small things it is the rule rather than the exception for human beings to
enjoy superiority.
Foucault's reply to this is typically postmodern, masterly or maddening
depending on one's view of postmodernism: "Agreed, but what I meant to say
was that in order for there to be a movement from above to below there has
to be a capillary from below to above at the same time." 50 Foucault's notion
of power is in terms of two-way flow, rather than straightforward imposition
48 Foucault, Power/Know/edge 198.
49 Foucault, Power/Know/edge 201.
50 Foucault, Power/Know/edge 201.
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from above. He is not put out by the notion that the opposite view may be an
illusion engendered by power itself - a useful and necessary illusion at that.
Foucault is here being true to the spirit of postmodernism: he is not trying to
demolish an opposing point of view, but is happy to accommodate it within his
understanding of power. Such an accommodating spirit has been noted
elsewhere in this thesis and, although it may sometimes seem like a secular
form of Zen Buddhism in its ability to embrace rather than reject outright, it
has value in discouraging both quick judgements and the drawing up of
inflexible intellectual boundaries, such as are implicit in both Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four.
Apter comments that "ideology helps to support an elite and to justify the
exercise of power." He elaborates on this by drawing on the views of Lenin:
"Superior wisdom is equated with ideological authority by means of which the
public is converted to the political line. Indeed, ideology becomes the rock
against which waves of deviation ism must be dashed unless they submerge
the promontories of revolution." 51 This rock-like image of ideology is one that
Orwell found threatening rather than the comfort which, in this context, it is
meant to be - a difference of perspective which highlights the fact that
ideology can be seen as either a unifying or an ominous force in the hands of
a government.
Grosrichard's more neutral statement that "One always needs to have
someone smaller than oneself' gives the exercise of power a very human,
though hardly more attractive, dimension. In Animal Farm the pig called
Napoleon has dictatorial powers, thus invoking a double layer of significance:
there is the notion that human beings act like pigs, and there is also the fact
that this pig is named after an historical figure who was highly autocratic, the
two ideas mutually reinforcing Orwell's point that democracy is a highly
vulnerable system. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, however, all power is embodied
in the person of Big Brother, who is depicted as larger than life and, true to
Grosrichard's dictum, the main quality about him is a negative one: the
51 Apter, "Ideology" 18, 19.
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posters depicting his face are overpoweringly large and omnipresent, a
symbol of the universal bullying which passes for government in Oceania.
Significantly, the novel never reveals whether or not he is a real person, which
has the advantage for the Party that it enables him to be presented as the
timeless and immortal figure that he is claimed to be. O'Brien tells Winston
that Big Brother will never die, 52to which Pittock, who sees Nineteen Eighty-
Four as a depiction of hell, responds that "the reign of the Antichrist is forever,
not as a preliminary to the New Jerusalem. There are no angels; only
devils.,,53 If this is so Big Brother's horns and forked tail are cloaked by a
veneer of amiability - a form of mystification which can be compared to that
practised by Stalin, particularly during the Moscow trials. 54
The people of Oceania know Big Brother primarily through the massive,
identical and omnipresent portraits of him in public places, as well his
appearances in propaganda films, where he is represented as "black-haired,
black-moustachio'd, full of power and mysterious calm, and so vast that [he]
almost filled up the screen." 55 Under each poster of Big Brother are the
capitalised words "BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU" which, despite the
use of the word "brother," exude menace rather than comfort. Readers in this
part of the twentieth century would recognise these huge posters of a leader,
with their Pinteresque quality of violence lurking beneath a bland smile, as the
mark of a dictator, whether he be Ze-Dong or Saddam Hussein. There can be
no doubt, though, that the specific model for Orwell's Big Brother was Stalin:
the physical resemblance between the two is marked, and when Winston, in
the course of his duties, has to write an article using Big Brother's style, the
prose is "at once military and pedantic" 56, resembling that of Stalin, according
to Fischer, who also indicates other more striking resemblances:
One of the secrets of Stalin's personality seems to be a desire
to substitute an unreal Stalin for the real one ... .The outstanding
52 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 209.
53 Malcolm Pittock, "The Hell of Nineteen Eighty-Four," Essays in Criticism 47.2 (1997): 147.
54 See 169-70 above.
55 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 16.
56 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 41.
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feature of Stalin's self-portraiture in Soviet propaganda is flight
from reality. This starts with the radical retouching of his photo-
graphs and ends by attributing almost godlike qualities to him. 57
Big Brother, too, is seen by us, and by the citizens of Oceania, as an unreal
figure, godlike in many ways, and it is the symbolic force of Big Brother, rather
than any vestigial human qualities he may seem to have, which makes him so
important to Nineteen Eighty-Four. His name is an unusual choice for an
authority figure, and the question is, "Why not a parent figure, as in 'Big
Father' or 'Big Mother'?" In fact, as Mellor suggests, the term "Big Brother"
best fits Orwell's concept of the totalitarian ruler:
Orwell's masculine Big Brother draws our attention to a
specific aspect of totalitarian ideology: its inability to respond
affectionately to an individual. ... Big Brother is totally without
love, without concern for the health and mental welfare of
the individual. He is a logical abstraction, not a person ....
Assigning the role of political leader to a Big Father would
arouse the expectation that the father would grow old,
weaken, and eventually turn over his authority to his younger,
stronger male heir. By elevating the oldest brother to the
position of ultimate strength, Oceania effectively claims that
there is no possibility of changing the status quo. Your older
brother will live as long as you will, especially since he has
always been bigger and stronger than you .... What Orwell has
portrayed in Oceania is the complete triumph of a patriarchal
culture, a fascist society in which the man with the most
machismo, the older and stronger brother, reigns forever. 58
The work of Adler seems to confirm the psychological accuracy of the above
analysis. He says of the oldest children in a family:
57 Fischer, Stalin 214.
58 Anne Mellor, "You're Only a Rebel from the Waist Downwards Orwell's View of Women,"
OnNineteen Eighty-Four, ed. Peter Stansky (New York: Freeman, 1983) 116.
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[They] have once tasted power and they remain worshippers
of power .... The oldest children usually have some authority
over their brothers and sisters, and thus learn the advantages
of power. This develops their interest in authority and law,
and they see to it that authority is maintained. They themselves
yield to paternal authority. 59
It is therefore not surprising that in Oceania, where power is not yielded to
paternal authority, the result is tyranny. Big Brother has a stranglehold on
power because there is no father to whom he can yield authority. By the same
token, the citizens of Oceania are permanently in the situation of children - all
younger children at that - who have no hope of liberation because they are
not ruled by a father, but by a relatively youthful big brother.
Oceania is essentially a society in which the state has constructed new values
and structures, in place of the traditional ones which have been neutralised
and discredited. In parodying family relationships in this way, Orwell may be
alluding satirically to the totalitarian "Volksgemeinschaft and Brudersband of
the Nazis, [with] their false fraternity and contempt for individual liberty." 60 In
Nineteen Eighty-Four solid networks of relationship, particularly within the
family, are undermined, and Big Brother furthers this process since, despite
his name, he is neither protective nor caring, entirely lacking the comradely
qualities ideally shown by an elder brother towards his siblings. He is much
more like an autocratic and unloving father than a brother of any kind, but
whether one sees him as a brother or a father one is left with the image of a
relative who does not relate to any of the other family members, but seems
instead to be a perfectly empty shell. Big Brother is portrayed as mythical in
the most pejorative sense of the term: he is a political myth created to help a
dominant group retain and exercise power. The kind of myth he represents is
not "a way of binding the individual and the social together. For such myths to
be useful, Sorel argues, they must be in tune with the worthier moral
59 Hertha Orgler, Alfred Adler: The Man and his Work: Triumph Over the Inferiority Complex
~1939; London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1963) 24.
o Crick, "Satire or Prophecy" 93.
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tendencies. It is on a moral basis that ideologies must be evaluated rather
than on vague belief in dialectical progress." 61 This may seem to endorse
Orwell's implication that values are fixed and given, though what may be
"worthier moral tendencies" for, say, a Soviet Marxist may not be so for
Orwell.
In the case of Oceania, for example, the kind of relationship the state finds
most desirable between its citizens and Big Brother is one in which they are
nothing and he is everything. The reader is therefore prepared for the worst
when O'Brien and Winston have the following conversation in the Ministry of
Love:
Tell me, Winston - and remember, no lies: you know that I
am always able to detect a lie - tell me, what are your true
feelings towards Big Brother?'
'I hate him.'
'You hate him. Good. Then the time has come for you to
take the last step. You must love Big Brother. It is not enough
to obey him: you must love him.'
He released Winston with a little push towards the guards.
'Room 101,' he said. 62
Ironically, Room 101 is the most feared place among the prisoners in the
Ministry of Love, yet it is here that Winston will learn to "love" Big Brother. In
this room tailor-made torture is inflicted, since it is where each prisoner is
confronted with precisely whatever it is that he or she most fears. Thus the
Thought Police are able to reduce individuals to a state of helpless terror in
which their inner defences are completely breached and in which they will
give their deepest intellectual and emotional consent to whatever is put to
them. "The worst thing in the world is whatever unmakes the self, dispersing it
61 Quoted by Apter, "Ideology" 19.
62 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 227.
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or devouring it." 63 In Winston's case it is a cage containing rats, strapped to
his face, which leads him to "betray" his love for Julia - a love which both of
them were certain would last forever - as he shouts out, " 'Do it to Julia! Do it
to Julia! Not me! Julia! I don't care what you do to her. Tear her face off, strip
her to the bones. Not me! julia! Not me!' " 64
It is in this distinctly "horror comic" context that Symons's comment about the
"schoolboyish sensationalism" of Orwell's approach becomes relevant: for
Symons "the idea of Room 101 and the rats will always remain comic rather
than horrific." 65 Orwell subsequently wrote to Symons about this, saying "You
are of course right about the vulgarity of the 'Room 101' business. I was
aware of this while writing it, but I did not know another way of getting
somewhere the effect I wanted." 66 Significant here too is Fowler's contention
that two major aspects of Orwell's style are "[n]egativism and hyperbole.?"
Certainly it is debatable whether Winston's words really constitute betrayal
and whether any blame can reasonably be attached to anyone acting or
speaking under such circumstances of agonising and dehumanising duress.
Orwell himself says in an article (about Ghandi) published after the
completion of Nineteen Eighty-Four.
The essence of being human is that one does not seek
perfection ... and that one is prepared in the end to be
defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price
of fastening one's love upon other human beings. 68
It is on this issue that Parrinder quotes Burgess to the effect that "a man with
63 Judith Wilt, "Behind the Door of 1984:The Worst Thing in the World," Modernism
Reconsidered, eds. Robert Kiely and John Hildebidle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1983)
248.
64 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 230-31.
65 Julian Symons, rev. of Nineteen Eighty-Four, Burmese Days and Coming Up for Air, Times
Literary Supplement 10 June 1949: 380. .
66 Jenni Calder, "Orwell's Post-War Prophecy," George Orwell: A Collection of Critical Essays
~Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974) 150. .
7 Roger Fowler, The Language of George Orwell (London: Macmillan, 1995) 54.
68 George Orwell, "Reflections on Gandhi," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol. IV
(London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 467.
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a more robust conscience would have been able to discount his enforced
betrayal of Julia in Room 101." 69 However, in the context of the liminal world
of the novel into which the reader has entered, what matters is that both
Winston and Julia believe that they have betrayed each other in Room 101.
The aim of the Thought Police is deception and control, and this they have
achieved.
Thus it appears that Winston has been made to renounce his love for Julia in
order that he can do what is demanded of every inhabitant of Oceania: devote
all his physical and emotional energy to the state. The last two sentences of
Nineteen Eighty-Four proclaim this in their bitter way: "He had won the victory
over himself. He loved Big Brother." 70 In fact the process by which Winston
has come to "love" Big Brother belies this conclusion since, on one level,
Winston's "love" for Big Brother is as factitious as his "betrayal" of Julia. Both
are the product of coercion, violence and terror, and thus neither has any
substance beyond the world of Oceania. Neither Winston's betrayal nor his
love for Big Brother is a free act, and yet Winston cannot see that he has
become enslaved, thus exemplifying the Party slogan that "freedom is
slavery." Winston sincerely believes that, now that he loves Big Brother, he is
free for the first time in his life. The real triumph of O'Brien is not simply that
he has made Winston see his present pathetic and sterile state as love of any
kind, but rather that he has persuaded Winston that Big Brother is human and
real enough to be loved. In other words, Winston has come to accept the
version of reality offered by the Party - a reality which consists largely of a
web of political myth, with Big Brother at the centre.
The force and symbolism of Big Brother are both political and personal: he is
a visible sign of the omnipotence of the state but, at the same time, he
penetrates into the heart of all human relationships, implicitly or explicitly
forbidding intimacy, and jealously diverting feelings of family loyalty or sexual
passion out of their natural course and towards himself in parodic imitation of
----_._--_._---
69 Patrick Parrinder, "Updating Orwell? Burgess's Future Fictions," Encounter 56.1 (1981): 48.
70 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 240.
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the Old Testamentary God. Thus his power is enormous, particularly at the
subconscious level, where his example conditions people in their expectations
of both fatherhood and brotherhood, and serves as a template for human
relations in general. His influence thus works from below as much as above to
form the framework of society, in this way linking the political to the personal,
and pointing to Foucault's way of seeing power as all-pervasive and inherent
in the very fabric of society, not emanating in a simple way from the
government, whether despotic or otherwise.
The history of totalitarian rule in Oceania set out, putatively, by Emmanuel
Goldstein in Nineteen Eighty-Four, makes a similar point about government
not simply by politicians but also by a "new aristocracy [of] bureaucrats,
scientists, technicians, trade-union organizers, publicity experts, sociologists,
teachers, journalists .... ,,71 Foucault also views the network of service-
orientated professional people in society as constituting a major part of the
power structure at the personal level. We are, he says, "in the society of the
teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge;
it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based .... " 72 In
Nineteen Eighty-Four, the figure of O'Brien embodies the norms of the society
on a personal level, though his persona contains elements of all the above-
mentioned roles, and he is also father-confessor to Winston, with an intimacy
very like that of a family member.
The link between the power of the state on the one hand and that of the
family on the other is stressed by Fischer in his comments on "the power of
the father-image" and "patriarchal hypocrisy .... It begins with this dictum of all
rulers, that without them there is no world-father, no home for little ones,
never mind if the home is a bunker and the world a hell. ... " 73 This bitter
comment on the abuse of power may refer to the bunker in which Hitler died,
but clearly has relevance to Stalin as well, since both these totalitarian rulers
71 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 166.
72 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New
York: Pantheon, 1977) 304.
73 Ernst Fischer, Art Against Ideology, trans. Anna Bostock (London Penguin, 1969) 11.
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created a dystopia for their people, while promising them a utopia. The same
conditions apply in Oceania, where people are coerced into believing - or
pretending to believe - that their miserable existence is in fact an enjoyable
one. Fischer's use of the terms "world-father" and "little ones" points to the
way in which totalitarian rulers reduce their citizens to the state of helpless
children, deprived of the nurturing influence of a mother and at the mercy of a
father who is depicted as a distant and superhuman being. Attempts were
made to depict Hitler as an "Ubermensch" (superman), Stalin was at pains to
be seen as invulnerable, almost immortal (the very name Stalin, meaning
"man of iron," was an assumed one) and Big Brother's stance is one of
godlike omniscience. This largely explains the sense of powerlessness and
fatalism which pervades the lives of nearly all the characters in Nineteen
Eighty-Four. Even when Winston rebels against Big Brother and the state he
does so without any real hope of success, as his thoughts reveal: "Nobody
ever escaped detection, and nobody ever failed to confess. When once you
had succumbed to thoughtcrime it was certain that by a given date you would
be dead." 74
For Winston, if there is any hope it lies in the proles, as he writes in his diary.
He has faith in their innate strength and sees them as the unselfconscious
(and unconscious) bearers of dignity and freedom: "They needed only to rise
up and shake themselves like a horse shaking off flies. If they chose they
could blow the party to pieces to-morrow morning." 75 Yet later he comments
on the diary entry as follows: "The words kept coming back to him, statement
of a mystical truth and a palpable absurdity." 76 However, he clings to this
hope, despite palpable proof of the helplessness of the proles and, moments
before his arrest, he admires the prole woman singing as she hangs up
washing and describes proles as "people who had never learned to think but
who were storing up in their hearts and bellies and muscles the power that
would one day overturn the world. The future belonged to the proles." 77
74 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 86.
75 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 59.
76 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 69.
77 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 176-7.
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Huntington's view of this is that "Orwell [here] suggests, not a revolutionary
hope, but a level of being that. .. by its unconscious co-optation of the culture-
producers' co-optation, transcends the totalitarian state." 78 However, this
suggests a political passivity, very alien to the classic Marxist ideology which
Orwell never entirely abandoned, though he claimed to represent a more
commonsensical (and genuine) brand of socialism. He remained a committed
(though maverick) socialist, and the matter of the working class was one on
which he held strong - even somewhat idealistic - views, as his Down and Out
in Paris and London, and especially The Road to Wigan Pier, show. Goodall
says that "the concept of the 'common people' is important in Orwell's work
from first to last,,,79while Gregory takes up Winston's thought that belief in the
proles required "an act of faith" and applies it to Orwell:
Orwell's 'act of faith' required him to believe that it was
possible to have an absolute standard of values to base his
democratic socialism on while at the same time realizing
that there was nothing to base that standard of values on
except the inherent value of a class that had little possibility
of gaining any sort of influence. 80
In "The English People" Orwell says (somewhat wistfully) that "England can
only fulfil its mission if the ordinary English in the street can somehow get
their hands on power." 81 Crick suggests that this view of the proles is
prompted by Orwell's conservatism:
Quite simply, Orwell did not believe that poverty and
class oppression ... had dehumanized people completely.
Rather these forces had created a genuine fellowship and
fraternity in the common people that the middle classes
78 John Huntington, "Utopia and Anti-Utopian Logic," Science Fiction Studies 9.2 (1982): 135.
79 Peter Goodall, "Common Decency and the Common People in the Writing of George
Orwell," Durham University Journal 52.1 (1991): 75.
80 Mark W. Gregory, " 'An Act of Faith': George Orwell's Socialist Thought and 1984," South
Atlantic Quarterly 84.4 (1985): 378.
81 Orwell, "The English People" 37.
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lacked. 82
Elsewhere, Crick insists that "[Nineteen Eight-Four] is perfectly unclear and
deliberately ambiguous as to whether we are to believe in an inevitable victory
of the common people." 83 However, Sharrock believes that "Orwell escapes
from pessimism and paranoia through his idealization of the proles." 84 Zehr
argues the point even more strongly:
[Orwell's] views of the working class remained rooted within a
pre-World War I nostalgia and a middle-class sensibility, and
this nostalgia for his cultural childhood was accentuated by his
growing personal fears during the forties. He believed that it was
the ordinary, non-intellectual Englishman who conveyed the
cultural vitality, native resiliancy (sic), and traditional moral sense
that he identified with England's heritage and peculiar cultural
sensibility. At the same time he believed that they had as yet no
developed, articulated consciousness, and possessed only limited
mental resources. 85
In his depiction of the proles in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell seems to have
been trapped between his longing for the past and his need for a future that
held some hope, his state of mind presumably exacerbated by the totalitarian
nightmare which took shape in his mind and his writing, as Nineteen Eighty-
Four followed Animal Farm. Whatever the role Orwell intended for the proles,
the sometimes ambiguous idealism expressed by Winston towards them has
no apparent relevance to their fate, since they are simply brushed aside by
the state in its all-pervasive assertion of power.
82 Crick, "Satire or Prophecy?" 94.
83 Crick, "Reading Nineteen Eighty-Four as Satire," Reflections on America, 1984.·An Orwell
Symposium, ed. Robert Mulvihill (Athens, Georgia: U of Georgia P, 1986) 25.
84 Roger Sharrock, "1984 and the Rupture of Desire," Essays in Criticism 34.4 (1984): 327.
85 Zehr, David Morgan, "Orwell and the Proles: Revolutionary or Middle-Class Voyeur?".
Centennial Review 27.1 (1983): 39-40.
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The situation of Outer Party members is hardly better: Winston and Julia, for
example, have virtually no private life, so that private and public life come very
close to merging. It is a sign of their rebellion that, for a short while, they do
have something of a private life, and a sign of the omniscience of the state
that they are detected almost as soon as they do rebel. The degree of
surveillance to which their society is routinely subjected is echoed in
Foucault's writings on Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, a structure which was
intended to ensure continuous surveillance of those within it. For Foucault the
most important effect of the Panopticon was as follows:
[T]o induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to
arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects,
even if it is discontinuous in its action ... that this architectural
apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a
power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in
short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation
of which they are themselves the bearers. 86
The society of Oceania is very much a mechanism of surveillance of this kind,
with its telescreens indoors, its microphones in the countryside and its
Thought Police. This system ensures the functioning of power and, although
surveillance by means of the telescreens may not be continuous, because the
citizens have no way of knowing when they are in fact being observed, the
surveillance is permanent in its effects. Finally, the members of the Outer
Party do indeed become the enforcers of the power exercised over them,
since they inform on one another and oil the wheels of repression by
enthusiastically taking part in various activities which only reinforce the Party's
hold over them. According to Foucault, "The Panopticon ... must be
understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power
86 Foucault, Discipline 201.
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relations in terms of the everyday life of men." 87 It certainly proves to be an
effective way of defining the power relations existing in Oceania.
It is significant (bearing in mind the dystopian nature of Nineteen Eighty-Four)
that for Foucault the philosophy of the Panopticon was appropriated by the
French revolution for utopian reasons, ostensibly to further the cause of
openness and transparency:
A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear
of darkened spaces, of the pall of gloom which prevents the full
visibility of things, men and truths. [The revolution] sought to
break up the patches of darkness that blocked the light, eliminate
the shadowy areas of society, demolish the unlit chambers where
arbitrary political acts, monarchical caprice, religious superstitions,
tyrannical and priestly plots, epidemics and the illusions of
ignorance were fomented. 88
Insofar as these ideals went awry there was a shift from an avowedly utopian
society to an actually dystopian one, very much like the scenario in Nineteen
Eighty-Four, where the Party depicts life before the revolution which brought it
to power as having been intolerably oppressive, in contrast to what it presents
as its own benign policies.
As shown in Chapter 3, ideology plays a crucial role in the administration of
power. 89 From the way Orwell portrays the role of ideology in Nineteen
Eighty-Four it is clear that he regards ideology as a sinister force. Virtually all
the habits of mind which rob people of freedom and dignity in Oceania are
grounded in ideology: the worship of Big Brother, the hatred of Goldstein, the
blind faith in the Party's pronouncements. The attraction of ideology for many
people lies in its provision of simple responses which exclude thought and
reduce life to a neat, consistent and predictable form. One of the Nazi
87 Foucault, Discipline 205.
88 Foucault, Power/Knowledge 154.
89 See 87ff above.
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slogans, for example, warned that "Wer denkt, zweifelt schon: 'He who thinks
has already doubted.' " 90 - and Newspeak openly declares itself to be the
enemy of thought. Ideology offers a sense of historical comprehensiveness,
as well as persuading its devotees that they have a privileged knowledge of
the world:
First, ideologies ... explain ... all historical happenings ... ,
[promising] the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge
of the future. Secondly ... ideological thinking insists on a "truer"
reality concealed behind all perceptible things requiring a sixth
sense that enables us to become aware of it. The sixth sense is
provided by precisely the ideology ...which is taught by the
educational institutions, established exclusively for this purpose,
to train the "political soldiers" in the Ordensburg of the Nazis or
the schools of the Comintern and the Cominform. 91
Ideology can be a mental prison into which totalitarian states drive people by
means of both propaganda and terror, but people can also come to embrace
an ideology, consciously or unconsciously, because they find it comfortable,
or have a need to surrender their personal freedom to a metaphorical or literal
Big Brother. In other words, one may be battered into accepting an ideology
or one may collude in the process. Cassirer speaks of freedom and
totalitarianism as follows:
Freedom is not a natural inheritance of man. In order to
possess it we have to create it. If man were simply to
follow his natural instincts he would not strive for freedom;
he would rather choose dependence. Obviously it is much
easier to depend upon others than to think, to judge, and
to decide for himself ... [and] under extremely difficult
conditions man tries to cast off this burden. Here the
90 Young 70.
91 Arendt, Totalitarianism 470-1.
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totalitarian state and the political myths step in.92
This may sound elitist, cynical or condescending. Certainly it contradicts the
modernist myth of political progress 93which assumes, inter alia, that people
are ready, willing and able to accept freedom and use it creatively. This myth
is not part of postmodern thinking, though one of the underlying messages of
Nineteen Eighty-Four is that the myth has been betrayed rather than become
irrelevant in any way. A writer such as Arendt is aware of the vulnerability of
such humanistic legacies:
The Greeks, whose city-state was the most individualistic
and least conformable body politic known to us, were quite
aware of the fact that the po/is, with its emphasis on action
and speech, could survive only if the number of citizens
remained restricted. Large numbers of people, crowded
together, develop an almost irresistible inclination toward
d t· 94espo Ism ....
Modern totalitarian states stress conformity at the expense of the self-respect
and personal independence which are implied in the ancient Greek emphasis
on untrammelled action and speech. There may be a vicious circle here, in
that people's inability to exercise their individuality in what Bettelheim calls the
"mass state" 95encourages the state to step in and control them. Eventually,
the citizens' ability to be independent is so weakened that they come to rely
on outside guidance in virtually every matter. It would seem that, in many
cases, the victims of totalitarianism must take some degree of responsibility
for their plight.
92 Cassirer, The Myth of the State 288.
93 As Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Note on the Meaning of 'Post-' ," Postmodernism: A Reader, ed.
Thomas Docherty (New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993) says, "It is no longer possible to
call development progress." (49)
94 Arendt, Human Condition 43.
95 Bruno Bettelheim, in his The Informed Heart (1960; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), uses
this term to describe large modern states.
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In Nineteen Eighty-Four these issues are particularly problematic because
Orwell has presented us with a totalitarian state in which ideology,
propaganda and terror control the citizens so absolutely that, in general, the
issue of collusion becomes a marginal one. Collusion argues at least some
freedom to think and feel as an individual, to speak and act from motives
which are one's own, even if the actions themselves are completely
conformist, but in Oceania thinking and feeling differently are labelled
"thoughtcrime" or "ownlife" - offences for which the Thought Police are
constantly on the alert. The reader is thus faced with a society in which
people are careful to reveal - and try actually to feel - only what is allowable in
thought, word and deed. In this novel the surface texture of the characters'
words, deeds and personalities is so opaque that it is seldom possible to
distinguish those who are genuinely enthusiastic followers of Big Brother from
those who are miserably going through the motions. The constant perspiring
of Parsons almost certainly indicates a degree of conflict with the ruling
ideology, yet it is impossible to ascertain whether his enthusiastic commitment
to community activities is motivated by fear or by a kind of collusion in which
his childishness has found an enjoyable outlet in the mindless activities
organized by the Party. In the case of Syme, his enthusiasm for the work he is
doing on the latest edition of the Newspeak dictionary is clearly genuine and
suggests a degree of collusion, in that he has found a comfortable niche in
which he can exercise his linguistic skills in the service of Ingsoc, apparently
without any scruples. Yet ironically, the position of even such a person is
unsafe, and Winston's thoughts about Syme are an indication of how hostile
the Party is towards any manifestation of individuality:
One of these days, thought Winston with sudden deep conviction,
Syme will be vaporised. He is too intelligent. He sees too clearly
and speaks too plainly. The Party does not like such people. One
day he will disappear. It is written in his face .... And yet it was a
fact that if Syme grasped, even for three seconds, the nature of
his, Winston's, secret opinions, he would betray him instantly to
the Thought Police. So would anybody else, for that matter: but
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Syme more than most. 96
Through the eyes of Winston we see Syme as an intelligent, articulate and
able man whose loyalty to the Party is absolute. Yet, because Winston is also
intelligent and articulate, but not loyal to the Party, he can perceive that it is
these very qualities that doom Syme. Ironically, Winston is himself doomed by
having these qualities, and he too colludes with the system by relishing his
work, though he does not parade this as Syme does. Apter says that, under
certain circumstances, "Ideology becomes a protection for people alienated
from their society - a protection against the final alienation." 97 In other words,
such people are unable to face up to the very hard existential realities
prevalent under totalitarianism and accept the kind of comfort that the state
does offer, even though it means the loss of their birthright to be independent
human beings.
Yet, if the majority of the Outer Party falls prey to these temptations, Winston
avails himself only marginally of such false comfort, and instead persists with
his plans to rebel. The extent of Winston's disloyalty is early made clear by his
keeping a diary (itself punishable by death) of which the contents certainly
constitute thoughtcrime, and thereafter "he recognized himself as a dead
man." 98 Yet, ironically, the loyalty of a person such as Syme will not enable
him to escape the same fate eventually suffered by Winston, a man who had
repeatedly written in his diary the words "DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER." 99
As Miller says:
Nor does the Party thus superannuate only its opponents. In its
relentless onward thrust, sooner or later it simultaneously
bypasses and exterminates everyone above ground level, whether
they hate the Party, zealously applaud it, or vacuously go about
their business: Syme is vaporized, despite his exemplary
96 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 47,48.
97 Apter, "Ideology" 37.
98 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 26.
99 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 18.
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commitment to ... Iinguistics ... but then Parsons too is vaporized -
for "thoughtcrime," although he seems to have no thoughts. 100
Winston's awareness of and ensuing outrage at how the Party controls life in
Oceania are heightened by the work he does at the Ministry of Truth which
entails his systematically altering or fabricating material in various journals,
documents and speeches. The aim of this is to destroy or alter evidence
pertaining to certain past events, statements or even the existence of certain
people, in order that the past should conform with the reality which the Party
wishes to establish. As Hunter puts it, "Winston's job is to do the very thing he
fears the most, to make history a 'palimpsest', to aid the Party in control of
information .... " 101 Yet we are told that he is good at it and that his "greatest
pleasure in life was his work," 102 though this statement occurs before his
involvement with Julia. Winston's attitude may be an example of what Anna
Freud calls "identification with the aggressor" - a form of ego defence which
occurs in people under intolerable stress, who collude with or imitate the
thoughts or person oppressing them, but repress the negative associations of
such thoughts or actions. 103 Whatever the reason, Winston's enjoyment of
his work is one indicator of how deeply he is embedded in the system he
hates - and his inability to prevent himself from joining in the Two Minute Hate
sessions 104 shows that he. is enmeshed in the system at a subconscious
level. Nevertheless, he maintains his integrity and independence insofar as
that is humanly possible in Oceania. Those who appear actively to embrace
the system suffer a different fate: they lead robot-like and fearful lives, empty
of real meaning and leading to a kind of mental death.
Those like Winston and Julia who make gestures of defiance bring on
themselves the most appalling consequences, made more telling because the
reader's hopes for some kind of positive outcome are pinned on these two
100 Mark Crispin Miller, "Big Brother Is You, WatChing," The Georgia Review, 38 (1984): 706.
101 Lynette Hunter, George Orwell: The Search for a Voice (Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1984)
197.
102 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 38.
103 Anna Freud, "Identification with the Aggressor," Selected Writings by Anna Freud, ed. and
introd. Richard Elkins and Ruth Freeman (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998) 13-22.
104 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 15.
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characters, particularly Winston. After all, he has a great deal of insight and
objectivity about what is happening around him, and he seems to have
particular advantages (e.g. a strong awareness that the past differs from the
version of it offered by the Party) in his struggle to retain his own sense of
reality. Yet despite this both he and Julia seem to be doomed from the start.
The novel dispassionately examines the two possible ways of living under Big
Brother - obedience and rebellion - and shows them to be equally harrowing.
This refusal by Orwell to leave the inhabitants of Airstrip One with any hope
(Winston's hope in the proles is unconvincing) or any way of avoiding being
crushed by the machinery of the party is what gives Nineteen Eighty-Four its
aura of claustrophobia and helplessness. The novel is the story of Winston's
struggle to free himself from the web of ideology, propaganda and myth in
which he finds himself, but in the end he finds that he cannot do it.
Julia, too, is not willing to give up her individuality, and she presents to the
world the appearance of someone unreservedly immersed in the world
created by the ruling ideology of Ingsoc. She consciously operates on two
different levels - a very different process from that of "doublethink," which is
intended to allow logical inconsistencies to co-exist happily in the interests of
maintaining complete conformity to Party ideology.
Despite her disloyalty she, too, bears the scars of a life lived in the shadow of
Big Brother, which show themselves primarily in her inability to relate closely
to her lovers - until, that is, she meets Winston. Her contempt for the system
and the emptiness of her lip-service to it have not stopped it from damaging
her ability to function in a fully human way. Yet it is significant that, among the
heteroglot texts which create dialog ism within Nineteen Eighty-Four - for
example, Winston's creations at work, his diary, Goldstein's seditious book (if
it was his work) - it is the very small text produced by Julia, the one that says
"I love you," which has the most powerful deconstructive force in the novel.
The fact that this in the end comes to nothing indicates how Menippean satire
can shift into the genre of tragedy. 105 Wilt speaks of "their doomed struggle to
105 See 189 above.
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add a spark of life to their death by making love." 106 Oceania does not offer
an accepting community within which people can develop their personal
relationships, since it aims to drive individuals into conformity by devaluing
personhood, and thus making it difficult for people to see themselves as
adult, independent beings.
In Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell protests vehemently against such a
development, bitterly asserting the primacy of individual consciousness - a
modernist view since postmodernism is sceptical about the very possibility of
a single, unified consciousness. Orwell repeatedly shows us what the effects
of totalitarian power are on individuals, and he does this through that most
intimate of connections between human beings: love. At first glance it seems
curious that the massive state machinery of Oceania should be concerned
with aspects of love, yet Big Brother shares with one of his historical
counterparts, Stalin, a deep concern with precisely this matter. Fischer
informs us that a theme of Soviet propaganda was that "Stalin loves all Soviet
men, women and children; everything he does is for their welfare .... " 107 It was
presumably to inspire a genuinely reciprocal response in the hearts of
Russian citizens that his propaganda machine turned out many songs and
poems like the following "Hymn to J.V. Stalin":
The world has no person
Dearer, closer,
With him, happiness is happier,
And the sun is brighter. 108
The love that Big Brother demands (or rather that the Thought Police demand
for him) is a grimmer affair. The menace involved is spelt out when O'Brien
says of the alleged traitors, Jones, Aaronson and Rutherford:
I took part in their interrogation myself. I saw them gradually
106 Wilt 251.
107 Fischer, Stalin 80.
108 Fischer, Stalin 32.
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worn down, whimpering, grovelling, weeping - and in the end it
was not with pain or fear, only with penitence. By the time we
had finished with them they were only shells of men. There was
nothing left in them except sorrow for what they had done, and
love of Big Brother. It was touching to see how they loved him.
They begged to be shot quickly, so they could die while their
minds were still clean. 109
O'Brien here establishes a clear link between people being broken and
emptied of their humanity and their coming to love Big Brother. This passage
is one of several parodies of religion to be found in Nineteen Eighty-Four,
here alluding to the Catholic practice of confession and reflecting on the way
Catholicism saw God. Orwell was, in fact, sceptical about some aspects of
Christianity in general and unflattering, sometimes scathing, about
Catholicism in particular, as several commentators have noted. 110
Foucault takes the matter of confession much further. He alludes to the way
confession has been practised since the Middle Ages - "one of the main
rituals we rely on for the production of truth" 111 in both the Church and other
insitutions. Orwell's vision of confession in the future is sinister, but Foucault's
view of it in the present is just as disturbing:
We have since [the Middle Ages] become a singularly
confessing society. The confession has spread its effects far
and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family
relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of
everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one's
crimes, one's sins, one's thoughts and desires, one's illnesses
and troubles .... One confesses in public and in private, to one's
parents, one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves ....
109 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 205.
110 See for example, Crick, George Orwell 226-9.
111 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley, vel. I (London: Penguin,
1981) 58.
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When it is not. ..dictated by some internal imperative, the
confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is
driven from its hiding place in the soul, or extracted from the body.
Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied it like a shadow,
and supported it when it could go no further: the dark twins. The
most defenceless tenderness and the bloodiest of powers have a
similar need of confession. 112
For both Foucault and Orwell the ritualistic nature of confession is an
important element, whether it be in the systematic uncovering of crime in the
courtroom or the torture chamber or (for Foucault in particular) the structured
invasiveness of the social worker or the doctor. But Foucault goes further:
There was undoubtedly an ... extension of the domain
controlled; but also a sensualization of power and a gain of
pleasure ... that comes of exercising a power that questions,
monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to
light; and on the other hand, the pleasure that kindles at having
to evade this power, flee from it, fool it. .. [t]he power that lets
itself be invaded by the pleasure it is pursuing; and opposite it,
power asserting itself in the pleasure of showing off .... 113
This can be used to throw light on the last part of Nineteen Eighty-Four in
which O'Brien variously and evasively adopts the roles of teacher, confessor,
friend, adversary, psychotherapist and torturer. Orwell must have been
familiar with the techniques of psychotherapy since his first wife, Eileen, was
a senior psychology student and lay psychotherapist when he met her.114The
long torture scenes played out between Winston and O'Brien can be viewed
as a perversion of the kind of psychotherapy practised by Epston and
112 Foucault, Sexuality 59.
113 Foucault, Sexuality 44-5.
114 Laurence M. Porter, "Psychomachia versus Socialism in Nineteen Eighty-Four. A
Psychoanalytic View," The Revised Orwell, ed. Jonathan Rose (East Lansing: Michigan State
UP, 1991) 64.
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White,115 since in both scenarios there is an interaction between two people
with the intention of bringing about change, though that is where the similarity
ends. The latter process empowers patients by helping them to restory their
lives in a healing way, while in the former there is a kind of sado-masochistic
ritual from which both O'Brien and Winston gain some kind of pleasure - not
necessarily conscious. Michael Orange discusses the encounter between
Winston, julia and O'Brien in the latter's flat, as well as the later torture
scenes, and notes the presence there of "a dark complicity in sado-
masochistic fantasy.,,116 O'Brien's discourse of power moves from measured
talk to passionate denunciation, and the cumulative effect of his words and
actions is to deny the value of non-controlling relationship, yet at times he
displays a caressing quality towards Winston which has strong sexual
overtones. Patai says that "the romance between Julia and Winston is far less
important in the novel, and occupies less space, than the 'romance', between
Winston and O'Brien." 117
O'Brien is clearly a sadist, though he presents this in the guise of a Victorian
fatherliness which believes it is only hurting a child for his/her own good.
According to Staub, in reality the activities of torturers such as O'Brien feed
off themselves and the activities of such perpetrators come to feel
omnipotent. Drawing on tendencies in Cambodia and Argentina as well as
Nazi Germany, Staub says the following of state-designated torturers:
Learning by doing stifled the torturers' feelings of empathy and
concern. They had come to see themselves as absolute rulers
over the victims' well-being and life, not subject to normal human
constraints. They often talked to the victims about this absolute
godlike power and the victims' total dependence on them; as they
did this, they strengthened their own belief in it. 118
115 See 72-3 above.
116 Michael Orange, "Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Spirit of Schweik," George Orwell, eds.
Courtney T. Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky (New York: Greenwood P, 1987) 53.
117 Patai 239.
118 Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1989) 226.
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O'Brien's behaviour follows this pattern very closely. The concern he
expresses for Winston is obviously suspect, since it involves an assumption
that if only Winston were to understand the world as the Party does, he would
immediately see it as the truth:
O'Brien silenced him by a movement of his hand. 'We control matter
because we control the mind. Reality is inside the skull. You will
learn by degrees, Winston. There is nothing that we could not do.
Invisibility, levitation - anything. I could float off this floor like a soap
bubble if I wish to. I do not wish to, because the Party does not wish
it. ...We make the laws of nature. 119
O'Brien's stance is one of omniscience and omnipotence, with a ponderous
smugness to his discourse. His remarks about levitation make him sound like
some religious fanatic who also has a touch of psychosis - an element which
is at variance with his apparently logical way of arguing, and adds to the
nightmare quality of the novel.
Yet if we view O'Brien primarily as a parodic representation - the mad or
deluded philosopher figure who is an important part of Menippean satire - we
gain a more light-hearted view of him as he argues against common sense
with such "quixotic conviction" and "narcissistic neglect of the facts." 120 As
Sherbert says, "The self-referentiality of the mad philosopher's own digressive
[discourse] ... marks his lack of control over both language and himself." 121 To
see O'Brien not as a psychotic but as a mad philosopher (or a satire on
totalitarianism) would change the reader's feelings about him - a reminder of
the different kinds of alternative worlds that satire can offer us.
Foucault returns us to more serious views on the power relations existing
between interrogator and prisoner, and he speaks of "a game that combined
119 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 213.
120 Sherbert 76, 87.
121 Sherbert 30.
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pleasure with compulsion, and consent with inquisition, [and] made it tell the
truth about itself and others as well." 122 In other words, power often involves
an element of sado-masochism, and the question is to what degree Winston
gives himself to a ritual in which he enjoys the pleasures of being dominated -
or at least has an unconscious need to be dominated. Good detects in
Winston "hints, in his emotions mostly, that his rash defiance is simply a way
to hasten the punishment and forgiveness he subconsciously desires." 123
Whatever the case, it is clear that at no point does Winston hate O'Brien. On
the contrary, even after months of humiliation and torture Winston can still
admire and revere him:
The peculiar reverence for O'Brien, which nothing seemed able to
destroy, flooded Winston's heart again. How intelligent, he thought,
how intelligent! Never did O'Brien fail to understand what was said
to him. 124
Bouson maintains that "Winston's attraction to O'Brien stems from an archaic
need for merger with an omnipotent, idealized figure." 125 Bouson sees Big
Brother and O'Brien as representations of the same "all-powerful,
protective/destructive parental imago" 126 and relates this to Winston's
frustrated need to merge with his mother. The notion of O'Brien and Big
Brother as ambiguous - both protective and destructive - is a key to the novel,
since both O'Brien and Big Brother entice people into a false haven which is
actually a kind of death so that, finally, destruction is the only reality.
Bettelheim speaks of such false havens in different terms since, for him, the
great trap of submitting to what he calls "the total state" is that "it leads to a
disintegration of what seemed a well integrated personality, plus a return to
122 Foucault, Sexuality 77.
123 Graham Good, " 'Ingsoc in Relation to Chess': Reversible Opposites in Orwell's 1984,"
Novel 18.1 (1984): 54.
124 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 220.
125 J. Brooks Bouson, "The 'Hidden Agenda' of Winston Smith: Pathological Narcissism and
1984," University of Hartford Studies in Literature 18.1 (1986) 14.
126 Bouson 16.
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many infantile attitudes." 127 It is for this reason that he launches a scathing
attack on Anne Frank and her family, accusing them of refusing to take proper
measures to save themselves and to accept the fact of human evil 128. In the
same way, Winston equivocates with his intuitive awareness of exactly what
O'Brien represents because he needs someone to believe in, writing in his
diary that it does not matter whether O'Brien is a friend or an enemy. 129
However, the elements of both ambiguity and "splitting" (the oversimplified
view that things are either completely good or completely bad) in Nineteen
Eighty-Four have even deeper ramifications. In the course of earlier
discussion, warnings were sounded about the contamination of satire by the
very aspects it sets out to attack 130 and, more specifically, the question was
posed as to whether Orwell, through a lack of provisionality in his stance, was
showing a desire to control people and oversimplify issues by defining social
and linguistic strategies so rigidly, even as he points out the dangers of doing
such things. 131 The passion to expose and prevent the evils of ideology and
propaganda may have led Orwell to write a novel which is itself highly
propagandistic in setting up alternative forms of ideology. Such an argument
would spring from a postmodern rather than the modernist outlook which
Orwell espoused: from the former point of view no text is innocent. Bouson
addresses this point by implicating Orwell directly: "The omnipotent party-
parent and the split figure of the persecutor/savior are clandestine
representations of the author-rnanipulator.v'Y In other words, there are
manipulative agendas in Nineteen Eighty-Four which Orwell does not declare
to his readers - and perhaps not even to himself - and this is a situation that
satire's audience has to live with.
This thesis has insisted repeatedly that satirists are an essential but flawed
part of society, since they are often evasive and aggressive, pursuing their
127 Bettelheim, Informed Heart 255.
128 Bettelheim, Informed Heart 253-54.
129 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 208.
130 See 76 above.
131 See 128-9 above.
132 Bouson 17.
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own agendas in a way which puts them on the margins of society.
Nevertheless, satirists habitually exploit their very marginality in a creative
way that competes strongly with more conventional voices for attention: in a
family the children often find the disreputable uncle or aunt more attractive,
thus giving them a greater influence than the mother or father ever could
have. It is in this role of disreputable relative - both familiar and
unconventional - that the satirist exaggerates and distorts issues, ignoring
conventional notions of fairness and pulling the rug out from other people's
feet, while exercising a fair amount of aggression towards the values and the
institutions of society.
As argued earlier, satirists exaggerate in order, paradoxically, to bring their
audience closer to a different truth. 133 It is the apparent unwillingness to
acknowledge that parody and exaggeration are stock satiric strategies that
leads critics such as Young to leap to Orwell's defence against those who
accuse him of parody in Nineteen Eighty-Four. 134 But if the novel is viewed
as satire then it is not surprising that, for example, in depicting Big Brother,
Orwell has taken the historical figure of Stalin and parodied his qualities in
order to make a point about the nature of totalitarian rule. Similarly, the
powers of mind control and general surveillance attributed to the Thought
Police in Oceania are exaggerated versions of the way both the Soviet and
Nazi secret police operated. But the important thing is that the basic themes
of Nineteen Eighty-Four lay readily to hand in the personalities, views and
actions of people like Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. Orwell took these already
distorted styles of government and distorted them even further, deepening the
qualities of evil and oppression that they embodied and exaggerating their
power and influence until, in his novel, they become universal. Orwell's
general view of current civilisation was decidedly bleak, and in 1937 he wrote:
"We are living in a world in which nobody is free, in which hardly anybody is
secure, in which it is almost impossible to be honest and remain alive." 135
Elsewhere in his writings his message to the "free world," as it called itself,
133 See 38-9 above.
134 Young 5-6.
135 George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962) 149.
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was that those freedoms that it had would in the future be in grave danger
from power-hungry politicians and capitalists. 136 The fact that the outlines of
the totalitarian world Orwell has created are recognisably historical in nature
makes it difficult for readers to objectify Orwell's text as merely a dire warning
about what the future holds for the world, though that is part of its message.
Yet readers are likely to be ambivalent in their response, since to most people
a world in which no thought or action is free is a monstrous one, both
frightening and inconceivable.
The modern painter Francis Bacon, not strictly speaking a satirist, is an
example of an artist who makes use of the most grotesque distortions in his
work, and in the following interview he sets out his thoughts on this issue:
SR In many of your portraits, despite the distortion, one
can still see a likeness. It's not all distortion.
BACON No, it isn't all distortion. But then, you see, I always hope to
distort into reality.
SR To distort into reality?
BACON And not distort away from it. 137
By saying that he "distorts into reality" Bacon implies that there is more than
one kind of distortion and is claiming a privileged status for his kind of
distortion on the grounds that it points towards "reality." It is obvious that he is
not speaking of a reality that lies on the surface, since in order to find the
reality presented by Bacon the viewer has to make an effort to enter into the
liminal world of distortion presented by Bacon's portraits. As always, liminality
invites participation in a newly-created externalising discourse which initiates
changed views in the participants. In this case the externalising discourse
deepens the viewer's awareness of the qualities portrayed in Bacon's
136 See, for example, George Orwell, "You and the Atom Bomb," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and
Ian Angus, vol. IV (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 9, War-time Diary: 28 May 1940 - 28
August 1941, CEJL, vol. II, 354 and "Inside the Whale," CEJL, vol. I, 525.
137 Francis Bacon, interview with Joshua Gilden, "I Think About Death Every Day," Saturday
Review, September 1981 : 39.
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paintings, particularly the vulnerability of the people depicted in them. But the
paintings are also an assault on the viewers, which makes them in turn more
aware of their own vulnerability.
It has been said of Bacon that "there is nothing gratuitous or wilful about the
distortions which he imposes upon the sitter's features," 138 and that his
problem was "how to ally the strongest possible dose of verifiable reality to
the strongest dose of inspired risk. 139 Similarly, one has to recognise the
craft in what Orwell has done in Nineteen Eighty-Four. As with Bacon, Orwell
had to provide his audience with a certain amount of verifiable reality to avoid
alienating them entirely, while going as far as he dared in the direction of the
grotesqueness and horror that lie at the heart of the novel. Contemporary
literary critics describe the mode of a certain kind of novel as "magic realism,"
indicating that the novel embodies elements of both fantasy and realism. On
an analogy with that, one could categorise Nineteen Eighty-Four as
"nightmare realism" - though that would be far from a comprehensive
description of the novel.
As with Bacon's paintings, Orwell's novel presents a powerful invitation into an
alternative world. Being a form of externalising discourse, satire constantly
offers its audience liminal' experiences, and in Nineteen Eighty-Four that
experience is of a particularly traumatic kind as readers are drawn into the
liminal world of Nineteen Eighty-Four and made to feel on the pulse what the
state can do to the human spirit. Orwell would have had no difficulty in
answering Ernst Fischer'S question: "What do you say about reality when the
screams from the cellar grow louder than the singer's voice?" 140 Orwell had
no doubt that his art was not to be a singer, but rather to make his readers
unavoidably aware of what he heard coming from the cellar. Those screams
had to be magnified, even distorted, until the reader was forced to empathize
with the suffering of humanity. That is as important a part of Orwell's purpose
as it is of Bacon's Study after Velasquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X. As far
138 john Russell, Francis Bacon (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979) 124.
139 Russell 107.
140 Fischer, Art Against Ideology 130.
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as Orwell was concerned, unless great care was taken, the future would be
as O'Brien defines it: "a boot stamping on a human face - for ever." 141 This
demonisation of the relations between politics and power has been
challenged by Raymond Williams, who believes it should be resisted because
"it would then be pointless to try and distinguish between social systems, or to
inquire, discriminatingly, where this or that system went good or went bad." 142
It is true that pointing to the violence - in word and deed - of the politics
portrayed in Nineteen Eighty-Four does not clarify the issue of how such a
text succeeds in drawing its readers into the alternative or liminal world it
offers. Bacon has said that people do not buy his paintings because they like
them, and it is likewise reasonable to suppose that people do not read
Nineteen Eighty-Four because they enjoy it. Bouson and others suggest that
some apparently paradoxical processes are at work here:
1984 exerts a strange power over its readers ... .The terror and rage
that erupt from the subsurfaces of the text assault the reader who,
like Winston Smith, becomes a passive victim. Georges Poulet's
description of the reading process as involving the 'annexation' of
the reader's consciousness ... is analogous to the description [of]
Winston's takeover by O'Brien and Orwell's manipulation of the
reader .... Similarly, Norman Holland links the reading process - the
commonly described experience of being absorbed, engrossed,
carried away by a text - to the primitive fear of merger .... Winston's
core fantasy - desire for and fear of merger - is, in effect, replicated
in the reader, who becomes engrossed in what seems at first a
familiar fictional world but which is transformed into an unrelieved
nightmare. 143
Orwell lulls us into a false sense of security by presenting us in the very first
lines of his novel with "a familiar fictional" world - in this case a typical seedy,
run-down city which becomes even more familiar as we recognise that this is
141 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 215.
142 Raymond Williams, Orwell (London: Fontana, 1984) 124-5.
143 Bouson 8.
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post-war London, despite the strangeness of the clocks "striking thirteen" in
the second line. 144 "Satire straddles the historical world of experience and
the contrived world of created literature, and it insists on the necessity of
both." 145 The dialogic relationship between the satirist and society, between
the liminal world created by satire and the actual, tangible world within which
satire is received, is a crucial aspect of satire:
Reference to things outside of a fictional context does not by
itself distinguish satire from other literary forms, but the reader's
perception of extrafictional reference is perhaps more important
in the case of satire than it is for other genres: it is the reader's
relating of 'satirical' descriptions to a context outside of the fiction
that determines their satirical significance .... 146
The society depicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four is both familiar and unfamiliar to
the reader, and the satirist capitalises on both of these aspects. On the one
hand, the political strategies of the Party often reflect the current - or recent -
history of Orwell's time and the dreary social conditions of post-war Britain.
However, the contemporary reader can identify with certain aspects of the
novel because they are accurate reflections of life today. There is the
increase in surveillance, based on sophisticated technology, the growing
sense of loneliness and helplessness that individuals are experiencing in
most societies, and the totalitarian systems which, even in these days of
glasnost, have not yet disappeared. All these considerations reinforce the
impact of Nineteen Eighty-Four, forcing the reader to regard it as more than a
work of fiction.
The aggressive aspect of satire emerges as "the terror and rage that erupt
from the subsurfaces of the text assault the reader"; but one would have to
add that much of the strength of Nineteen Eighty-Four lies precisely in the
144 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 5.
145 Knight 35.
146 Terence Harpold, "The Anatomy of Satire: Aggressivity and Satirical Physick in Gulliver's
Travels, Literature and Psychology 36.3 (1990): 34.
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ability of the text to appal. It is this unreal world of horror - this distortion and
exaggeration of evil so that it becomes almost a parody of itself - which repels
readers, but also holds a kind of terrible fascination for them. However, the
reader of Nineteen Eighty-Four is not merely a passive victim of Orwell's
verbal violence, and the matter is a more complex one than the theories
alluded to by Bouson suggest. It may rather be the very grotesqueness of the
suffering depicted in the novel that moves readers and keeps them so
involved in the text, whether because of some deep atavistic need to witness
suffering or out of the kind of helpless pity which can do nothing but stand by
the sufferer, but is driven to do just that anyway. It would be odd to suggest
that Orwell is here intent on feeding atavistic impulses, but he may wish to
make people aware of such impulses, so that they can be exposed to the
civilising influence of consciousness.
The issue of aggression In satire is examined in detail by Bentley, who
discusses how satirical aggression can be devoid of noble motives and thus
tend towards sadism:
Reduction to flesh is the rhetoric of sadism ... [and s]atire
employs the same central maneuver. Even a casual glance
at the history of this genre will show that scatological
reductionism is its most frequent technique. 147
Bentley argues that such reductiveness is a result of both satire and sadism
concentrating on the body, so that the mind of the victim is excluded. He does
not accuse the satirist of being consciously sadistic, but concludes that "on
the unrationalized level, both in action and in method, satire is sadistic." 148
Foucault has a different view of sadism: "The precise object of 'sadism' is not
the other, nor his body, nor his sovereignty: it is everything that might have
been said." 149 Foucault has redefined the site of sadism, problematizing the
147 Joseph Bentley, "Satire and the Rhetoric of Sadism," Centennial Review 11 (1967): 394.
148 Bentley 404.
149 Michel Foucault, "Language to Infinity," Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald
F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977) 62.
237
concept and retrieving it from the realm of closed and centred signification.
Foucault's view, applied to Nineteen Eighty-Four, invites the reader to view
the character of O'Brien from a postmodern stance, which implies less
certainty about the interaction between O'Brien and Winston.
Some writers have depicted Orwell as having had a sadistic streak. Sharrock
speaks of "the Orwell whom a friend on Jura saw methodically chopping up a
living adder with his jack-knife." 150Rayner Heppenstall, another friend, tells of
being attacked by Orwell during a domestic. quarrel and describes Orwell's
expression as "a curious blend of fear and sadistic exaltation" as he raised a
metal shooting-stick to strike Heppenstall. 151Crick's comment is that "There
was this sadistic streak in Orwell's character - which usually he mastered." 152
Richard Sanderson mentions two critics who "have each pointed out strong
resemblances between O'Brien's manipulation of Winston and Orwell's
manipulation of the reader." 153It has already been suggested that there is a
sado-masochistic relationship between Winston and O'Brien 154and there is
no doubt that Nineteen Eighty-Four contains a great deal of sadism. If Orwell
took even an unconscious pleasure in this is it is likely to have been in his role
of satirist, with the satirical animus here being tinged with the sadism of which
Bentley speaks. Yet this is precisely what Pritchett exults in, calling the Orwell
of Nineteen Eighty-Four "the most devastating pamphleteer alive because he
is the plainest and most individual ... and because, with steady misanthropy,
he knows exactly where on the new Jesuitism to apply the Protestant
whip.,,155 Rai believes that readers of Nineteen Eighty-Four experience a
"sadistic element in the pleasure which the novel gives." 156
150 Sharrock 332.
151 Coppard 113.
152 Crick, George Orwell 525.
153 Richard K. Sanderson, "The Two Narrators and Happy Ending of Nineteen Eighty-Four,"
Modern Fiction Studies 34.4 (1988) 593.
154 See 228-30 above.
155 EV Pritchett. rev. of Nineteen Eighty-Four, New Statesman and Nation 18 June 1949 :
646.
156 Rai 137.
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It is clear that the level of aggression in Nineteen Eighty-Four - directed at
both the satiric target and the readers of the novel - exceeds that normally
encountered in satirical works. Orwell is here fiercely attacking both those
who perpetrate the evils he is exposing and those who read about them, a
dual process which has more than one end. It seeks to break down the
imperviousness to suffering which many people have and it reminds them
that, because they are all members of the human race, they too are
potentially guilty of the faults which can be seen in the rulers of Oceania. The
distortion practised by satirists also constitutes a form of violence directed
against the version of reality accepted by most people. Neither form of
violence can be seen as gratuitous, since they are both an essential part of
the mechanics of satire, and the degree of violence employed is a finely
judged thing.
Because Orwell's approach differs from that of the conventional novelist of his
time, Nineteen Eighty-Four has been criticised on the grounds, among other
things, that it has "no credible or 'three-dimensional' characters," 157 that Big
Brother "resembles the bogieman of a rather inartistic nursery tale" 158 and
that an oligarchy such as rules Oceania could not, realistically speaking, last
for any length of time without divisions developing among its members, so
that cracks began to show in its apparently invulnerable facade. As Hollis
asks:
Why should such a man as O'Brien have fanatically given
himself to the service of the Party, where it was obviously
only too probable that one day before long the masters of the
Party, in their insatiable sadistic appetite, would seize him and
torture him in his turn? 159
157 Irving Howe, "1984: History as Nightmare," Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984, ed.
Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 43.
158 Isaac Deutscher, "'1984' - The Mysticism of Cruelty," Twentieth Century Interpretations of
1984, ed. Samuel Hynes (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 30.
~hristopher Hollis, A Study of George Orwell: The Man and His Works (London: Hollis and
Carter, 1956) 197.
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Such aspects cannot be ignored, but to focus on them is to discount the
contemporary fluidity of the novel as a genre, and to detract from the fact that
Nineteen Eighty-Four is an extremely powerful work of art. These objections
become serious only if they are allowed to outweigh other considerations,
particularly the fact that this novel is primarily a satirical work in which serious
political issues are made to come alive for the reader with compelling force. In
any case, even in Orwell's own time, a critic such as Symons was able to
distinguish between writers who are primarily interested in ideas and those for
whom the major focus is on the characters. 160 One could add to this Howe's
statement that "The last thing Orwell cared about when he wrote 1984, the
last thing he should have cared about, was literature." 161 An aspect which
strengthens Nineteen Eighty-Fours right to unorthodox literary strategies is
that it is not only a satirical text, but also a typical dystopian one, so that its
"major textual/discursive' strategy ... is an external referentiality which is
inimical to any kind of realist aesthetic." 162 In fact, many of the objections to
the style and characterisation of this novel stem from an adherence to rigid
norms of realism and ignore the fact that distortion and exaggeration are the
satirist's stock-in-trade. Judged from the former point of view, Julia may
indeed seem weak as a character, O'Brien unreal and the whole world of the
novel unconvincing. Yet in fact, as Crick points out, the characterizations of
Winston and Julia appear increasingly skilful "the more one begins to
perceive that they are meant to be studies in 'one-dimensional man': the
regime has dehumanized people .... " 163 Elsbree sees the fractured, episodic
quality of the novel, with its use of flashbacks, dreams and distortions of time
as the successful creation of a literal "nightmare, a frightening dreamlike state
in which the individual is helpless before an involuntary succession of
symbols and ideas." 164 This is related to the critical observation that, in
important ways, satire habitually resists closure, 165 discussed by Seidel in
160 Symons, rev.of Nineteen Eighty-Four 380.
161 Howe, "History" 42-3.
162 Cranny-Francis 156.
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terms of satire's "sustained, unresolved state of crisis .... Satire, in a sense,
has no licence to end satisfactorily .... Insofar as satire can be said to have an
ideology at all, its tents are located in absurd, skeptical, despairing, or even
subversive assessments of human capacity where the powers necessary to
resolve life's crises are absent or concealed.v''"
Cope says that "Satire is the only literary genre which is enthusiastically
philosophicaL .. [since] only satire openly esteems truth more than art. Only
the satirist claims to declare truth without worrying about beauty." 167
Traditional aesthetic and literary concerns have seldom been paramount for
satire, since its main focus is not on providing credible and realistic narratives
- and this is particularly true of Menippean satire. Satire concentrates instead
on presenting challenging structures which will create liminal spaces and give
life to certain ideas, often neglecting issues such as characterization and /.
realism in favour of these other goals. Gulliver is an example of a successful
satirical character who is not fully rounded, as is Pieter Dirk-Uys's Evita
Bezuidenhout. In fact, characters such as these have become masks - a
favourite distancing device of the satirist, in which a disguised stance or voice
is adopted. Although satire does have close connections with the everyday
world, its aim is not to present an alternative world which is verifiable and
convincing, but rather a distorted one, marked by elusiveness on the part of
the satirist.
Yet, as in the case of Animal Farm, the level of allusion to documented
historical facts and practices in Nineteen Eighty-Four is high - a practice
which doubtless owes much to Orwell's being a journalist to the marrow, but
also reflects the unique dialogic relationship between the satirist and historical
events. Howard Wolf speaks of the "difficult struggle in Orwell between the
claims of non-fiction and its relationship to history and the inescapable
presence of the author, between the claims of creative or constructed writing
166 Michael Seidel, "Crisis Rhetoric and Satiric Power," New Literary History 20.1 (1988): 165-
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and what we called confidently journalism from about 1660 to 1960 .... " 168
Orwell himself viewed his novel as "a show-up of the perversions to which a
centralised economy is liable and which have already been partly realised in
Communism and Fascism." 169He wrote this novel just after the death of
Hitler and during the lifetime of Stalin - which is reflected in the novel's
atmosphere and much of its detail. The killing of twenty million people under
Stalin and the gassing of many millions in Hitler's concentration camps stand
at the centre of these regimes' totalitarian nature.
There were, however, other significant, if less major, contemporary
manifestations as well, which are closely reflected in Nineteen Eighty-Four.
The attempts to control the sex-life of the populace in Oceania are
comparable to those in Nazi Germany, even if the Nazi ideal was primarily to
breed an Aryan master-race: Germans were forbidden to have sex with
Jews,170 homosexuals were persecuted, 171and special "superior" types of
women, so-called" Chosen Women," were to be trained in Himmler's
Women's Academy, the "products" to be "awarded" to Party and SS leaders.
Himmler said that "The Fuhrer had placed him in charge of the [latter] project
and final decisions on marriage rested with him." 172 The way in which
children are indoctrinated in Airstrip One offers close parallels with the
situation in both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia where, as in the novel,
children were pressurized into joining youth organisations at an early age in
order to facilitate indoctrination. Life under these regimes was heavily
totalitarian: hundreds of Germans were sent to concentration camps merely
for listening to foreign radio broadcasts 173 and, during the German
occupation of Holland, there were guards in the cinemas to apprehend
168 Howard Wolf, "George Orwell and the Problematics of Non-Fiction," Critical Quarterly 27.2
\1985): 25.
69 Orwell, letter to Henson 502.
170 Padfield 199.
m Padfield 367.
172 Padfield 319.
173 Bettelheim, Informed Heart 277.
242
anyone who laughed, or even coughed, during the showing of Nazi
propaganda films. 174
As far as family life is concerned, the parallels between fiction and reality are
again close. In Nazi Germany parents whose religious and political
convictions did not agree with those laid down by the state had their children
taken away from them and put in a "local Youth hostel (referred to as a
'politically reliable home'). " 175 Much closer to the world of Nineteen Eighty-
Four was what went on when children were not taken away from their
parents. Winston, after a visit to the Parsons family, comments on the role of
children:
With those children, he thought, that wretched woman must
lead a life of terror. Another year, two years, and they would
be watching her day and night for symptoms of unorthodoxy.
Nearly all children nowadays were horrible .... It was almost
normal for people over thirty to be frightened of their own
children. And with good reason, for hardly a week passed in
which The Times did not carry a paragraph describing how
some eavesdroppinq little sneak - 'child hero' was the phrase
generally used - had overheard some compromising remark
and denounced its parents to the Thought Police. 176
The case of the Parsons family could have been taken unaltered out of the
daily life of a German or Russian family under Hitler or Stalin, where political
denunciations by children of their parents were encouraged, and those
responsible publicly praised. Bettelheim has the following to say about the
effects of such events on German parents:
This fear gripped most parents, and by weakening their security
174 Gerhard Hirschfeld, "Nazi Propaganda in Occupied Western Europe: The Case of the
Netherlands," Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations, ed. David Welch (London:
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within the home, dried up a main source that could still have fed
their self-respect, given them a sense of worth and thus of inner
autonomy. The fear, more than the fact of betrayal by children or
mates, made it impossible to lower one's defenses even within
one's own four walls. Unquestioned trust, which is the greatest
value of an intimate relation, became a danger instead of the relief
it should have been. It turned family life into an experience of
continuous caution, of strain, of being on guard if not openly
distrustful; it became a weakening experience when it should have
given greatest security. 177
Thus parents were mistrustful of their children and children were mistrustful of
their parents. By using children in this fashion the Nazis could assert the
supremacy of the state over the family with virtually no remission. As Orwell
makes clear in his novel, the common thoughtlessness and cruelty of children
of a certain age would have ensured that many parents experienced not just
the sense of being spied on, but a fair degree of real fear as well. From the
state's point of view, one might call this a highly economical system of terror.
The same system was followed by the Soviet authorities, as Conquest
indicates:
Orwell would certainly have known of the case of Pavlik Morozov,
a fourteen-year-old Pioneer [member of the Communist youth
movement] who denounced his father for 'hoarding' grain, and was
himself killed by villagers. He became ... a Soviet hero - the Palace
of Culture of the Red Pioneers in Moscow was named after him,
and even in the Khruschev period Komsomo/skaya Pravda, official
organ of the Party youth, told of 'the sacred and dear' Pavlik
Morozov Museum in his own village: 'In this timbered house was
177 Bettelheim, Informed Heart 273.
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held the court at which Pavlik unmasked his father.' ... In his speech
marking the twentieth anniversary of the secret police, Mikoyan
went out of his way to praise two other children who turned in their
relations, and these were representative of tens of thousands
enrolled to report on the peasantry. 178
Nineteen Eighty-Four contains many other examples of totalitarian practices
which actually occurred. Among these are the practice known in Airstrip One
as "blackwhite" and the ability of the state to switch the focus of the populace
from one enemy to another at short notice. In the novel the term "blackwhite"
as a quality of a Party member "means a loyal willingness to say that black is
white when party discipline demands this. But it means also the ability to
believe that black is white, and more, to know that black is white, and to forget
that one has ever believed the contrary." 179 In Russia as early as 1929
Pyatokov (later to be an important victim of Stalin's trials) proclaimed his
loyalty as follows:
He "would be ready to believe that black was white, and white was
black, if the Party required it. In order to become one with his great
Party, he would fuse with it, abandon his own personality, so that
there was no particle left inside him which was not as one with the
Party." 180
Pyatakov is willing to abandon his personality in pursuit of this aim. Winston
Smith is one of those who has his personality taken away from him so that he
will be able to achieve the same end as Pyatokov.
On another issue, David Gurevich, a Russian who grew up under the Soviet
system, speaks of life there in the 1960s. He says the following about
Nineteen Eighty-Four.
178 Conquest 182-83.
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180 Conquest 184.
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The opening scene in "Nineteen Eighty-four," where Winston is
bullied into reaching his toes, left me stunned. Morning exercise
on the radio is a staple of Soviet life, and the announcer's voice,
now sugary, now stern, had always made me feel I was being
watched. How did Orwell know that? 181
Orwell himself speaks of his concern with the concrete details of life, and his
reporter's nose served him well in this respect:
So long as I remain alive and well I shall continue to feel strongly
about prose style, to love the surface of the earth, and to take
pleasure in solid objects and scraps of useless inforrnation.l'"
His empiricism is strongly evident here, and he combined that with the ability
to incorporate this information into a novel such as Nineteen Eighty-Four and
to use it to convey the atmosphere of a totalitarian state with great realism,
paradoxically, despite the exaggerated quality of the description.
A final point here concerns the transfer of enmity which occurs in Nineteen
Eighty-Four during a highly organized Hate Week against Oceania's current
enemy, Eurasia. There have been processions, films, waxworks, firing of
heavy guns and military parades - in fact all the elements of dramatic
enactment which are one of the marks of a propaganda campaign. However,
"after six days of this, when the great orgasm was quivering to its climax and
the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into ... a delirium" 183 it becomes
known that it is now Eastasia that is the enemy, while Eurasia is now an ally.
The change is made public by a speaker at a mass rally who has been
delivering a vituperative denunciation of Eurasia for twenty minutes when the
message is handed to him:
181 David Gurevich, "Moscow Days: Liberated by Harold Robbins," New York Times Book
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He unrolled it and read it without pausing in his speech. Nothing
altered in his voice or manner, or in the content of what he was
saying, but suddenly the names were different. Without words said,
a wave of understanding rippled through the crowd. Oceania was
at war with Eastasia! The next moment there was a tremendous
commotion. The banners and posters with which the square was
decorated were all wrong! Quite half of them had the wrong faces
on them. It was sabotage! The agents of Goldstein had been at
work. 184
This example of how the mechanism of propaganda, once established, can
very flexibly be used to support or undermine any social or political
development, is undoubtedly a satirical account of the suddenly announced
Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939. The news that their former German enemies were
now allies took some Russian newspapers so much by surprise that day that
some of them "accused the Germans of warmongering in the afternoon, and
celebrated them as friends in the evening." 185
This incident indicates how highly propagandized - and hence manipulable -
societies can become. Totalitarian states invariably manufacture external
enemies for their citizens, to divert attention from the political situation at
home and to provide people with an outlet for their aggression. Oceania
presents a classic case of this by offering the populace external enemies
which change from time to time, so that people will not become habituated to
the same target. But the Party also focuses people daily on the figure of
Emmanuel Goldstein by means of the Two Minutes Hate - a ritualised venting
of hatred on the traditionally marginalised Jew (specifically, a Trotsky-
Bronstein figure here) who is clearly chosen for this role by Orwell as a
comment on the way societies need scapegoats. Goldstein, as the chief
scapegoat of this society, is also an important element of the mythology of
Ingsoc, which is continuously reinforced by propaganda. He is a shadowy
184 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 148.
185 Conquest 184.
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figure, seen only in propaganda films made by the Party, and therefore open
to constant re-creation and manipulation by the various socio-poltical
discourses. The daily Hate sessions capitalise on the powerful, irrational and
non-linear mode of myth, showing how it engenders blind belief, using the
mechanisms of ritual and taboo.
In his satirical description of Hate Week the distortion and exaggeration are
so strong that they merge into the grotesque, in the description of the two
thousand "war criminals" waiting to be hanged, the blind savagery of the
crowd and the inflammatory speech of the speaker. The grotesque has a
"disorienting and generally overwhelming effect," producing "a confusion of
reaction." The writer of the grotesque excites both "derisive laughter" and "a
sense of the gross evil which arouses anger ... simultaneously and with equal
force,,186 Hence, in the description mentioned above, readers are
overwhelmed because they feel both revolted and amused - a mixed reaction
which is useful to the satirist because it helps to disorientate readers, thus
assisting satire in its initial purpose of defamiliarising the environment and
creating liminal texts.
Postmodernism in qeneralis enthusiastic about creating and remaining within
liminal spaces. However, Foucault leaves less space for play than usual in his
theoretical structures when he writes about power, perhaps because he sees
power as being applied and influenced entirely through the structures of
society, with no sense that individuals can influence that power. But Orwell,
though in his novel he sees power as more monolithic than Foucault does,
still chooses to create an alternative (and liminal) world in which personal
relationship is set against these political structures in a struggle which author,
reader and characters must realise is doomed from the start. Winston's notion
is that "from the moment of declaring war on the Party it was better to think of
yourself as a corpse .... 'We are the dead,' he said." 187Later, while pretending
to recruit Winston and julia to the Brotherhood, O'Brien repeats this
186 Philip Thomson, The Grotesque (London: Methuen, 1972) 42.
187 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 112.
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sentence. 188 Finally, just before he and Julia are arrested Winston says it
again - and this time it is echoed, first by Julia and then by "an iron voice
behind them." 189 Orwell's narrative is thus framed by this absolute
acknowledgement of hopelessness and defeat.
There is, however, less rigidity in Foucault's notion of power, since he regards
rebellion as an integral part of the mechanism of power. Orwell insists on the
dreary inevitability of punishment for any offence against the regime, while
Foucault sees resistance (and, presumably, punishment) as part of the
mechanism of power. He believes in the "strictly relational character of power
relationships" - that their "existence depends on a multiplicity of points of
resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in
power relations. " 190 Thus, for Foucault, there is an interaction and
interdependence - a dialogic relationship, in fact - between power and
resistance which gives the latter more overt importance than in Orwell's
scheme. For example, it is Foucault's way of seeing power that might lead us
to speculate that in Nineteen Eighty-Four the Party actually creates and
orchestrates resistance to itself, perhaps by means of mind control which has
the power to determine the path of people's lives from a very early age.
According to this highly deterministic view, julia's note to Winston would not
be a chance thing and Winston's dreams and fantasies about the Golden
Country and the light place beyond the dark wall would form part of a
predetermined pattern which would culminate in his arrest. Parrinder, for
example, believes it highly possible that Winston's premonitions about Julia
and the Golden Country have been programmed into him and that Julia is "a
spy, or at best a decoy (this is not to deny that she grows genuinely fond of
Winston)." 191 This kind of process would ensure that there were always
people who rebelled, enabling the Party to demonstrate and exercise its
power, not simply declare it. Foucault's view suggests that systems of political
power do not function in a vacuum, detached from those over whom they
188 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 144.
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exercise power. Rather, the functioning of such systems is dependent on a
symbiotic relationship with those who resist power. As Casement says of
Nineteen Eighty-Four "Without dissidence, dominance would become
mechanical and the thrill would be lost." 192
Foucault maintains that "The relationship between rationalization and the
excesses of political power is evident. We should not need to wait for
bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such
relations." 193 Foucault is concerned with a more sophisticated manifestation
of power than Orwell, not surprisingly since the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four
represents a parodic - and hence simplified - version of the way power
operates. In addition, Foucault sees "the political form of a central and
centralizing power" as different from what he calls "the pastoral mode of
power," by which he means "power techniques oriented towards individuals
and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way." 194
While power in Nineteen Eighty-Four is as intrusive as "pastoral power," it is
administered with the full impersonality of a totalitarian (or what is currently
referred to as a totalized) state. Expressing one's individuality is dangerous in
Oceania, and in Newspeak is called "ownlife," "meaning individualism and
eccentricity. 195 The Party claims control over every waking moment, starting
with the communal calisthenics in which all Party members have to participate
early every morning in front of the all-seeing and all-hearing telescreen.
These aspects of life are intended to force individuals to define themselves
only in relation to the entire society. What is created is what Ellul calls a
"mass society" in which the individual "becomes an abstraction and is in effect
reduced to a cipher." 196 Ellul regards many modern developed nations as
consisting of mass (or totalized) societies.
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Basic to the elimination of individuality and intimacy is the Party's view of
marriage. It is clear that the Party would like to eliminate sex and marriage
altogether but this is impossible, even for such a totalitarian state. In any
case, as implied by Foucault's view mentioned earlier, such complete control
would deny the state the large numbers it needs to work for it and to die for it,
as well as to satisfy its desire to dominate through the infliction - and not just
the administration - of power. Therefore sex (though preferably without
pleasure) is allowed, but only within marriage, and the whole institution of
marriage is strictly controlled. 197 The Junior Anti-Sex League, of which Julia is
an apparently militant member, advocates celibacy for both sexes, and
chastity is deeply ingrained in wornen.l'" As Chandler points out, "The denial
of the normal sex urge also induces hysteria, a very valuable emotion which
the Party can transform into war fever and leader worship." 199 The same
principle operated in the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s, with a dissident
reporting that the principle of "Stalinist Virtue" regarded love for its own sake
as an act of treason, since it would" 'detract from the sole purpose of human
existence: service to the state.' " 200
In the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four, the "sexual act, successfully performed,
was rebellion. Desire was·thoughtcrime." 201 The Party fully understands that
for Winston and Julia their rebellion against authority is incarnated in their
physical relationship with each other. Ironically, the only other relationship in
the novel which is physically and emotionally close is that between Winston
and O'Brien in the Ministry of Love. It is as though the ultimate price of any
real human contact in Oceania is emotional and even physical death, and
such contact is experienced only by those who have made themselves into
"unpersons." Those who are considered orthodox and normal are also
197 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 56.
198 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 58.
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considered sane by the state and, as a mark of their sanity, they never
experience intimacy.
Shortly before he is arrested Winston has the following reflection: "Being in a
minority, even a minority of one, did not make you mad. There was truth and
there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth against the whole world, you
were not mad." 202 In the Ministry of Love O'Brien, as so often, divines what
Winston is or has been thinking, and tells him that he "preferred to be a
lunatic, a minority of one." O'Brien is calmly certain of Winston's insanity,
adding that "You must be humble before you can become sane" and "It is
not easy to become sane." 203 The earlier remarks on the practices of Soviet
psychiatrists are relevant here, 204 as are the comments of Foucault on this
issue, where he maintains that society has become increasingly policed:
The policing process fosters a mentality that requires ever more
explicit definitions of what is appropriate to human behavior ....
The notion of sanity, Foucault argues, is a historical definition,
imposed by a process ever more relentless in its demands
for behavioral conformity .... Only as such behavior becomes
subject to public scrutiny does it become necessary to define
the boundaries of its legitimacy. 205
Thus surveillance multiplies upon itself, making increasing demands on those
it is policing and becoming more detailed and complex as it subjects more
areas to scrutiny and control. That in turn leads to increased and narrower
definitions of what is acceptable and what is not. Hence O'Brien, as the
representative of a highly intrusive system of surveillance and control, can lay
down very narrow parameters as to what constitutes sanity for his particular
202 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 174.
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society. He can also co-opt Winston into the process of making himself
"sane" again, in the way articulated by Foucault:
Foucault shows how the inmates being policed are enticed
into participating in, and hence confirming the validity of, the
policing process. The madman is encouraged to rid himself
of his infirmity by actively seeking a cure .... The prisoner is
admonished to undertake his own rehabilitation. 206
In Nineteen Eighty-Four Winston is in his society's eyes both an imprisoned
criminal and a madman. He is exhorted to connive at his own "cure," which
amounts to his sincerely adopting all the beliefs that define sanity and non-
criminality in that society. O'Brien says to Winston:
You are mentally deranged. You suffer from a defective
memory. You are unable to remember real events and you
persuade yourself that you remember other events which
never happened. Fortunately it is curable. You have never
cured yourself of it, because you did not choose to. There
was a small effort of the will that you were not ready to
make. Even now, I am well aware, you are clinging to your
disease under the impression that it is a virtue. 207
O'Brien's discourse here parodies psychiatry (though, as pointed out earlier,
too much certainty is a possible danger in psychiatry). 208 He believes that
other people's view of reality is flawed, and that he himself is infinitely wise
and perceptive. This is fertile ground for satire, particularly Menippean satire,
which "attacks learned discourse more than any other target. When the
mouthpiece of the learned discourse is self-conscious, the satirist can bring in
an element of self-parody by emphasizing an inner division or sense of
206 Hutton 127.
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alienation." 209 Thus the satirist here deals with his victim by showing him to
the audience as psychologically fragmented, while the victim believes himself
to be mentally more healthy than other people.
The other side of that coin is that O'Brien has induced psychological
fragmentation in the mind of Winston. Yet O'Brien suggests that he is not
interrogating and torturing Winston: instead he is giving meaning to Winston's
situation by first destroying his putatively useless belief system and then
replacing it with another. His activity is thus a hermeneutic one, though he is
initially applying what has been called, in a different context, "the
hermeneutics of suspicion." 210
The entire society is pervaded by this particular hermeneutic, since everyone
has to operate within a general atmosphere of suspicion and fear. It has
already been shown how the Party poisons children against their own
parents, thus ensuring that family life in Oceania will be saturated with the
hermeneutics of suspicion. 211 The result of this is demonstrated by Winston's
encounter in the Ministry of Love with Tom Parsons, the indefatigable
frequenter of Community Centres, whose daughter has denounced him.
Parsons, mindful that the telescreen in the room constitutes yet another
source of surveillance, is pathetically eager to say - and appear to think - the
right thing:
'It was my little daughter,' said Parsons with a sort of doleful pride.
'She listened at the keyhole. Heard what I was saying, and nipped
off to the patrols the very next day. Pretty smart for a nipper of
seven, eh? I don't bear her any grudge for it. In fact I'm proud of
her. It shows I brought her up in the right spirit, anyway.' 212
Parsons has tried for many years to do exactly what the Party wants, but he is
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reported by his daughter for saying "Down with Big Brother!" in his sleep. On
the one hand, the situation is so grotesque as to be risible. On the other hand,
there is a deep pathos in this simple man's double betrayal, first by his
subconscious, which has expressed his true feelings about Big Brother and,
secondly, by a close family member who has had no compunction about
betraying him to the authorities. " 'Of course I'm guilty!' cried Parsons with a
servile glance at the telescreen. 'You don't think the Party would arrest an
innocent man, do you?' ,,213 His attempts to accept blame for his words and
to approve of his daughter's action only serve to highlight the way the Party
damages people, forcing them to behave in ways that are bizarre.
This grotesque, nightmare quality constitutes the frame within which much of
the novel unfolds, the satire distorting attitudes and perspectives, and making
conventional assessments impossible. For example, despite the fact that
Winston starts out with some of the conventional attributes of a hero and, at
first, proclaims a "liberal-humanist belief in the impregnability of the spirit of
man," 214 the structure of the liminal world of Oceania progressively places
major difficulties in the path of a reader wishing to regard him as such. After
all, Winston is reduced to a snivelling wreck who believes that two and two
are five, begs that his torture be inflicted instead on his beloved and finally,
awash with self-pity and sentimentality, tearfully acknowledges that he loves
Big Brother. Orwell denies the reader the relief of a conventional hero whose
humanity and dignity remain intact and whose beliefs and courage give
meaning to his suffering.
Throughout his many ordeals Winston has never thought of himself as any
kind of hero. His actions have proceeded from a concern for truth and
freedom which is totally free from any kind of .self-consciousness or self-
congratulation. Yet, ironically, after his defeat he has strong feelings of
conscious virtue based on what he sees as a victory over himself. At the heart
of the equivocal issue of Winston's heroism lies the difference between the
213 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 187.
214 Sharrock 321.
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covert hero, which is all Winston is allowed to be in a state which allows its
dissidents no publicity, and the more conventional hero who displays his
qualities openly, through his engagement with the world. The latter sense has
a long tradition, here evoked by Arendt:
The ... word 'hero' originally, that is, in Homer, was no more than
a name given each free man who participated in the Trojan
enterprise and about whom a story could be told. The connotation
of courage, which we now feel to be an indispensable quality of
the hero, is in fact already present in a willingness to act and
speak at all, to insert one's self into the world and begin a story of
one's own ... .The extent of this original courage, without which
action and speech and therefore, according to the Greeks, freedom,
would not be possible at all, is not less great and may even be
greater if the 'hero' happens to be a coward. 215
Winston is unable to become this kind of public hero because in Oceania
speaking and acting, "inserting oneself into the world" as a unique human
being, are tantamount to suicide. By winning "the battle over himself" Winston
has become a kind of hero, but on the Party's terms, which deny him any
opportunity to appear in public as a hero, just as he is denied any opportunity
to appear as a martyr because of his rebellion. In the same way, by denying
them the right to exercise their love in public, the Party succeeds in devaluing
and annulling the feelings that Winston and Julia have for each other.
It seems that there is tragedy, rather than heroism, to be found in Nineteen
Eighty-Four, but Rae questions Winston's (and implicitly, Orwell's) stance
towards both these qualities:
Winston suffers from the blindness Raymond Williams later
identified as endemic to modern criticism: so committed is he
to a 'traditional,' liberal humanist conception of tragedy, with
215 Arendt, Human Condition 186-87.
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its focus on the individual and its precise specifications about
the decorum of tragic suffering, that he fails to valorize the new
form of tragedy happening all around him and exemplified by
his own fate: a 'social' tragedy, in which the noble tragic 'hero'
is replaced by a less noble tragic 'victim.' Winston's conviction
that tragedy belongs to an 'ancient time' reflects a hypostatization
of the term tragedy that is profoundly ideological, devaluing
contemporary forms of loss. 216
Nineteen Eighty-Four presents loss in dramatic forms: in a state such as
Oceania, as often in Nazi Germany, people who are arrested for a crime
against the state are not merely punished: they disappear, and the official
attitude is that they never existed. When Syme is vaporised nothing is said,
either by the authorities or his associates: he simply stops appearing at work
and the membership list of the Chess Committee, to which Syme had
belonged, "looked almost exactly as it had looked before - nothing had been
crossed out - but it was one name shorter." 217 For Arendt this is one of the
marks of any totalitarian state:
In totalitarian countries all places of detention ruled by the police
are made to be veritable holes of oblivion into which people
stumble by accident and without leaving behind them such
ordinary traces of former existence as a body and a grave.
Compared with this newest invention for doing away with people,
the old-fashioned method of murder, political or criminal, is
inefficient indeed. The murderer leaves behind him a corpse, and
although he tries to efface the traces of his own identity, he has
no power to erase the identity of his victim from the memory of the
surviving world. The operation of the secret police, on the contrary,
miraculously sees to it that the victim never existed at all. 218
216 Patricia Rae, "Mr. Charrington's Junk Shop: T.S. Eliot and Modernist Poetics in Nineteen
E'f!hty-Four", Twentieth Century Literature 43.2 (1997) 211-12.
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At the Ministry of Truth there are numerous slits in the walls, in every room
and at frequent intervals along the corridors. These apertures lead directly to
huge furnaces and are intended for the destruction of any document which
does not reflect the version of reality currently espoused by the Party, and
they are called "memory holes." In the same way as dissidents are made to
seem as though they never existed, so the evidence of any event or utterance
which conflicts with the Party's views must be destroyed, and forgotten.
The oblivion into which offenders vanish is typical of totalitarian states, but in
Oceania it is accompanied by a legal system characterised by deliberate
vagueness. The aim of the Party is to keep people in a constant state of
anxious uncertainty in which the structures within which they live are not fixed
- a lack of containment which makes the society much more susceptible to
discourses such as propaganda, ideology and political myth. The point is
made early in the novel in relation to Winston's diary:
The thing that he was about to do was to open a diary. This was
not illegal (nothing was illegal, since there were no longer any
laws), but if detected it was reasonably certain that it would be
punished by death, or at least by twenty-five years in a forced-
labour camp. 219
Later, when Winston buys a paperweight, he again senses that it is
something compromising: "Anything old, or for that matter anything beautiful,
was always vaguely suspect." 220 Ampleforth, arrested and placed in the same
cell as Winston, tells him that there is only one crime (he means
thoughtcrime) and, when Winston asks him if he has committed it, all he can
say is, "Apparently I have." 221
Totalitarian states often cynically regard the law as only one among many
means to be used to keep their hold on power. In Oceania the lack of a formal
219 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 9.
220 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 80.
221 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 185.
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legal system allows the Party to decide arbitrarily what constitutes an offence,
so that people live in constant fear of being arrested for something they may
have done in good faith. This point is made in The Theory and Practice of
Oligarchical Collectivism:
[A Party member] has no freedom of choice in any direction
whatever. On the other hand his actions are not regulated by
law or by any clearly formulated code of behaviour. In Oceania
there is no law. Thoughts arid actions which, when detected,
mean certain death are not formally forbidden, and the endless
purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments and vaporizations are
not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been
committed, but are merely the wiping-out of persons who might
perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future. A Party
member is required to have not only the right opinions, but the
right instincts. Many of the beliefs and attitudes demanded of
him are never plainly stated, and could not be stated without
laying bare the contradictions inherent in Ingsoc. 222
This final statement indicates that Party members are deprived of definite
information in respect not only of the misdeeds they might commit but also of
the desirable thoughts and qualities they are called upon to have. Given that
Goldstein's book, whether written by him or the Party, is in itself a piece of
propaganda, one needs to maintain a certain distance from it. However,
Goldstein's assertion has an authentic ring to it - a view which is confirmed by
the discussion about crimethink (the verb from thoughtcrime) in Orwell's
appendix entitled "The Principles of Newspeak":
What was required in a party member was an outlook similar to
that of the ancient Hebrew who knew, without knowing much else,
that all nations other than his own worshipped 'false gods'. He
did not need to know that these gods were called Baal, Osiris,
222 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 170.
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Moloch, Ashtaroth, and the like: probably the less he knew
about them the better for his orthodoxy. He knew Jehovah and
the commandments of Jehovah: he knew, therefore, that all
gods with other names or other attributes were false gods. In
somewhat the same way, the Party member knew what
constituted right conduct, and in exceedingly vague, generalized
terms he knew what kinds of departure from it were possible. 223
As Syme says, "Orthodoxy means not thinking - not needing to think.
Orthodoxy is unconsciousness." 224 It is perhaps more accurate to say that
orthodoxy requires Party members to allow themselves to be steered through
life in a kind of obedient, misty haze in which their only faculty IS an
unreflecting, half-conscious awareness of the wishes of the Party.
The quotation above is significant in its use of religious terms to denote the
relationship between the Party faithful and the state. A blind faith in a single,
fairly narrow way of life is suggested and, given the connotations of the Old
Testamentary Jehovah, any kind of deviation would not be advisable. -
despite the fact that religion is supposed to offer hope and comfort, as Ingsoc
is supposed to benefit the people of Oceania. This accurately reflects the
strong element of dystopian satire which marks Orwell's thinking, not only in
Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, but elsewhere in his writings as well.
In the course of earlier discussion, links were established between utopia /
dystopia and satire, in relation to the two novels by Orwell dealt with in this
thesis. One of the most striking uses of utopianism and its opposite in
Nineteen Eighty-Four centres around Winston's recurring dream of a non-
existent utopian landscape he calls the Golden Country:
Suddenly he was standing on short springy turf, on a summer
evening when the slanting rays of the sun gilded the ground ....
Somewhere near at hand, though out of sight, there was a
223 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 246.
224 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 46.
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clear, slow-moving stream where dace were swimming in the
pools under the willow trees. 225
Into this idyllic dream landscape comes a beautiful girl who tears off her
clothes and makes love with Winston. Their love-making is primarily a political
gesture, since Winston's dream experience is that her grace seems to
annihilate the whole paraphernalia of oppression of Oceania. Yet the dream
becomes reality when Winston and Julia first meet in the countryside to make
love, since the setting is that of Wil)ston's Golden Country - and Julia's sexual
behaviour is that of the girl in Winston's dream.226 This utopian dream of love
and freedom eventually turn into a dystopian nightmare - which is the story of
the rest of the novel, though the seeds of that process are evident even here
in Winston's fear that their love-making may be detected by some "small
beetle-like man" listening to them by means of a microphone concealed in
this paradisaical setting. The description of the Golden Country mirrors
Orwell's nostalgic and idealised view of the English countryside and, arguably,
the fact that from the start there is a serpent in Winston's Garden of Eden
reflects the fears Orwell had that his own private utopia was under threat from
the forces of change, both political and social. Adding to the reader's sense of
dystopia is the strong possibility that the dream of the Golden Country has
been inserted into Winston's mind by the Thought Police - and that Julia is
herself their agent. Orwell's veneration for certain aspects of the past cut
across his socialist utopian ideals 227and, in The Lion and the Unicorn, fairly
radical proposals for what he calls "the English Revolution" exist side-by-side
with an assertion that such a revolution "will show a power of assimilating the
past which will shock foreign observers and sometimes make them doubt
whether any revolution has happened." 228Rae groups Orwell with T.S. Eliot
"in their profound sense of disaffection from contemporary life and of longing
for the past," 229 and Greer says that Orwell's "writing suggests a harking
225 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 28.
226 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 101-4.
227 See 176, 180 above on this point.
22B Orwell, Lion and Unicorn 102.
229 Rae 198.
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back to Edwardian middle-class socialism .... " 230 Crick, in his biography of
Orwell, calls him "a revolutionary in love with the past." 231
The subject of Orwell's internalised and idealised notions of the past is
relevant to the last section of this chapter, which will deal with notions of
utopia / dystopia (which often embody an implicit longing for the past) evident
in Nineteen Eighty-Four and reflected in some of Orwell's shorter writings,
specifically those about the Catholic Church and Stalinism, his early
experiences in Burma and as a tramp and, above all, his days at St. Cyprian's
school - all autobiographical issues which, as stressed earlier, are an
important aspect of satire.232
These issues are also important insofar as this thesis puts them into dialogic
relationship with Nineteen Eighty-Four as part of a strategy for reframing the
novel. The Catholic Church and Stalinism offer strongly utopian goals to
believers, and British imperialism had its own brand of utopian thinking - all of
which are presented by Orwell in a dystopian way. Schooldays are often
thought about in an idealised and utopian way, though Orwell's essay on his
is decidedly dystopian and, finally, Orwell's tramping experience was
motivated, in part, by a desire to share the lot of the working-class, reflecting
a utopian view of this class which Nineteen Eighty-Four seems to share. As
can be seen, the relevance of Orwell's personal beliefs (both conscious and
unconscious) and their effect on his work are deeply interwoven with issues of
utopia / dystopia, not least so in the case of religion.
Several critics relate issues in Nineteen Eighty-Four to religion, though it is
the New Testamentary brand, specifically Roman Catholicism, which Orwell
believed to be dangerously dogmatic and monolithic - a Christian equivalent
of the old Hebraic religion. That this particular equation was not far from
Orwell's thoughts can be seen from his reference in an article to "the Hebrew-
230 Herb Greer, "Orwell in Perspective," Commentary 75.3 (1983): 51.
231 Crick, George Orwell 408.
232 See 11 above.
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like pride and exclusiveness of the genuine Catholic mind." 233 The (largely
uncomplimentary) use made by Orwell of Catholic belief and practice in the
novel is so extensive 234 that it is necessary to convey something of the tenor
of his mind on the subject.
His animus is clear in remarks such as "One cannot really be a Catholic &
grown-up" 235 and in his classing Catholics among the "enemies of intellectual
liberty":
The Catholic and the Communist are alike in assuming that an
opponent cannot be both honest and intelligent. Each of them
tacitly claims that "the truth" has already been revealed, and
that the heretic, if he is not simply a fool, is secretly aware of
"the truth" and merely resists it out of selfish motives .... Orthodox
Catholicism ... seems to have a crushing effect upon certain
literary forms, especially the novel .... No one ever wrote a good
book in praise of the Inquisition. 236
Orwell is right to question the claims of both Catholicism and Communism to
absolute truth, both of which are often cited as good examples of the exercise
of ideology. On the other hand, he himself sometimes believes his version of
truth to be unquestionable, 237 and his treatment of facts is not uninfluenced
by his ideology, as well as his intentions as a satirist and political writer.
Foucault attempts here to give some perspective to the issue of truth:
'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures
for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and
operation of statements .... 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation
233 George Orwell, rev. of The Spirit of Catholicism, by Karl Adam, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell
and Ian Angus, vol. I (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 80.
234 Freedman says that "Verbal and incidental references to Catholic Christianity abound in
Nineteen Eighty-Four" (610).
235 Orwell, "Extracts from a Manuscript Note-book" 513.
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with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to
effects of power which it induces and which extend it. ... It's not
a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power
(which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of
detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social,
economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. 238
Unlike Foucault, Orwell does not always recognise the social, economic and
cultural forces which shape the truths which he regards as obvious and
axiomatic. 239 As a satirist, Orwell's focus is necessarily a narrower one when
he examines the issue of truth in relation to both Catholicism and Ingsoc, as
well as the attitudes of both towards heretics. The similarity between these
two systems of belief is heightened by the Church's monolithic quality in
Orwell's day, as well as its tendency to negate the role of the individual
conscience in favour of adherence to a single set of beliefs and rituals set out
by the papacy in Rome.
Orwell's view of the Church as dangerous was fostered by the fact that the
"literary Catholics whom he read about were generally conservative, sneerers
at democracy ... " 240 and further inflamed by his experience in the Spanish
Civil War, which made him see the Catholic Church as the powerful and
conservative upholder of privilege. The degree to which Orwell saw
Catholicism as a threat to liberty is stressed by his reference above to the
Inquisition - a byword for dogmatism and torture - and it is perhaps no
coincidence that O'Brien is an Irish name.
Orwell was more tolerant towards Protestantism, which has always stood for
the primacy of the individual conscience, and he took some of the basic
tenets of Christianity seriously, though his interest in it was primarily as a
social force which was now spent, leaving a worrying gap in the ontological
fabric of modern society:
238 Foucault, Power/Know/edge 133.
239 See 156 above.
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[B]elief in survival after death ... is enormously less widespread
than it was .... There is little doubt that the modern cult of power
worship is bound up with the modern man's feeling that life here
and now is the only life there is. If death ends everything, it
becomes much harder to believe that you can be in the right
even if you are defeated .... 1do not want the belief in life after
death to return .... What I do point out is that its disappearance
has left a big hole .... Reared for thousands of years on the notion
that the individual survives, man has got to make a considerable
psychological effort to get used to the notion that the individual
perishes. 241
In Nineteen Eighty-Four Winston Smith, who has formerly had an
unshakeable belief in the importance of the individual, perishes without a
trace. Orwell implicitly links this quality of meaninglessness to totalitarianism
when he speaks of the influence of "the modern cult of power worship" and, in
Nineteen Eighty-Four for example, it is the state which ensures that the
memory of Winston will not survive. Sealing this sense of utter alienation are
O'Brien's words to him: "Do you understand that you are alone? You are
outside history, you are non-existent" confirming O'Brien's repeated jibe that
Winston is "the last man." 242 This notion is reflected in Orwell's working title
for the novel - The Last Man in Europe 243 - which stresses that not just
Winston, but the humanist philosophy which sustains him (and, to some
degree, Orwell himself) is irrelevant because it is impotent. Winston Smith,
whose name ironically contains an allusion to the British prime minister who
led the country to victory, becomes a symbol of modern man struggling with
the meaningless of modern life and being defeated by it. As R.D. Laing has it,
241 George Orwell, "As I Please," 3 March 1944, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vel.
III (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 102,103.
242 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 217.
243 Jonathan Rose, "The Invisible Sources of Nineteen Eighty-Four," The Revised Orwell, ed.
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" 'There is nothing to be afraid of.' The ultimate reassurance and the ultimate
terror." 244
Such terror arises from the sinister quality of the "comfort" offered, leading to
a sense that life is persecutory and that there is nowhere to hide from all-
powerful controlling forces. These feelings are not found only between the
covers of Nineteen Eighty-Four they also coloured Orwell's own emotional
life, as reflected in his attitudes towards the Catholic Church and the
bitterness of his childhood memories as a young schoolboy (at St. Cyprian's
school) depicted in the essay entitled "Such, Such Were the Joys." The
thread which unites Orwell's views on Catholicism with the misery depicted in
"Such, Such Were the Joys" is that of disappointed utopianism. In both cases
the vehemence of Orwell's attack is directly related to the fact that, in very
different ways, both one's childhood and the Catholic Church are supposed to
offer forms of utopianism and, in Orwell's eyes, both failed to do so. Instead of
offering an example of the radical message of Jesus, the Church took the
side of Franco in Spain, and was generally reactionary in its politics. And, as
far as St. Cyprian's is concerned, Orwell's attack on it clearly suggests that it
failed to soothe his tender sensibilities and offer him the opportunities for
freedom and growth necessary for a young boy. It is for this reason that
Orwell's accounts of both the Church and his early schooldays take on a
dystopian flavour - the preferred mode of a disappointed utopian.
It has already been suggested that in Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell draws the
reader into an alternative world which is a mixture of actual totalitarian
practices and a strong element of fantasy and exaggeration. He does
something similar in relation to the Catholic Church, taking the rigidity,
intolerance and dogmatism of the Church as it was then and demonizing it,
making its claim to authority appear to be one of absolute power by means of
his satire. The allusions to the Church in Orwell's novel are calculated to
evoke it as it was at the height of the Inquisition (which Orwell equates
244 R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1967) 33.
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elsewhere with Catholicism), particularly in his use of terms such as
"orthodoxy" and "heresy," as well as the inquisitorial and confessional thrust
of O'Brien's treatment of Winston.
Confession - a cornerstone of the Catholic Church - is a central issue in the
novel, Orwell stressing this aspect no doubt because he saw it as an invasion
of people's privacy and because it may seem to lead to the weakening of
individual conscience. At any rate, he shows Julia and Winston making no
fewer than three confessions to .O'Brien, each different in nature and all
intended to pillory the practice of confession. The first occurs upon their
arrival at O'Brien's flat, when Winston makes a confession that is
unnecessarily self-abasing and distinctly masochistic:
We believe that there is some kind of conspiracy, some kind of
secret organization working against the Party, and that you are
involved in it. We want to join it and work for it. We are enemies
of the Party. We disbelieve in the principles of Ingsoc. We are
thought-criminals. We are also adulterers. I tell you this because
we want to put ourselves at your mercy. If you want us to
incriminate ourselves in any other way, we are ready. 245
O'Brien then proceeds to play with them like a cat with a pair of mice,
subjecting them to a set of questions which, in fact, elicit their second
confession:
He began asking his questions in a low, expressionless voice,
as though this were a routine, a sort of catechism, most of
whose answers were known to him already.
'You are prepared to give your lives?'
'Yes.'
'You are prepared to commit murder?'
'Yes.'
245 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 139-40.
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'To commit acts of sabotage which may cause the death of
hundreds of innocent people?'
'Yes.'
'To betray your country to foreign powers?'
'Yes.'
'You are prepared to cheat, to forge, to blackmail, to corrupt
the minds of children, to distribute habit-forming drugs, to
encourage prostitution, to disseminate venereal diseases - to do
anything which is likely to cause demoralization and weaken the
power of the Party?'
'Yes.'
'If, for example, it would somehow serve our interests to throw
sulphuric acid in a child's face - are you prepared to do that?'
'Yes,246
According to Crick, "one critic, at least, sees this scene as central to the book
and to Orwell's concerns. The whole book is thus about the state replacing
God, and Orwell's agonized despair at believing in neither." 247Significantly, in
this passage most of the desperate or appalling actions to which Winston and
Julia are asked to give their assent are in fact practised by the Party itself and
thus legitimated by its own ideology. Certainly the party commits murder,
often upon innocent people, both in the Ministry of Love and, if Julia's earlier
surmise is correct, by bombing London. Cheating and forging are major
occupations of the Ministry of Truth, and drugs are abused by the Thought
Police in the process of brainwashing people. Finally, by distorting children's
relationships with their parents and turning them into political commissars, the
Party is abusing them. The philosophy behind this programme accords very
much with the spirit of the Party, particularly as expressed by O'Brien during
his sessions with Winston in the Ministry of Love: any means are justified in
the attainment and preservation of power. Yet, ironically, the programme is
purportedly that of the Brotherhood - a fact which clearly suggests that
246 Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four 141-2.
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opponents of the Party have to become as evil as the Party in order to defeat
it, or even threaten it. Patai concludes that, from this point on, "Winston is an
active participant in the game [in the serious sense of the term] the two men
are playing .... Winston is [now] O'Brien's accomplice; he is thereby implicated
in his own downfall .... " 248 The issue of sado-masochism, discussed later in
this chapter, is relevant here too.
The third confession occurs in the Ministry of Love where, at times during his
torture sessions with Winston, O'Brien uses the language of the Catholic
Church, speaking of heresy, confession, penitence, conversion, martyrdom
and the Inquisition. He says, "We are the priests of power" and claims that if
anyone "can merge himself in the Party ... then he is all-powerful and
immortal." 249Thus the Party promises its faithful omnipotence (ironic in view
of the context of Nineteen Eighty-Four) as well as the traditional Christian gift
of eternal life ("immortal"). To Winston, O'Brien has the air "even [of] a
priest,,250and Winston's attitude to him is often that of a penitent and humble
pupil or even sinner before a priest-teacher figure: well into his process of
"conversion," he feels a "peculiar reverence for O'Brien which nothing
seemed able to destroy." 251 At the end of the novel Winston, sitting in the
Chestnut Cafe listening to the telescreen relate the details of a great victory
over Eurasia, experiences the inner "victory":
Winston, sitting in a blissful dream ... was back in the Ministry
of Love, with everything forgiven, his soul as white as snow.
He was in the public dock, confessing everything, implicating
everybody. He was walking down the white-tiled corridor, with
the feeling of walking in sunlight, and an armed guard at his
back. The long-hoped-for bullet was entering his brain. 252
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There are strong elements of religion and masochism here, with bliss being
associated with the complete betrayal "of everybody" and then - the ultimate
masochistic gesture - a feeling of joyous welcome towards the bullet which
will take one's life. It is this parody of a soul in bliss that ends with the words
"He loved Big Brother," an experience strongly recalling the spirit in which the
followers of jim jones committed mass suicide in an ecstasy of self-
abasement. 253 Freedman regards Winston's tragic end as reflecting Orwell's
fixation on modernist "autonomous, centered subjectivity of bourgeois thought
and feeling .... He can conceive of the destruction of individual autonomy, but
he cannot really imagine its transcendence. ,,254 Winston's subjectivity,
systematically undermined by the process of interrogation and confession at
the hands of O'Brien, is now irretrievably fragmented, his will totally
surrendered to that of the Party:
He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him
to learn what kind of smile was hidden beneath the dark
moustache. 0 cruel, needless misunderstanding! 0 stubborn,
self-willed exile from the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears
trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything
was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory
over himself. He loved Big Brother.
THE END 255
Foucault comments on confession as follows:
The confession is ... a ritual that unfolds within a power
relationship ... [to one who is] the authority who requires
the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes
in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a
ritual. ..which ... produces intrinsic modifications in the person
who articulates it it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it
253 See 169 above.
254 Freedman 615.
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unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him
salvation. 256
This description of confession is surely intended by Foucault to be sinister in
its import, yet it is an accurate description of the interaction between Winston
and O'Brien in the Ministry of Love.
Orwell's marked use of religious discourse within a totalitarian and dystopian
context may well be intended to parody the Nazi practice of adopting such
discourse, as described by Young:
Goebbels called the Nazi party 'a political church,' its
members 'the political pastors of our people,' its mass
meetings 'the divine services of our political work'; its dogmas
were a 'Gospel' and a 'teaching of eternal life.' 257
There is, in general, much in common between the concerns of Orwell and
those of Foucault in this area, but where they part company is in their different
stance towards, and divergent ways of dealing with these issues. Orwell's
view of Catholicism as totalitarian in its dogmatism and invasiveness led him
to equate it with Stalinist Communism, 258 as what Sandison has called
"confessional totalitarianism":
At first his linking together of the Communist Party and the
Roman Catholic Church seems little more than an analogical
convenience: the Communist Party in its heresy-trials and
inquisitorial methods recalling the Church in its absolute hey-day.
Even then it is often the Roman Catholics who bear the full
brunt of his ferocious attacks .... Comparisons between them
are so insistent and distinctions so often blurred that, morally,
the Communist Party begins to look like the Catholic Church in
256 Foucault, Sexuality 61-2.
257 Young 79.
258 See, for example, 263 above.
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mufti and the Catholic Church - to adapt a well-known adage -
like the Communist Party on its knees. The explanation is, of
course, that it is not simply totalitarianism but a confessional
totalitarianism which poses the greatest threat to Orwell's
fluctuating confidence in the idea of the personal self; and the
greatest attraction. 259
The presence of sado-masochism in Nineteen Eighty-Four has already been
argued from Foucault's model Of power, 260 and Bouson suggests the
involvement of "the author-manipulator" in these matters. 261 Sandison's last
sentence suggests that Orwell was himself torn between a strong antipathy to
totalitarianism and an equally strong attraction to the prospect of surrendering
in confession to an apparently all-powerful person or system. This would
imply a degree of masochism in Orwell himself - a notion which though
provocative is not new, as Porter suggests:
In Winston's masochism, which appears excessive and
overdetermined, biographically oriented critics have found
their most convincing avenue for extrapolating from the
protagonist to the historical author. The most thorough
psychoanalytic study of the novel to date 262 speculates that
five years of "traumatic overstimulation" at St. Cyprian's
[Orwell's first school, about which he wrote a scathing
critique] provoked in Eric Blair a rage that had no outlet,
and that led in turn to fears of retaliation .... The adult Orwell
would have perpetuated his scapegoat role by identifying
with workers and derelicts subject to economic victimization
and helplessness. 263
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Zwerdling is another critic who identifies Orwell with his main character:
Orwell has transformed the genre [of fantasy] into a
semi-confessional mode which expressed his own deepest
conflicts and fears .... He allowed himself to use even
idiosyncratic personal fantasies in imagining the world of
Oceania and the mind of Winston Smith. 264
Marcus supports this, but also comments on the positive use to which Orwell
put such personal material, stressing how Orwell "was able to enlist his
deepest conflicts and to at least some degree momentarily transcend them,
as he largely does in Animal Farm and 1984," this involving a "quasi-
conscious creative use of his neurosis." 265
Chief among Orwell's conflicts and neuroses would be the sadism and
masochism already discussed. Sadism, although a common ingredient of
satire, is particularly prominent in Nineteen Eighty-Four and, by some
accounts at least, formed part of Orwell's make-up. 266 Meyer maintains that
"the driving force of politics in Oceania is sadism." 267 Masochism is a
strongly marked characteristic of many of Orwell's characters, but especially
so in the case of Winston Smith and, as with sadism, aspects of masochism
have been found in Orwell himself. 268 Williams believes that "what is being
recorded, in Orwell, is the experience of a victim .... " 269 and in fact Nineteen
Eighty-Four encourages the reader to associate totalitarianism with the
presence of sado-masochism.
The simultaneous presence of these two aspects is predictable:
264 Zwerdling, "Techniques of Didactic Fantasy" 94-95,
265 Steven Marcus, "George Orwell: Biography as Literature," Partisan Review 60:1 (1993):
47,
266 See 238 above,
267 Meyer 126,
268 Rai asserts that "Orwell can only allow his self-undermining 'masochism' free rein under
cover.i.of [his) fiction (44).
269 Williams 292.
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Neither sadism nor masochism exists without the other, at least
unconsciously. The sadist gains vicarious pleasure from hurting
the object and vicarious masochistic pleasure from simultaneously
identifying with the object. ... Both sadism and masochism are blends
of pleasure and pain, of erotic and aggressive drive elements. 270
Neither sadism nor masochism is necessarily to be seen as a sign of grave
mental illness, since these manifestations exist along a broad continuum, In
some cases forming a virtually unnoticeable part of people's personality, In
others having very obvious effects which may turn people into virtual social
outcasts. In Orwell's case, his (imputed) sadism does not seem to have
crippled him and, if Bentley's arguments are accepted, sadism is something
that one would expect to find in the satirist. Certainly, this thesis has
repeatedly stressed the high level of aggression to be found in satire - and, by
extension, the satirist. As for the elements of masochism found in Orwell, they
too seem to have been an important part of the creative process for him - in
tandem with his sadistic aspects, if Rai's theory about Orwell has credence.
Rai's notion is that Orwell's mind was always "splitting reality into 'adversarial'
forms - 'victims' and 'victimisers', bourgeois proletarians and proletarian
bourgeois, St George and the dragons .... " 271
Marcus speaks of Orwell's "neurotic choices and behaviors" In living as a
vagrant and a tramp, inter alia:
He undertook these "adventures" both as a form of self-laceration
and penitence and as a means of appropriating material to write
about. He consorted with the homeless, painfully disabling his
hands by picking hops .... [In Paris he] more or less voluntarily chose
to starve for days at a time, and slaved at the lowest and most self-
punishing labor he could find. [In his last days he chose] isolation
and virtual self-mortification on the primitive island of Jura in the
270 Burness E. Moore and Bernard D. Fine, eds., Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts (New
York: The American Psychoanalytic Association; New Haven: Yale UP, 1990) 171.
271 Rai 73-4.
274
Hebrides. 272
Leys compares Orwell with Simone Weil, believing that "they both burned with
the same passion for justice, they both cultivated poverty and asceticism to a
degree which bordered on self-punishment." 273
Orwell's experiences when relatively young seem to have contributed directly
to this kind of behaviour. One influence was his spell in Burma as a member
of the Imperial Indian Police from which he resigned at the age of twenty-four
after five years of service. A passage about this period in The Road to Wigan
Pier is full of raw feeling:
I was not going back to be a part of that evil despotism. But I
wanted much more than merely to escape from my job. For five
years I had been part of an oppressive system, and it had left
me with a bad conscience. Innumerable remembered faces -
faces of prisoners in the dock, of men waiting in the condemned
cells, of subordinates I had bullied and aged peasants I had
snubbed, of servants and coolies I had hit with my fist in
moments of rage ... haunted me intolerably. I was conscious of an
immense weight of guilt that I had got to expiate. I suppose that
sounds exaggerated .... 1felt that I had got to escape not merely
from imperialism but from every form of man's dominion over man ....
And ... 1had carried my hatred of oppression to extraordinary
lengths .... Every suspicion of self-advancement, even to 'succeed'
in life to the extent of making a few hundreds a year, seemed
to me spiritually ugly, a species of bullying. 274
Ingle believes that this experience gave Orwell a touchstone - "the imperial
metaphor,,275 -which he applied to a wide range of other moral and political
272 Marcus 47.
273 Simon Leys, "Orwell: The Horror of Politics," Quadrant 28.12 (1983): 11.
274 Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier 129-30.
275 Stephen Ingle, "The Anti-Imperialism of George Orwell," Literature and the Political
Imagination, eds. John Horton and Andrea T. Baumeister (London: Routledge, 1996) 224.
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situations. According to this "imperialist model," one was "either exploiter or
exploited and as he said ... the exploited were always right and the exploiters
always wrong." 276The point is not simply that all of Orwell's novels reflect this
experience and these feelings, but that all are concerned, some to a small
degree, many in a concentrated way, with the issues of human dignity and
freedom (or their opposites) in the personal and political sense. As Marcus
indicates,277 Orwell's biography shows that he carried these influences with
him to the grave. He says that the feelings quoted above are "exaggerated,"
but the evidence suggests that they came from very deep within himself, and
his last two novels indicate that these concerns became more intense, rather
than diminishing, as he grew older. Calder says that "Crudely put, Orwell's
message had always been 'keep humanity human,' and he spent his life in
trying to show how Conservative values involved a denial of the right of
fulfilment to a large section of humanity." 278
The other strong emotional influence on Orwell's writing - particularly when it
comes to the issue of sado-masochism - is particularly relevant to Nineteen
Eighty-Four, though it comes from even earlier in his life: his years at a
preparatory school, St. Cyprian's, which he describes in detail in his dystopian
essay "Such, Such Were the Joys." Orwell does caution readers of this essay
against too sympathetic a view of the young protagonist, saying that "No one
can look back on his schooldays and say with truth that they were altogether
unhappy" and "Whoever writes about his childhood must beware of
exaggeration and self-pity." 279 Yet, despite this, Orwell still proceeded to
write a tale which reflects the helplessness of the child in an adult world with
such power and accuracy that it is less an indictment of the school in question
than a voice which speaks for the wounded part of every reader except some
lucky few. The centrality of this essay to the interpretation of Nineteen Eighty-
276 Ingle, "Anti-Imperialism" 228.
277 See 274 above.
278 Calder, "Orwell's Post-War Prophecy" 152.
279 George Orwell, "Such, Such Were the Joys," CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vol.
IV (London Secker and Warburg, 1968) 344, 347.
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than I had imagined." 282 In terms of the reaction of his psyche, infinite
wickedness would have been seen as worthy of infinite punishment. In fact,
later in the essay, speaking more generally about his boyhood, he indicates
that he felt profoundly "that I was no good, that I was wasting my time,
wrecking my talents ... and all this, it seemed, was inescapable, because I
lived among laws which were ... not possible for me to keep." 283 The fantasy
and nightmare aspects of Nineteen Eighty-Four are clearly prefigured here:
the normal laws of cause and effect do not apply because one inhabits a
world which has no predictable framework or boundaries within which one can
safely operate.
An important restatement of these ideas in "Such, Such Were the Joys"
occurs when Orwell links them to his childhood notions of religion:
The Prayer Book told you, for example, to love God and fear
him: but how could you love someone whom you feared? ...
It was equally clear that one ought to love one's father, but I
knew very well that I merely disliked my own father, whom I had
barely seen before I was eight and who appeared to me as a
gruff-voiced elderly man forever saying "Don't." It was not
that one did not want to possess the right qualities or feel the
correct emotions, but that one could not. The good and the
possible never seemed to coincide. 284
These are the thoughts of a young person who has not yet learned to value or
really understand the depth and complexity of interaction that occurs between
people. His problem at this point - which is precisely that of Outer Party
members in his novel - is not how to relate to others, but how to gain a sense
of being right with his world by feeling and doing the correct thing so that he
will be accepted and not punished. There is a deep sense of pathos here
since he finds himself rudderless, in this case apparently because he lacked
282 Orwell, "Such" 334.
283 Orwell, "Such" 343-44.
284 Orwell, "Such" 360.
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the love and guidance of an involved and concerned father. Orwell's
childhood experience of father-figures, whether his actual father or the
fatherly God of Judaeo-Christian belief, can be directly linked to the way he
presents that prostitutor of fatherly qualities, Big Brother.
Towards the end of "Such, Such Were the Joys," Orwell homes in on his main
point:
The weakness of the child is that it starts with a blank sheet. It
neither understands nor questions the society in which it lives,
and because of its credulity other people can work upon it,
infecting it with the sense of inferiority and the dread of offending
against mysterious, terrible laws. 285
There is, perhaps, a parallel with the case of Franz Kafka here, of whom it
has been said, "To the end of his life, Kafka persisted in denouncing school
as a 'conspiracy of the grown-ups', the lapidary half-truth still charged with the
despair of the six-year-old." 286
Other accounts of Orwell's childhood, by his sister and by a friend of his,
seem to cast doubt on the reliability of "Such, Such Were the Joys." Orwell's
sister, Avril Dunn, has the following to say about this period of Orwell's life:
It has been said that Eric had an unhappy childhood. I don't
think this was in the least true, although he did give out that
impression himself when he was grown-up .... Every summer
we used to go down to Cornwall. My mother and father used
to take a house or furnished rooms perhaps, and really we used
to have a lovely time down there - bathing .... He [Orwell] always
285 Orwell, "Such" 368.
286 Ernst Pawel, The Nightmare of Reason: A Life of Franz Kafka (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1984) 26.
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seemed perfectly happy. 287
Jacintha Buddicom, a close friend of Orwell's in his youth, "wrote a book
about their childhood in which she claimed that 'he was a specially happy
child'. She cast shrewd doubts on the literal accuracy of the great polemic
against prep schools." 288 Finally, it should be mentioned that Orwell's account
of life at St. Cyprian's has also been challenged by one or two of the pupils
who were there with him 289 - and an article by Pearce systematically and
comprehensively undermines the literal credibility of "Such, Such Were the
Joys." 290
However Michael Shelden, Orwell's authorised biographer, gives a different
perspective on the matter:
Old men can claim that their memories of St. Cyprian's are warm
and golden, but Orwell is not writing a version to satisfy them. His
account of his childhood terrors is so compelling not because every
word of it is literally true, but because - from beginning to end - it
strives to be true to the one thing which matters most to its author:
the impressions and feelings of his boyhood, a time when he lacked
the articulate voice to speak up for himself. Throughout his work,
Orwell uses his power over words to provide an eloquent voice for
others whose voices have been silenced or ignored - political
prisoners in Spain, tramps in London, miners in Wigan. In 'Such,
Such Were the Joys' he is an impassioned advocate for himself,
291for the boy he once was.
287 Avril Dunn, "My Brother, George Orwell," Orwell Remembered, eds. Audrey Coppard and
Bernard Crick (London: Ariel, 1984) 27.
288 Crick, George Orwell 80.
289 See, for example, Henry Longhurst, "A Sportsman Defends the Old Prep School," Orwell
Remembered, eds. Audrey Coppard and Bernard Crick (London: Ariel, 1984) 35
290 Robert Pearce, "Truth and Falsehood: George Orwell's Prep School Woes," Review of
English Studies 43:171 (1992): 367-86.
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The point is that Orwell never was - and never claimed to be - a merely
objective recorder of what he saw around him. He was a man who felt
passionately, who wanted to make a difference to the world by what he wrote,
and who shaped and pointed his thoughts and experience to that end. He
was also a polemicist (of the best kind), as well as a satirist. He was keenly
aware of how his own experience was also that of many others and he was
outraged that any child should be subjected to such treatment, as he was
outraged to think that any people should be subjected to authoritarian or
totalitarian government, or that any group should be repressed by the Catholic
Church. His early experiences determined the kind of issues that aroused his
passion, and by exaggerating and distorting both the events concerned and
his feelings about them into a new kind of emotional reality,292 he produced a
satirical novel of the power of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Shelden concludes:
Endless theories have been put forward to explain [Nineteen
Eighty-Four's] vision of the future, but not many critics have
been willing to see how firmly rooted it is in Orwell's past.
Almost every aspect of Orwell's life is in some way represented
in the book. 293
Jasbir Jain believes that "The significance of 'Such, Such Were the Joys'
does not lie in its autobiographical element; it lies in the expression of Orwell's
opinions about the relationship of the individual to the outer reality." 294 This
essay is, among other things, a piece of satire in which Orwell is inviting his
readers into an alternative world where children are powerless. Satirists do
not simply attempt to reflect reality in a precise way, but rather react to
specific events or ideas, distorting them in order to highlight aspects of them.
The source and nature of such distortion are worth examining, since satirists
are among the least disinterested of artists. Satirists have axes to grind - and
also to swing. It is thus of interest to the recipients of satire, who are usually
292 See 233-4 above for a discussion of Francis Bacon and "distorting into reality".
293 Shelden 470-1.
294 Jasbir Jain, "Orwell: From Clerisy to Intelligentsia," George Orwell, eds. Courtney T.
Wemyss and Alexej Ugrinsky (New York: Greenwood P, 1987) 44.
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its direct or indirect victims, to know something about the size, the origins and
the relative keenness of the satirical axe. It is also important to know
something about the nature and the fulcrum of the swing, which can come at
the audience impelled by a large measure of controlled intellectual contempt
or be launched at the reader straight from the depths of the satirist's
subconscious mind, weighted with deadly quantities of long-simmering pain
and outrage. It is in this context that this thesis views "Such, Such were the
Joys" as a serious piece of evidence about Orwell's feelings and his
motivations for writing, even though it may not be a faithful historical account
of what happened. Orwell himself makes the same point about writing in
general:
I give all this background information because I do not
think one can assess a writer's motives without knowing
something of his early development. [B]efore he ever begins
to write he will have acquired an emotional attitude from
which he will never completely escape ... but if he escapes
from his earlier influences altogether, he will have killed his
impulse to write. 295
The fact that he forwarded "Such, Such Were the Joys" to his publisher in
194 7 (even though he worked on it earlier) 296 suggests that Orwell was
thinking about this essay during the writing of Nineteen Eighty-Four, which
occurred between 1946 and 1948. 297 The influence of current events on
Nineteen Eighty-Four is stressed by Zwerdling, who points out that the novel
was taking shape in Orwell's mind at just about the time when the first
detailed reports about the Nazi concentration camps were being published in
Britain.298 At the core of this chapter lies Orwell's view of totalitarian
government as a system which, by means of persecution and victimisation,
295 Orwell, "Why I Write" 3.
296 George Orwell, letter to F.J. Warburg, 31 May 1947, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian
Angus, vol. IV (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968) 330.
297 Hammond 68.
298 Alex Zwerdling, "Orwell's Psychopolitics," The Future of Nineteen Eightv-Four, ed.Ejner J.
Jensen (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1984) 91-2.
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induces a state of regression in those under its sway (in the same way as
regression is shown to be induced and perpetuated in "Such, Such Were the
joys"). People are forced, in subtle and unsubtle ways, to surrender their
deepest selves to the state and are prevented, in both the public and private
spheres, from realising their potential as human beings: they are not allowed
to grow up and relate to the world in a healthy way.
The traditional psychological view of the father is, inter alia, that he functions
as a bridge between the developing child and the outside world: he is the
parent who is primarily responsible for the child's healthy integration into the
wider community. Big Brother does come across as fatherly, but as a false
father - one who is presented as caring and gentle yet in fact stands for a
system of bewilderingly vague and capricious rules, accompanied by
wholesale bullying and violence, both physical and emotional, which are the
binary opposite of the nurturing function and the just use of power typical of
true fatherhood. In Oceania this betrayal of fatherliness, referred to in this
thesis as punitive fatherhood, functions not only on a public level but also in
the private sphere, where it invades and disrupts relationships within families,
as well as between co-workers, friends and lovers. This, for Orwell, is the link
between the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four and such seemingly disparate
areas as Nazism, St. Cyprian's school, Catholicism and Stalinist Communism.
In all of these Orwell saw the dystopian exercise of punitive fatherhood: a thin
veneer of beneficence offering freedom behind which lurks the killing power of
ideology, deliberately blocking off the paths to a multifaceted view of reality
and denying access to authentic experience and growth.
The disjunction between utopia and dystopia, though often covert, is ever-
present in satire and this contributes to the dynamic tension within which
satire operates. One of the fascinations that satirists exercise for people is
that they are the carriers of the myth of utopia, as well as its living refutation:
they are the bearers of the deepest hopes and disappointments of society.
They tease out the implications of utopian myth and show its bearing on the
society of the time, using dystopian methods to demonstrate how far short it
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falls of the ideal. They help society to take its failure seriously, but they often
introduce a light-hearted note to offset such failure - even if the humour is
decidedly black, as in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
Another dualistic quality revealed in satire is its combination of radicalism and
conservatism: the mythical aspect of satire may suggest a conservatism, as
may the utopian view it takes, if these involve looking back on the past as a
lost source of perfection. However, myth which looks forwards to the future or
dystopian satire which has lost its faith in the future is often radical in nature.
This thesis has stressed that while satire is very much part of society, there
are many ways in which it operates on the fringes of society - its allegiances
dubious, its commitment ambiguous, its stance hovering between playfulness,
seriousness and anarchy. The thesis concludes that satire and
postmodernism share some common ground, while acknowledging that they
also have distinct differences. The unfixed aspect of satire constitutes a kind
of "deferral" which is related to, though not identical with, the Derridean sense
of the word - an avoidance of absolutes and closure that is a key factor linking
satire and postmodernism, and contributing to the penetrating and restless
quality of both these discourses.
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Conclusion
This thesis began by examining the relationship between the satirist and
society, showing the satirist as occupying an equivocal position in society,
with the citizenry treading a fine line between interest or amusement on the
one hand, and fear of the satirist on the other. The state is often equally
ambivalent towards satire, frequently walking an uneasy path between
grudging acceptance and harsh suppression of satire. It has also been
argued that satirists at work are complex and equivocal, but unique: satire
makes use of irony, parody, the grotesque, allegory and other forms of
distortion - all indirect and oblique discourses which allow the satirist to retain
an uncommitted stance. Yet, it seems, this lack of commitment may hide a
deeper, if unconventional, commitment in the satirist. Orwell was certainly
committed to an ideology (though not a party) he called "democratic
socialism" and, on a personal level, Crick sees him as highly committed:
Blair came to adopt the Orwell part of himself as an ideal
image to be lived up to: an image of integrity, honesty,
simplicity, egalitarian conviction, plain living, plain writing and
plain speaking, in all a man with an almost reckless commitment
to speaking out unwelcome truths. 1
In the case of Orwell, the habitual complexity of satirists overlay both his
ideals and his very name. Crick's comments above sum up Orwell's life,
describing in a nutshell the man who began as the rather ordinary middle-
class Eric Blair, but who gradually gained the stature of his alter ego, George
Orwell ("The Orwell was a river he knew and liked, the whole name had a
manly, English, indeed country-sounding, ring to it. ... ,,).2 Orwell's life was
essentially about process, not stasis, involving the creative but unpredictable
state of liminality which this thesis sees as part of the mechanics of satire. It is
significant that liminality is evident in the fabric of Orwell's life as well as in his
art.
1 Crick, George Orwell 28.
2 Crick, George Orwell 234.
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The thesis has looked at how satire uses liminality to sever its audiences from
their connection with the linguistic worlds they unthinkingly occupy. More
specifically, satire uses the oblique discourses mentioned above to create
alternative worlds which, by means of various strategies, it invites its audience
to inhabit for a while, with the aim of creating movement and play in the way
its audience views its own worlds.
The thesis has drawn on Bakhtin's notion of dialogism, which views the
textual juxtaposition of several "voices" (heteroglossia) as a subversive force.
For Bakhtin satire is a discourse which is particularly effective in creating
dialogism - and his views on the strategies of satire are similar to those of this
thesis. Both value satire for the same reason: it attacks the fixed patterns of
language and thought which are responsible for inflexible ways of seeing the
world. The thesis has introduced a further note of subversion in the form of
postmodernism, with its playfulness and its disrespect for master narratives
and its tendency, too, to foster dialogism by accepting multiple views of the
world.
The thesis has provided a backdrop against which various discourses
operate, both independently and in relation to other discourses. Satire,
dialogism and postmodernism have been used to open up faultlines, and to
explore and challenge various perceptions and discourses, within the polis.
Postmodernism has been used to suggest new views on satire, by reframing
and redefining it as a complex dynamic, rather than a closed and predictable
system, creating a process of dialogism between satire and the society within
which it operates. Dialogic relationships have been also created between
satire and certain other discourses operating within society, which have
revealed both the strengths and the weaknesses of satire. On the one hand,
there is the value of an independent voice, with no formal political power, the
importance of the satirist's prophetic role and the healthiness of a discourse
which relentlessly exposes the hypocrisy and corruption of society. On the
other hand, satire has been seen to have a tendency to didacticism and lack
of fairness, while there is a large element of subjectivity in the satirist's choice
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of target and mode of attack. However, this dialogic process has opened up
more serious flaws in some of the socio-political discourses which co-exist
with satire in many societies, showing them to be more far-reaching, more
powerful and less gentle, despite the ferocious rhetoric of satire. Above all,
these discourses have been shown as more covert than satire, and liable to
embed people in rigid alternative worlds from which they cannot easily
escape. In the course of further dialogic process, the disapprobatory view of
these discourses has been engaged with more positive views of them, often
by invoking postmodernism - and it is this kind of dialogism which has drawn
the thesis closer to an examination of the specific faultlines in Orwell's
satirical writing.
Other issues pertaining specifically to Orwell have arisen when the thesis has
initiated dialogic processes which highlight his conservative modernist
ideology in contrast to the postmodern stance, raised issues of power and
sado-masochism, and shown the disjunction between Orwell's ideology and
his more radical satiric praxis. The thesis has wrestled with the notions of
fixedness and epistemology, as expressed by Orwell politically and as a
satirist, exploring Orwell's modernist approach to issues such as language,
ideology, propaganda and myth. It has used dialogism and postmodernism to
challenge Orwell's views, suggesting that he is sometimes as guilty as his
satiric targets in Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four of authoritarianism,
closed thinking, prescription, one-sided views of the world, unimaginativeness
and intolerance. Satire in general has been shown to fall short of
postmodernism as a way of exploring new worlds in an open way, and the
limitations of Orwell may well be typical of those of the satirist in general.
These limitations have a great deal to do with the conservatism and didactic
bias which are an inherent part of satire, emerging to different degrees in the
work of different satirists, and accompanying its radical thrust. These
contrasting but limited qualities may help to give satire its particular focused
quality, but also lead to a sacrifice of breadth and inclusiveness. In the case
of Orwell, he focuses particularly narrowly on his own experience, both
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political and personal - and the times he lived in also weigh heavily in the
message of his two last novels.
More specifically, in Animal Farm the necessarily narrow focus of satire is
compounded by Orwell's single-minded view of historical events, while the
alarmist notions about discourses such as propaganda and ideology found in
Nineteen Eighty-Four serve, to some degree, to limit the novel's viewpoint to
a particular historical time. This has served to highlight the relationship
between society and satire, as well as the other social discourses examined
in the thesis. Orwell challenged 'many of the trends of his time, but he also
confirmed some of its most deep-seated ideologies and myths. He stood for a
liberal humanism which had its roots so entangled in the past that it had
become defensive and lost some of its energy. The postmodern (specifically
deconstructive) focus in this thesis has revealed how in Nineteen Eighty-Four
he could parody a prescriptive system of language, while still displaying in his
essays on language a linguistic and philosophical conservatism which is akin
to that of prescriptiveness - and yet not be conscious of the disjunction.
It is this specific disjunction - between Orwell's modernist stance and that of
postmodernism - which has been exploited by this thesis. The dialogic
process between these two modes has suggested that Orwell's modernist
cast of mind makes him less flexible towards alternative discourses. His
espousal of socialism is a related factor which increases this disjunction,
since socialism embodies a utopian dream, and postmodernism is suspicious
of utopian thinking, unless the issue concerns heterotopias' This has also
created dialogism between postmodernism and discourses such as ideology,
propaganda and myth, since all of these contain a utopian element, implying
that they will open the way to a better world, or even a perfect one. Satirical,
overtly political texts like Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four find such
3 This term is taken from the introduction by Tobin Seebers, ed., Heterotopia: Postmodern
Utopia and the Body Politic ( Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994) 20.
288
offers of utopia highly suspect, and portray them as dystopic instead yet,
paradoxically, satire is itself not devoid of utopian thinking. As Steinhoff
comments, "Orwell had a lifelong interest in this genre [of utopian literature]
and its typical themes; he was absorbed by the relation of rulers to ruled, the
satirical portrayal of utopias ... and what the future was going to be like." 4 Yet
Orwell's sensibility was as much rooted in the past: Wolf sees Orwell's writing
as a contrast between "the humanism of character" and "pastoral
associations" of "the pre-1914 period" on the one hand, and "the technologies
and technological fantasies of totalitarianisms in the modern period" on the
other."
It is through his satire that Orwell is most heavily engaged in the dialogics that
occur between utopianism and dystopianism, the latter being a soured
version of the former. This thesis has maintained that satirists are covert
idealists or utopians: they patently want conditions in society to improve, yet
what drives them is clearly stronger than a mere wish for improvement. But
they are utopians who, because of their aggressively demythologising
enterprises, are acutely aware of the unattainability of the paradise or other
mythological utopian past which we have all lost, whether it is felt through the
collective unconscious of a society or the personal nostalgia for a childhood
which now seems paradisaic. Rabkin refers to utopian writing as "a
consolation for today cast in the forms of tomorrow but borrowed for us from
our own personal past." 6 Dystopian writing - the shadow side of utopian
writing - offers the opposite of comfort, but Rabkin's remarks about the future
and "our own personal past" remain highly pertinent.
In the case of the dystopian writing of Orwell, it has been suggested that the
promise of modernism, in terms of culture, politics and technology, failed him
- it disappointed his utopian longings and, for Rezler, utopianism is
4 William Steinhoff, "Utopia Reconsidered: Comments on 1984," No Place Else. Explorations
in Utopian and Dystopian Fiction, eds. Eric S. Rabkin, Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D.
Olander (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983) 152.
5 Wolf 26-7.
6 Eric S Rabkin, "Atavism and Utopia," No Place Else: Explorations in Utopian and Dystopian
Fiction, eds. Eric S Rabkin, Martin H. Greenberg and Joseph D. Olander (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois UP, 1983) 10.
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"essentially reactionary,"? despite its traditional association with ideas of
progress. The focus of Orwell's satire is against what modernism has
become, rather than what it should be - a view which reinforces the point
made elsewhere that elements of Orwell's ideology are very conservative, and
have a certain nostalgia for things as they were, or as they might have been:
Orwell was very attached to the past, both to the Edwardian
years of his childhood, and to the longer past preserved in
history and literature. In Nineteen Eighty-Four he makes a
horrified but fascinated exploration of the possibility that the
past could be abolished by the power of the state. 8
In this particular sense, Orwell was not at one with the tenor of his times - an
ironic aspect in one who so strongly proclaimed his belief in the value and
power of lived experience and everyday reality. But, whether by his
disappointed utopianism, his refusal to accept the stock brand of English
socialism and his necessarily marginalised position as a satirist, or by virtue of
his lack of close personal relationships, his self-imposed geographical and
social exile, first in London and Paris and, finally, on the lonely island of Jura,
Orwell lived the life of an expatriate, even when he was geographically in
Britain. Expatriates, whether they be exiles in a geographical sense or of the
mind, often cherish an idealised notion of the mental or physical homeland
they have left behind. The conservatism of exiles in this respect seems to
arise primarily from the nostalgically utopian view they have of the longed-for
place, with the implicit sense that it will not - or should not - change, and will
thus provide a kind of mental stability. Utopia is essentially a condition of
stasis: once the perfect place exists, no changes can be permitted, since one
cannot improve on perfection:
7 Andre Rezler, "Man as Nostalgia: The Image of the Last Man in Twentieth-Century
Postutopian Fiction," Visions of Apocalypse: End or Rebirlh?, eds. Saul Friedlander, Gerald
Holton, Leo Marx and Eugene Skolnikoff (New York: Holmes and Neier, 1985) 197.
8 Bernard Bergonzi, "Nineteen Eighty-Four and the Literary Imagination," Between Dream and
Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia, eds. D. Baker-Smith and C.C. Barfoot (Amsterdam
Rodopi, 1987) 221.
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The attempt of utopian writers to freeze history - the fight
of utopia against history - has prompted severe criticism of
the whole enterprise; but the attempt has been merely one
way in which man has tried to arrive imaginatively at the
condition of paradise on earth. 9
However, there is an alternative to such stasis in the depiction of utopia,
though it is not always open to the modernist writer. This involves the
displacement of the sign "utopia," with its fixed binarism of familiar world /
utopia, and its replacement with the postmodern conception of heterotopias: a
series of alternative worlds which offers different views of utopia, rather than a
single utopia which becomes a (limiting) master narrative. In this respect,
Roland Barthes has more affinity with satire than conventional utopianism
when he advocates "speaking ... out of context. .. by describing utopias of
language - places where neither speaker's intention nor society's ideology
holds sway." 10 Moylan takes this even further with his discussion of "critical
utopias," which are seditious and self-aware rather than prescriptive, as well
as encouraging exploration rather than the adoption of a fixed position:
To be part of the emancipatory project, therefore, [critical] utopian
writing breaks with the limits of the traditional genre and becomes
a self-critical and disturbingly open form that articulates the deep
tensions within the political unconscious at the present moment.
The imposed totality of the single utopian text gives way to the
contradictory and diverse multiplicity of a broad utopian dialogue. 11
At this point satire and utopia part company: this sophisticated and liberatory
mode of utopian writing makes demands which satire, even with its liking for
9 Robert C. Elliott, The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre (Chicago: Chicago UP,
1970) 10.
10 Mary Bittner Wiseman, "Rewriting the Self: Barthes and the Utopias of Language,"
Literature and the Question of Philosophy, ed. Anthony J. Cascardi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
UP, 1987) 312.
11 Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination (New
York: Methuen, 1986) 210.
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liminality, cannot meet. Satire, for all its advantages and usefulness to
society, is ultimately more conservative and narrow in its aims and, certainly,
critical utopianism is very far from both ordinary utopianism and dystopias
such as Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four.
These two novels have demonstrated clearly how dystopia, the parodic
version of utopia, nevertheless offers the same quality of stasis: though the
motivation is the opposite of idealism, as the dystopian world is constructed
by the writer in disillusion and outrage, dystopia strives for the same degree
of perfect unchangeability as in the case of a utopian world. Ironically, though,
in the stifling world of the dystopian novel (particularly in Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four) it is ordinary life which becomes the protagonists'
longed-for utopian vision." Certainly, Nineteen-Eighty Four offers Winston a
depressing future, while the past, which was for Orwell the present, is treated
with wistful yearning: the meagre advantages of post-war Britain, such as the
availability of a certain number of books, as well as objects with only aesthetic
value, in addition to many individual freedoms, including those of thought and
speech, are for Winston things for which he can only long. 13 It is common
cause that Orwell stood for these latter freedoms, yet in this novel he, an
avowed socialist, seems to represent such freedoms as a function of the
capitalist society in which he lived. However, Orwell was not oblivious to such
contradictions, as this piece he wrote in 1944 shows:
Indeed, if one thinks of the artist as an ... autonomous individual
who owes nothing to society, then the golden age of the artist
was the age of capitalism. He had then escaped from the patron
and not yet been captured by the bureaucrat. ... Yet it remains
true that capitalism, which in many ways was kind to the artist and
the intellectual generally, is doomed and is not worth saving
anyway. So you arrive at these two antithetical facts: (1) Society
12 Elaine Hoffman Baruch, " 'The Golden Country': Sex and Love in 1984," 1984 Revisited:
Totalitarianism in our Century, ed. Irving Howe (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 48.
13 Arthur Eckstein, in "1984 and George Orwell's Other View of Capitalism," Modern Age 29.1
(1985), makes this point very fully (11-12).
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cannot be arranged for the benefit of artists; (2) without artists
civilization perishes. I have never yet seen this dilemma solved
(there must be a solution), and it is not often that it is honestly
discussed. 14
At the very least, one can say that Orwell was torn between his nostalgic
longings and artistic values on the one hand, and his socialist ideals on the
other 15 - in effect, two conflicting utopian notions, one based in the past and
the other in the future. Yet the view of this thesis has been that in satire, ,
conflicting views are neither undesirable nor confusing, since they may impel
an audience into the desirable state of liminality. Cope, arguing in a different
context, provides a formulation which sums up the point here: "Satire never
sparks a simple argument between defective experience and unreachable
ideals, but sews them together on an infinitesimal seam, where they may
touch but never intersect." 16 This reflects the open-ended nature of satire, as
well as its combination of seriousness and playfulness: the fallen state of
humankind is pointed out and the utopian ideal implicitly invoked, but the two
are not inextricably yoked together, and the game of the satirist is to evoke a
liminal state within which the language world of the audience may become
more fluid.
Side-by side with personal and public utopias and dystopias, issues of control
are crucial to both Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four. One of the chief
concerns of this thesis has been power and its many failures: Animal Farm
and Nineteen Eighty-Four show how power can dehumanise both the
wielders and the victims of power. Power has been shown to be very
ambivalent: there is always the risk that power will damage the ability of
governing structures to stay flexible and responsive - and yet, at the same
time, power is hugely attractive to most people. Foucault demonstrates the
insidious seductiveness of power, and Orwell himself seems to have fought a
14 George Orwell, "As I Please," 8 September 1944, CEJL, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus,
vol. III (London Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 229-30
15 8ergonzi (221) makes a similar point.
16 Cope 178.
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battle against this aspect of power - hence his abrupt rejection of his career in
the Burmese police and his adventures as a tramp, both arguably an attempt
to flee from what he found attractive, but also hated. The occasional sadistic
incidents, related by his friends, may suggest that the dark side of his nature
could arise unbidden. Orwell's description of the torture scenes in Nineteen
Eighty-Four suggests that the line between enjoying and being repelled by the
exercise of power is a very thin one: certainly O'Brien enjoys it, but the
question arises as to whether both Orwell and Winston have mixed feelings
about it. The quality of Orwell's fury with institutions such as the Catholic
Church and St Cyprian's is so energetically overstated that it strongly
suggests a subconscious need to keep his own unacknowledged feelings
about power at bay.
It is interesting, therefore, that satire is the discourse he used for his most
effective fictional writing, since satire has a violent streak, though, as noted
earlier, it has no political teeth. Yet satire is also more open and flexible than
most other discourses, as it attempts to "make strange" existing views of the
world and encourage new ways of understanding it. It is a discourse which
instinctively mistrusts power and attempts to distance itself from it, often by
means of playfulness. Orwell's great seriousness of temperament and sense
of social responsibility ensured that he would not become a satirist whose
work exploded with jokes and puns. Nevertheless, in a more important sense,
he was faithful to the tradition of satire, having the courage to remain a
maverick despite his conservative political views, not committing himself
entirely to anyone party or philosophy, but instead, in Animal Farm and
Nineteen Eighty-Four in particular, devoting himself to creating satirical texts
which encourage people to re-examine the bases of their own thinking and
question the actions of their institutions. This is the demystifying role of satire,
exercised by one who steadfastly remained on the fringes of society, inviting
his readers to participate in liminal and dialogic processes, writing as he said
294
one should, lias an individual, an outsider, at the most an unwelcome
guerrilla."17
17 George Orwell, "Writers and Leviathan," CEJL. eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, vel IV
(London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968) 413.
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